

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(66)6

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 16e., on
Wednesday, 9th February, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

<u>BELGIUM</u>	<u>GREECE</u>	<u>NORWAY</u>
Mr. A. de Staercke	Mr. Christian X. Palamas	Mr. G. Kristiansen
<u>CANADA</u>	<u>ICELAND</u>	<u>PORTUGAL</u>
Mr. P.A. Bissonnette	Mr. T.A. Tómasson	Mr. V. da Cunha
<u>DENMARK</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>TURKEY</u>
Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	Mr. A. Alessandrini	Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u>	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>
Mr. P. de Leusse	Mr. P. Reuter	Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>
Mr. W.G. Grewe	Dr. H.N. Boon	Mr. Harlan Cleveland

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General : Mr. J.A. Roberts
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant
Secretary General for Economics
and Finance : Mr. F.D. Gregg
Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs : Mr. R.W.J. Hooper
Assistant Secretary General for
Production, Logistics and
Infrastructure : Mr. J. Beith
Acting Executive Secretary : Mr. F.C. Menne

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative : Maj.Gen. W.W. Stromberg
Controller for Infrastructure : Mr. M. Chase (for Item V)

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I. STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS

(Discussed in private session).

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II. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY SOVIET ZONE RESIDENTS

Document: C-M(66)12

1. The CHAIRMAN said he thought there was very little he needed to say about the report by the Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers or, indeed, the attachment, which was a revised version of the report on TTD policy which had served as a basis of the Committee's review of the TTD system.

2. Members of the Council would have noted that there appeared to be general satisfaction with the way in which the modifications in travel restrictions on residents of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany agreed to in 1965, had, in practice, worked out.

3. He asked whether the Council was prepared to take the action requested in the final paragraph of the report.

4. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept the report. The new flexible arrangements proposed for pensioners, which would allow them to travel without by-passing the TTD system, represented a considerable relaxation; his Authorities accepted them on the understanding that these arrangements would be observed by all NATO countries.

5. The CHAIRMAN noted that no objection had been raised to this understanding in the Committee of Political Advisers.

6. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the report by the Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers (C-M(66)12);
- (2) invited the three Powers responsible for the operation of the Allied Travel Office to give effect to the proposals set out in Section C, paragraph 3, and Section D, paragraph 5, of the report;
- (3) noted that the TTD system would be kept under constant review in the Committee of Political Advisers;
- (4) noted the statements by the United Kingdom Representative and the Chairman.

III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1964 AND 1965

Document: C-M(66)7

7. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee of Economic Advisers had, in the past, occasionally submitted to the Council for its information reports on economic developments in Communist China. The present report C-M(66)7 covered the period 1964 to 1965. It was different from the previous reports since it had been prepared on the basis of a special meeting held by the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy with the assistance of experts from various capitals.

8. From this short report it appeared that, both in 1964 and 1965, continuing progress had been achieved in Communist China towards economic recovery after the 1960 collapse; yet the gap in terms of economic development between that country and the advanced industrialised countries had widened still further. Intensive efforts undertaken in the atomic field by such an economically backward country had undoubtedly held back expansion in other sectors. Trade relations between Communist China and the USSR had by now been reduced to a minimum. In contrast, Japan and the Western industrialised countries had increased the volume of their trade, although in absolute terms such trade represented a negligible share in the total trade of the more advanced countries. (For instance Japan, which was in 1964 the leading free world trade partner of Communist China, conducted little more than two per cent of its trade with its neighbour.)

9. He invited comments on the report.

10. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities found this note valuable and thought that the procedure followed by the Committee, of recruiting economic experts from capitals for a special meeting of the Sub-Committee, was a useful one. For over fifteen years, there had been much romantic discussion of Chinese Communism. He thought that the report put into perspective the size and irregularly-developed quality of the Chinese economy. While the available data were most unreliable, and estimates of population might contain an error of 100 million, it was probable that China produced less than half the electric power of, say, Italy, and only 80% of combined Belgian and Luxembourg steel output. Accordingly, the use of the word "huge" to describe the Chinese market would be more correctly applied at present to the Belgian and Luxembourg market. The main question was to what extent the assessment outlined in the note could be used for a realistic discussion of the situation in China today.

11. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, pointing out that this was a vast subject to be covered in a one-page note, thought that this was inevitably a conjectural study from which it was difficult to draw conclusions. He doubted whether it was possible to obtain precise data; in particular, he asked whether the population estimate of 735 million was any more than a compromise between two extreme estimates of possible maximum and minimum figures. The reality of the statistics available must be taken into account in any study of China's potential.

