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~~Summary record of a meeting of the Council
held at the Palais des Congrès, Brussels, on
Tuesday, 7th June, 1966 at 3 p.m.~~

PRESENT

President of the Council: The Hon. Paul Martin

Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H. E. Mr. P. Harmel Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. E. Mr. A. de Staercke Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin Secretary of State for
External Affairs
H. E. Mr. G. Ignatieff Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H. E. Mr. Per Haekkerup Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H. E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. E. Mr. P. de Leusse Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H. E. Mr. Gerhard Schroeder Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs
H. E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe Permanent Representative

GREECE

H. E. Mr. Jean Toubas Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. E. Mr. Ch. X. Palamas Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H. E. Mr. Emil Jonsson Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. E. Mr. Henrik Sv. Björnsson Permanent Representative

NATO SECRET

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J.A. Roberts	Deputy Secretary General
Mr. F.D. Gregh	Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
Mr. J. Jaenicke	Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
Mr. John Beith	Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
The Lord Coleridge	Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

Maj.Gen. W.W. Stromberg	Standing Group Representative
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I. STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

and

II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

(continued)

1. Mr. SCHROEDER (Germany) said that the question of whether the Soviet threat had lessened was crucial to NATO, as the Allied effort only had a purpose insofar as it ensured peace, freedom and security. The political situation both in Europe and in the whole world had undergone essential changes since the foundation of NATO in 1949. But the confrontation of the Free World with the Communist World, and the division of Germany and Europe, had remained. Various arguments were put forward in favour of the thesis that the danger of a conflict along this demarcation line was non-existent: the Chinese threat to the Soviet Union, the abandonment of Soviet world revolutionary aims for the pursuit of national interests, and the increasingly middle-class character of Soviet society. These arguments could easily be refuted, as there was not yet a serious military threat to the Soviets from China, as Soviet national and world-wide objectives were inseparable, and as a bourgeois social order was not by definition non-aggressive.

2. It was probable that the present Soviet leaders did not desire a nuclear war entailing the destruction of Russia, and even Khrushchev had probably not wanted war despite his action over Cuba.

3. Defence planning was always carried out on a basis of an objective assessment of the military strength of the potential enemy. Far from there having been any decrease in the Soviet war potential since the Cuban crisis, the Soviets still commanded the strongest land forces in the world, with some thousand MRBMs continually targeted on Free Europe. The report of the Secretary General, which was before the meeting, was therefore correct in concluding that in shaping their policy the Allies should bear in mind that Soviet goals continued to conflict with those of the West.

4. Moreover, Moscow refused to permit Germans in the Soviet-occupied Zone the right of self-determination. With the intention of maintaining the régime installed by Stalin in 1945, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin continued to attempt to retain the occupation Zone in Germany, and to secure permanent acceptance of a situation that was only understandable in the aftermath of war.

5. Such a backward-looking policy required constant military and political effort to maintain and to justify. Efforts to obtain world-wide acceptance of the Soviet Zone had been renewed in a recent diplomatic offensive which had obviously been agreed with Moscow. The Soviet Zone had circulated its own disarmament memorandum at Geneva, and had applied for admission to the United Nations, and the Socialist Unity Party had proposed an exchange of speakers with the German Social Democratic Party. The latter initiative represented an attempt to influence the West German working class and to provoke controversies among the German political parties. A third motive for such efforts was the need to distract the attention of the population of the Soviet Zone from domestic difficulties, which were highlighted by the suicide of the Planning Chief, Herr Apel, and by the dismissal of Dr. Havemann, a professor well-known for his independent views.

6. While the population of the Soviet Zone had attempted to come to terms with the régime, and was rightly proud of what it had, despite an inadequate system, achieved, it was not possible to say that they had developed a national feeling of their own. The majority of the population remained opposed to what they regarded as the non-national policy of a divided Germany. The proposed exchange of speakers with the Social Democratic Party of Germany would, in spite of the intentions of the rulers of the Soviet Zone, represent a glimmer of hope for the population of the Zone in the context of reunification, a prospect that should have embarrassing consequences for the Pankow régime. Such an exchange would be of value if for no other reason than that the voice of freedom would be raised in the Soviet Zone itself.

