

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO SECRET
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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held in
Lancaster House, London on Wednesday,
12th May, 1965 at 10 a.m.

PRESENT

President : Mr. P-H. Spaak
Chairman and Secretary General : Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P-H. Spaak : Vice-President of the Council
of Ministers and Minister for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin : Secretary of State for
External Affairs
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. de Leusse : Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe : Permanent Representative

GREECE

H.E. Mr. Stavros Costopoulos : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Christian X. Palamas : Permanent Representative

NATO SECRET

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Pétur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative

ITALY

The Hon. Amintore Fanfani : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. P. Werner : President of the Government,
and Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Reuter : Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Georg Kristiansen : Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha : Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Hasan Esat İşik : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Muharrem Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt.Hon. Michael Stewart : Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh : Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J.A. Roberts : Deputy Secretary General
Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General
Assistant Secretary General for
Economics and Finance
The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

Major General W.W. Stromberg : Standing Group Representative

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CONTENTS

Item

Subject

Paragraph Nos.

Annual political appraisal: review
of the international situation (Cont'd)

1 - 43

ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL: REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Cont'd)

1. Mr. İŞİK (Turkey) said that on this, the 10th Anniversary of the adhesion of the Federal Republic to NATO, it was clear that the membership of the Federal Republic had made, and would no doubt continue to make, a most effective contribution to the strength and solidarity of the Alliance.
2. In common with the majority of its allies, Turkey generally agreed with the views and conclusions set out in the excellent report by the Secretary General. Although the Alliance had not yet completely harmonised its views on the subject of East-West relations, efforts in this direction should, he felt, be continued with a view to achieving more effectively, the common goals.
3. The Soviet Union continued to dominate the Eastern camp, but was no longer its uncontested leader. Western planning must clearly take account of the Sino-Soviet rift, which had already made possible a détente in East-West relations which seemed unlikely to be reversed. The Soviet Union now apparently preferred to avoid "hot" conflicts with the West. This, he felt, was an important factor liable to contribute to greater world security.
4. Turkey welcomed the more conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Union, which, he felt, would allow relations between the two countries to be improved. It should be stressed, however, that any movement in this direction would in no way affect the maintenance and development of Turkish co-operation within the framework of the Alliance.
5. Developments in Eastern Europe were followed with close attention by his country, and he agreed that the majority of East European nations evidently wished for emancipation. It would, he felt, be in the NATO interest to encourage this tendency.
6. Drawing attention to the serious condition of NATO's South-Eastern flank, Mr. Isik urged that action to remedy this situation should be taken as rapidly and on as wide a scale as possible. In particular, he recommended that Ministers should consult with their Governments on this issue in order that appropriate decisions might be taken at the forthcoming meeting of NATO Defence Ministers.
7. With respect to the problem of Cyprus, a favourable new development had taken place here in London. It had been for him a great pleasure to exchange views on this subject with his Greek colleague. The problem however continued to cause him great anxiety, in view of the serious repercussions of the dispute on

Greek-Turkish relations. In his view, this question could be resolved only if it were examined within the overall context of relations between Greece and Turkey. He thought it should be admitted that the Alliance had a rôle in this respect. While NATO might at the present stage restrict itself to following negotiations between the interested parties, he felt that if these contacts were to prove unsuccessful, it would be both proper and expedient for the Alliance to intervene.

8. The dispute over Cyprus had not been prompted by any wish of the island for independence, but simply by the desire initially of one, and subsequently of both communities, to be affiliated to another country. If due account was taken of this factor, a solution might be greatly facilitated.

9. At present, the rule of law in Cyprus had given way to force, and the smallest development had immediate repercussions on Greek-Turkish relations. Regrettable measures had already been taken, and public opinion in Greece and Turkey had become extremely sensitive. If this situation persisted, relations between the two countries would deteriorate even more seriously. It was therefore essential that an attempt should be made at least to avoid any further aggravation of the situation pending a negotiated solution. If this was to be done, tolerable living conditions must be restored for the Turkish Cypriot Community. The statement made to the Council by Mr. Martin was full proof of this. It must be recognised that neither of the two communities had the right to dominate the other. Since clearly the two communities themselves could not be expected to improve the situation in the island, Greece and Turkey should attempt to agree on measures to this end.

