

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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Summary Record of a meeting of the Council
held at the Porte Dauphine, Paris, XVIe.
on Wednesday, 16th December, 1959, at 3.30 p.m.

1) N 287
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PRESENT

President : H.E. Mr. H. Lange (Norway)
Chairman and
Secretary General: Mr. P.-H. Spaak

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P. Wigny (Minister for foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. J. van Houtte (Minister of Finance)
H.E. Mr. A. Gilson (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative)

CANADA

The Hon. H. Green (Secretary of State for External Affairs)
The Hon. D. Fleming (Minister of Finance)
The Hon. G.R. Pearkes, VC (Minister of National Defence)
H.E. Mr. J. Léger (Permanent Representative)

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. J.O. Krag (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Admiral E.J.C. Qvistaard (Chief of Defence)
H.E. Mr. K. Philip (Minister of Commerce)
H.E. Mr. A. Wassard (Permanent Representative)

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Pinay (Minister of Finance)
H.E. Mr. P. Guillaumat (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. P. de Leusse (Permanent Representative)

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. H. von Brentano (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. F.J. Strauss (Federal Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. F. Etzel (Federal Minister of Finance)
H.E. Mr. G. von Walther (Permanent Representative)

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GREECE

H.E. Mr. E. Averoff-Tossitsa (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. N. Martia (Minister of Industry)
H.E. Mr. G. Themelis (Under Secretary of State for
Defence)
H.E. Mr. M. Melas (Permanent Representative)

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. G.I. Gudmundsson (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. H.G. Andersen (Permanent Representative)

ITALY

H.E. Mr. G. Pella (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. F. Tambroni (Minister for Budget Affairs)
H.E. Mr. G. Andreotti (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. A. Alessandrini (Permanent Representative)

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus (Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Defence)
H.E. Mr. P. Reuter (Permanent Representative)

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Dr. H.R. van Houten (Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. S.H. Visser (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Dr. J. Zijlstra (Minister of Finance)
Jonkheer J.A. de Ranitz (Deputy Permanent Representative)

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. N. Handal (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. J. Boyesen (Permanent Representative)

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. M. Mathias (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. General J. Botelho Moniz (Minister of Defence)
H.E. Mr. A. de Faria (Permanent Representative)

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. F.R. Zorlu (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. E. Menderes (Minister of Defence)
General R. Erdelhun (Chief of Staff)
H.E. Mr. S. Sarper (Permanent Representative)

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd	(Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
The Rt. Hon. Heathcoat Amory	(Chancellor of the Exchequer)
The Rt. Hon. H. Watkinson	(Minister of Defence)
H.E. Sir Frank Roberts	(Permanent Representative)

UNITED STATES

Mr. C.A. Herter	(Secretary of State)
Mr. R.B. Anderson	(Secretary of the Treasury)
Mr. T.S. Gates	(Secretary of Defence)
Mr. W.R. Burgess	(Permanent Representative)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. A. Casardi	(Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. F.D. Gregh	(Deputy Secretary General/Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance)
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	(Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs)
Mr. R.B. Fiske	(Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics)
Dr. F. Seitz	(Science Adviser)
The Lord Coleridge	(Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

General Jar Beleza Ferraz	(Chairman, Military Committee)
General B.R.D.F. Hasselman	(Chairman, Military Committee in permanent session)
Admiral W. Boone	(Chairman, Standing Group)
General L. Norstad	(Supreme Allied Commander Europe)
Admiral J. Wright	(Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic)

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

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DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

I. DEPARTURE OF ADMIRAL WRIGHT AND GENERAL PARKER

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council was about to lose two of its military colleagues, Admiral Wright (SACLANT), and General Parker who for several years had been responsible for liaison between the Council and the Standing Group. Speaking first of General Parker, he wished to pay tribute to the exceptional qualities of loyalty, hard work and diplomacy, which he had brought to the accomplishment of a frequently delicate task. He was sure that his departure would cause general regret in the Alliance and that the Council would wish him every success in his future career in the US army.

2. Continuing, he said that in losing Admiral Wright, the Alliance was losing a most valuable colleague. The Council was well aware of the great weight of responsibility falling upon SACLANT. He much appreciated the forcefulness with which Admiral Wright had always defended his ideas before the Council, and the devotion, conscientiousness and cordial co-operation with which he had fulfilled his task. He thanked him on behalf of the Council and expressed the deep sorrow felt at his departure.

3. ADMIRAL WRIGHT expressed his sincere regret at the termination of his close association with NATO which had lasted ten years, of which he had spent six as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. On this last occasion he had of addressing the NATO Council, he wished to say a few words about the mission which had been given to him by the Council, about the organization of forces assigned to him and about his estimate of forces required, which had been approved by the NATO Council.