7. The Federal Government had not changed its attitude in regard to the German question, but was ready to prove that in the intellectual and political spheres it was not afraid of a direct confrontation with Communism. While self-determination in the Soviet Zone would only come about with the consent of Moscow, every effort should be made towards relaxation, providing the situation was viewed in its true perspective.

8. The Federal Government had for many years been attempting to counteract the distorted picture painted by Communist propagandists in Eastern Europe. The results had been fairly satisfactory, although willingness to establish contacts had varied from country to country. The Polish Government in particular had shown itself irreconcilable towards Germany. However, the long-term outlook was not discouraging, and the Federal Government had, as all members present knew, made proposals on disarmament and security to Warsaw Pact nations in its peace note of 25th March, 1966. This step had been taken in order to initiate an exchange of views on disarmament and security, to acquaint the governments of the Warsaw Pact with

the German point of view on those matters, to make concrete proposals and to counteract Communist accusations of warmongering. Replies had been received from the Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian Governments. Three of the replies had been negative in varying degrees, though a final judgement had to await replies from the South-East European countries. Warsaw Pact governments had either failed or not attempted to prepare a combined reply.

9. Despite the opposition of Communist propaganda, the effects of the German initiative in Eastern Europe had been considerable. Replies to the German note indicated that there had been difficulties in rejecting some of the proposals, particularly the offer to exchange declarations of renunciation of the use of force, and the invitation to non-nuclear Warsaw Pact nations to renounce the production of nuclear weapons and to submit to controls in the same manner as Germany. Close contact with Germany's partners in the Alliance would be maintained in future efforts to continue this dialogue with the East.

10. The Federal Government was most grateful to its Allies for support in this initiative, and he suggested that the German note might be mentioned in the final communiqué of the present conference.

11. It could be considered whether NATO itself should take initiatives towards the East. NATO's main function in this context should be to agree on a flexible policy in the present-day situation. NATO was not equipped for direct political action and should avoid appearing as the opposite number to the Warsaw Pact organization.

12. Suggestions had recently been made to hold a European Security Conference. While the idea was appropriate to the basic problem, efforts to accomplish the objective should be carefully co-ordinated. Eastern European polycentrism originated partly in the revival of national feeling. To concede importance to the Warsaw Pact by negotiating on equal terms would obstruct this trend. It seemed to be agreed that NATO's policies should not be inflexible, but that at the same time initiatives towards Communist countries should be undertaken preferably by individual members of the Alliance, in accordance with common policy.

13. It was difficult to determine practical action in this sphere. General statements of a desire to reduce tension were insufficient. Growing differences between various Eastern European countries demanded differing approaches. To act otherwise would be politically mistaken, and energies should be directed where they were most likely to bring results. Co-ordinated policies in this respect were more essential than ever in view of

increasing Soviet efforts to disrupt the Alliance and exclude the United States voice from the discussion of important political questions in Europe. The European responsibilities of the United States should, on the contrary, be clearly recognised, as the United States made a decisive contribution to European security. The effort to establish a harmonised policy towards Eastern Europe should be intensified within NATO. A restricted conference, perhaps at the level of Foreign Ministers' Deputies, could be held to discuss these topics. In this way, and without becoming politically active vis-à-vis the outside world, NATO could serve as a clearing house for the ideas and actions of the Allies in the field of Eastern policy. Such policy should be realistic and concrete. Relaxation of tension should be a purposeful, concrete and well-considered policy, and every step taken in that field should correspond to such a policy.

14. Mr. RUSK (United States) said that the Council had this morning taken some important first steps in making the necessary adjustments arising from the French decision to withdraw from the NATO military organization. He joined the Secretary General in his Political Appraisal in underlining the need to maintain in the lengthy process ahead an atmosphere of understanding and mutual confidence. Ministers were charged with the responsibility for maintaining an Alliance which had before it tasks affecting the vital security interests of all of its members, and whose Treaty declared that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America should be considered an attack against them all. He hoped that having successfully met the present crisis, the Council would not be faced again in 1969 and the years thereafter with an instability undermining the mutual interest of the Allies. The first objective of the Alliance was the security of its members, and this objective remained as essential as ever before.

