

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(56)38

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held
at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris XVIIe. on
Wednesday, 11th July, 1956 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman - The Lord Ismay

Mr. A. de Staercke (Belgium) Mr. A. Alessandrini (Italy)
Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Canada) Mr. N. Hommel (Luxembourg)
Mr. M.A. Wassard (Denmark) Mr. M.F. Vigeveno (Netherlands)
Mr. A. Parodi (France) Mr. J.G. Raeder (Norway)
Mr. F. Krapt (Germany) Count de Tovar (Portugal)
Mr. M. Melas (Greece) Mr. M.A. Tiney (Turkey)
Mr. H. Andersen (Iceland) Mr. N.J.A. Cheetham (United Kingdom)
Mr. G.W. Perkins (United States)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Baron A. Bentinck (Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. A. Casardi (Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs)
Mr. F.D. Gregh (Assistant Secretary General for
Economics and Finance)
The Lord Coleridge (Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

General G.M. de Chassey (Standing Group Representative)
Mr. J. Vidaud (Chairman of the Military Budget
Committee); for Items
II and III of the Agenda
Mr. E. Merrill (Controller for Infrastructure) for
Item IX of the Agenda

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I. DEPARTURE OF MR. VAN STARKENBORGH

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he felt sure that the Council would regret that they had not had an opportunity to tell Ambassador van Starckenborgh in person how deeply grateful they were for the immense contribution which he had made to their counsels, and how sad they were at his departure. The Council were in entire agreement and asked that their feelings might be placed on formal record in the minutes of the meeting.

2. Accordingly, the COUNCIL agreed:

- (1) to place on record their admiration of and gratitude for the incomparable services that had been rendered by Ambassador van Starckenborgh to NATO over a large number of years, and for the example of selfless devotion to duty that he had set;
- (2) to invite the Secretary General to communicate the above to Ambassador van Starckenborgh together with their best wishes for his future.

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II. INITIAL WARTIME FINANCING OF NATO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Document: C-M(56)86

3. Mr. VIDAUD (Chairman of the Military Budget Committee) pointed out that most national legislations had already worked out the financial and administrative provisions appropriate to ensure, in the best possible circumstances, the transfer from peacetime arrangements to the special arrangements necessary in wartime, insofar as the administration of units, services and organs responsible for national defence were concerned. A similar need was felt with regard to the allied military organizations, whose administration and financing depended on the North Atlantic Council. For that reason, at the request of the Standing Group, and in agreement with the Supreme Commanders concerned, the Military Budget Committee put forward, in document C-M(56)86, a procedure, to be examined simultaneously by both the military and the financial authorities, and which should enable the Committee later to submit to the Council a satisfactory solution to this problem.

4. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that the military authorities were in full agreement with the proposals made by the Military Budget Committee and would be glad to see a solution reached on those lines.

5. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he could not give the formal approval of his Government to the document at the present meeting, but did not believe that there would be any difficulty in obtaining approval.

6. The COUNCIL:

- (1) approved the Military Budget Committee's recommendations for the initial wartime financing of NATO Military Headquarters, set out in paragraph 3 of document C-M(56)86;

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- (2) noted that approval was subject to confirmation by the United States Representative of the approval of his Government.

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III. APPOINTMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTROLLER AT HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE, FONTAINEBLEAU

Document: C-M(56)87

7. The COUNCIL:

approved the recommendation of the Military Budget Committee that Mr. A. Guillot-Tantay, Financial Controller of the above Headquarters since 1st August, 1953, be reappointed Financial Controller for a period of three years, with effect from 1st August, 1956.

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IV. FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMMES

Previous reference: C-R(56)37

8. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Council that he had been asked to put forward his own view as to a reasonable German contribution to future infrastructure programmes, as a starting point for discussion. He had consulted a number of delegations, and had just circulated his ideas on the subject. He did not think any useful purpose would be served in starting a discussion on his proposals at the present meeting, as delegations clearly had not had time to obtain instructions. Further, he thought that there would be little point in continuing discussion of the more general aspects of future infrastructure programmes until agreement had been reached on the fundamental question of the German contribution. He therefore suggested that the question be placed on the agenda of the Council meeting on 18th July, in the hope that all Permanent Representatives would have received instructions from their governments by that date.

9. The COUNCIL:

approved the Chairman's proposal.

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V. EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN MATTERS ARISING FROM THE PINEAU PLAN
RELATED TO AID TO UNDER-DEVELOPED AREAS.

Documents: C-M(56)79
RDC/294/56

10. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that the new terms of reference submitted in RDC/294/56 represented an improvement and a simplification of the earlier proposals made by his Delegation and, he thought, met points raised by other delegations.