4. It was his firm belief that the mission which had been assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was as sound today as when it was first drawn up, and that it would remain so as long as the members of the Alliance were dedicated to mutual support. It was not necessary to dwell on the strategic importance of the seas, but he wished to emphasise strongly that the assigned mission must be accomplished not only on D-Day but on all subsequent days until the complete mission was accomplished, and that notwithstanding the importance of the defence of Europe, the continent of Europe could not be defended in isolation; it was thus indispensable that the control of the sea lines of communications should be maintained.

5. The organization of assigned forces remained basically the same as when his Command was set up, but important changes had come about with the introduction of new types of ships and new weapons, and modifications in some national contributions. During the same period, Soviet Russia had developed and improved their nuclear stockpiles and their missile capability, especially in respect of submarines equipped with guided missile launchers. Efforts should ceaselessly be made to counteract, through research and review, the increased Russian capability. It was

a prime requirement that military organization should remain simple and flexible, to allow an able, efficient allied leadership to be of the greatest worth and to derive the most benefit from the forces assigned to it.

6. Admiral Wright went on to say that he considered the force goals of MC 70 to be the absolute minimum required to accomplish the mission, and the only challenge that had been made to his estimate of force requirements was in respect of their adequacy. He wished to say once again that if the forces requested were ready, in place and equipped with modern weapons, then they could face the military threat to the Alliance. However, the 1959 Annual Review had revealed that these force goals were not being met. He wished to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the infrastructure programme, which for the SACLANT area was centred on the European seaboard of the Atlantic, had not progressed as quickly as had been hoped, for administrative reasons and on account of political considerations which the military commanders hoped would not be insurmountable. He pointed out that without the finalisation of the infrastructure programme, naval forces deployed in European waters would have a line of communications stretching across 3,000 miles of ocean and he stressed that infrastructure expenditure was a sound investment for collective security.

7. He did not wish, however, to conclude on this negative note, and among the achievements which had improved the operational capability had been the application of the principle of nuclear fission to anti-submarine warfare and the development of an effective depth charge, the application of nuclear fission to propulsion with the development of an atomic submarine equipped with missiles of the "Polaris" type, which possessed the advantages of ability to launch missiles from remote sea areas, ability to get close to the target, instantaneous response and complete concealment. Further, there were the development by the United Kingdom of the 987 radar and automatic data computing devices, by France of the Bréguet anti-submarine aircraft, by Norway of the lightweight anti-submarine sonar, and the development of the United States' homing torpedo. However, whereas all these developments had increased ability to destroy, an important problem remained, namely that of detection and identification. In this respect, with the financial help of the United States, the anti-submarine research centre at La Spezia had been developed, by which the benefits of untapped research potential could be reaped. He asked for the full support of all members for this project.

8. Progress had also been made in the field of combined planning and operation and these had been strengthened by the standardisation of material and operational procedures, thus giving a high capability to the first-class personnel whom he had been honoured to command. However, progress in the fields of combined operations and technology did not compensate for

deficiencies in numbers and these deficiencies prevented him from giving the firm assurance that the mission could be accomplished. He considered that this problem should be raised at the highest political level. To meet the agreed force goals would mean the allocation of additional national resources, and he urged members of the Alliance to keep in mind three considerations when studying the allocation to NATO of forces and resources.

9. Firstly, NATO was a defensive Alliance and military strength was a background to political strength and gave increased negotiating ability. Secondly, the strength of individual nations could never be as great as their combined strength as members of the Alliance, and thus the allocation of resources and forces should be a primary element in national policy. Improvements in the economic situation of member states should be reflected in their Defence Budgets. Thirdly, he wished to emphasise the need for unity and consolidation of defence. No member nation alone could resist the strength of Soviet Russia; Europe or North America could not be defended in isolation, and it was essential to retain firm control of the intervening lines of communication.

10. It was his firm belief that the future of the entire world depended on the collective defence of the Alliance, and this defence must be united and adequate to provide a deterrent against aggression, an obstacle to Soviet penetration and a force against Soviet blackmail. It was certain that the Alliance was the principal target of the Soviet Union.

11. He wished to repeat how honoured he had been to serve the Alliance, and he expressed the hope of continued peace for NATO.

12. The CHAIRMAN thought that it would be fruitful for all present to reflect upon the words that had just been spoken.

13. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the above statements;
- (2) at its meeting the next day, adopted a resolution accepting the release of Admiral Wright as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and requesting the President of the United States to nominate a United States naval officer for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic to succeed Admiral Wright. (For text of resolution, see C-M(59)126, Annex B.)

II. PRESENT STATUS OF THE MILITARY EFFORT

(a) The 1959 Annual Review (Contd.)

Documents: C-M(59)94, Parts I and II.
MC 39/11

14. Mr. PEARKE (Canada) stated that Canadian defence policy was based on collective defence within the Alliance. His government believed that the principles of collective defence were sound, and it was their intention to continue to meet the agreed force goals. They also expected all other members for their part to do likewise.