10. Even with goodwill on both sides, however, a solution to the Cyprus dispute could not easily be achieved, and the Alliance should closely follow developments with a view to providing the maximum possible assistance if necessary. Turkey, for its part, wished progressively to increase its co-operation with Greece, recognising that a high degree of co-operation would be in the interests of both countries.

11. Mr. İşik went on to express concern at certain military measures taken since the Cypriot crisis and directed against two members of NATO, which endangered the future of the Alliance. He had originally intended to invite Ministers to consider this problem with a view to taking remedial action; however, his discussions with the Greek Foreign Minister now led him to believe, on his personal responsibility, that the matter might be resolved by bilateral agreement. He was particularly happy to welcome this new development.

12. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Secretary General would continue to exercise his functions under the watching brief with a view to achieving the best possible results.

13. Mr. COSTOPOULOS (Greece) said that the Soviet policy of intermittent pressure on Berlin had perhaps had one beneficial effect, in that it constantly reminded the allies that Berlin and Germany were the principle areas of confrontation between East and West, both politically and militarily. The Berlin crisis had, in fact, allowed a crystallisation of the actual situation, which was not entirely to the advantage of the allies. It was disquieting to note that some success had been achieved in obtaining international recognition for the Soviet zone of Germany, and Western vigilance must not therefore be relaxed for a minute. The Greek Government wished to express its esteem for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and sincerely hoped for the rapid unification of Germany.

14. As far as peaceful coexistence was concerned, it was important to realise that Communist attack was nonetheless dangerous for not being a frontal and open one. The principle aim of all Communist countries remained the destruction of the free world, and this fact must not be lost sight of. Peaceful coexistence for the Communists was not a static but a dynamic process, a struggle carried on by all means short of arms. For this reason, the policy of taking the initiative in establishing relations with the USSR and the satellite countries seemed to be a constructive one. Increased contact with the West could only lead satellite countries towards greater independence (though this tendency should not be over-estimated), and Greece had therefore adopted a policy of economic co-operation with both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

15. However, there were limits to the possibilities of such co-operation, which involved several risks. Competition amongst allies must be avoided, and a false impression of security must be guarded against, especially in view of the fact that the Communist parties of the Western democratic countries created a weak point in the defensive front against Soviet expansionist aims.

16. Regarding the need for unity within the Alliance, Mr. Costopoulos said that there should ideally be a common orientation of general policy amongst allies. However, consultation was often difficult to achieve before taking action, and once action had been taken, it took on an aspect of information, which was only of limited interest. Nevertheless, Atlantic solidarity remained a valuable and powerful common denominator, whilst permitting a certain freedom of action. This solidarity was helped by the co-operation of experts in preparing reports in different sectors of the international situation, which increased contact and understanding between the allies.

17. Mr. Costopoulos repeated the support of the Greek Government for the action taken in Vietnam by the United States, who, he said, had acted in reply to an appeal from the people of South Vietnam in their struggle against aggression. To defend Vietnam was also to prevent all the other countries of South East Asia from becoming dependent on Communist China. If any means other than those of armed force would be effective in resisting armed aggression in South Vietnam and in guaranteeing her independence, the United States would surely be the first to seek to use them: having proposed negotiation without pre-conditions, the United States had unmasked the subversive aims of the Communists.

18. Greece was anxious to see the study of the defence of the South Eastern flank of the Alliance and the Northern frontier of Greece progress rapidly, and she was willing to do everything possible to achieve a satisfactory solution to this urgent problem, which would be discussed further at the meeting of Defence Ministers.

19. Expressing satisfaction that he had now in London had an opportunity to discuss the Cyprus problem with his Turkish colleague, Mr. Costopoulos said that his Government would be happy to continue these contacts with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution to the problems dividing the two nations.

20. While not wishing to embark upon a comprehensive review of developments in Greek-Turkish relations since the last Ministerial meeting, he felt obliged to point out that the measures recently taken by the Turkish Government against Greek interests in Turkey had caused great prejudice to Greece, and had not facilitated a solution to the Cyprus problem. It would be noted that Greece, for its part, had carefully avoided any retaliatory measures similar to those taken by Turkey.