12. The CHAIRMAN, commenting on the length of the note, pointed out that it was a summary of the report by the Sub-Committee contained in AC/127-D/208.

13. Mr. GREGH, speaking as Chairman of the Committee of Economic Advisers, said that the experts could not be certain of their figures since China herself did not have the necessary data, particularly in the demographic field. The estimates made by the experts were necessarily tentative.

14. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE suggested, with reference to paragraph 6 of C-M(66)7, that the Committee of Economic Advisers should examine even more closely the interdependence existing between the Chinese efforts in the nuclear field and the development of China's other essential industries, such as steel production, energy production, and the chemical industries, especially the production of fertilizer. He asked whether information might be made available in time for the next meeting of the NATO experts on the Far East.

15. The CHAIRMAN said that this might be difficult, but that he would request the Committee of Economic Advisers to try to provide such information for the experts.

16. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE asked whether information was available on the balance of payments situation of China, including gold and foreign exchange reserves. It was stated in paragraph 5 of the note that China had continued to purchase large quantities of grain from the free world and had paid off the debt to the USSR ahead of schedule. He pointed out that the balance of payments aspect had political consequences.

17. Mr. GREGH said that the balance of payments question was very important from the political point of view, but that it was difficult to get at the facts. The Committee of Economic Advisers had decided some time ago to try to draw up a picture of the balance of payments situation of the USSR, the Eastern European countries, and Communist China; a group of experts would meet on this question on 10th February.

18. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had studied the note, and the report by the Sub-Committee, with great interest. Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, it was gratifying that the Committee had been able to reach this degree of consensus. He congratulated the International Staff on the high quality of their work in preparing these documents, which should provide a valuable basis for the forthcoming study of China's potential.

19. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities found the report a valuable one and had provided supplementary information which he would forward to the International Staff.

20. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of document C-M(66)7 on Economic Developments in Communist China in 1964 and 1965;
- (2) noted the statements made in discussion.

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IV. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND TRADE POLICY OF ALBANIA

Document: C-M(66)6

21. The CHAIRMAN recalled that on 24th November, 1965, the Council examined a consolidated report reviewing the results of a number of studies undertaken by the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy with a view to pooling, within NATO, information on the current economic situation in Eastern European Communist countries.

22. The present report covered a country which had a special position amongst European Communist countries owing to its size, economic backwardness, and close political and economic links with Communist China. The conclusions of the report made it clear that, while the measures suggested for loosening the economic ties of the other Eastern European countries with the USSR would be irrelevant in the case of Albania, it would, nevertheless, not be against the long-term interest of the West to explore future possibilities of developing their economic relations with this country.

23. He invited comments.

24. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE referred to the last comment voiced by the Chairman and felt that there might be a contradiction between a short-term policy of ignoring Albania and a long-term one of increasingly including it into the policy presently pursued vis-à-vis the other Eastern European countries.

25. He had the impression that the report seemed to have taken in consideration mainly political factors. To his mind, political and economic factors were so closely interrelated in underdeveloped countries that it was impossible to base one's attitude towards these countries on either of these factors separately.

26. The rigid attitude of the Hoxha régime and the close allegiance of Albania to Communist China should not discourage the West from trying to free Albania from the influence of Communism. After all, countries like Rumania and Poland and even Bulgaria had, at the beginning, very strict régimes and were very closely linked to the USSR but, in spite of that, they were moving now gradually towards political and economic liberalism. His Authorities thought that as far as Albania was concerned, it was worth while to follow economic policies similar to the ones decided on for Eastern European countries.

27. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities considered this a very useful report, dealing as it did with a country which, though small, was important because of its history, its support for Marxist dogma, and the fact that it was the only European satellite of Communist China. Since Albania might have a certain rôle to play in the future, it was worth paying attention to developments in that country, particularly in the economic field. It was noteworthy that Albania's orthodox Marxism was illogical for such a poor and small country.

28. Albania had recently normalised relations with Poland and also, it appeared, with the USSR. She might now find it in her interest to open the door to contacts with countries outside the Communist world. In view of this, Italy intended to maintain, and where possible develop, her present modest economic contacts with Albania.

29. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that the report would be of great interest to his Authorities. Greece had a common frontier but no diplomatic relations with Albania, a country which had never had an independent policy but had always been in the orbit of one or other great power.(1) He thought that it would be almost impossible for Albania to become independent, and that of the two evils, Russian or Chinese influence on Albania, it was perhaps the latter which was the lesser evil for the West.

30. The COUNCIL:

- (1) noted the report by the Committee of Economic Advisers (C-EA(66)6);
- (2) noted the statements made in discussion; and agreed with a suggestion by the Chairman to refer them to the Political and Economic Advisers Committees for further study.