15. While there was talk about an atmosphere of reduced tension, one should not forget the threats posed to the Alliance in recent years by the Berlin and Cuba crises, and the fact that today substantial quantities of Soviet arms were appearing in North and South Vietnam as a part of an effort to seize South Vietnam by force. One could not yet see the end of an era in the policies of the Soviet Union. The central objective of the Alliance required the most effective ordering of defence resources on the part of member countries, and required that they remain strong and alert. A strong NATO also provided a solid base for efforts to improve East/West relations. All the Allies realised that they had a common interest in doing what they could to encourage evolutionary trends within the countries of the Soviet bloc with a view to helping the world to build a more orderly and reliable peace.

16. In addition to the decisions now required regarding the necessary adjustments in the structure of the Alliance, the Council had before it some important regular business. The Chairman of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers would later give a report on the activity of the Committee; the Council would also hear of the new approach in NATO to organizing co-operation in weapons research, development and production.

17. Among the institutions important for broadening understanding of the principles and objectives of the Alliance was the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. While this was not a governmental body, the United States had long recognised its importance as a forum for the exchange of ideas between United States and European parliamentarians. It served also as a means for organizing parliamentary participation in formulating the policies of the Allies. The Council should aim at ensuring that the Parliamentarians' Conference was equipped to keep in step with consultation and communication in the Alliance. This would undoubtedly require a strengthened Conference Secretariat to provide continuity between annual sessions and more effective liaison between the Council, delegations, the International Staff and parliamentarians. There was a growing sentiment in the United States congress that such strengthening was needed, and United States parliamentarians were prepared to play their part in making it possible.

18. The Council should also address itself to the solution of certain long-standing problems, for example the recognised need to assist the defence efforts of Greece and Turkey, and the requirement to put the financing of the ACE mobile forces on a permanent sound footing.

19. In economic terms, the strength of the Alliance depended on the willingness of each member to divert substantial resources from civilian use to military preparedness in such a way that the sum total of member countries defence efforts would meet a common and agreed need. One must avoid the appearance of anything like a double standard, under which some countries felt that their defence requirements could be dealt with on the basis of a détente, while the United States and others were required to meet their defence commitments on the basis of danger, threat and confrontation. The resources devoted by each member country of the Alliance should be used economically both in the area of procurement and for the support of the forces. The Council must also find a way to prevent balance of payments' considerations from intruding on military decisions.

20. Turning to the question of East/West relations, he thought that no-one would take the view that the fundamental problem remaining unresolved after World War II, the division of Europe and the division of Germany, could be settled on a basis acceptable to the West in the absence of continuing Atlantic strength and unity. If the point had now been reached at which one could address oneself more actively to the improvement of East/West relations, one had the Atlantic Alliance to thank for this.

21. As concerns the efforts to achieve a more favourable East/West environment, the Council provided a mechanism for consultation, for harmonising national actions and for evolving an agreed view on what kind of ultimate European settlement, including an end to the division of Germany, would be acceptable from the viewpoint of Western security. Meanwhile each member country could examine what national initiatives it might undertake, such as for example, the development of trade, cultural and other exchanges, or political initiatives such as the peace note of 25th March by the Federal Republic of Germany, which could do much to improve the atmosphere for considering East/West problems. Consultations of disarmament within NATO were another useful activity with a direct bearing on East/West relations. Since the last Ministerial meeting, a useful effort had been made to provide all NATO countries with the technical background required for sound judgements on disarmament questions; this effort should be intensified.

22. The fact that the Council should be the primary arena for continuing consultation on the improvement of East/West relations in no way required that NATO be the exclusive instrument for executing policies in this area. Possible initiatives in the cultural, political, security and economic fields should be considered in a pragmatic way in the framework of a closely co-ordinated policy among the NATO countries. The OECD might be an ideal institution for dealing with economic matters, since it offered the possibility of technical co-operation with Eastern countries such as Yugoslavia and Finland. It was also important to inform the general public of the number of contacts, agreements and exchanges taking place between the members of NATO and countries of Eastern Europe and which, he thought, was substantial.

23. Notwithstanding the situation in Vietnam, the Soviet refusal at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to accept reliable international inspection, and the lack of any indication that the Soviets were ready to consider the reunification of Germany on any terms except their own, the United States Government would continue to press for measures to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

24. The United States Government did not know the exact purpose of the present considerable activity reported within the Warsaw Pact organization. It was to be hoped that General de Gaulle's forthcoming visit to Moscow would throw further light on Soviet policies, and on whether new initiatives on the part of the members of NATO were opportune.

