

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

modet

EXEMPLAIRE

N° 361

COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH
23rd June, 1962

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(62)29

Summary record of a meeting of the Council,
held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe,
on Friday, 15th June, 1962 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM
Mr. A. de Staercke

GREECE
Mr. M. Melas

NORWAY
Mr. S. Ekeland

CANADA
Mr. J. Léger

ICELAND
Mr. T.A. Tomasson

PORTUGAL
Mr. V. Armando
Martins

DENMARK
Dr. E. Schram-
Nielsen

ITALY
Mr. A. Alessandrini

TURKEY
Mr. Pertev Subasi

FRANCE
Mr. P. de Leusse

LUXEMBOURG
Mr. P. Reuter

UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. F.S. Tomlinson

GERMANY
Dr. G. von Walther

NETHERLANDS
Mr. H.N. Boon

UNITED STATES
Mr. T.K. Finletter

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General
Deputy Secretary General, Assistant
Secretary General for Economics and
Finance
Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs
Assistant Secretary General for Production,
Logistics and Infrastructure
Assistant Secretary General for
Scientific Affairs
Executive Secretary

: Mr. G. Colonna
:
: Mr. F.D. Gregh
:
: Mr. R.W.J. Hooper
:
: Mr. Johnson Garrett
:
: Dr. W.A. Nierenberg
: The Lord Coleridge

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ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative : Général de Corps d'Armée
J.M. Guérin
Chairman of the Civil and Military
Budget Committees : Mr. H. Massberg (for Item I)

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I. ORGANIZATION OF FINANCIAL CONTROL IN THE NATO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN GERMANY

Document: C-M(62)64

1. The CHAIRMAN, noting that in C-M(62)64 the Military Budget Committee recommended a modification of the organization of financial control in the NATO Military Headquarters in Germany, recalled that the Council had decided in 1959 to create a single post of Financial Controller for all the NATO Headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany. Since then, the different Headquarters had received international status and the scope and complexity of the budgets had greatly increased. For these reasons, a modification to this arrangement, acceptable to SHAPE, was now proposed in paragraph 5 of C-M(62)64, for approval by the Council.

2. The COUNCIL:

- (1) agreed that the single civilian post of Financial Controller, Germany, should be abolished;
- (2) agreed that, taking account of the time required for nomination procedures, two new posts of Financial Controller, NORTHAG/2ATAF and Financial Controller, CENTAG respectively, should be established as from 1st January, 1963, each to be filled by a civil servant of the host country, having regard to the NATO Financial Regulations which provide that "a Financial Controller shall normally be a civil servant of a member country". These posts should be established in a grade not exceeding that of A.5, in the light of the grades established for Financial Controllers in comparable Allied Headquarters;
- (3) agreed that each of these Financial Controllers should be assisted, as at present, by a deputy Financial Controller, who should remain a suitably qualified Service Officer of the nation of the main supporting force;
- (4) agreed that notwithstanding the provisions of the NATO Financial Regulations referred to in paragraph (2) above, the establishment of a separate civilian Financial Controller for the 4th ATAF would not at this time appear to be justified by the scope or characteristics of the budget of that Headquarters. The Budget and Finance Section of this Headquarters should be under a senior serving officer, with suitable qualifications, of the nation of the supporting force. His official title should be "Deputy Financial controller" -

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thus not precluding the possibility of the creation in the future of a civilian controller's post at Headquarters 4th ATAF, when warranted by circumstances. He should be directly subordinate to, and should carry out his functions with powers delegated by, the Financial Controller, AFCENT.

- (5) invited SACEUR to take the necessary steps for the nomination of candidates for the two new posts of Financial Controller in accordance with approved procedure.

NATO RESTRICTEDII. CHAIRMANSHIP OF CIVIL AND MILITARY BUDGET COMMITTEES

Reference: C-R(61)26, Item III
Document: PO/62/340

3. The CHAIRMAN said that his note PO/62/340 recorded some agreements reached by the Deputy Permanent Representatives in connection with the problem of replacement of the Chairman of the Civil and Military Budget Committees, Mr. Massberg. The Council was invited to endorse these arrangements, whereby Mr. Massberg was asked to continue as Chairman of the Civil and Military Budget Committees for a further six months from the time when his duties would normally have expired, i.e. 15th July, 1962; and the two Budget Committees were asked to meet together to consider the suggestion that the chairmanship of the Civil and Military Budget Committees should no longer be vested in the same official, and to report by the end of July 1962.