(1) Indeed, the question was to know who the real neighbour was.

V. THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME FOR 1965 TO 1969 (SLICES XVI TO XX)

(a) The Continuing Need for Infrastructure

Documents: SGM-31-65
C-M(65)83 and Corrigendum

(b) Definition of Infrastructure

Document: C-M(65)84

(c) Military Implications of the Delays in Financing of NATO Common Infrastructure

Document: SGM-411-65

31. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council now had before it a number of interconnected documents regarding the Infrastructure Programme for 1965 to 1969 (Slices XVI to XX).

32. As the Council was aware, this story had a happy ending, but before coming to that, it was desirable that the Council should be reminded of the earlier chapters of the story. He suggested this course not only for the sake of good order, but also so that it might be clear that the cost-sharing agreement had been reached in full cognizance of the matters brought to the Council's attention in the documents listed in the Council Agenda under Item V(a), (b) and (c).

33. He therefore began with the motion by the Military Committee on the continuing need for Infrastructure (SGM-31-65). The Council at its meeting on 26th May, 1965, had instructed the Infrastructure Committee to examine a number of problems raised by this motion in regard to the future Infrastructure Programme. The Committee's report - C-M(65)83 - which, he understood, was now unanimous, dealt with these points as far as was possible. However, both this report and the Military Committee motion had been overtaken by the recent cost-sharing settlement, and were in themselves designed principally to encourage agreement on a cost-sharing formula. In due course, the Military Authorities and the Infrastructure Committee would bring to the Council for their approval the programme proposed for execution, and would seek any decisions deemed necessary for their achievement. In the elaboration of the programmes, close touch would be kept with the development of the discussions in the Defence Planning Committee and the Defence Planning Working Group.

34. He then invited the attention of the Council to C-M(65)84, a report by the Acting Chairman of the Infrastructure Committee, which was in the nature of a by-product of the Infrastructure Committee's previous report. The new definition of Infrastructure (here he quoted from the report) "is mainly concerned to take account of the changes which have occurred as a result of Council decisions made since C-M(53)63 was approved; it contains no new proposals with regard to the scope of NATO Common Infrastructure".

35. The Council was invited to approve C-M(65)84 in replacement of the old document C-M(53)63.

36. Continuing, he said that the Military Committee/Standing Group's memorandum - SGM-411-65 - pointed out the military implications deriving from delays in the financing of Slice XVI. The Council had, of course, been fully aware of the vital importance from the military, as from, indeed, all points of view, of achieving an early solution to the problem of cost-sharing; and he thought he need only say that the Council was very happy that this matter had now been settled, and express the Council's hope that host countries would begin to implement the Slice XVI projects as quickly as possible.

37. The action now requested of the Council was to note the documents SGM-31-65, C-M(65)83 and SGM-411-65, and to approve document C-M(65)84 in replacement of C-M(53)63.

38. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve C-M(65)84 subject to confirmation. With reference to Annex II to SGM-31-65, he asked whether the estimate for War Headquarters took into account requirements for IBERLANT.

39. The CHAIRMAN confirmed that account had so been taken.

40. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could take the action now requested, with the following comments. He agreed with the Chairman that the documents under (a) had now been somewhat overtaken by the recent cost-sharing settlement, but his Authorities were struck by the priority between Slices XVI and XVII on the one hand, and Slices XVIII to XX on the other. It was recognised that Slices XVIII to XX would reflect the force planning requirements. The estimate for Slices XVI to XVII was approximately £113 million and that for Slices XVIII to XX approximately £115 million, i.e. roughly £38 million for each of the later Slices. He had been instructed to draw the attention of the Council to this and to ask whether the NATO Military Authorities would consider reviewing the first two of the Slices in relation to the last three.

41. He had no comment on the documents under (b) and (c).

42. Mr. CHASE (Controller for Infrastructure) explained that Slice XVII had not yet been screened and that therefore there might be changes in it. Slice XVI had already been approved. However, the Military Authorities conducted a constant review of Slices under way, and could propose changes by way of postponement or deletion of projects, in their annual Infrastructure reports.

43. The CHAIRMAN suggested accordingly that the Military Authorities bear in mind the comment by the Canadian Representative.

44. The COUNCIL:

- (1) noted the documents SGM-31-65, C-M(65)83 and Corrigendum, and SGM-411-65;
- (2) subject to confirmation by the Portuguese Representative, approved C-M(65)84 in replacement of C-M(53)63;
- (3) noted the statement by the Canadian Representative.