25. Despite some evolution in the Soviet bloc countries, the basic policies of the members of the Warsaw Pact appeared to be unchanged. At the same time the United States deeply desired that the West play an active part in trying to improve East/West relations in the hope of eventually evoking favourable responses

from the East. His Government was convinced that if there was to be genuine progress towards the eventual settlement of the tragic division of East from West, and particularly the tragic division of Germany, the countries represented in NATO must stand together.

26. He expressed a certain caution about the idea that a major conference should be called between Eastern and Western Europe, or between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries. As regards United States participation in any possible conference on European security questions, he said that the United States had a vital interest in the problems which had arisen in connection with World War II, and did not expect to yield its interest in these questions. Quiet and effective preparation was essential for any conference if it was not simply to provoke another crisis. He therefore suggested that Ministers instruct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to examine closely the prospects for healthy developments in East/West relations, and to consider further initiatives which might be usefully undertaken by members of NATO. He hoped that member governments would be forthcoming in consulting intimately and frequently on these matters, and that there could be further consultation about the nature of the threat from the East, its implications for the West, the nature of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the points upon which agreement might be found in the process of trying to build peace. He hoped that Permanent Representatives would take this up as a matter of continuing business, making periodic reports if necessary before December, and that at their December meeting, or later, Ministers might have another broad review of the progress that had been made.

27. Mr. FANFANI (Italy) said that the very success of the Alliance defined certain new conditions which should be borne in mind in proceeding to necessary changes. The recent French initiative had highlighted an existing need for bringing up-to-date and improving the organization of the Alliance. It was to be hoped that the Council would now decide on appropriate procedures to bring about such a renewal. One might follow the suggestions in the Canadian document and create a restricted Ad Hoc Group which would collect the views of the Fifteen Allies and develop proposals for the Ministerial meeting in December 1966.

28. While the state of the Alliance demanded the greater share of the Ministers' attention in the current meeting, certain other subjects deserved mention. The first of these, underlined by the Secretary General and by Mr. Rusk, was the need for a common effort among the Allies to support the defence effort of Greece and Turkey, an aim which the Italian Government would wholeheartedly and actively favour.

29 The second of these subjects referred to the need to preserve and encourage all possible contacts with certain peoples to which member countries of the Alliance were linked in friendship and moral solidarity. This was, as far as Italy was concerned, particularly true for the Latin-American world which was in a crucial stage of development. European influence in Latin-America was, while not competing with that of the United States, an important element of stability, encouraging Latin-America to take that place in the world for which its ever-growing natural and human resources qualified it. The most serious consequences for the West would follow an insufficient effort of help, co-operation and understanding towards Latin-America. An ever-widening gulf would separate Latin-America from the West, only to expose the continent to the infiltration of ideologies inimical to the Alliance.

30. Thirdly, the Italian Government had for a long time subscribed to the opinion that, within the framework of Atlantic cohesion, it should be possible and useful to develop a more open policy towards Eastern Europe. It was, in any case, agreed that one of the merits of the Alliance had been to establish conditions suitable for a détente. In this context, the proposal of a European conference posed problems which demanded considerable reflection on the part of participants, including the United States, with regard to the aims and to suitable timing. A study by the Secretariat or by a Special Working Group of the political and organizational problems linked to such an idea would provide an opportunity of giving the question mature consideration without rejecting the proposal and shutting the door on an eventual encounter, at the same time leaving an opportunity to sound out the intentions of the Soviet bloc.

31. A further question meriting the immediate attention of the Allies was that of scientific research and technological development. Their ever-widening influence on the spirit of man was extending from scientific elites to affect the thought of the masses themselves. If the Alliance was to be considered as a means of achieving a united and balanced community, it should take account of the danger of an imminent and growing difference between the development of member nations, especially in the technological field.

32. Members of the Alliance had not yet shown themselves capable of making that combined effort which would promote balanced development. It was high time to study measures to set right this growing technological differential when one of the states represented had accomplished exceptional astronautical achievements while a group of other Allied nations had, with almost ten years' delay, to be content with announcing the launching of EUROPA I at the price of considerable sacrifices and efforts. Even apart from the crisis of the ELDO project, this belated success was not great enough to provide hopes of further achievements.