4. He invited comments on the proposals contained in paragraph 2 of PO/62/340.

5. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objection to the decisions recorded in paragraph 2(a) and (b) of PO/62/340, or to the recommendation in paragraph 2(c) that Mr. Massberg's period of service be extended for six months. However, he thought that, since this extension did not depend on the decision to be taken on the question of principle of the chairmanship of the Civil and Military Budget Committees, it might be preferable to omit the phrase in paragraph 2(c) "to give the North Atlantic Council time to take a decision on the question of principle of the chairmanship of the Civil and Military Budget Committees". His authorities were in favour of continuing the system of a single chairmanship.

6. In reply to a comment by the Chairman, who pointed out that the phrase in question was explanatory and not conditional, he said that he was prepared to approve the text as it stood. He hoped that agreement could be reached at an early date on the question of principle; his authorities would like to see a single chairman appointed in January, 1963.

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7. The COUNCIL:

- (1) agreed, in accordance with the established practice, to regard the period of service of the Chairman of the Civil and Military Budget Committees as limited to one year with the possibility of its extension for a further year;
- (2) agreed that the period of service of the Chairman of the Civil and Military Budget Committees should begin on 1st January or 15th January of each year, i.e. after approval of the budget estimates for the coming year;
- (3) agreed that, by way of an exception, Mr. Massberg's period of service be extended for six months to give the Council time to take a decision on the question of principle of the Chairmanship of the Civil and Military Budget Committees;
- (4) agreed that a full report on the proposed creation of two separated chairmanships for the Civil and Military Budget Committees be prepared by the International Staff before 30th June, 1962. This report, showing the advantages and drawbacks of such a measure, should be submitted without delay for consideration by the combined Civil and Military Budget Committees, who should notify the Working Group of the Deputy Permanent Representatives of their joint conclusions before 31st July, 1962.

NATO CONFIDENTIALIII. CO-ORDINATED PRODUCTION OF THE AS.30 MISSILE IN EUROPE:
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATO STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE
PRODUCTION OF THE AS.30 MISSILE

Document: C-M(62)65 ✓

8. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council had before it a memorandum by the Chairman of the Armaments Committee, inviting the Council to approve the establishment of a NATO Steering Committee on the Production of the AS.30 Missile. The Armaments Committee had taken its decision after ascertaining that all contracts would be dealt with in the name of the participating countries and that NATO would consequently not be involved in any financial responsibility in this respect. The Council was, therefore, invited to endorse the decision of the Armaments Committee to establish a NATO Steering Committee on the Production of the AS.30 Missile, with the terms of reference set out in paragraph 2 of document C-M(62)65.

9. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE recalled that, on 20th October, 1960, the Armaments Committee, after studying the report by the Group on Tactical Short-Range Air/Surface Guided Missiles, had agreed to set up the Ad Hoc Working Group AC/191 to study the possibilities of manufacturing or producing within NATO the AS.30 Missile.

France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Greece, Italy and the United States had taken part in the work of the Group as active members and Canada, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands as observers. The work of the AC/191 Group had been concerned in particular with technical information provided by the French authorities, and with German studies on the possibilities of equipping the F-104G aircraft with the AS.30. The Group had been present at a demonstration of the missile at Colomb-Béchar in February, 1961. Following thereon, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France had announced their decision in principle to adopt the AS.30 Missile. At the suggestion of France, these three countries had proposed to the Armaments Committee the creation of a NATO Steering Committee on the Production of the AS.30 Missile, whose terms of reference were set out by the Secretary General in C-M(62)65. It had been made clear that the Steering Committee would remain open to any country which desired to join it. The Armaments Committee had approved the creation of this Committee at its meeting on 28th May, 1962. He now invited the Council, on behalf of the three nations concerned, to approve this decision officially.

10. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities could approve the establishment of a NATO Steering Committee for the AS.30 Missile. There was, however, one point on which he would welcome clarification. When the establishment of this Steering Committee had been discussed in the Armaments Committee, the Netherlands Delegation had raised the question whether, and to what extent, there would be NATO liability for commitments undertaken by the new production group. The answer from the legal experts was that there would be no NATO liability. He thought, however, that there was at least a certain moral responsibility involved. The Council was now being invited to give its formal approval to the establishment of a Steering Committee. Formal approval by the Council might mislead outsiders with regard to the NATO rôle in respect of this new body. He wondered whether formal approval did not in fact mean that the Council itself would be establishing the new Committee, which would then seem to fall under Article 1(c) of the Ottawa Agreement and thus become a NATO subsidiary body. If this was the case, surely the question of NATO liability would arise. He recalled that the Council had recently adopted standard regulations for NATO Production and Logistics organizations which contained special clauses to restrict liability to the members participating in a particular agency, and to exclude any responsibility for non-participating countries. It was for this reason that his delegation had recently advocated the establishment of a NATO Production and Logistics Organization in all cases of co-ordinated production, including the AS.30 Group.

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11. He suggested that, in order to avoid any misunderstanding which might arise from formal Council endorsement of the establishment of the new group, it would be preferable for the Council simply to note its establishment by the Armaments Committee. This would rule out any implication of NATO commitment or of commitment by the non-participating countries.

12. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that he would have no objection to merely noting the establishment of the Steering Committee, though he assured the Netherlands Representative that NATO would incur no financial responsibility; this was borne out by existing experience, for example, with the Maritime Patrol Aircraft project, in which financial responsibility was limited to the participating countries.

13. The CHAIRMAN thought that there was perhaps little difference whether the Council endorsed or noted the establishment of the Steering Committee. The precedent in the case of the NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft was "endorsement" by the Council; from the legal point of view, this implied no financial responsibility for NATO. While he would regret a change from this precedent, he thought that the requirement in paragraph 2 of C-M(62)65 that the Steering Committee should submit relevant reports to the Armaments Committee would create the necessary links between the new body and NATO. Subject to agreement by the three governments concerned, he would be prepared to adopt the suggestion by the Netherlands Representative that the Council should simply note the establishment of the Steering Committee.

14. The COUNCIL:

noted the decision of the Armaments Committee to establish a NATO Steering Committee on the Production of the AS.30 Missile, with the terms of reference set out in paragraph 2 of C-M(62)65.

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IV. MEASURES NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE RATE OF EXECUTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS

Reference: C-R(62)1, Item IV

Documents: SG 137/60
C-M(62)68

15. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council had before it a report by the Infrastructure Committee (C-M(62)68), commenting, at the request of the Council, on the proposals of the Standing Group in SG 137/60. The Standing Group memorandum expressed the view that the rate of execution of NATO Infrastructure appeared to be slowing down and that the NATO military posture was being adversely

affected thereby; the Standing Group suggested that the International Staff should assume new responsibilities for progressing NATO Infrastructure work. Without fully endorsing the Standing Group's analysis of the rate of execution of the Infrastructure Programme, the Infrastructure Committee was ready to agree that improvement was possible, and recommended the establishment of a progress scheduling, reporting and follow-up system (paragraphs 11 to 18 of the report) as a means of meeting the common objective of the Standing Group's report.

16. He asked the Standing Group Representative if the recommendations of the Infrastructure Committee were acceptable to the Standing Group.

17. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that while appreciating the exceptional measures taken in C-M(61)92 to accelerate the execution of infrastructure works necessary for the installation of advanced weapons, the Standing Group considered that it was essential to accelerate the execution of the entire programme of Infrastructure as a whole. While it had not noted any major diminution in the rate of actual expenditure, the Standing Group considered that the lack of acceleration in expenditure, combined with the rise in cost prices, resulted finally in a reduction in the rate of work executed. The SACLANT Quarterly Report on the Progress of Infrastructure for the first quarter of 1962 showed that of 28 projects completed, 24 had been completed with an average delay of 28 months. A number of projects for the TACAN and LORAN systems at present showed delays of as much as 78 months. The completion dates of these projects, planned for 1957/1958, had not yet been reached, and the projects, were now planned for completion only in 1962/1963, if not later. Even admitting the difficulties encountered in the choice of sites, such delays were unacceptable from the military point of view.