15. During the intelligence briefing that had been given at the previous session by the Chairman of the Standing Group, the Council had noted the changing nature of the Soviet threat, and of particular concern to Canada was the greater ability of Soviet Russia to attack directly North America. Canada's geographical position rendered invaluable the assistance his country could give to United States nuclear power, both by giving advanced warning and by facilitating the operation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were the primary Western deterrent; therefore all efforts to strengthen nuclear power not only defended North America, but were an increase in the contribution to the defence of NATO. They were also additional to the forces assigned by Canada to SACEUR and SACLANT.

16. Canada, like certain of her partners, was experiencing certain difficulties in modernisation of equipment, especially due to rapidly changing techniques and the high costs involved in replacing obsolete equipment. For these reasons his government could not contemplate increased commitments beyond what had been accepted previously.

17. His government had taken the decision to re-equip the Canadian Air Division deployed in France and Germany with the modern strike and reconnaissance CF 104 aircraft, at a cost of over \$400 million. His authorities had undertaken with Germany a programme of co-operation whereby, wherever practical, procedures and production would be standardised and common pools of spare parts and components be set up. Canada was continuing the replacement of naval escort vessels, but costs prevented this replacement being carried out quite as rapidly as SACLANT would have desired. During the last year the Argus maritime aircraft had gone into service; this aircraft was one of the most modern of its type in the world. Canada had increased its allocation to SACLANT of this type of aircraft from 18 to 40 available on D-Day. A tanker supply ship was also under construction, which would ensure limited mobile logistic support in the Atlantic area. His authorities were endeavouring to set up stocks of dispersed POL for 30 days on the Canadian Atlantic seaboard.

18. The changing threat which had been referred to earlier had increased Canadian responsibility, in particular in respect of the Canadian Pacific seaboard; thus the vessels which had previously been earmarked for SACLANT had now to provide for maritime defence on both the East and West coasts of North America.

19. The nuclear capability of the Canadian Brigade in Europe had not yet been finalised, since his authorities, anxious to ensure the best weapons systems with the longest serviceable length, were awaiting the results of further tests before proceeding to procurement.

20. It was the opinion of his government that the 1959 Annual Review had been as thorough and as efficient as possible, and that the decision to use this review to assess the reactions of nations to MC 70 had been a wise one. Results had shown that there was no room for complacency, and he hoped that all members of the Alliance would concentrate on those deficiencies for which they had a clear responsibility. He hoped that all states would respond to the recommendations of the Military Committee, and he gave the assurance that Canada would play its full part in the achievement of this objective.

21. General MONIZ (Portugal), referring to Part II of the report on the 1959 Annual Review, gave certain details amplifying the section devoted to Portugal's defence effort. He said that since the end of the Annual Review, considerable sums had been included in the current supplementary defence budget for the common defence effort. Increases would be made in the defence budget for the next year which, in relation to Portugal's resources, must be regarded as very substantial. He pointed out that extraordinary expenditures had more than doubled, while the supplementary defence budget had increased very considerably. In view of Portugal's great effort in respect of military expenditures, it was inaccurate to say that Portugal's effort on behalf of NATO had been reduced in order to increase the effort it was making for the defence of its overseas territories. The purpose of the latter was essentially to counter Communist penetration in Africa, and he did not think it could be denied that efforts to preserve peace in Africa also served NATO interests.

22. Mr. GILSON (Belgium) noted that the statements made during the present discussion revealed the existence of three main causes for concern, which was shared by the Belgian government. The first cause for concern arose from the need to strengthen the defence capabilities of the Alliance to meet a changing threat. The internal reorganization of the Belgian Army, in the view of the Belgian government, fulfilled this purpose. He explained what had been done to increase the combat value of the Belgian Army by replacing an organization which relied mainly on national servicemen and long-term career personnel, who would soon be prevented by their age from remaining in combat units, by one composed of young men serving from three to five years, who were capable, thanks to intensive training, of becoming specialists.

23. A second matter of concern was the need to improve the social and economic conditions prevailing in the free world in order to meet the challenge represented by the new aspects of Soviet policy. In this connection, he agreed with the opinion expressed by several members of the Council that the economic and social threat was additional to the military threat, and had not taken its place. He recalled that Belgium had recently experienced serious economic and social difficulties, but that the necessary balance was now being restored.

24. In the third place, he emphasised the importance of giving substantial aid to the underdeveloped countries which were about to become the focal point of the struggle for ideological influence. It was with this in mind that Belgium had embarked upon a large-scale project for the benefit of the Congo and, broadly speaking, was preparing to make great sacrifices to enable her to discharge her responsibilities.

25. In order to attain this three-fold goal, two major conditions must be fulfilled if the small countries were to be capable of carrying out their task. As had already been said in 1958 and as several members of the Council had already pointed out during the present discussion, the efforts directed towards a greater degree of integration must be stepped up. The smaller members of the Alliance in particular were required to bear a burden of unnecessary expenditures which might be reduced by improved organization and, failing greater integration of the overall effort, would find it increasingly difficult to bear the burden laid on them.

