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NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held in the
Parliament Building, Ottawa, on Thursday, 23rd May, 1963 at 3.30 p.m.

President: The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Home
Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak: Vice-Chairman of the Council of
Ministers and Minister for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke: Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin: Secretary of State for External
Affairs
The Hon. Paul Hellyer: Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff: Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram: Minister for Defence
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen: Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Pierre Messmer: Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Francois Seydoux: Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. Gerhard Schröder: Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel: Federal Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe: Permanent Representative

GREECE

H.E. Mr. Evangelos Averoff-
Tossizza: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Christian X. Palamas: Permanent Representative

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ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Petur Thorsteinsson: Permanent Representative

ITALY

H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti: Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Martino: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini: Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus: Vice President of the Government,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Defence
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter: Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. S.H. Visser: Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon: Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem: Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Jens Boyesen: Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. General Gomes de Araujo: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha: Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi: Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Peter Thorneycroft: Minister of Defence
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh: Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk: Secretary of State
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara: Secretary of Defence
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter: Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. G. Colonna:	Deputy Secretary General
Mr. F.D. Gregh:	Deputy Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
Mr. Johnson Garrett:	Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
The Lord Coleridge:	Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

General C.P. de Cumont:	Chairman, Military Committee
General A. Heusinger:	Chairman, Military Committee in Permanent Session
General Sir Michael West:	Chairman, Standing Group
General L.L. Lemnitzer:	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Admiral H.P. Smith:	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Sir Wilfrid J.W. Woods:	Commander-in-Chief, Channel
Général de Corps d'Armée J.M. Guérin:	Standing Group Representative

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I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Contd.)

and

NATO SECRET

II. SECRETARY GENERAL'S ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL (Contd.)

1. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) said that he would speak on three subjects. Firstly, he agreed with previous speakers that the trend of Soviet foreign policy was difficult to forecast at the present stage. Outlining recent developments in the relationship between his country and the Soviet Union, he recalled that in the course of his official visit to Denmark in March 1963, Mr. Gromyko had reaffirmed the opposition of his country to NATO co-operation in the Baltic, and said that the activity of the Baltic Command was directed against the Soviet Union and was not easily compatible with the friendly relations existing between Denmark and the Soviet Union. He, for his part, had stressed the defensive character of the Alliance and of the new command structure in the Baltic. He had also explained at length the good relations which had developed between Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany, and rejected the usual Soviet allegations against the latter.

2. Generally, the friendly and relaxed tone which had characterised Mr. Gromyko's visit was in keeping with the trend recently evident in Soviet policy and attitudes, both public and unofficial, to the Nordic countries, the basic object of which was to stress that the friendly relationship which, they claimed, had developed between the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union suitably demonstrated the possibility of peaceful co-existence between East and West. The Danish authorities could not say whether this conciliatory position had been taken in preparation for the forthcoming visit of Mr. Khrushchev to Sweden and possibly to other Scandinavian countries, nor could they be sure whether the Swedish visit would serve only limited technical purposes or whether it formed part of a more general scheme.

3. Secondly, he commented on the question of political and economic relationships with the emerging nations. This was one of particular urgency, in view of the ever-increasing gap between their standards of living and those of the West, and given the manifest need to strengthen their confidence in Western policies. It was clearly important that all Western countries, whatever their size, should make an equitable contribution to the development of these nations; in Denmark there was an increasing willingness to participate in an effort of this kind. Recent reports bore witness to many encouraging signs among the new nations in Africa; the Soviet bloc and China appeared to be losing ground, while the new countries were maturing politically and seemed to realise that economic and social progress could best and most safely be achieved by co-operation with the West. Many of the new countries, however, adopted forms of economic planning which were not always to the liking of the West; this they were obliged to do in order to base their hopes for rapid economic development on a reasonable degree of reality. The West should recognise this position and show willingness to co-operate on this basis.

4. While good progress had been made on the level of political and economic relationships, various problems remained which harmed the Western image in the new world and promoted an ever-increasing impatience on the part of Western populations; one such problem was the situation resulting from the racial policies of the South African Government.

5. Thirdly, the present impasse with regard to a nuclear test ban was extremely serious and might well herald a similar situation to that which had prevailed in the late summer of 1961. Denmark therefore welcomed the continued United Kingdom-United States approaches to Mr. Khrushchev on this subject, in the belief that unless a further dissemination of nuclear weapons could be avoided, the Alliance would have great difficulty in restoring stability and lessening international tension.

6. Recognising the importance of maintaining and, if possible, amplifying their present contacts with the Soviet bloc, the Western Powers should vigorously oppose any attempt to postpone the Disarmament Conference indefinitely.