18. The Standing Group considered that the need for new measures should be based on the delays experienced so far rather than on forecast plans, since experience showed that for various reasons plans had often not, in fact, materialised. Moreover, the Standing Group considered that unless care was taken now, the rate of construction was likely to be delayed further for systems included in the later Slices, and in future Slices, due to the fact that these systems were more complex than those in earlier Slices: for example, the Infrastructure systems for the air defence of Europe. In consequence, the Standing Group considered that the goals it had proposed in the document SG 137/60 were essential in order to achieve a satisfactory NATO defence posture and that if, in practice, taking into account a major effort by host nations, the recommendations in C-M(62)68 did not appear adequate to reach these goals, it would be necessary to envisage speedily more stringent measures.

19. In conclusion, he could not say that the recommendations in C-M(62)68 corresponded fully to the recommendations made by the Standing Group in SG 137/60. However, taking into account

the difficulties involved and in order to avoid further delay in tackling the problem, he thought that the military authorities hoped that the recommendations by the Infrastructure Committee would be shown in practice to be adequate; the Standing Group would reserve the possibility, if this did not turn out to be the case, to request the Council to institute more stringent measures.

20. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had one reservation to make on the report by the Infrastructure Committee. While the Committee had been doing excellent work over the past 12 years, his authorities agreed with the Standing Group view that it was essential to accelerate the rate of execution of projects. If the recommendations by the Committee were to be responsive to the Standing Group requirements, they would have to be implemented at an early date. He could approve the recommendations on the understanding that their implementation should be kept under periodic review and that, if necessary, additional measures for accelerating work should be considered in the future.

21. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had been in favour of a somewhat stronger report than that by the Committee. Nevertheless they considered that the recommendations by the Committee represented a real step forward in the direction of better control and more expeditious execution of infrastructure works, and they were prepared to support them.

22. At the same time there were one or two aspects of this subject which the report did not mention or did not stress quite enough. Firstly, his authorities believed that the Standing Group was right in urging an intensification of efforts to execute infrastructure works more quickly; the Infrastructure Committee also shared this view. A look at recent figures on infrastructure progress indicated that currently the difference between the estimated cost of approved NATO Infrastructure projects and actual expenditures was of the order of £400 million. It should prove possible to reduce this substantially. To do so would certainly seem desirable from a military point of view; but it was also important financially. If this sum increased, or even remained more or less stable, there might be growing difficulties for governments in making further financial commitments. Canada could not, when considering demands for additional funds, overlook the heavy financial commitments which existed in relation to already approved projects. Furthermore, uncertainty as to when existing commitments would have to be met made proper budgeting extremely difficult.

23. Secondly, as regards the general surveillance of infrastructure progress, the Infrastructure Committee report mentioned that improved methods to this end had been under consideration, and that it might be possible to have more effective periodic examination of infrastructure progress as a result of the revised

semi-annual reporting procedure. Canada's view was that something more thorough might be required. However, his authorities were prepared to await the result of experience with the examinations presently envisaged before making any final judgement. They hoped that the Infrastructure Committee would make an assessment of these results in due course and reconsider at that time whether any further improvements would be desirable.

24. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, speaking as the representative of a host nation, made the following comments. Firstly, the slow rate of completion of infrastructure projects in the United Kingdom up to 1960 was in many cases due to factors outside United Kingdom control. However, as recognised in paragraph 6 of the Infrastructure Committee report, the programme for the United Kingdom was now well under way. Secondly, in assessing a country's record in the NATO Infrastructure field, due regard should be paid to those nationally funded projects which made an equally important contribution to the defence posture of the Alliance. This point was recognised in paragraph 8 of the Infrastructure Committee's report. Thirdly, as a host country, and having experience of the difficulties which arise from time to time in the implementation of projects, the United Kingdom had doubts about the need for the introduction of the measures proposed in C-M(62)68, but was prepared to accept the recommendations of the Infrastructure Committee. The new measures proposed should be applied selectively, since otherwise they would defeat their purpose.

25. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities were aware of the fact that NATO infrastructure projects in Germany had not always been completed as scheduled. The difficulties which had caused these delays were known to the Council. They were due to the federal structure of the Federal Republic, lack of available land, and to a variety of other tasks such as the build-up of new armed forces. In the light of these circumstances, the Federal authorities considered that they had met their responsibilities for NATO infrastructure to the best of their ability. Moreover, considerable progress had recently been made in the implementation of advanced weapons projects, of which a large number would be completed by the end of 1962. This progress had been made possible by the accelerated procedure agreed by the Council in October, 1961. The results obtained in the application of this procedure had been evaluated in the proposals by the Infrastructure Committee contained in C-M(62)68. The German authorities were convinced that the adoption of these proposals would promote the completion of the remaining infrastructure projects in a satisfactory manner.