26. Secondly, it was important for the small countries to be able to promote economic and social ends with their military expenditures. He explained the reasons why it was easier for the small countries to meet certain military expenditures if they stimulated the national economy, than if they served for the procurement abroad of new and costly equipment. He therefore laid stress on the need to make an even more determined attempt to develop joint production programmes, which would help the small countries to minimise the conflict between military and civil claims on the economy.

27. Mr. HANDAL (Norway) recalled that for the last three years his country's defence plans had been based on the 1957 programme. Although this programme did not meet all the recommendations of the NATO military authorities, these recommendations had had great influence on the planning and deployment of the Norwegian forces. In accordance with common defence planning, continuing efforts were being made to strengthen the defensive posture in Northern Norway. On the assumption of the continuance of mutual aid, it was his country's intention to maintain its defence effort in real terms, although he pointed out that mutual aid, while resolving budgetary problems, could lead to a balance of payment problems. He stressed the

fact that in a period like the present where there was hope of reducing international tension, there were difficulties in convincing public opinion of the necessity for measures that would lead to a marked increase in defence expenditure.

28. A pressing problem facing his country was the replacement of ships in the Royal Norwegian Navy. After detailed study, the Norwegian Navy had drawn up plans for new construction. He stressed, however, that there would be great interest and economy in finance and in time, particularly for the smaller countries, if there was more co-operation between the NATO countries in the development of certain types of smaller naval vessels.

29. Insofar as the air defence of Europe was concerned, given the importance attached by the NATO military authorities to an integrated system, his government was prepared to recommend to Parliament the implementation of the recommendations of MC 54.

30. In conclusion, he said that his government believed that the Annual Review as at present conducted was no longer entirely in accordance with the original purpose of this exercise and, accordingly, had put forward a proposal to the Permanent Council which might in due course be discussed by the Ministers of Defence.

31. Mr. KRAG (Denmark), apologising for the unavoidable absence of his Minister of Defence due to a Parliamentary examination of the proposed Danish defence reorganization, reported that there were now good hopes for a decision on this matter. He hoped that, in spite of the difficulties encountered by Denmark in meeting the MC 70 goals, the decision would result in some increase in the Danish defence budget. He would inform the Permanent Council of the nature of the decision taken in due course.

32. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) said that the present situation where the absolute minimum force goals of MC 70 were not being fulfilled was one of serious concern. In addition, the NATO military authorities had, in paragraph 7 of MC 39/11, expressed their view that one of the greatest threats at the moment was of a psychological nature, i.e. the belief that the détente justified a slackening of effort. He shared the concern of the NATO military authorities, feeling that it was incumbent on all member nations to spare no effort in implementing their recommendations. There were, however, new fields to explore and the most important of these, in view of the rapidity of arms development, was the study of a more realistic approach to logistic problems. He proposed that the NATO military authorities should be invited to study this problem and report to the Permanent Council, particularly on the financial aspects of it and the necessity of finding a common solution.

33. He was glad to report that agreements had been signed for the installation of at least one IRBM Squadron in Turkey, and encouraging progress had been made on problems of the location and staffing of this squadron.

34. Thanking the International Staff and the NATO military authorities for their efforts in the preparation for the Annual Review examination for Turkey, he pointed out that the recommendations which have emerged from this year's Annual Review, in which his government concurred, would be the basis of the future Turkish effort. He welcomed Mr. Herter's assurance of continued United States support for NATO.

35. It was unfortunate that no substantial progress had been made in the integration of air defence, and he expressed the hope that all countries would show the utmost understanding and endeavour to find a satisfactory solution to this vital problem.

36. Having made reference to various encouraging statements in the preceding discussion, he concluded by pointing out that his country devoted a relatively high share of its limited resources to defence and had taken the decision to increase its already substantial defence budget by three per cent.

37. He emphasised the fact that the defence of the free world depended on a strengthening of both the economic and military foundations of member countries. Assistance to underdeveloped countries within NATO should be rapidly solved within the Alliance for the common benefit.

38. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSITSA (Greece) pointed out that, from the conclusions of the study which had just been made, he found it impossible to regard the outlook as optimistic, either from the psychological or from the purely military point of view. The report on the implementation of MC 70 had shown that the minimum in the matter of defence had not been achieved. Admiral Wright, for his part, had emphasised that with the means at his disposal he could give no assurance that, if called upon to fulfil the task for which he had been appointed, he would be able to do so. This situation caused the Greek government great concern since it believed that great danger still existed. Perhaps it viewed the problems involved from a different angle owing to Greece's geographical position, but it could not disregard the fact that Albania had an army out of proportion to its size as well as a very important submarine base, with Soviet submarines in it, and that Bulgaria also had a very modern army which was greatly superior to that of Greece.