33. It was in the common interest to reach an agreement on the means of adapting the organization of all Allied nations towards developing a technological balance. Such a general plan could not be conceived without the participation of the United States. Although there should be no question of reinstating a Marshall plan, its psychologically attractive idea of co-operation could be revived. What was necessary was not action on the part of one member for the benefit of others, but an increase in exchange and co-ordination of technological knowledge and experience. Such a procedure of exchange could provide a further means of reopening the dialogue between East and West. Thus those peoples who were not in the vanguard of progress could see something of the opportunities resulting from the sharing of the conquests of science. The youth of these countries, vacillating between opposing camps, would be able to see that the camp which claimed to be on the side of liberty knew how to use that liberty to the benefit of all.

34. There was a growing differential between the contribution to the Atlantic community of Europe and that of the United States. He called attention to a study by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing according to which the Common Market countries would, in ten years' time, produce only two-thirds of the Soviet Union's, and only one-third of the United States' production. Apart from the Alliance, the whole world would be exposed to severe threat and the balance of forces on which peace depended would be in peril if this trend was allowed to continue. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared certain observations on this subject which could be put at the disposal of the Allies. At the present time he would do no more than underline this very serious problem as he had underlined those of relations with Latin-America and with Eastern Europe.

35. The CHAIRMAN expressed the hope that the paper referred to by Mr. Fanfani would be available in the near future.

36. Mr. NOGUEIRA (Portugal) said that the current discussions were a further indication of the serious crisis in the Alliance, a crisis whose gravity no-one questioned. The crisis itself, however, was not the whole problem. The question to be faced was whether the French decision was the sole cause of the crisis or whether it was merely a symptom of an existing crisis. It was of the utmost importance to find an answer to this question, although it had not yet been raised in the meeting.

37. If the crisis was solely the result of the French decision, then to solve the problems arising therefrom would be to end the crisis. But in the Portuguese view the second alternative, that the French decision was only a symptom, was the true interpretation, and the Alliance should have the courage to face this. The Portuguese Delegation had, on very many occasions, seriously called the attention of the North Atlantic Council to the growing tension within the Alliance.

38. Apart from a few exceptions, it appeared that members of the Alliance were not entirely pleased with the prevailing state of affairs; this was certainly true of Portugal. No nation could expect that all the policies it put forward would be fully approved by the Alliance as a whole; this represented an unacceptable extreme. At the other extreme would be the situation where all a nation's policies would be systematically opposed by its Allies. Between these two extremes there was a range of possibilities whose exploration was the crucial point in the current state of the Alliance.

39. It was often said, and said especially often to Portugal, that times were changing and that one should adapt oneself to keep abreast with them. But this argument seemed rather one-sided, working only to the advantage of some. Some acted as if they believed that conditions in 1966 were the same as in 1949, which was not true. Threats were different and wider; different tactics were adopted by the enemy and the whole political and strategic context was very different from what it had been in 1949.

40. It was also true that the confrontation with the Soviet bloc continued, and there was no reason to believe that the Soviet threat against Western Europe had diminished. As the power of the Soviet Union had increased, so the threat had taken on a world-wide aspect. The statements of the Secretary General and of Mr. Schroeder supported such conclusions.

41. The Council refused to admit these conclusions, and seemed to maintain an inward-looking attitude with respect to the world. Only in very special cases did it debate problems arising in outlying areas if they concerned a member of the Alliance. But the considerations involved raised most serious issues, and the current crisis should be regarded as an opportunity to reconsider NATO's philosophy and political conception and to readjust them in order to avoid further crises. It would be useful to appoint a committee or small group to study the whole range of such problems.

42. Mr. STEWART (United Kingdom) comparing the situation today with that of 1949, thought that it was generally agreed that the Alliance was still necessary, not only from a defence point of view but also as a forum within which the Allies could settle to their mutual advantage any problems which arose among themselves. It was agreed that it was essential that the Alliance must be a credible one which could work speedily and efficiently if it were put to the test.