7. Denmark fully supported the recommendation made by the United Kingdom Delegate to the conference, Mr Godber, at the meeting of the Council in Permanent Session held on 15th May, 1963, to the effect that at the present meeting Ministers should, in the communiqué and otherwise, reaffirm the defensive nature of the Alliance and its wish to achieve real progress in disarmament.

8. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) announced that he would first have a few words to say on certain points already dealt with by previous speakers and, more particularly, on the remarks of Mr. Dean Rusk regarding the place of the United States and of Europe within the Alliance. It seemed to him that the United States was making an exceptional and, from the standpoint of its domestic policy, a very difficult effort which gave Europe complete assurance as regards its security; and that for its part, the United States must entertain no doubts as regards the sincerity of its allies. Speaking of the extension to China of membership of the "nuclear club", he believed that such an event would be dangerous, not only because of the vast area of the country and the fanatical régime which prevailed there, but also because countries such as India, Egypt and Israel would be encouraged thereby to pursue their own projects for creating a nuclear force which, even if not a strong one, would nevertheless constitute a threat to the safety of neighbouring countries. He felt that the signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would be extremely regrettable, partly because to do so would imply recognition of Eastern Germany, but mainly because the psychological effect of such a pact would be to induce a false sense of security in the peoples concerned, thus rendering the burden of defence more difficult to accept. He saw this proposal as part of the psychological campaign launched by Moscow. In this connection, he wished to inform the Council of the proposal the Soviet Government

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had just made to the Greek Government to enter into a solemn undertaking to keep the Mediterranean area free from all nuclear activity in the event of war. He pointed out that such an undertaking would be without value, since it did not refer to the territory of the USSR or of the satellite countries bordering on Greece. He feared, however, that it would be attractive to public opinion.

9. As regards the countries of Eastern Europe, he expressed the conviction that important events were occurring in this part of the world. Recent information went to show that demonstrations of independence towards Moscow had taken place in several countries, their cause being either ideological differences or divergencies of opinion regarding the attitude to be adopted towards China. He stressed, however, that the reason for the friction between certain satellite countries - Poland and Rumania, for example - and Moscow was mainly due to serious economic difficulties. He recalled that the satellites could turn only to Moscow for aid without, however, being able to rely on obtaining what they required for their economic progress; and that the USSR participated in their economic planning to a degree which was not always reasonable. Although NATO countries had only limited means of action in this field, he suggested that they might select one or two from among the countries which had shown signs of discontent, and attempt to extend trade relations with them. He nevertheless warned of the danger of over-estimating these divergencies, for, apart from Albania, all the satellites faithfully toed the Moscow line when solutions had to be found for major problems. In any case, he considered that Mr. Khrushchev's foreign policy was sufficiently flexible to avert a break and to preserve unity. In this connection, he pointed to the definite rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia which, affecting the relations between the two states in all fields, was eloquent testimony to the soundness of the policy followed by Tito. While remaining a staunch Communist, Tito had chosen a different course of action from that of the Communist countries owing allegiance to the USSR, because he was determined to maintain his independence. There was little doubt, moreover, that Yugoslavia would, if necessary, fight to preserve its independence. He added that the better relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria afforded additional evidence of the complete dependence of the latter on the Soviet Union. It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that Bulgaria constituted a threat to the southern flank of the Alliance and could muster far greater military forces than Greece.

10. He referred next to the defence and economic problems of Greece, dealt with in paragraphs 30 and 31 of C-M(63)29. The importance of these problems within the framework of the Alliance was as great as ever. The consortium set up by the OECD to give Greece assistance in the form of long-term loans had been marking time for the last six months and it had had to contend with a negative attitude. It was certain that if the situation did not change for the better, a blow would be struck at the efforts made to strengthen the Greek economy, as well as at the solidarity and prestige of the Alliance. His country still needed help in order to make it economically independent in the next three or four years.

11. As regards military assistance, assessed at \$23,500,000 for 1963, he announced that negotiations were being pursued with most of the countries concerned with a view to enabling his Government to pay the counterpart of this assistance into the defence budget and thus render possible, at least in part, the implementation of the defence programme regarded as the essential minimum by NATO military authorities. He recalled that the latter had estimated the cost of the required assistance at \$120 million, subsequently reduced to \$53 million for 1963 and to \$59 million for 1964. As a contribution to this effort, the Greek Government had raised its defence expenditures for 1963 by \$7 million, and was thus devoting more than 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ % of the gross national product to defence. This was a very great sacrifice when it was considered that more than one-fifth of the population had an annual income of between \$50 and \$100 per head and that the average income was \$360.