39. He thought that, if this concern was shared by all the NATO governments, they should increase their defence effort without excessive reliance on United States aid. He acknowledged the difficulty of imposing these further financial burdens on

the peoples. Greece, moreover, was one of the poorest countries of the Alliance, with an annual per capita income of \$270; nevertheless, it devoted about 6% of this income to defence. He thought, therefore, that countries in a more favourable financial position should make an effort to increase their defence expenditures to the extent needed to attain and even exceed the minimum goals set by the military authorities in MC 70. In his opinion, the danger would remain as long as there were no tangible guarantees, and the only safeguard of the peoples of the Alliance lay in military strength combined with a sense of unity. But this military strength was lacking, since the military authorities had stated that they were without even the strict minimum. He thought the danger might assume various aspects and take the form of a local conflict, for example, which would have to be met jointly. The Council should say, in all conscience, whether it considered that the Alliance could indeed meet such a threat.

40. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the above statements;
- (2) took note of the report on the 1959 Annual Review C-M(59)94, Parts I and II;
- (3) took note of the Analysis of military implications of the 1959 Annual Review Document MC 39/11.

(b) Status of incorporation of nuclear capabilities in the Shield forces, including the status of introduction of IRBMs in Europe.

41. The CHAIRMAN called on General Norstad to give a military briefing to the Council on this item of the Agenda.

42. General NORSTAD (SACEUR) said that before speaking on the technical aspects of the question, he would like to make a few comments on the Annual Review debate which had taken place. He had been satisfied and reassured by what he had heard or read of the debate in the past two days. He was glad that there had been unanimity in the Council in support of the views expressed in document MC 39/11, that there should be no reduction in NATO armed forces. He was also glad that there had been unanimous support for the force goals laid down in MC 70. He hoped that the words expressed would be translated into action. In the past, this had not always been the case, and he made a special appeal to Ministers on this point.

43. He reminded Ministers that military requirements were firm. It was the political authorities who called on the military authorities to ensure the defence of NATO and the requirements of the military were clearly stated in MC 70.

44. Two points had been made in the discussion to which he would like to refer. First, it had been asked whether new weapons could replace manpower in the near future. He thought that the answer to this for the next five or seven years was no. Secondly, the German Minister of Defence had asked whether the military authorities would consider modifications in the weapon requirements laid down in MC 70. He would be only too pleased to meet the countries concerned to consider whether modifications could be made. Military planning was certainly not inflexible.

45. Two Ministers - those of Belgium and the Netherlands - had referred to the advantages of the collective balance of forces. This question had first been discussed in 1950. He realised that the problems facing small and large countries were different, but he would suggest (to the ministers of the two countries in question):

- (a) that there should be no resolution in the military communiqué relating to the collective balance of forces;
- (b) that the two countries in question were probably the best placed to achieve such a balance of forces. He hoped they would discuss together ways of setting an example in this field.

46. He thought that the year to come, though a year of crisis, was also a year of hope, provided NATO maintained its armed strength. Finally, it could only be the political authorities who could decide how long it was necessary to continue the present defensive effort.

47. General Norstad then gave a technical briefing on the incorporation of nuclear capabilities in the Shield forces. His briefing covered, in particular, the factors governing atomic capabilities, the causes of deficiencies in making capabilities available, the nature of the weapons system required, and the characteristics of the weapons system. His conclusions were that NATO must maintain and improve its present means in this field and meet future requirements. Further, a European production base, initially for some three hundred mid-range missiles, was essential. (For full text of the technical briefing, see Verbatim Record.)

48. Mr. GUILLAUMAT (France) said that France was convinced of the necessity of providing the Shield Forces with nuclear weapons. He recalled that this necessity stemmed from the strategic concept approved by the Council, to which France had agreed to make its own contribution. He added that this contribution would have been made sooner if a greater degree of co-operation had been possible. In this connection, he pointed out that the question of French nuclear tests had already been

raised in another forum, and he thanked the allied governments who had supported the French position. France also thanked the United States for the aid it was providing, which would enable certain advance French forces assigned to SACLANT to be equipped with US nuclear weapons, to the benefit of the Alliance as a whole. His government regretted that it had not been possible to reach agreement on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons on French territory, but it had felt unable to accept the conditions offered. It also regretted that, as a result, certain units based in France had been re-deployed elsewhere by SACEUR and that certain French units could not be provided with atomic weapons. His government hoped that an early solution would be found to this problem, which it realised could have serious consequences.

49. The CHAIRMAN was sorry that this particularly important point had not stimulated discussion in the Council. For his part he could not leave this question here. Encouraged by Mr. Averoff's statement, he felt it his duty to give an opinion on certain aspects of the situation; it would be for governments to assess the value of this opinion. He recalled that, last year, the military authorities had claimed that MC 70 was the minimum they could accept if they were to be able to assume their responsibilities without undue risk. As several speakers had emphasised, there was an apparently unbridgeable gap between this minimum and the present position in several countries. Faced with this situation, the military authorities had, in the course of the year, carried out a number of studies with a view to suggesting to countries certain ways whereby they might attain the prescribed goals by time-phasing their achievement. However, there still remained a very wide gap between this second minimum and the reality.