21. He went on to acknowledge the objectivity of the section of the Secretary General's report devoted to relations between Greece and Turkey, and paid tribute to the diligence exercised by the Secretary General in the discharge of his watching brief.

22. Stressing that the problem of Cyprus must be settled within the framework of the United Nations, he expressed the view that for political, psychological and legal reasons, the Alliance was not competent to resolve this question. The Republic of Cyprus was an independent member of the United Nations which had, from its inception, followed a policy of non-alignment. Rightly or wrongly, its people were opposed to any intervention, whether direct or indirect, on the part of NATO.

23. Thanking Mr. Martin for his eye-witness account of the situation in Cyprus, he recalled that Mr. Martin had stated on the island and elsewhere that the problem of Cyprus was one for the United Nations. In the view of the Greek Government, the question was not purely one of Greek-Turkish relations. The "watching" brief of the NATO Secretary General did not mean that any decision could be taken by NATO on the future of Cyprus.

24. The report of the United Nations mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, had been rejected by the Turkish Government. The Greek Government also had serious objections to several points contained in this document, but he nonetheless agreed with the Secretary General that certain of the suggestions contained in the report might usefully be explored, and hoped that these various possibilities would be studied during the coming months.

25. The problem of Cyprus was a difficult and delicate one, given the need to take due account of legitimate susceptibilities. As a first and all-essential step towards the peaceful solution of the crisis, the Greek Government was ready to co-operate with Turkey with a view to restoring peaceful conditions on the island. It should be noted that thanks to the presence of the United Nations force, great progress had already been made in this direction since the Ministerial meeting of May 1964. True, there were complaints on the Turkish side, and a number of measures taken by the Cyprus Government were not approved even by the Greek Authorities. Greece had, however, offered its good offices with a view to securing a liberal and objective settlement of certain of these questions. Moreover, the Turkish minority must also accept responsibility for certain disturbances. The restoration of peaceful conditions thus demanded a sincere and continuing effort on both sides.

26. While it could not agree that the Cyprus problem should be resolved by direct discussions between Greece and Turkey, or by any means which would call into question the exclusive competence of the United Nations in this matter, Greece was willing to co-operate with the Turkish Government within the framework of the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council, and to offer its good offices to the Cyprus Government with a view to the restoration of peace.

27. As for the military preparations in Cyprus mentioned by his Turkish colleague, he stressed that these measures had resulted solely from the threats directed against the independence of the island. If these threats ceased, if a spirit of reconciliation emerged and if serious international guarantees were given against an invasion of the island, he could assure the allies that these measures would be progressively suppressed by the Cypriot Government.

28. Noting that only the previous day there had been certain actions and statements in Ankara likely to endanger the present efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations, he stressed that the Greek Government could not discuss the Cyprus problem if subjected to threats or intimidation. He therefore invited the Turkish Foreign Minister to make urgent representations to his Government on this subject.

29. In conclusion, Mr. Costopoulos reaffirmed the wish of the Greek Government to maintain contacts with the Turkish Authorities, and expressed the hope that goodwill would be exercised by both parties to the dispute.

30. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) expressed his most sincere appreciation of the wise moderation marking the exchanges between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, which was an excellent omen for the private exchanges opened in London. After two such unique and constructive statements, he appealed that the opportunity for discussion without pre-conditions be taken, and he expressed his certainty that both Mr. Costopoulos and Mr. İşik would have the support of their fellow Foreign Ministers within the Alliance for their action.

31. Mr. FANFANI (Italy) thought that as regards this specific problem the need to co-ordinate action within the Atlantic framework with that of the United Nations, must not be forgotten. Experience had proved that problems even more complicated than that of Cyprus could be solved with patience and goodwill, and the situation in Cyprus must not be allowed to cause a deterioration of relations between two countries of the Alliance. He appealed to both countries to continue their efforts, while respecting the personality of the people of Cyprus. Once the desire of both communities to live peacefully together had been established, it should be possible to envisage adequate regional autonomy, in an overall framework, a procedure which indeed had European precedents. All the allies within NATO were ready to help and support the efforts of Greece and Turkey, and their sincere thanks went to the Secretary General for his construction action.