(d) Cost-sharing of the Infrastructure Programme and Military Budgets - Reports on the Plenipotentiary Meeting of 20th and 21st January, 1966

Document: C-M(66)10 and Corrigendum

45. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, at its meeting on 14th to 16th December, 1965, the Council of Ministers had agreed to refer the Secretary General's proposals for the cost-sharing of the Infrastructure Programme and Military Budgets (circulated as PO/65/610) to a special high-level meeting empowered to give a final solution to these long-standing questions.

46. This meeting was held on 20th and 21st January, 1966 under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General. All were gratified to learn that, thanks to the spirit of flexibility and goodwill which prevailed at this meeting, as was fitting in the NATO Organization, complete success was reached and a solution acceptable to all delegations was found for the two cost-sharing problems.

47. He wished personally to express his appreciation of the great co-operation shown by all delegations, and his praise for the skill, patience and good humour of the Deputy Secretary General, which had contributed to this success.

48. The summary record of the meeting had been circulated under reference PO/66/44, but the decisions reached had already been published in the Annex to document C-M(66)10 and Corrigendum. These decisions were accompanied by a number of formal statements in which the delegations concerned had expressed their understanding of the agreements reached or their hope that the spirit of goodwill in which they had accepted an increase in their financial burden would be matched by an equal willingness to understand their own position on certain problems they were, or would be, facing mainly in the field of Infrastructure.

49. He now invited the Council to turn its attention to the cover note to C-M(66)10, paragraph 3 of which set out the follow-up action required of the Council, and in particular sub-paragraph (3), which proposed a number of decisions to cover certain ancillary aspects of the Infrastructure and Military Budgets cost-sharing agreements. He asked whether the Council could accept these proposals.

50. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he approved all the documents under Item V of the Agenda. He noted with pleasure paragraph 8(d) of document C-M(66)10 recommending that the Council refer to the appropriate body the problem of operation and maintenance costs of NATO Infrastructure installations on the territories of certain countries of the Alliance. Given the particular nature of the problem, he wished to state that he intended to return to this question in the Council in the near future.

51. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the agreements reached had been correctly recorded in the Annex to C-M(66)10. As regards the statement by the Canadian Representative recorded in paragraph 8(b) he circulated the following amendment, which corresponded more exactly to what had been said, and which he invited the Council to note.

"The Canadian Representative underlined the unique position of Canada in that the whole of its contributions to NATO Common Infrastructure to date constituted a net outflow of foreign currency without any compensating receipts, and the concern of his Government for the impact of this situation on his country's serious balance of payments problem. His Government intended to seek the co-operation of other NATO governments in remedying this situation. He hoped that sympathetic consideration would be given to facilitating Canadian industrial participation in the execution of NATO Infrastructure works, possibly by the adoption, wherever practicable, for future large Infrastructure projects of production-sharing arrangements on the general lines of those adopted, for example, for the NADGE project."

52. Continuing, he said that he had a general observation to make on paragraph 3(3)A. His Authorities doubted whether the action recommended here was complete, since they felt that the cost-sharing agreement was based on lump sum amounts, whereas the consequential action would have to refer to percentages.

53. The CHAIRMAN said that this point would be dealt with in the Payments and Progress and Military Budget Committees.

54. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE further commented that his Authorities could accept the original text of paragraph 3(3)A(ii) but not the Corrigendum now proposed to it, since they considered that it introduced a new element by providing for the insertion of additional projects into old Slices through the use of savings. He could not accept this idea without a full study by the Infrastructure Committee of its implications.

55. The CHAIRMAN accordingly suggested that this subparagraph be referred to the Infrastructure Committee.

56. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that while sub-paragraphs 3(1) and (2) were a summary of what had taken place at the meeting of Plenipotentiaries, sub-paragraphs 3(3)A and B, and paragraph 4 had not been discussed fully, or in some cases at all, by the Plenipotentiaries. They therefore required different Council action from that in connection with sub-paragraphs 3(1) and (2). He could agree to sub-paragraph 3(3)A(i), the provision of a 10% contingency fund. However, the proposal in sub-paragraph 3(3)A(ii), whether in its original form or as contained in the Corrigendum, was a proposal requiring further analysis before any Council decision. He recalled the United States proposal for a "guillotine", which was not reflected here and which had not yet been taken up by the Infrastructure Committee. The Council should be given detailed figures and a statement of the projects deleted or suspended. He therefore agreed with the Canadian Representative that this question could not now be considered by the Council.