12. He therefore asked that deadlines be set for the application of the military assistance programme adopted by the Alliance, in particular, that implementation of the proposed 1964 programme as set out in Council Resolutions C-M(62)58 and C-M(62)154 should be considered forthwith. He suggested that the Secretary General should be empowered to study this matter and to propose the most suitable procedures. Expressing the hope that the problem of the most equitable distribution of the defence load would be examined, he recalled that Greece had already recommended the setting-up for this purpose of an "Atlantic Defence Fund" to which all the member countries would contribute according to their means, and which would enable all to receive assistance according to their needs.

13. In conclusion, he drew the attention of the Council to the misunderstandings liable to arise from the way in which the problem of military assistance had been presented. He remarked that to argue that this assistance only profited the countries which received it was wrong and even dangerous, since it could mislead public opinion and destroy the confidence on which Atlantic solidarity must rest. As a case in point, he emphasised that Bulgaria was in reality an advance post of the Soviet Union, which had provided it with large numbers of highly perfected tanks, aircraft and missiles representing a threat with which Greece could not cope alone. He therefore considered that the aid afforded Greece by the United States was in reality not given specifically to his country, but was meant to strengthen this section of the front separating the Atlantic Alliance from the Communist world. He recalled that the United States supplied Greece with the greater part of the military assistance it received by providing very large quantities of military equipment, but that Greece, for its part, contributed 167,000 men and 4.8% of its gross national product. He wondered, nevertheless, whether apart from the United States and Greece, the Alliance showed sufficient interest in the defence of this area.

14. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) reaffirmed that true political consultation, as defined in the Report of the Three Wise Men, implied the discussion of problems collectively in the early stages of policy formation and before national positions became fixed. He stressed that while impressive progress had been made during recent years, the effective application of this fundamental principle was now more than ever required. The Canadian Government for its part would attempt to remedy any shortcomings which Canada might have shown in this respect. Insofar as informal political consultation was concerned, he would be glad to respond at the earliest convenient opportunity to the suggestion that individual Ministers should occasionally attend meetings of the Council in Permanent Session.

15. It was now recognised that local conflicts outside the NATO area, if not contained, could have consequences as grave as those which directly concerned the Alliance; Canada would thus continue to assume international peace-keeping obligations both inside and outside the United Nations. These activities provided a constant reminder that the Alliance must be viewed in the context of a broader perspective; decisions taken in the military sphere could not be seen in isolation from the broader commitment of all to the goal of disarmament, nor was the pursuit of that goal incompatible with the Western military posture. Given the status of the general disarmament and nuclear test ban talks, Western defence efforts must clearly be maintained; nonetheless, the implications of the arms race were such that the West could not relax its efforts to negotiate balanced reductions of armaments and armed forces under proper safeguards. Nor was the disarmament picture entirely negative, especially with respect to collateral measures designed to prevent surprise attack or war by miscalculation, which might admit of earlier implementation than general disarmament. Similarly, insofar as the problem of the nuclear test ban was concerned, a continued effort was needed to bridge the gap between the two sides, provided reasonable safeguards could be established. Canada therefore welcomed the recent United Kingdom-United States approach to Mr. Khrushchev.

16. Recommending that Ministers should bear in mind the relationship between the defence arrangements developed at the present meeting and the position taken by the four Western Powers at Geneva, Mr. Martin recalled the commitment of the latter to the principles contained in the Irish resolution unanimously adopted at the United Nations General Assembly against the wider spread of national control over nuclear weapons. He felt that in view of Communist efforts to distort and exploit the subject matter of the present Meeting, special attention should be given to any public statements to which it gave rise.

17. Commenting on East-West relations, he said that the continuing post-Cuban détente appeared to be primarily attributable to the domestic difficulties of the Soviet Union and to Sino-Soviet differences. No optimistic conclusion should be drawn from the

quiescence which, since the Cuban crisis, had characterised the Soviet attitude to the Berlin and German problems; Soviet objectives remained unchanged and Berlin continued to be a potential danger point for East/West relations. Canada was therefore most anxious that the United States should keep in close touch with Moscow on Berlin, as on other problems, so that the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation was kept to a minimum; it likewise welcomed the current negotiations for a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow. Bilateral contacts of this kind were so useful that they should perhaps become a permanent feature of East/West relations, at least in their present phase.