50. He earnestly requested each country to face up to the situation. By placing on the agenda this item and the following one, air defence, he had hoped they would be the subject of more detailed discussion. After the preliminary statement of the situation which had just been made, he noted that no concrete remedies had been proposed for the shortfall from the MC 70 goals. Summing up, he urged that special attention be paid to the conclusions of the military authorities in MC 39/11, which were summarised as follows in paragraph 10: "The aggregate of the deficiencies in Shield Forces renders the commanders' capabilities to carry out their tasks and missions considerably below the level of acceptability." As Secretary General, he felt he must emphasise to the Council the gravity of this situation.

51. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statements.

(c) Progress on Air Defence in NATO Europe.

52. General NORSTAD (SACEUR) gave a military briefing, sketching the progress of air defence since 1951 when document MC 36 had made SACEUR responsible for the air defence in the undefined "land combat zones" which had been taken to mean

Germany - although it was apparent to the military authorities at the time that the independent conduct of air defence in adjoining allied countries was a thoroughly unsound proposition. By December 1955, MC 54 designated SACEUR "co-ordinator of air defence for NATO Europe", established four air defence regions and made it clear that SACEUR was responsible for developing an appropriate system for the co-ordination of air defence in NATO Europe in consultation with the national authorities. In January 1956 the existing national early warning systems were manned eight hours per day, five days per week; by April 1956 it had become possible to arrange for the system to be manned on a permanent basis all-round-the-clock.

53. The speeds of present day attack aircraft were such that, compared with the speeds prevailing during World War II, Europe had in effect shrunk to one-tenth of its size and now presented a smaller air defence region than, say, Switzerland had then: integration of air defence was inescapable from the military point of view.

54. In December 1958, document MC 54/1 defined the concept of integration of air defence, the original proposal for a co-ordinated system having been found insufficient. Integration was defined as "the welding of the existing national air defence systems in NATO Europe into one unified system with a NATO, as opposed to a national, operational command and control organization effective in peace and war". Whether this concept were to be dubbed "integration" or "unification", General Norstad stressed that the definition of MC 54/1 must be applied.

55. In practice, integration in NATO forces was effected at the national level above that of the contingents, e.g. for land forces at Army Group level, Corps being national formations; MC 54/1 made it clear that integration of air defence would preserve the existence of the national air defence commands, paragraph 11 specifically setting forth principles to safeguard national interests.

56. The document had been agreed in 1958 with reservations by Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. The Danish reservations had arisen from a constitutional problem and had subsequently been withdrawn following agreement between SACEUR and the Danish authorities. The United Kingdom reservation, arising from the requested assignment of air defence forces to SACEURs operational command, had subsequently been withdrawn in February 1959. The French reservation was outstanding; it referred, inter alia, to the right to open fire, the inclusion of sea areas, the delineation of inter-regional boundaries, as well as to the methods for providing the equipment and financing. All these problems had since been clarified in studies undertaken by the military authorities, and he now hoped that the French Government would accept the proposals for integration.

57. A point had now been reached where the military authorities could make no more progress unless it was clearly decided whether a loose alliance of national forces was intended - which would be powerless to provide air defence in the present age - or central control of air defence. The task of central control was unenviable and he had no personal desire to have it thrust upon him, but individual nations alone could not solve the problem.

58. In conclusion, General Norstad referred to the necessity to ensure that systems of data transmission and fire control used by the various national authorities should at least be fully compatible.

59. The crucial problem of the integration of air defence must now pass out of the hands of the military authorities; it was for the political authorities to find a solution.

60. Mr. GUILLAUMAT (France) thanked SACEUR for his tireless efforts to resolve the difficulties which had arisen in the field of air defence. His government had the firm desire to see a successful result from the plan at present under discussion. It appeared to his authorities necessary and possible to take in common, in the technical fields, all the steps required for the system to operate as a whole and in the most efficient manner.

61. The French Government considered that in certain circumstances steps to delegate national responsibilities would have to be taken. Perhaps, in addition, it could be hoped that a satisfactory formula could in the meantime be found which would in all circumstances cover both the political and the military aspects of the problem.

62. His government was resolved to go ahead within the limit of its financial possibilities, in such a way as to be ready to meet the requirements defined by SHAPE in those zones where the whole of the allied air forces must be ready to intervene. There was, however, a special problem in the rear zone where, in fact, no inter-allied air defence existed, but only French air defence forces. In this field, too, his government considered that steps could and should be taken so that, with the necessary liaison created, the efficiency of the whole might be ensured to the maximum extent.