26. He accordingly welcomed the report by the Infrastructure Committee and could accept its recommendations.

27. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE recognised that there had been considerable delays but pointed out that some countries, including Turkey, were faced with complex difficulties. His

authorities would be glad to do all in their power to accelerate the rate of execution of infrastructure works, but it was necessary for the measures agreed to be applicable. They considered the report by the Infrastructure Committee to be constructive and its recommendations practicable, and could therefore approve these recommendations as recorded in paragraph 20.

28. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, commenting on the views expressed by the Standing Group Representative and the references in SG 137/60 and paragraph 7 of C-M(62)68 to delays in the execution of Italian projects, reassured the Council that as regards his country the delays concerned only the tail-end of projects. These projects were now almost completed, and the installations could be used in their present state, if necessary. His authorities would do all in their power to complete the work at an early date. With regard to the report by the Infrastructure Committee, his authorities agreed that the major responsibility for accelerating work lay with the host governments, who should make the major effort to overcome the difficulties involved. They considered that the recommendations in the report would make it possible to accelerate the execution of projects and they could therefore approve these recommendations.

29. Mr. GARRETT, speaking as Chairman of the Infrastructure Committee, said that the International Staff fully agreed with the Standing Group comment that there was considerable room for improvement; that this question was continually under study. He expected that actual expenditure would increase over the next few years, in particular in connection with the air defence ground environment project. The present period was an interim one, in which an attempt was being made to complete projects which had been programmed up through Slice XII; at the same time, important new projects were being undertaken, such as air defence ground environment, which was the largest infrastructure project which had ever been programmed. Provided there was full support from the host countries and the Infrastructure Committee, he thought that good progress could be made in the future.

30. With regard to the first comment by the Canadian Representative, the Infrastructure Committee was constantly studying the question of the "back-log". It was difficult to define this back-log. One definition was that it represented the difference between expenditure authorised and expenditure actually incurred. There were, however, a number of elements to be taken into account, including political factors and the idea of what was an acceptable back-log. Both the Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress Committee had this matter constantly under consideration. As regards the suggestion by the Canadian Representative for more frequent reviews of progress, he said that the Infrastructure Committee had recently adopted a revised semi-annual reporting procedure for host countries, which should facilitate a closer follow-up of progress. The Committee would, of course, keep the matter of acceleration of infrastructure projects under continuous review.

31. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

- (1) noted the Standing Group's report in SG 137/60, and the report of the Infrastructure Committee (C-M(62)68);
- (2) reaffirmed that the prime and ultimate responsibility for the proper progress of the execution of NATO common infrastructure works lay with the host nations;
- (3) agreed to the establishment of a progress scheduling, reporting and follow-up system as outlined in paragraphs 11-18 of C-M(62)68;
- (4) agreed that, for the time being, the action in (1) to (3) above was a practical means of meeting the common objective of the Standing Group's report;
- (5) took note of the statements made in discussion and, in particular, of the need for continual review of progress made.

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V. EFFECTS ON THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE NATO COUNTRIES OF EVENTS SINCE THE NOVEMBER 1960 CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTY-ONE COMMUNIST PARTIES, INCLUDING THE TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

Document: C-M(62)49

32. The CHAIRMAN said that he thought the Special Committee should be congratulated on the extremely thorough report they had made in C-M(62)49 on the effects on the communist parties in the NATO countries of events since November 1960. As the Council would have seen, there was little comfort to be gained from this report. In spite of the strain on the unity of the world communist movement caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Soviet breach with the Albanian party, these events had had little effect on the threat to security presented by the communist parties in the NATO countries. Indeed, they had demonstrated beyond doubt that the communist parties in the NATO nations remained completely loyal to Moscow. Moreover, in the Berlin crisis, these parties, without exception, had supported Soviet policy. The Committee's conclusion was, therefore, that the threat to security posed by the communist parties in NATO nations, with two possible exceptions, remained undiminished.

33. In the preparation of this paper, the Committee had borne in mind the desirability of transmitting it to the CENTO and SEATO Organizations. It was classified Confidential and therefore could, if the Council agreed, be sent to them.