18. The more belligerent policies of Communist China had been the main source of East/West tension since the Cuban crisis. Canada was particularly concerned that the long-standing threat to South-East Asia be contained. In Laos it had hoped that the full execution of the Geneva Agreement of July 1962 and the rôle of the International Control Commission would promote stability and peace in South East Asia. Canada would continue its efforts to secure greater freedom of action for the Commission, whose supervisory activities had until now been restricted by the Pathet Lao. The most important contribution which could presently be made by the Commission appeared to be to establish itself in and around the Plain of Jars with a view to exerting a restraining influence. Although India had in the past been reluctant to ascribe blame to the Pathet Lao for the deterioration in the Laotian situation, it now appeared determined to submit reports on an Indo-Canadian majority basis, despite its apprehensions that the result might make the operation of the Commission machinery difficult or impossible. This determination appeared to reflect a general Indian reassessment, as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict, of Chinese intentions in South-East Asia and elsewhere, and of the relative degrees of influence that Communist China and the Soviet Union could exert in this area.

19. The situation in the Himalayas remained potentially dangerous. China had demanded that on certain specific conditions, negotiations should start on the border dispute with India. India for her part required China to accept the Colombo Conference proposals before beginning negotiations. India could hardly be expected to accede to China's demands after having experienced a humiliating military setback. In the belief that a modest build-up of Indian military strength would exert a stabilising influence throughout Asia, Canada had provided India with a limited amount of military assistance; this had been given in close co-operation with the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and with due regard for the position of Pakistan.

20. Any explosion in the Middle East would clearly be exploited by the Soviet Union in an effort to counter the fall of Kassem and the emergence of an actively anti-Communist régime in Iraq. Current unrest in Syria, Iraq and Jordan and the recent fighting in Yemen provided renewed evidence of the instability of Arab relations and showed the importance of avoiding direct

Western involvement in Arab affairs. While the future of the United Arab Federation remained quite uncertain, it was important that Western nations should not indicate any reservations about the desirability of, or prospects for, Arab unity; this need not, however, prevent them from making clear their concern that political change in the area should be effected without violence or subversion. Canada considered that in the Middle East any action intended to counteract an outbreak or acute threat of hostilities should be taken within the framework of the United Nations and should make the maximum use of existing United Nations machinery in the area; much was to be said for preventive United Nations measures rather than reliance upon hasty improvisation after hostilities had broken out.

21. In the Congo, the United Nations action was happily coming to an end. The Congolese Government had invited Canada, along with various other NATO countries, to provide it with bilateral assistance in training and modernising its forces. This request would be given careful consideration by the Canadian authorities, bearing in mind the obvious difficulties of assigning for a further prolonged period highly-trained French-speaking personnel, reserves of which were already overstrained by commitments to the United Nations Organization in the Congo and in Indo-China. Moreover, as long as Canadian forces were serving with the United Nations in the Congo - and Canada alone had a substantial contingent in the Congo - it must be remembered that the United Nations Congo Advisory Committee, of which Canada was the only NATO member, had failed to agree on a United Nations co-ordinating rôle in the Congo, or indeed on whether bilateral military assistance would be appropriate while United Nations forces were still in the Congo. On the other hand, Canada recognised the Congo's needs and the difficulties which would be faced by Belgium in assuming such a large share of the burden of re-training Congolese forces. In this connection, he wished to pay a tribute to the rôle played by Mr. Spaak in restoring a constructive relationship between his country and the independent government of the Congo.

22. Recognising the considerable vulnerability of Latin America to Communist penetration, Canada was undertaking a thorough review of its relations with that area, and welcomed evidence of increasing interest in it on the part of European members of the Alliance.

23. In conclusion, Mr. Martin stressed that any divergencies in the Alliance could be reconciled only by consultation and negotiation based on a true feeling of partnership within the Alliance; defence, economic and cultural requirements made no other conclusion possible.

24. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) noted with satisfaction that the Alliance had made considerable progress during the last six months and that this positive stocktaking afforded confirmation of the effectiveness of the policy pursued and of the importance of NATO as a factor for peace and balance in international relations.

25. In the military field, he considered that efforts should be directed at seeking diverse formulas able to secure for the free world a complete range of means of defence. He had read with interest the special report by the Secretary General on NATO defence policy and, in particular, had accepted the proposal to invite the Council in Permanent Session to make a detailed examination of methods of obtaining a proper balance between conventional and nuclear forces. He pointed out, however, that although for reasons of national and collective security the question of armaments must not be neglected, all peoples continued to place their hopes in the outcome of the disarmament negotiations, despite the intransigence of the Soviets. That was why he welcomed the steps taken in Moscow by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the field of disarmament. As regards East/West relations, he shared the opinion of Mr. Rusk and Lord Home that the West must preserve the possibility to conclude agreements, even partial, on the understanding that such agreements would be negotiated without relinquishing the basic principles underlying the defence of the free world and after prior consultation of all the countries of the Alliance. In his opinion, the possession by the Alliance of nuclear as well as conventional weapons reduced the likelihood of total war and tended to restrict the East/West conflict to the realm of economics and ideology. He thought NATO might do well to consider improving its defence arrangements in these two latter fields.