43. The Council was now faced with the need to make certain reorganizations inside the Alliance following from the declarations of policy of the French Government. Referring to the question by Mr. Nogueira on whether the crisis in the Alliance was identical with the situation created by the French measures or possibly

larger, he thought that it was essential to keep NATO up-to-date in two respects: in its military organization and in its political outlook. One should take the present opportunity for ensuring that the organization was kept up-to-date and economical, since the Alliance would always run into periodic crises if it did not keep itself up-to-date by permanently reviewing its own efficiency and economy. In reorganizing the machinery of the organization one should ensure that the Alliance was not inward - or backward - looking. The objective must not be a world organized into two perfectly running military machines, but ultimately a world in which those machines would have served their purpose.

44. The present division of Europe into two armed camps was an unhappy and unnatural division. While it was essential to provide an effective deterrent against aggression, the wider objective remained that of removing the political factors which gave rise to tension and which were responsible for the present high level of armament on both sides of the dividing line in Europe.

45. He did not believe that a complete revolution in East/West relations was just around the corner. Progress along this path would probably be slow and undramatic. Part of this new situation was the new economic measures in Eastern Europe, to which the reports of the Groups of Experts had drawn attention. These measures represented a change of attitude, more radical in some Eastern countries than in the Soviet Union, which was potentially of very great importance. He quoted examples to show that statesmen in the Iron Curtain countries were being increasingly brought up against problems which could not be solved by a doctrinal Marxist solution, and on which they would wish to have the experience of their opposite members on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Ultimately this kind of development must influence the view of life of people and governments in Eastern Europe.

46. Despite these recent developments there was not so far much sign of a new Soviet approach to the major problems between East and West. After 18 months of the new leadership in Moscow, Soviet policy was still neither co-operative nor constructive. No doubt the struggle with China to be recognised as the leaders in the task of spreading Communism imposed limitations on Soviet foreign policy.

47. In Europe it was important to recognise that Soviet policy was both offensive and defensive. The only reason that it was not offensive in deed was the existence of NATO, and the fact that the Russians were realists where power is concerned. At the same time it was probable that the Russians needed a defensive strategy to defend their existing position in Eastern Europe, to which they saw East Germany as the key. If they

were to take any action which released East Germany from its present colonial servitude, the web of Soviet power in East Europe would be broken. It was therefore unrealistic to suppose that at present the Russians would be disposed to co-operate in a radical settlement in Central Europe. This should be borne in mind when considering the possibility of a conference on European security, since the Russian objective would be much more to consolidate the position and given status of the régime in East Germany, than to seek the reunification of Germany. In testing the Russian intentions the Allies should therefore make it clear that they were interested in anything that would lead to greater security in Europe and that they expected the Russians to explain their proposal for a European Security Conference in detail so that they might decide whether or not it was a real proposal.

48. As regards the possibility that the Allies should take the initiative in making suggestions for European security, he was very willing to consider this. It should however be made clear that the following points were essential: participation by the United States, the recognition that European security involved political as well as military issues, in particular the problem of German reunification, and the recognition that there could not be any question of participation by East Germany in a conference.

49. One could not expect an early solution of the problems of European security, but the West must maintain strongly and publicly its view of what was necessary for a settlement. At the same time it should evolve a long-term policy aimed at creating a relationship with the East European countries and the Soviet Union which might lead in time to a climate more favourable to the solution of the main problems.

50. The countries of Eastern Europe had recently been showing in various degrees a growing desire to develop their relations with the West. It was in the interests of the Allies that they should respond individually and collectively to this desire, and that they should take initiatives when they judged these were likely to meet with a favourable response. In this context he welcomed the approach of the German Government in their note of 25th March.

51. He thought it would now be timely for the Council to consider whether the West might take a new collective step in this direction. This might begin with an attempt to work out a statement of principles and purposes to which many member countries and many countries in Eastern Europe could subscribe. On the political side such a statement would of course have to be very broad, since it would have to be limited to what was acceptable to both sides. On the cultural, social, scientific

and economic fronts, it might be possible to explore the way in rather more detail. While there might be difficulties in preparing such a statement and in agreeing how and when to discuss the idea with the Eastern countries and the Russians if they were interested, he did not think these difficulties need be overwhelming. Careful preparation was necessary and in this present meeting there was not time to go into detail. He was, however, asking the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to raise this subject at an early meeting of the Council and set out in more detail what the United Kingdom had in mind. He hoped that this could be the basis of constructive discussion in the Council.