63. Mr. STRAUSS (Germany) considered that in the future it was likely that piloted aircraft would be replaced by unpiloted aircraft or by missiles and that thus the problem would be simply that of the ability to survive and to strike back after aggression. The Alliance was in a serious dilemma with regard to air defence, since Soviet Russia still possessed a large number of piloted aircraft, defence against which would be needed for a number of years. As he had recalled during

the previous session, the German authorities were in a strange position, in that they wished to assign fighter units to NATO in peacetime and did not know to whom they should be assigned. His government shared the view which had been expressed by SACEUR, and considered that he should receive the firm, unambiguous support he required to allow him to carry out effectively his mission. His authorities welcomed the withdrawal from the Council agenda of the document SGM 685/59, since they considered it to be a weakening of the position outlined in MC 54, and that a mere "co-ordination" of European air defence was obsolete on, among others, technical, military and economic grounds. In view of the serious implications of any further delay in the implementation of unified air defence, he wished to suggest strongly that the Council express its serious concern, both by taking an early decision and by referring thereto the military communiqué.

64. He wished to draw attention to the complex situation that existed in the forward area of Central Europe. In peacetime, the ATAFS had no direct air responsibility in Western Germany, and fighter units could not be assigned to the ATAFS. France, the UK and the US at present carried out air defence to protect their own forces. Air defence could only work if NATO achieved, not only loose co-ordination in wartime, but also real co-ordination and full co-operation in peacetime. In wartime, the air defence forces of six nations would be employed over Western Germany, operating under the ATAFS in accordance with MC 36/1. Western Germany would now gradually be taking over control facilities from the UK and US forces. A SHAPE plan to improve the command control system by the installation of new electronic equipment was at present under study. This plan could only be effectively implemented if the six nations made a joint effort; a unified control of the forces deployed would be required. From the beginning, the German air defence forces had been based on the assumption that they would be integrated into the ATAFS stationed in Western Germany. Germany was therefore very anxious to see the unification of air defence in NATO Europe implemented at the earliest possible moment. Unless all efforts were made to resolve this problem, the Alliance would deliberately be resigning itself to a lesser degree of efficiency.

65. Mr. WATKINSON (United Kingdom) welcomed the frank discussion which had taken place. Though UK Thor missiles were not under SACEUR's command, they were now operational. The discussion had convinced him that it was now possible to make progress on unified air defence. His government supported the principle that, without this unification, air defence in Europe would not be possible. His government would contribute fully towards this aim. If the United Kingdom could in any way help to overcome the present deficiencies in the air defence of Europe, they were prepared to do so.

66. Mr. VISSER (Netherlands) had been impressed by the briefing given by SACEUR. For a number of years his authorities had fully realised the urgency of this problem, and had been convinced that it could only be solved on a NATO-wide basis. He regretted the lack of progress in this field, and considered that it was only fair to put complete confidence in SACEUR and to give him the authority to carry out the mission he had received from the NATO Council. It was certain that unless continued efforts were made to find a solution, the members of the Alliance would only be deceiving themselves, and not the potential aggressor who was certainly aware of the deficiencies in this respect.

67. Returning to the question of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, he thought it would be helpful if Mr. Guillaumat could indicate the manner in which he envisaged negotiations towards a solution of this problem, and when he expected a concrete solution.

68. Mr. HERTER (United States) said that it was clear that the two matters before the Council were essentially of a political nature and that there was no difference of opinion in the military field. NATO faced a problem inherent in an Alliance of individual, independent states confronting a monolithic bloc. All efforts during the last ten years had been directed towards common strategy because it had been realised that defence would only have value if there was ready a unified response when necessary. The United States remained devoted to the principle of collective defence. The intelligence briefing by Admiral Boone had indicated that the Soviet threat had not diminished but had, on the contrary, increased and, furthermore, the time available for decision and reaction could now be counted in minutes. Europe was too small to be defended in national segments, and military operations had to be conducted as far forward as possible. Instantaneous reaction was not possible in a type of loose coalition; peacetime organization of unified air defence was essential to avoid dislocation in an emergency. National resources were stretched to the utmost to provide expensive equipment and the increasing number of skilled personnel required to operate this equipment. Their full value could only be obtained through a unified system.

69. He had pointed out earlier that continued support of NATO depended on the assurances that could be given to those responsible for national finances that the money contributed was being used with maximum effectiveness, and in accordance with the recommendations of the military authorities. If those who contributed to NATO defence could not be convinced that all was being done towards this end, increasing difficulties would be met.

70. Finally, he had been impressed by the statement of Mr. Watkinson on the need for a unified command, and hoped that continued efforts would be made to clarify positions and to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

71. Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) said that his government was directly concerned in this question and the question of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. In view of its geographical position, stockpiling of atomic warheads was particularly dangerous so far as Italy was concerned. Though Italy was prepared to help the Alliance by stockpiling, his government hoped that a general solution to the problem would be found, which was of particular interest to Italian public opinion. So far as an integrated air defence was concerned, his government had always been in favour of the principle. But integration, to be effective, must be complete. Any delay in the solution of these two problems would be serious to the Alliance and to Italy.