26. Furthermore, he felt that at the present juncture, the internal structure of the Alliance raised increasingly important problems. He recalled that at the last Ministerial Meeting his Government had stressed the need to solve the problem of political consultation and that of the information system which, in his opinion, was one of the weakest points in the structure of NATO. He had been pleased to note the progress in this respect during the last six months and felt that these positive factors constituted an incentive to continue along this path. He suggested that the present political situation should be examined as should the short and long-term assumptions underlying the foreign policies of the member States, with a view to the co-ordination of these policies by prior consultation. He added that the achievement of a common European policy, which remained one of Italy's basic aims, was regarded by his Government as an equally important aspect of the reorganization of the relations between the member States.

27. As regards the relations of the Alliance with the unaligned countries, he considered that the development of the situation in Latin America should be closely watched and that the attitude to be adopted towards the different governments of this part of the world should be determined not only on the basis of the requirements of law and order, but also in the light of the guarantees these governments could give as regards their determination to establish really democratic régimes. With respect to the Middle East, his Government continued to keep developments under very close review and was prepared to foster economic and social

progress intended to call a halt to Soviet infiltration and satisfy the legitimate national and social aspirations of the peoples. In Africa, it was to be hoped that the Addis Ababa Conference would provide useful indications of the policy of the various States which had recently won their independence and which should be kept within the Western economic sphere. Where Asian questions were concerned, the Italian Government considered it essential to help those countries which could be regarded as solid bastions of the West.

28. Turning next to problems of information, he dwelt on the utility of closer collaboration in the study of the initiatives of the Communist countries in the NATO countries, the need for which had already been urged by the Committee of Three. He was particularly anxious for consideration to be given to the long-term objectives of the Communist movement, to its political plans and to their development under the pressure of circumstances, in order that the Alliance should be able to make the necessary changes to its own plans. He recalled that at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1961, the present President of the Italian Republic, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, had urged the West to counter with "simple and effective formulas" those employed by the Eastern bloc.

29. He concluded by stressing that, while strengthening its means of defence and intensifying its action to frustrate the Communist threat, NATO must address itself to the task of guaranteeing to all peoples the stability required for the free development of their civilisations along democratic lines.

30. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) said that a comparison of the present overall political situation with that of December 1962 revealed no major changes in Western relations with the Soviet bloc. The absence of any aggressive Soviet moves could primarily be attributed to the firm and timely United States' action during the Cuban crisis. This present period of calm offered an opportunity to develop new formulas for co-operation in common defence and improve political and economic co-operation; integration in the military field could only succeed if firmly based on a greater harmonisation of foreign policies. To improve the process of political consultation, each nation should conduct its foreign policy less as an expression of national interest than with a view to furthering the political aims of the Alliance. In the past, several nations had undergone pressure from their NATO allies to follow policies weakening their position and increasing that of the Soviet bloc. Yet the strength of the Alliance could not be promoted by appeasement, sacrificing principles to expediency or yielding to military aggression. The importance of harmonisation of policies and a co-operative spirit were overriding. Despite the necessity in an emergency for prompt reaction by allies bearing the heaviest responsibilities, more timely exchanges of views must take place within the Council in Permanent Session on events preceding such emergencies.

31. He endorsed the remarks of Mr. Rusk at the December meeting regarding the means of achieving advance consultation; and also those of Mr. Martin that the presence of Ministers at meetings of the Council in Permanent Session should be further encouraged in order to facilitate discussion of particular issues and to emphasise that the Council in Permanent Session was the focal point for exchange of views and harmonisation of policy. Occasional meetings of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group would also be valuable, without committing the participating governments to an early assessment of developments which eventually might become of interest to NATO. The Council in Permanent Session could then investigate for consultation or action recommended by APAG, for example that the possibility should be considered of more diversified economic relations with the Soviet satellites.