34. The CANADIAN and NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVES undertook to confirm their governments' agreement that the report should be transmitted to CENTO and SEATO.

35. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Report by the NATO Special Committee on the effects on the communist movement in the NATO countries of events since November 1960 (C-M(62)49).
- (2) subject to confirmation by the Canadian(1) and Norwegian Representatives, agreed that the report should be transmitted to CENTO and SEATO.

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VI. BULGARIAN PROPAGANDA AGAINST TURKEY

36. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he was instructed to make the following statement.

"Recently Bulgarian leaders and the Bulgarian press have launched a systematic propaganda campaign against Turkey and Turkish statesmen. This campaign was particularly intensive during the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to Bulgaria and in the days following this visit.

"Acting under orders from Moscow, the Bulgarian propaganda apparatus is aiming at destroying the links uniting the members of NATO and CENTO; in particular it attacks Turkey's membership of these alliances, the steps taken by Turkey in their framework and, in addition, the political and economic situation in Turkey. Bulgarian propaganda is trying to create the impression that military preparations are under way in Turkey against Bulgaria and the other communist countries, and that the defence measures taken by the Turkish Government are instruments of an aggressive threat.

"Almost every day the Bulgarian radio and press put out items of news on Turkey, devoid of any foundation, which are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of the country. For example, Bulgarian propaganda alleges that military expenditure has created a precarious economic situation in Turkey, that famine and misery are widespread and that those responsible are the Turkish statesmen who are instruments of western policy.

"Recently the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party repeated these allegations in a speech made on 28th May in the region of Razgrad, where the majority of the population is of Turkish origin. He added that Turks in Bulgaria enjoyed all the rights of Bulgarian citizens and that they were staunch adherers to communism. He even went so far as to make the ridiculous claim that Turkish leaders were engaged in activities aiming at disrupting the unity of Bulgaria and inciting the Bulgarian population to revolt.

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- (1) The Canadian Representative subsequently confirmed the agreement of his government.

"The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has put this subject into its proper perspective in a statement made to the correspondent of the Anatolia Agency on 7th June. Mr. Erkin recalled the purely defensive character of NATO and CENTO. He stated that no one was blind to the real meaning and intention of the allegations by the Bulgarian leaders that Turkey is preparing war against Bulgaria and the other communist countries, and is using the NATO and CENTO alliances as instruments of a hostile threat. Mr. Erkin added that the efforts of international communism to destroy the links uniting the members of NATO and CENTO are condemned to failure in Turkey. He continued as follows:

"It is strange that Bulgarian leaders try to lay at Turkey's door the responsibility for the lack of improvement in relations between the two countries. The Bulgarian Government has not replied to the suggestions and proposals made by the Turkish Government in September 1961 for solving certain problems of direct concern to the two countries, in the hope that this would be useful for the development of their relations and in conformity with the wish expressed by the Bulgarian Government to this effect. Notwithstanding this wish, Bulgarian leaders and the press are daily intensifying the propaganda launched against our country. It is impossible to reconcile this with the avowed desire to establish good relations with Turkey.

"Referring to the Razgrad speech by the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Foreign Minister said:

"This speech proves that the Bulgarian leaders do not honestly desire an improvement in the relations between the two countries. They are using the underhand method of addressing themselves directly to the Turkish people, ignoring governments publicly voted into office, in an attempt to discredit these governments in the opinion of the people. These propaganda tactics, which are a flagrant denial of international usage, will not find any acceptance among the Turkish people.

"As regards the Turkish Government, it naturally cannot remain indifferent to situations and actions which harm the rights and interests, guaranteed by international agreements, of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Our aim is to ensure that the Turkish minority enjoys the basic rights recognised by those agreements. It is not possible to reconcile with good neighbourliness either the statements by the Bulgarian leaders or the uncalled-for publications of the Bulgarian press on the economic and social problems of Turkey.

"Emphasising the respect entertained by Turkey for the rights of man and the firm intention of Turkey to carry out its economic and social development in the framework of realistic plans and in accordance with the requirements of a democratic system, Mr. Erkin concluded his statement to the Anatolia Agency by saying that, in the sphere of international relations, the Turkish Government has the right to expect that other countries show it the same respect and esteem as the Turkish Government shows them."

37. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the Turkish Representative.

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VII. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

38. The next meeting will take place on 27th June, 1962.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIIe.