

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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SUMMARY RECORD  
O-R(57)49

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at  
the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIIe, on Thursday,  
11th July at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. P-H. Spaak

BELGIUM

Mr. A. de Staercke

CANADA

Mr. L.D. Wilgress

DENMARK

Mr. M.A. Wassard

FRANCE

Mr. A. Parodi

GERMANY

Mr. H. Blankenhorn

GREECE

Mr. M. Alexandrakis

ICELAND

Mr. N.P. Sigurdsson

ITALY

Mr. M. Pinna Caboni

LUXEMBOURG

Mr. N. Hommel

NETHERLANDS

Mr. E.N. van Kleffens

NORWAY

Mr. J. Boyesen

PORTUGAL

Count de Tovar

TURKEY

Mr. S. Sarper

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Frank Roberts

UNITED STATES

Mr. G.W. Perkins

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Baron A. Béntinck
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:	Mr. A. Casardi
Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:	Mr. F.D. Gregh
Acting Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics:	Mr. A. Moreau
Executive Secretary:	The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Chairman, Standing Group	Lt.Gen. L.W. Johnson
Standing Group:	( Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny Gen. J. Piatte
Standing Group Representative:	Gen. G.M. de Chassey

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I. THE HIGHER NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE

1. General JOHNSON (Chairman of the Standing Group) reminded the Council that in December the Military Committee had directed the Standing Group and the Military Representatives Committee to review the present higher NATO Military Structure. Three reports had been prepared as a result of this directive. The first concerned evolutionary changes in the structure, and was at present being implemented. The second and third reports examined various proposals for more radical changes. The Military Committee had considered the reports at its meeting on 9th/10th July, and had agreed not to:

- (a) abolish the Military Committee, the Military Representatives Committee or the Standing Group;
- (b) move the Military Representatives Committee or the Standing Group from Washington;
- (c) set up an overall NATO Command or a Supreme Commanders Committee;
- (d) add a fourth member to the Standing Group;
- (e) separate the national and international functions of the members of the Standing Group.

2. The Military Committee had then issued a directive to the Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee, as follows; the Military Committee having agreed:

- (a) that the Military Representatives Committee should in future be recognised and designated as the Military Committee in Permanent Session;
- (b) that the Standing Group should be the executive agency of the Military Committee in Permanent Session, its functions being unchanged;
- (c) in principle, that the Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session should be appointed by the Military Committee;
- (d) that the Standing Group Planning Staff should be expanded by inviting each non-Standing Group nation to provide one staff planner. The expanded staff would continue its function, as it did at present, multilaterally.

3. In view of the above, the Military Committee directed the Standing Group, in conjunction with the Military Representatives Committee:

- (a) to prepare for its consideration by 1st September draft revised terms of reference for the Military Committee;

- (b) to prepare for its consideration by 1st September draft terms of reference for the Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session.

4. In connection with the terms of reference for the Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session, the Military Committee agreed that any such appointment should be for a period of two years, subject to extension for a further period not to exceed one year. The Military Committee also agreed that the Chairman should preferably be chosen from a non-Standing Group nation, act in an international capacity, and be free to attend all meetings of the Standing Group. Finally, when the terms of reference had been prepared and processed through the Higher NATO Military Structure, they would be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for consideration and final approval.

5. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether the Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session would have at his disposal an international staff.

6. General JOHNSON replied that for the time being it was contemplated that the Chairman would use Standing Group staff. The question would be subject to further consideration.

7. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE then said that he welcomed the statement that had just been made. It seemed to him an important first step to implement the two principles approved by the Council in December last, that is:

- (a) that representation and participation in the Higher NATO Military Structure should be equitably shared among NATO Members;
- (b) that there should be more effective co-operation between the military and civilian sides of NATO.

General Johnson's report seemed to him to represent real progress, particularly so far as the first principle was concerned. He was particularly glad to hear that the Military Committee would now operate on a permanent basis. In the past, the Higher Military Structure had suffered from the fact that decisions depended on the Military Committee, which met at infrequent intervals. Further, he thought that the new system would lead to better liaison between the military and civilian sides of NATO.

8. However, the system now proposed should be regarded only as a first step. It would be unwise to try to proceed too rapidly, but after the experience in this first step had been assimilated, further progress should be made. In particular, he thought that the possibility of the Chairman of the Military Committee having at his disposal an international staff should be carefully examined. The Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session should keep in close touch both with the Standing Group and with the civilian authorities. In this connection, he thought that the possibility of the new Military Committee moving from Washington to Paris should also be examined at a later stage: effective and constant colla-

boration between the military and civilian authorities could only be brought about when this was done.

9. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the views expressed by the Canadian Representative. His authorities had always advocated an equitable participation in the Higher Military Structure by all member countries, and had also supported the idea of close liaison between the military and civilian authorities. General Johnson's report indicated that both these objectives seemed in process of realisation.

10. The COUNCIL:

took note of the report of the Chairman of the Standing Group, and of the comments on it made by the Canadian and Italian Representatives.

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II. STATUS OF DOCUMENT M.C.70

11. General JOHNSON said that the major NATO Commands were at present preparing their minimum forces requirements to cover the period up to 1962. The Standing Group hoped to receive the reports by about 1st September. The Standing Group would then prepare its own paper covering all NATO requirements, which would be circulated under reference M.C.70. The main task of the Standing Group would be to collate and to reconcile the requirements of the various commands. He hoped that the Military Committee would be able to approve the final document in October or November. After that, the document would be submitted to the Council.

12. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the Chairman of the Standing Group.

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III. DISARMAMENT

Previous reference: C-R(57)47

Documents: PO(57)822  
SGM/475/57

13. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Council had before it his own redraft of the telegram for the four Western Powers on the Sub-Committee, a report by General Norstad, and the reply by the Standing Group to questions put by the Council at its meeting on 8th July. He suggested that the Council should first examine the Standing Group document.

14. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that the work of the Council might be helped if he gave some information on recent developments in the Sub-Committee. The four Western Powers were

at present rounding off their ideas on the inspection zone as a means of defence against surprise attack. Their views had already been given to the Council so far as air inspection was concerned in their fifth report (RDC/57/262). They had not yet completed their thinking on ground inspection: they would communicate their views on this point to the Council as soon as possible. The statement by the Russian Representative on 8th July in connection with nuclear tests had put the inspection zone problem to some extent into the background: in any case, he thought that the latter problem was no longer of such immediate urgency. Further, the Western Powers did not know Russian views on the inclusion of an inspection zone in the first-step agreement. At the same time, the question might be put at any time, and the four Western Powers ought to be in a position to give a quick reply, if necessary. For this reason the Western Powers on the Sub-Committee would like to know whether NATO countries saw sufficient positive advantages in an inspection zone for the principle to be advocated in the Sub-Committee. Finally, the four Western Powers were agreed not to sign any first-step agreement based on air inspection alone.

15. The Council then examined the first two questions asked by the Council to the Standing Group, and the replies given by the Standing Group, as set out in SGM/475/57. The questions were:

- (a) What is the value of air inspection alone?
- (b) Does ground inspection require both static and mobile units?

16. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Standing Group reply on these two points was clear. To make their position even more clear, could he summarise it as follows: no system of air inspection was worthwhile unless it were coupled with ground control.

17. General JOHNSON, before replying to the Belgian Representative, said that he must stress the fact that the views he would give, and the views expressed in SGM/475/57, were Standing Group views offered from a purely military standpoint, and with full recognition that national views had not been determined. He then said that air inspection alone would give increased intelligence, but might also give rise to a false sense of security. From the military point of view it was essential that air inspection be completed by ground control.

18. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE then asked whether mobile ground control was essential from the military point of view.

19. General JOHNSON replied that from the military point of view mobile ground control was essential in the area to be covered by air inspection. Fixed ground control posts outside that area might also serve a useful purpose.

20. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government was not opposed to a combination of air inspection with fixed ground control posts, though it believed the ground control posts should cover airfields. On the other hand, it was firmly opposed to including mobile ground control in first-stage disarmament, because of the danger that this would lead to demilitarisation of a large

area. Mobile ground control should only be considered in subsequent stages. Further, his Government considered that the overlapping radar chain should also be left out of account during the first-step negotiations, though the question might be considered in subsequent stages.

21. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the fifth report from the Western Powers on the Disarmament Committee had stressed the fact that air inspection was intended to guard against the danger of surprise attack. In the question put to the Standing Group, it was not clear that it was from this angle only that the question should be examined. Did the Standing Group consider that if the question had been put to them from this angle alone, they would have given the same reply as appeared in SGM/475/57?

22. General JOHNSON replied that the Standing Group believed that air inspection alone was not a sufficient defence against surprise attack. It must be coupled with other elements, in particular, control of the delivery means of atomic weapons.

23. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that during the past two or three years the Council had been told that improvements in the radar system would mean a valuable contribution to the defence of the West. Yet the Standing Group seemed to be somewhat sceptical about the overlapping radar chain. He would have thought that since the chain would be of great value to an Alliance conceived for defensive purposes, the military authorities would have been in favour of it.

24. Admiral DENNY replied that an overlapping radar chain would have a certain value, but that it was far from being infallible. In the first place, it would be technically possible to block it out on certain occasions. In the second place, the chain could give no indication of the intent of large aircraft movements. Suppose, for example, the Russians stated that on a certain date they intended to hold large-scale air manoeuvres. The radar chain would report the presence of an abnormal number of aircraft, but no-one could say whether the aircraft were brought together for the purpose indicated or as a cloak for a surprise attack.

25.. The CHAIRMAN asked the Standing Group what they meant when they had stated that air inspection by itself might lead to a false sense of security being created. Surely the military authorities were unlikely to be lulled into this false sense.

26. General JOHNSON, in reply to this and a number of similar questions, said that the Standing Group thinking was based on three considerations:

- (a) if air inspection showed little significant movement in the zone, there was always the risk that a sense of false security might develop even in the most vigilant minds.
- (b) air inspection could give useful intelligence but it could not add substantially to security, and might in certain circumstances weaken security.

(c) the effect on public opinion must be taken into account, since if public opinion was lulled into a sense of false security, it would become increasingly unwilling to accept the financial sacrifices needed for effective defence.

27. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE asked whether the four Western Powers believed that Russia would be unwilling to accept either fixed or mobile ground control.

28. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that Russia had already proposed fixed ground control in terms which had proved unsatisfactory to the West because airfields were not included. He believed that Russia would be unwilling to accept mobile ground control at the present stage.

29. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE suggested that the Council should transmit to the four Western Powers on the Sub-Committee the Standing Group document together with General Norstad's report. They might also add their own comments on the two documents, by way of clarification.

30. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE agreed that the two military documents should be sent to London, for information. He thought the Council should also state that there were political as well as military aspects involved, and that the Council was continuing to study the political aspects. He then referred to the view expressed by the Standing Group that air inspection alone would be of greater advantage to the Russians than to the West. His own experts were divided on this point. On the one hand, it could be argued that since the West was already more open to inspection than the Eastern bloc, throwing the Eastern bloc open could only be of advantage to the West. On the other hand, the fact that industry and military installations were more highly concentrated in the West than in Russia and the Satellites seemed to justify the Standing Group argument that air inspection alone would on balance benefit the USSR. He felt that this was a question on which the Council should reflect at length before coming to a decision.

31. General JOHNSON replied, speaking in terms of air inspection alone, that Russia had a considerable advantage in that it had already had subversive elements working for it in NATO territories. That meant that Russian air inspection could be checked on the ground by such elements. That was a point of some importance in military thinking.

32. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the main object of air inspection as at present contemplated was to guard against surprise attack. Since NATO did not intend to attack the USSR, would not any factor which helped to defend against surprise attack be of value.

33. General JOHNSON pointed out that the first objective in a surprise air attack would probably be areas where the strategic counter-offensive was stationed. Aerial photography could reveal the presence of aircraft in large numbers at any one place, but could not reveal the purpose for which they were assembled: it

might be for manoeuvres or for a ceremonial parade, or as a cloak for a surprise attack. In other words, air inspection could detect the movement of aircraft but not the purpose of such movement.

34. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the position reached seemed to be this: the Council had questioned their military advisers on the principle of an inspection zone, first from the angle of increasing the security of the west. From this angle their advisers considered that the zone should be as large as possible and that there should be air and ground control, the latter to be both by fixed posts and by mobile units. One delegation had raised objections to the idea of mobile control at the present stage. They had also questioned their advisers on the principle from the angle of ensuring against a surprise attack. Their advisers had replied that air and static ground inspection might give greater advantage to the Russians than to the west and might induce a sense of false security. He then suggested that the Council should examine question 3.