32. He believed that advantage should be taken of the present lull in East/West relations by rounding off the discussions started by the Council in Permanent Session regarding contingency planning for Berlin and by undertaking political planning with regard to other contingencies in Berlin. Furthermore, the projection, especially in the eyes of non-NATO nations, of a more positive image of Western policy than one of mere passive reaction to Soviet moves should be examined. As regards the disarmament negotiations and the German problem, the West should continue to be more inventive and active in its approach. However, it would be dangerous to contemplate Western concessions in Berlin in return for a more conciliatory Soviet attitude towards other problems; firmness, together with open-mindedness towards all proposals, should remain the basis of the Western position. The Netherlands Government fully endorsed the views of Mr. Schröder on Berlin and expressed its admiration for the courage of the Berliners. The many problems besetting Russia had considerably restricted Soviet freedom of action and rendered inadvisable any Western concessions on Berlin. He viewed with gratification the widening rift between the Soviet Union and China and endorsed the view of Lord Home that Indonesia was veering towards Communist China.

33. Turning to the Western hemisphere, he pointed to the quiescence of the situation in the Caribbean, despite the problems existing between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. However, the complete resolution of the Caribbean problem still lay in the future. Attention should be devoted to the problems facing the Latin American countries as a whole, which should be regarded as a special challenge to the members of NATO, who shared similar ideals and had the means to assist Latin America to achieve a better standard of living. The United States had demonstrated by the Alliance for Progress its full intention to bear its responsibilities, and other members, especially the Netherlands, having direct interests in Latin America, had also shown their desire to play a full part in the development of Latin America. The encouraging results so far achieved would be an incentive to the Netherlands Government to place its experience at the disposal of other useful

ventures in Latin America. In this area there was room for greater co-ordination of NATO activities and for a strengthening of the sentiment that Latin America was an integral part and a common responsibility, of the West as a whole.

34. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) began by dealing with the domestic problems of the Alliance. He thanked Mr. Rusk for having reiterated the United States Government's conviction of the indivisibility of NATO defence and for having stated once again that United States collaboration rested on this conviction. In view of this solemnly repeated pledge, Mr. Spaak urged that the problem be regarded as settled for good, and that everyone should accept the indivisibility of defence once for all as the corner-stone of the Alliance. As Mr. Rusk had said, it was not for sentimental reasons that the United States considered itself to be indissolubly linked to the rest of the Alliance; it was merely recognising a fact, an absolute necessity. If they were to think otherwise, the leaders of the United States would be making a fatal mistake since in no conflict involving Europe could the United States remain indifferent without being in mortal danger. The dominant position which certain European countries had enjoyed at the beginning of the century should no longer influence its thinking. It should remember that in any future conflict it would no longer be the future of Europe that was at stake; it would be the conquest of the entire world by the USSR, and so the United States would find itself involved right from the beginning. At all events, it would be childish to imagine that the USSR would allow the United States to choose the time and method of attack. The policy outlined by Mr. Rusk should therefore be accepted as flowing inevitably from the indivisibility of the Alliance and its defence. It only remained for all the members of the Alliance to shape their action in accordance with this indisputable truth.

35. He recalled that Mr. Rusk had also stated that the United States was prepared to share the responsibilities involved in the possession and use of atomic weapons. It was not the first time that Mr. Rusk had made such a statement, but this very repetition was important as proof of the will to strengthen the military links of the Alliance and to promote integration in the atomic sphere. Such an aim could only be achieved by the development of political consultation; this consultation was not yet perfect, but everyone agreed that it should be continued. It was obvious that such consultation must not hamper action. This was a perfectly understandable reservation which did not seem to be at variance with the principle of permanent consultation. Such consultation would make it possible to spot dangers as soon as they appeared on the horizon and work out progressively the policy to be followed and the action to be taken.

36. Turning to the problem of East-West relations, he observed that members of the Council had made an identical assessment of the situation. Several of them had spoken about the "immobilism" of Soviet policy and this expression, for the time

being at least, was apt. A very great change had occurred since the time when Soviet policy displayed such drive that the West did not know how to regain the initiative. There had been a considerable change since then and it would be most discouraging if the Alliance, which had not been able to find an answer to Soviet dynamism, were now unable to find one to its immobilism.

37. Several speakers had examined the causes of this immobilism. He personally wanted to take as an example the Soviet Government's Congo policy, the underlying aims of which since 1961 remained an inexplicable mystery to him. Since that date, the USSR had not intervened in any way. U Thant had been able to apply, without opposition, without a meeting of the Security Council, the plan which bore his name, the plan which in actual fact was a Western-inspired plan. The USSR had not reacted to the scheme to reorganize the Congolese army, which at any other time would have aroused the most bitter controversy. The West was, therefore, faced with a Soviet policy which had lost its drive, a policy of immobilism as some speakers had called it. He personally felt that Mr. Schröder had used a more apt description when he had spoken about making full use of "the present pause". The question was how to make use of it. The Prime Minister of Canada had said in his opening address at the present Ministerial meeting:

"We must direct the best of our talents towards uncovering, exploiting and building upon every conceivable point of common interest between East and West. There is no alternative to utilising all the genius of our statecraft to wed the power of our collective strength to reasoned and forward-looking policies, and thus to give our diplomacy its best chance of reducing tensions and fostering international understanding."

38. Although he fully endorsed these words, Mr. Spaak said that the problem now was to give them a meaning, to decide how the best use could be made of the pause, how the Alliance could display some drive before the USSR regained its impetus. As regards a non-aggression pact between NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty, he felt that the idea should not be rejected out of hand; it might be studied, not in itself, but as a complement to an agreement on disarmament. In any case, the idea of a pact of this kind should not be rejected on legal grounds. The public was often put off by the legal hair-splitting, to his mind exaggerated, indulged in by the Alliance. The signing of this pact would obviously raise very serious problems, mainly concerning East Germany, but from a psychological standpoint it would have very great propaganda value.

39. He felt that the Alliance should also review its position on the control and inspection of nuclear weapons. As Secretary General of NATO he had often heard the view expressed, by the most eminent military authorities, that it was possible to devise a system of inspection which would minimise the risk of a surprise attack. While developments had taken place since then, he thought that such a proposal was still worthy of study.

40. In conclusion, he said that it was now or never that the Alliance needed ideas and needed to be as imaginative in its approach as the USSR had been a few years before. It was from this standpoint that NATO must tackle the problem and impress public opinion. It should take heart and derive imaginative inspiration from the recent marked improvement in its position, from the setback suffered by Communism in Africa and the Far East, which could not have been predicted a few years ago. In a word, it should go over from the defensive to the diplomatic offensive in order to ensure peace.

41. Mr. COUVE de MURVILLE (France) said he would not return to the specific questions which had been fully dealt with by the previous speakers. Like Mr. Spaak, he would confine himself to the problems of NATO and its relations with the East.

42. As far as NATO was concerned, there were two main problems: the nuclear problem and the European problem.

As regards the nuclear problem, three questions arose:

- (a) the manufacture and possession of atomic weapons;
- (b) the decision to use them;
- (c) the elaboration of NATO policy in the field of military strategy.

43. The problem was therefore conditioned by a de facto situation which was itself governed by the responsibilities involved in the possession of atomic weapons, and it was for this reason that it was very difficult to find any solutions. It was a problem which would require further lengthy discussions and it should be approached modestly, calmly and objectively.

44. The European problem was created by the far-reaching transformation of Western Europe which was the result, on one hand, of its recovery and growing prosperity and, on the other, of the disappearance of the antagonisms which had been rife only a short while ago. This transformation had given rise to tendency to speak of Europe as though it were an entity representing, in its own right, an equal partner to the United States. Very great hopes could be founded on this notion, but the fact of the matter was that at present Europe was composed of States, and no real entity existed. Admittedly, certain signs looked promising, especially the Common Market in the economic sphere, but nothing had yet been started in the political or military spheres. One therefore needed to be careful to speak in moderate terms and not allow oneself to go further than the facts warranted.

45. The European problem was directly connected with the sharing of the defence burden referred to by Mr. Rusk and with the fact that hitherto by far the biggest burden had been carried by the United States. This was a situation which must not go on

indefinitely, but it was also a situation which could not easily be changed as long as no real progress had been made towards the political and military unification of Europe. The equitable sharing of the defence burden was a long-term task to which the Alliance would have to devote itself for many years to come.

46. The question of East-West relations had given rise to much questioning. There were signs, which seemed obvious, of changes in Soviet policy that were ascribable to both domestic and external factors, but it was very difficult to say more than this. The result had been a certain immobilism which in fact went back to May 1960, to the abortive Summit Conference and the pretexts which had caused it to be adjourned. At the time there had been talk of a détente and of disarmament; since then everything had come to a standstill, except the armaments race, and it was now therefore quite illusory to speak of disarmament. Since that time Mr. Khrushchev had given the impression of, so to speak, beating about for ideas in all fields, except in the case of the building of the Berlin wall in August 1961 which marked, as it were, the end of the Berlin crisis in the form it had taken since 1958.