52. It was also important to bear in mind the uncommitted countries, who were critical spectators of the international scene, for example in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. These countries often had distorted views of the NATO Alliance and had been inclined to accept too readily the anti-NATO propaganda of the Soviet Union. The Allies must do all they could to correct this impression and to consult together increasingly in developing policies towards the uncommitted nations of the world.

53. There had been developments in recent months which were not unfavourable to the interests and security of the North Atlantic area. One example was Indonesia, where the policy of confrontation had placed a heavy drain on the United Kingdom's military and financial resources. At present a settlement of this problem appeared to be in sight, and the United Kingdom was now working out with her Commonwealth partners a plan to bring about an early military disengagement. He hoped that it would not be long before substantial force reductions in Malaysia could take place, though he also trusted that the Allies would continue for the time being as they had done in the past, to consult the United Kingdom about military and para-military exports to Indonesia.

54. He thought that the promising result achieved by Britain in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was connected with the way in which Britain had handled it as a matter of policy; and that this provided some lessons, though on a small scale, for NATO as a whole. This policy had been to ensure that Britain's defences were well organized and credible, and at the same time make it clear that they were defences and would not be used offensively against anyone.

55. Mr. OOUVE de MURVILLE (France) said that in dealing with East/West relations, these being of direct concern to the Atlantic Alliance, which had been formed for the purpose of defence against a threat from the East, he considered it appropriate to recall the situation in the years 1948 and 1949, because of the profound changes which had occurred since then.

At that time the only real powers were the United States and the Soviet Union; the European countries were merely potentialities, the Third World did not exist and China was not yet a political power of any importance. In these circumstances, there had been a grouping around the two great powers, brought about in the East by conquest and force and in the West by a spontaneous defensive reflex. It was this situation which had produced the cold war and the division of Europe, of which the division of Germany was the consequence and not the cause.

56. He went on to stress the contrast with the current situation: the existence of the Third World, which was contemporaneous with the last stages of de-colonisation, the re-emergence of China as a great power and, in Europe, which was once again a reality, the halting of Russian expansion.

57. In these circumstances, he did not feel that anyone could believe in an immediate threat but thought that since the Berlin crisis in 1958 - 1961 and the Cuban crisis in 1962, the world had come to recognise the nuclear deterrent as a political reality. These changes convinced him that the world had entered a period of change, in which previously non-existent opportunities might occur that would enable the basic problems to be discussed. In his view, it would be in no-one's interests, for example, to leave the problem of Germany and that of security unsolved and to refrain from endeavouring to establish an equilibrium which would provide guarantees of stability. To this end he considered it essential to promote normal relations among European countries and to bring about a détente, and thus to create the conditions for genuine discussion.

58. From this point of view he thought that the changes occurring in the East, for example the trend in Eastern Europe towards a certain degree of emancipation, the fact that the Communist world no longer formed a monolithic bloc and the spontaneous overtures which the countries of Eastern Europe were beginning to make to the West were of political significance.

59. He said that France's policy was aimed at developing relations with these countries and at creating a fresh climate. He saw no alternative to this policy, since no-one imagined that the U.S.S.R. might one day agree to a settlement on dictated terms and since no-one could assume the responsibility for rejecting the détente which today appeared possible.

60. He recognised, however, that such a policy must be pursued with open eyes and with the necessary precaution, and here he agreed with Mr. Rusk in his warning against over-hasty actions, such as the idea of a conference in the near future between the countries of the East and those of the West. He pointed out that the question of détente did not come within the

province of the Atlantic Alliance or of the Warsaw Pact but that it concerned first and foremost the European countries most directly affected, and that it was for them to take appropriate action. He added that this was the spirit in which French policy had been conducted over the last few years, but stressed that it was a long-term policy which excluded spectacular results.