Question 3: size of the zone.

35. The CHAIRMAN thought that the Standing Group had given a clear answer to the effect that the minimum zone should run from 5° east to 35° east. He did not think that any further clarification was needed.

Question 4: north and south limits of a European zone.

36. General JOHNSON, in reply to questions with regard to a possible Polar zone, said that procedures for inspection throughout both zones should, as far as possible, be identical.

37. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE asked the Standing Group to amplify their reference to ports in the Black Sea area.

38. Admiral DENNY said that the ports in question were those in Russian territory. The Standing Group view was that if Turkish territory were to be included in the zone, the zone should be extended east to cover a substantial part of Russian territory lying between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

39. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he must reserve his position on this matter.

40. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities were particularly interested in the southern sector. They would be prepared to see the zone extended to cover the greater part of Italy, provided in compensation substantial areas of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Roumania and Albania were also included in the zone. That would be an additional safeguard against surprise attack in the southern sector. He would like the view of the Italian Government to be communicated to the four Western Powers. He also hoped that the Standing Group would give this particular point most careful consideration.

41. General JOHNSON said that he could not give a detailed reply at present, but the Standing Group would certainly take the views expressed into careful account.

42. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE asked whether basing the zone on meridians might not give rise to controversy. Would it not be **better** to use geographical features, such as rivers, where possible.

43. General JOHNSON said the Standing Group was in complete agreement with this view.

44. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE thought that meridians could be used as a starting point, and that when broad agreement on the area had been reached, every attempt should be made to use geographical features to implement the agreement.

Question 5: overlapping radar.

45. The CHAIRMAN suggested that as this question was not at present under discussion in London, and as one delegation had made formal reservations on the point, the Council should not discuss it at present. There was general agreement with this view.

Question 6: inspection of nuclear weapons.

46. General JOHNSON said that the Standing Group fully agreed with General Norstad's position: that is, that it would be dangerous at present to allow the control of nuclear components. Control of delivery means was acceptable.

47. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE referred to the view he had expressed at an earlier meeting; that is, that to advocate mobile ground control and at the same time insist that nuclear components be excluded from control would place the Western Powers in a difficult position from the point of view of negotiating.

48. The CHAIRMAN suggested that as the German Representative had stated his Government's objection to mobile ground control, the Council should not discuss it at present. There was general agreement with this view.

49. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE then referred to the system of inspection, a point to which their military advisers attached great importance. Did their military advisers think that the system of joint inspection by the two sides, possible under UNO auspices, would result in effective inspection, or did they consider that each side should carry out its own inspection?

50. General JOHNSON replied that if there were to be a system of inspection the essential need was to get as much information as possible for one's own side. In a joint inspection it was most improbable that countries would allow their most secret and up-to-date equipment to be used. Joint inspection would, therefore, result in loss of efficiency. Moreover, the west probably had more up-to-date equipment in the field of aerial photography than the Russians, and separate inspection would therefore be an advantage to the west.

51. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE urged that in any interpretation of the military views which might be sent to London, there should be included two questions which were not stressed in the military papers:

- (a) the importance the military attached to effective inspection, and their views on joint inspection;
- (b) the political danger that really efficient inspection in Europe might lead to demilitarisation of a considerable area and, possibly, to neutralisation.

52. The COUNCIL:

- (1) expressed their thanks to the Standing Group for the very full answers they had given to the questions put to them. Their answers would be of great value to the Council in helping it to develop its final conclusions.
- (2) agreed to send to the four Western Powers on the Sub-Committee Standing Group document SGM/475/57 and General Norstad's report on the importance from the military standpoint of the area lying between 30° east and 35° east;
- (3) invited the Chairman to prepare a new telegram setting out the supplementary views expressed by the Standing Group, and any other points which he thought appropriate for inclusion;
- (4) agreed to meet at 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 16th July to continue their discussion on the basis of the paper to be prepared by the Chairman;
- (5) expressed the hope that the Standing Group would be able to alter their arrangements so as to take part in the Tuesday meeting.

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.