57. Sub-paragraph 3(3)A(iii) was a proposal that the Council should package a large variety of documents, many of which it was difficult to identify, and approve them again. He thought that the Infrastructure Committee should indicate to the Council which were the documents concerned, which were obsolete, and what exactly the Council was now asked to agree to. He would be surprised if all the agreements in question were considered as applicable to the next five Slices.

58. Commenting on paragraph 4, he recalled that at the meeting of Plenipotentiaries he had said that if it was proposed to have a single percentage for the three budgets, Civil, Military and Infrastructure, then he was prepared to reach an agreement. However, it had been pointed out that the Civil Budget cost-sharing formula did not come within the competence of the meeting. If it was now suggested that this formula should be aligned on the agreed new formula for Military Budgets, he would be forced to re-open the agreement reached by the Plenipotentiaries. The United States view was that one could as well propose that the Military Budget formula might be aligned on that for the Civil Budget. If the formula for the Civil Budget was to be reviewed, it could not be reviewed in isolation from the other questions involved.

59. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the Plenipotentiaries had agreed that the points made by delegations should be recorded. The proposal in paragraph 4 had been made by the United Kingdom, and should remain on record. He earnestly hoped that the settlement reached by the Plenipotentiaries would not be called in question.

60. After some discussion of this point it was agreed that paragraph 4 should be amended by replacing the phrase "the question as to whether" by "the proposal by one delegation that". This drafting would not in any way prejudge the study proposed.

(At this point the Chair was taken by the Deputy Secretary General).

61. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the document had been issued on 1st February and the Corrigendum received on 7th February, containing two new drafts. He asked for an explanation of the reasons behind these changes. He also asked the Canadian Representative to explain the reasons for the revised text he had presented to the Council.

62. The CHAIRMAN said that the object of the Corrigendum was to take account of comments by delegations on C-M(66)10. The Corrigendum had been agreed with the delegations interested. He thought that the Canadian revised text was nearer to what had actually been said.

63. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that this text was considered a more appropriate one for the record.

64. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Canadian revised text was not necessarily nearer the truth. Commenting on the words "unique position", he thought that any country might argue that its position was unique. The reference to "without any compensating receipts" was neither a record of what had been said nor a statement of the factual position, since Canada had benefited from Infrastructure sub-contracts. Further, he felt that NADGE-type arrangements interfered with the principle of international competitive bidding and moreover might adversely affect speedy implementation of urgent projects. He hoped therefore that it was not the intention to apply these arrangements as a general line for the future; they should rather remain an exception than be used, in the words of the Canadian statement, "wherever practicable".

65. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that in the first place, the text should be taken as a statement of national position and not as one which had been approved by the meeting. Canada had been trying for the last two years to show that she was in a "unique position". He suggested that the reference to "compensating receipts" might be amended to read "compensating inflow". The words "wherever practicable" were contained in the original draft of C-M(66)10 and reflected what had actually been said (paragraph 44 of PO/66/44).

66. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE welcomed the proposed amendment ("compensating inflow").

67. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the agreements reached between governments on 21st January, 1966 regarding the cost-sharing of Infrastructure Slices XVI to XX and of the Military Budgets for the years 1965 onwards, as laid down in paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the report at Annex to C-M(66)10 and Corrigendum;

- (2) noted the formal statements made by the Delegations of Canada, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as set forth in paragraph 8 of the report, the Canadian statement having been amended in the light of the present discussion;
- (3) agreed to take all necessary action to implement the agreements reached, and that all existing rules with regard to Infrastructure should apply to Slices XVI to XX until modified; and requested the Infrastructure Committee to make recommendations to the Council as regards any modification which it might deem desirable;
- (4) agreed that the cost-sharing formula set out in Annex I to C-M(55)70 no longer applied to the Military Budgets as from fiscal year 1965;
- (5) agreed to refer to the Special Working Group on the Financing and Imputation of Common Military Expenditures the proposal by one delegation that the cost-sharing formula for the Civilian Budget, at present laid down in Annex I to C-M(55)70, should be aligned on the agreed new formula for Military Budgets.

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VI. APPOINTMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Document: PO/66/47

68. The CHAIRMAN said that in PO/66/47 the Secretary General had suggested two decisions to take: to extend Mr. Bastin's appointment for a further three months, until 31st May, 1966, and, secondly, to appoint his successor. Of these two, the extension of Mr. Bastin's term of office was the only action proposed for today, while consultations with regard to the succession would carry on in the early future.

69. The COUNCIL:

agreed to the extension of Mr. Bastin's term of office as Financial Controller, International Staff, until 31st May, 1966.

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VII. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

70. Wednesday, 16th February, 1966 at 10.15 a.m. (Plenary Session).

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, (16e).

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