32. Mr. İŞIK (Turkey) welcomed the affirmation of the Greek Government's desire to pursue the present contacts to a successful conclusion.

33. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said he thought that this session had had two positive results. The first was the fact that the Council associated itself with the Three Power Declaration on Germany. There had also been useful amplifications on this declaration, notably by Mr. Schröder and Mr. Couve de Murville. The second positive result had been the beginning of direct contacts between the Greek and Turkish Governments about their mutual relations and the question of

Cyprus. All members of the Council hoped that this good beginning would be followed by fruitful results. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had said that they would make every possible effort towards an understanding, ensuring at the same time the necessary peaceful atmosphere both on the island and in their respective countries.

34. The difficulties of the military situation in the South-East flank had again been mentioned by both these Ministers and deserved the continued serious attention of all member governments.

35. The Council had also had the usual basic review of East-West relations. The position of the Soviet Union in respect of China, and of the Eastern European countries in respect of the Soviet Union, had been analysed by several speakers; and the connection had been pointed out between East-West relations in the Atlantic area and the Communist efforts in other areas of the world.

36. Mr. Fanfani had stressed the absolute necessity for solidarity in the Alliance as a basis for the dialogue between East and West, which should certainly be pursued under proper conditions. With regard to the development of contacts between the Eastern and Western countries, several Ministers had underlined the necessity for constant consultation in the Council in order to co-ordinate action with a view to preventing the allies being played off against one another by the Communist powers.

37. Mr. Ball had pointed out the necessity for reviewing trade relations between East and West. The United States Government had promised suggestions on this subject which would be examined with interest by the Council in Permanent Session.

38. The most significant theme raised by Ministers had been, in his opinion, that of the state of the Alliance and of how to face problems such as the question of Asia. Among others, Mr. Ball had suggested that this subject be examined in December by the Council in Ministerial Session. The general feeling was that it should be examined in the context of the Canadian initiative at present under consideration by the Council. The definition of the problems to be discussed and procedure for discussing them would be considered by the Council in Permanent Session.

39. On the problem of the areas outside the Alliance various opinions had been expressed which implied a clear difference of approach deserving careful later consideration. The necessity for action in specific areas such as Vietnam and Latin America had been largely recognised, though the causes of such a necessity had been differently assessed by different speakers. There had been a wide declaration of confidence in United States action in the past, together with the expectation and trust that the United States

would do everything possible in order to negotiate at the right time in Vietnam and to come to a peaceful settlement within the OAS in Santo Domingo. The connection between these two dangerous situations and the Communist action of indirect aggression had been largely recognised by many Ministers. Certainly these two practical examples of what could happen in the outer areas would give considerable food for thought to those who had studied in more general terms the conditions of the Alliance and the best measures to improve them.

40. The meeting had again reiterated the peaceful intentions of the Alliance and its close connection with the United Nations Organization, with the United Nations peacekeeping forces and with the disarmament and arms control measures which were one of the major responsibilities of the United Nations itself. It had been confirmed that there was no contradiction whatsoever between the United Nations and NATO. NATO had been born, and was acting, as a regional union in conformity with the United Nations Charter. It was perfectly normal that while having the primary aim of defence, NATO should accept and promote as far as possible the aim of rendering such defence superfluous through progressive arrangements for general and controlled disarmament.

41. In general, he would say that at this meeting Ministers had in a very moderate and responsible way reflected a certain feeling of uneasiness in the face of the situation of the Alliance. Several Ministers had shared the view that an effort should be made to examine the reasons for these difficulties and the ways to solve them. The task which had been suggested to the Council for the future was not easy: it was that of determining in a more precise way the real sources of, and solutions for, the problems which beset the Alliance. There was no doubt that if a cool assessment of the conditions of the Alliance along the lines indicated by Ministers were made in the future, member countries would succeed in facing the coming years and in eventually making the Alliance stronger and more fit to meet the new situations of a changing world.

42. He thought this had been a good general discussion valuable not only for what had been said and clarified but also for the directives given to the Council in Permanent Session, who would work them out in Paris.

43. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.