61. With regard to relations between France and the countries of the East, he considered that these were today most fertile and more positive. The journeys which he had made to Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, those which he would be making to Czechoslovakia and Hungary in July, and General de Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R., were in point of fact visits to countries whose representatives had been to France since 1960. Concerning the visits which he himself had paid to Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, he said that he had immediately been struck by the great diversity of the situations and problems in these three countries. These situations and problems were, of course, influenced by these countries' two great neighbours, Russia and Germany, which explained why Poland and Romania were at opposite ends of the spectrum. Moreover, he had everywhere noted a recrudescence of national life, a desire to regain a wide measure of the independence lost in often tragic circumstances. Everywhere too he had found a strong desire to develop contacts with the West; this was a tradition in countries imbued with Western civilisation which lived under an alien régime and which saw in their relations with the West a step towards emancipation.

62. He therefore considered it normal that each of the Western countries should go forward to meet those nations and develop political contacts with them, while at the same time taking the precautions required by respect for their independence and without trying to detach them from the Soviet Union or to influence them.

63. As regards policy towards the Soviet Union, he recognised that this was quite a different problem. He stressed that the French Government considered the coming visit of General de Gaulle to that country as but an important stage in the development of its policy, and that sensational results should not be expected. As regards the talks which would, of course, have to do with the German problem and European security, he was aware of the fears of the German Government but pointed out that if there were any hopes of settling the problems at issue, the only way open was that of discussion.

64. In conclusion, he summarised the French position, which was that the world had been gradually entering a new phase representing, both for the French and for their Allies, certain principles and interests which were, moreover interlinked, namely freedom, or in other words independence, and security. He felt that in this changing world the question for each was how to adapt to it and, while safeguarding one's interests, to ascertain what new prospects existed.

65. Mr. TOUMBAS (Greece) said that he would not comment on the situation created by the withdrawal of France from the NATO military organization, but must put on record the position of Greece in the present predicament. Greece's main objective was peace in freedom, which must be based on joint security. Greece could not make any distinction between the Atlantic Treaty and NATO, since one could not separate the Gospel from the Church. The NATO military organization translated into facts the language of the Treaty, thus creating security for the Allies and a deterrence for the potential enemy.

66. The question was now asked whether the Communist threat had vanished with the changes in the international situation. He submitted that in Europe, security was concerned with three fronts: international frontiers, diplomacy and the home front. On the first of these fronts one had witnessed since 1950 an exercise in the balance of power conducted between the two great nuclear powers of the world. If ever, for one reason or another such as a withdrawal or weakening of United States support for Western Europe, this balance was disrupted, then Western Europe would follow Central and Eastern Europe into serfdom under Soviet domination.

67. On the diplomatic front, the major European problems still remain unsolved. Nothing indicated that the Soviets were ready to make concessions in order to reach a reasonable settlement on the question of Berlin, the problem of German reunification or in the field of disarmament. Nearly half a million Soviet troops were still stationed in Eastern Europe. While the satellites were admittedly showing tendencies towards independence, there were reasons to believe that the slackening of the discipline imposed by Moscow on the satellites was due much more to the appearance of Peking as a second centre of attraction than to any Western influence.

68. As long as the existing defence equilibrium continued to guarantee the security of Western Europe, Greece foresaw that the main effort of the Soviet Union would be on the home front of the free world. In all real democracies this front had vulnerable areas. Greece, with its long unhappy experience in this field, was bound to lay particular stress on the importance of this front, which determined the course of events in the international field. This was true not only as regards the possible reinforcement of Communist subversion but also as regards the resurgence of nationalism, which in the United States, for example, might assume the form of isolationism. At present one had a striking example of the importance of the domestic front in the struggle against Communism in South Vietnam. Greece was preoccupied by this struggle, for if the domestic front in South Vietnam collapsed, Communist subversion in the world would be dangerously encouraged. In the full consciousness of this danger Greece believed that this was not the time to dismantle NATO.

69. The international situation had certainly evolved in recent years. Changes such as the weakening of the Iron Curtain, polycentric developments in the Communist world and the growing resistance of the individual in Soviet bloc countries to submit to arbitrary rule should be noted. They were due in great measure to the stability imposed by NATO; and they could continue if NATO continued. In response to such developments the policies of the NATO Allies could be diversified in order to strengthen the process of evolution.

70. In conclusion he made a distinction between an appropriate Western approach aimed at lessening international tension, in which Greece was ready to co-operate, and any suggestion for the convening of a conference on European security, which Greece considered premature. He would not be prepared at this time to discuss the latter.

71. The COUNCIL:

agreed to continue discussion the next day.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, (16e).