72. Mr. PEARKES (Canada) said that Canada had a brigade group in Germany which had always been considered to be part of a larger formation. Therefore no provision for the protection of these forces against air attack had been made. His government had always believed that the country in which Canadian troops were located would be responsible for defending them against air attack. There now seemed no certainty of this.

73. Two years ago, Canada had agreed, with some misgiving, to an integrated air defence system with the United States. Canada had been afraid that its comparatively small air forces would be swallowed up by the larger United States force. Developments both at the headquarters and at lower levels in the past two years had shown this fear to be completely groundless. This happy experience might be of interest to those countries who, like Canada two years ago, felt misgivings about an integrated air defence.

74. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the debate, thought that the two major points which had just been discussed were of capital importance to NATO. For years, the military authorities had stated that if there were a conventional attack by the USSR, NATO must reply by using tactical atomic weapons. This view had been universally supported. He thought that Mr. Strauss had been right in urging that it was neither logical nor proper that certain countries should be exposed to greater risk, since they alone kept stockpiles, simply because other countries refused to do so. The parliaments and public opinion in the countries exposing themselves to greater risk would certainly not accept this view. Further, since the supreme political authority of NATO, the Council, had accepted the need to stockpile, he thought it strange that there was no authority in NATO to implement the decision. This was surely a matter for the Council to discuss on a frank and friendly basis, to try to reach a firm decision which would be carried out.

75. With regard to the integration of an air defence system, it would seem that all save one of them were agreed, even though exactly what was meant by integration might not be clear. In this context, he referred to General Norstad's remarks that

radar equipment worth hundreds of millions of pounds would soon be installed in a number of NATO countries. Would the same kind of difficulty as had arisen over the integrated air defence system make it impossible to use this equipment? It might be absurd to think so, but it did not seem impossible.

76. In discussion, Mr. Guillaumat had indicated that his government was ready to consider and give its views on all the technical arrangements which had been proposed and which were regarded as necessary to enable an integrated air defence system to be established in NATO Europe. As a compromise, therefore, he would like to suggest that, in the light of the views which the French authorities would communicate to SACEUR on the various technical proposals which had been made, the NATO military authorities should report to the Council, making clear the extent to which lack of agreement on any of these technical proposals would prevent the establishment of an integrated air defence. The Permanent Council could reconsider the question in two months' time in the light of this report from the military authorities. This might not be an ideal solution but was one which he believed would enable some progress to be made.

77. Mr. GUILLAUMAT (France) said that he agreed with the Chairman's suggestion.

78. Mr. LANGE (Norway) thought that the Chairman's proposal was a workable one, and recalled the earlier statement by Mr. Handal. Insofar as the stockpiling of nuclear weapons was concerned, up to the present time there was no change in the position which his Prime Minister had stated at the 1957 Heads of Government meeting. He pointed out that this position was determined by the specific and unanimously accepted conditions upon which Norway had joined the Alliance in 1949. Behind these conditions lay important implications for other countries outside NATO in the Scandinavian area, in particular Finland. However, his government was ready to discuss whether the reasons which had conditioned its position in 1949 were still valid, and would welcome a discussion in the Council, with the participation of the NATO military authorities, on all aspects of Norwegian policy within this area.

79. General NORSTAD (SACEUR) said he would be gratified if the Chairman's proposal resulted in a solution of the problem of integrated air defence. However, he had to point out that he would not be in a position in two months' time to make any new technical proposals. He would prefer the French authorities to present in writing their views on the technical documents, which he had already submitted, and, at the same time, make a general statement on the basic principle of the centralisation of authority.

80. Mr. GUILLAUMAT (France) replied that his authorities were prepared to forward to SACEUR, in the near future, their comments on the technical documents which the latter had submitted to the Standing Group and the Military Committee.

81. After a further exchange of views and following a proposal by the Chairman, the COUNCIL:

- (1) agreed that the French authorities would, as soon as possible, send General Norstad their comments on the technical documents submitted by him to the Standing Group and the Military Committee; there would then be discussion of these comments between the French Government and SACEUR;
- (2) agreed that within two months it would, on the basis of a report by the military authorities on these discussions, resume consideration of this question with a view to assessing what might possibly prevent the establishment of the technical elements of a unified Air Defence Command.

(d) Draft Resolution on the 1959 Annual Review

Document: C-M(59)102(Revised)

82. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that in the course of discussion a number of suggestions had been put forward. He felt that some attempt should be made to reflect these suggestions in the resolution proposed for adoption by the Council on the Annual Review. He accordingly proposed that a new resolution should be drafted for consideration by the Council the next day.

83. The COUNCIL:

approved the proposal by the Chairman.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.