47. Two tentative conclusions could be drawn from this situation, namely, as Mr. Schröder had said, that the Alliance must continue to be vigilant and without illusions, and secondly that the West should not imagine that it could influence developments inside Russia. Any attempt at intervention, based as it was on an illusion, would only weld together any rival factions and lead to a turn of events unfavourable to NATO's interests. Nor should NATO do anything with the idea of helping Mr. Khrushchev in his struggle against the Stalinist elements who were so much more dangerous than he himself for the Western world. Thus, for instance, the idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Pact should not be considered from the standpoint of Russian policy, but exclusively from the standpoint of Western policy. If there were genuine prospects of a détente, it would be unwise to refuse to consider them, but in the present situation in which the Soviets, for reasons of their own, were reduced to immobilism, it seemed unlikely that they could re-shape their foreign policy so completely as to foster hope of a real improvement in relations. This question, like the others he had just dealt with, should be the subject of further discussions, since for the time being it was only based on more or less vague speculations.

48. Mr. NOGUEIRA (Portugal) proposed to confine his remarks to the situation prevailing in Latin America and Africa. Due to its special relations with the Latin American countries, Portugal had a keen interest in recent trends in that part of the world. He was not optimistic about the situation. The infiltration of Communism in many sections should rule out any kind of complacency on the part of the Alliance. In many Latin American countries the Communists were very active and often successful, and despite the presence of conservative governments, Communist subversion was a real danger. The Castro régime in Cuba inspired and directed most of these subversive activities by training agents and supplying

funds. There was no doubt that the present Communist danger in the rest of Latin America would not be nearly so serious and immediate without the Cuban forepost. When the Soviet missiles had been removed from the island the West had rejoiced that a firm policy had removed this threat to its security. The threat still remaining in Cuba was, however, as great as the one which had been removed.

49. In view of the powerful aid given by the Castro régime to the cause of the Communists in Latin America, it was important to emphasise the limitations of one of the remedies most frequently advocated for dealing with the Communist danger. Poverty must be fought, and the efforts made by the United States in this direction were welcomed. But if poverty was a good breeding ground for Communism, it had also been shown that Communism could spread even where the standard of living was rising and among people who were not poverty-stricken. The efforts to reduce poverty in Latin America would be insufficient to break the influence of Communism unless they were accompanied by political support for leaders who were willing and able to oppose Communist infiltration, and by co-ordination of the policies of the North American and European countries with a view to giving Latin America the feeling that its legitimate interests could be adequately safeguarded in association with an Atlantic Community in the broadest sense. The case of Cuba illustrated that the Communist attack was global and could not be met with a limited solidarity. In response to past suggestions that Europe should help Latin America, he could say that Portugal, as a country most intimately connected with Latin America, was fully prepared to play its part together with other European countries as go-between in order to keep this area safe for the free world.

50. As to Africa, it was his conviction that, so far as the Portuguese territories were concerned, the situation had considerably improved in the area of Angola which had suffered from terrorist activities in 1961. Law and order had been restored. The only cause for concern now was the activities across the border in the Republic of the Congo. Not all of these activities were the fault of the Congolese authorities, and some other sources were involved. Portugal had always maintained that the terrorist activity was organized and supported from outside, and there now seemed to be no doubt on this point.

51. Portugal felt that its policy was succeeding and that it was being more fully understood not only by some Western countries but also by certain African countries, in the sense that it was seen to be not an expedient but a solution for the problems in that part of the Continent of Africa. There were still troubles to overcome, especially in the political field where the Afro-Asian countries conducted a tireless propaganda campaign. More and more Africans, however, were beginning to realise that slogans were not enough to feed, educate and house people, to raise the standard of living and to improve transport and communications - all of which were being demanded by the African peoples. Because

of this and other political and economic reasons, Portugal was establishing and improving relations with Nyasaland and Madagascar and hoped to do the same with the Republic of the Congo.

52. In conclusion, he said that the Soviet Union and Communist China could be counted upon to stop at nothing to achieve their goals in Africa. The present lull in Soviet policy towards Africa should not mislead the West, which should remain vigilant in regard to developments in the Continent.

53. Mr. HARLEM (Norway) said that it would be wise to consider the question raised earlier by Lord Home, not only in connection with the Alliance's efforts towards disarmament but also with regard to the activities of NATO's permanent working bodies. Disarmament efforts had not produced the results which had been hoped for, but he was glad to see that none had given up hope that results could be reached, and that the United States and other member countries were sincerely working to find realistic solutions to the problem of arms control, including a test ban, without reducing the security of any nation. The policies of developing the common defence, consolidating the Alliance, supporting the United Nations, seeking balanced disarmament, searching without any illusions for a better relationship with the Soviet world and assisting the underdeveloped world were not contradictory but constituted one constructive whole.

54. The COUNCIL:

agreed to conclude the discussion the next morning.

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