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In particular, instead of listing specific problems to be examined, relating to the economic and technical aspects of the Pineau Plan, his new proposals in paragraph 1(b) were couched in much more general terms. He hoped that the new proposals by his Delegation would be generally acceptable.

11. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government would have liked to have seen wider terms of reference, more in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the decision taken at the Ministerial Meeting on 5th May. His Delegation would bring this question up again at a later stage if it thought it necessary to do so. In the meantime, in a spirit of conciliation, it would accept the terms of reference proposed by the French Delegation, provided that the committee of experts were appointed immediately and could begin their work at the earliest possible moment.

12. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, in approving the new terms of reference, stressed the fact that they would not commit the Council with regard to any decision it might wish to take in future.

13. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government would have preferred the appointment of a purely ad hoc committee, but was prepared to accept the terms of reference proposed if the rest of the Council approved them.

14. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE asked that the three following points should be placed formally on record:

- (a) that, if the Council approved the terms of reference, it should be clearly understood that the first task referred to in paragraph 1 was a task given the Committee by the Council, and that any decision as to possible subsequent tasks would be taken by the Council, and would not be left to the Committee itself to decide;
- (b) that the stability and well-being of member countries of the Organization referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the terms of reference related to economic stability and well-being;
- (c) that no publicity should be given to the terms of reference of the Committee, or to the decision to set up a Committee.

15. There was general agreement with the points made by the Netherlands Representative.

16. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could not approve the terms of reference proposed at the present meeting, though he hoped to be in a position to do so in the near future.

17. A brief discussion then took place as to the date of the first meeting of the new committee. It was agreed that no firm decision could be taken until the Canadian reservation was cleared. The date of 23rd July was tentatively suggested for the first meeting, it being understood that the meeting

would be essentially one to prepare a scheme of work, and that substantive questions would probably not be considered until September.

18. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that it was an expensive business to send experts from far-off countries to attend a single meeting of this kind. His Government was anxious to effect economies in this connection.

19. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that this first meeting would be primarily a procedural one, at which countries might well be represented by a member of their permanent delegations if they so desired. The need for experts would presumably not be felt until September.

20. The COUNCIL:

- (1) approved the terms of reference for a committee of technical advisers to the Council, as set out below, subject to confirmation by the Canadian Representative of the approval of his Government;

"1. Pursuant to the decision referred to in the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the 4th-5th May, 1956, the Council hereby instructs the Committee of Technical advisers established under its authority as a first task to:

summarise, in the light of the ideas expressed at that meeting and after having obtained the necessary further clarification of the Pineau Plan, the position taken and the views put forward by each member country:

- (a) on the relationship between the problem of economic development of under-developed countries on the one hand and the stability and well-being of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the other hand;
- (b) on the various economic and technical aspects of the Pineau Plan.

"2. The Committee will keep the Council informed on the progress of its work. Its report on these subjects shall be rendered by 1st November, 1956.

"3. The Committee shall be composed of representatives from each member government."

- (2) agreed to the date of 23rd July for the first meeting of the Committee, on the assumption that the reservation by the Canadian Representative would have been withdrawn in the meantime;
- (3) agreed that the Committee should select its own chairman.

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VI. CANADIAN MUTUAL AIDING OF F-86 AIRCRAFT TO GERMANY

21. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE made a statement on the above subject to the Council, for full text of which see annex.

22. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the Canadian Representative.

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VII. VISIT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1957

23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that Sir Christopher Steel had wished to inform the Council of the above visit before news of it was published in the Press. Unfortunately, Sir Christopher Steel had had to return to London at short notice and had not, to his great regret, been able to do so.

24. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the United Kingdom Representative.

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VIII. SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

25. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that this question had not been discussed at a formal meeting of the Council. He believed that the French, the United Kingdom and United States Representatives were prepared to give certain information on their position with regard to the present strength of countries in that area. He suggested that the Council might consider this question in restricted session at its meeting on 18th July.

26. The COUNCIL:

approved the Chairman's proposal.

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IX. THE CONTROL, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE NATO POL PIPELINE SYSTEM

Documents: C-M(56)83
C-M(55)74

27. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that in C-M(56)83 the Working Group had recommended terms of reference for the Central Europe Pipeline Office. In the cover note by the Chairman of the Group it was pointed out that the French Delegation dissented from certain points in the report. Had the Chairman of the Group any comments to add?

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28. Mr. MOREAU (Chairman of the Working Group) said that he had little to add. The opening paragraphs of C-M(56)83 summarised the divergencies that had arisen within the Working Group. A deadlock had been reached and the Group felt that only the Council could solve it. He stressed the fact that a solution was urgently needed, since in a very few months certain sections of the system should begin to operate.

29. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received very firm instructions from his Government to oppose some of the conclusions reached by the Working Group, and some of the proposals they had made. He added that he, personally, felt in full sympathy with the line taken by his authorities. His Delegation had hoped that the Experts would have taken account of some of the objections raised by the French Delegation during discussion, the previous year, of the basic document (C-M(55)74). This had not been done. As he saw it, the task of the Experts was to determine the best way of operating a complicated international pipeline system. There were clearly difficult technical problems involved: loading of petrol, despatching it, testing the lines, ensuring adequate circulation, the creation of depots and reservoirs, the problem of crossing lines etc. Further, these technical problems were complicated by the fact that a number of countries were involved. However, he did not think that too much stress should be placed on the complexity of the technical problems. After all, frontiers had to be crossed, and an effective signals and points system ensured every time a train crossed one or more frontiers in going from, for example, Paris to Brussels or Berlin. The engineers and administrators of their various countries had not in the past found any insuperable difficulty in solving these technical problems. He believed that national engineers and administrators could solve the technical problems involved in the pipeline system with no greater difficulty.

30. Apart from the technical problems, it was also essential to ensure that the needs of the armed forces in the area were adequately met, in particular with regard to the quality of the petrol needed for various purposes, and delivery date. Further, rules would have to be worked out in connection with the purchase of the petrol which would be fair to the firms engaged in this business in their various countries. Finally, there was a considerable accountancy problem involved. Here again, however, he did not believe that the problems he had listed differed essentially from the problems in similar fields which member governments were solving without great difficulty from day to day.

31. His Delegation fully recognised that the pipeline system was an international system, internationally financed, to meet international needs. It was therefore proper that there should be guarantees for effective international control, from a financial point of view and for effective control of operation. The Experts had dealt very fully with the international aspects of the pipeline system. They had not, however, taken sufficiently into account the national problems involved, in particular the need for the closest possible liaison between the international agency and the national authorities of the countries on whose territory the pipeline was located. He doubted whether the Experts had considered the serious difficulties which would certainly arise in wartime in connection with the loading of petrol in ports, difficulties which might also arise in peacetime in the case, for example, of strikes. Further, apart from the problem of ports, liaison was essential with suppliers and with transport authorities throughout the whole system.

32. In the southern and northern sector it had not been considered necessary to set up the elaborate machinery proposed by the Working Group. In Italy, Greece, Norway and Denmark there were national pipeline agencies who worked on behalf of NATO without the cumbersome machinery it was proposed to set up for Central Europe. Again, the United States pipelines in France were operated satisfactorily through bilateral arrangements worked out between France and the United States. Was it really essential to provide a completely different system for Central Europe? To sum up, his authorities wished to make the three following points:

- (a) the whole machinery proposed was elaborate and cumbersome;
- (b) too little authority with regard to day-to-day administration was left to the national divisions;
- (c) the central operating agency should be a co-ordinating rather than an executive body.

33. Mr. MOREAU, referring to the French criticism that the structure proposed was over-heavy, pointed out that at a meeting of the Working Group in January the French Experts had indicated that, in general, they considered the structure proposed was satisfactory and would meet the needs of the pipeline system. Further, at a meeting of the Working Group on the 16th May, it had seemed that general agreement would be reached. Unfortunately, this had not been possible owing to a last-minute difference of opinion as to the appointment of the General Manager of the Central Operating Agency.

34. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE replied that the French Experts had gone as far as they possibly could in the way of concessions, but that in the end they had been obliged to reserve their position. In any case, he felt that the question was now above the expert level, and that the Council should consider the political as well as technical issues involved. On the technical issues the experts might be the best authority: on the political issues, it was for delegations to say the last word.

35. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the French Representative that the problem was a complex one. However, he thought it discouraging that agreement did not seem to be near, since it was time that part of the system began to operate. He pointed out that all NATO countries were concerned in the matter, since the pipeline system was internationally financed, and the user countries were paying a higher contribution than host countries. The user countries must therefore have their word to say in arrangements for financial control. He agreed with the French Representative that there must be liaison with the national administrations concerned, and thought that that would be precisely the task of the Central Operating Agency. It might be true that the machinery was slightly cumbersome, but it did at least meet the essential needs.

36. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE replied that he had never questioned the need for financial control. All he wished to do was to place the accent differently, giving greater authority to national divisions and making the Central Agency a co-ordinating rather than an executive body. He suggested the Working Group might reconsider the problem in the light of his observations.

37. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE doubted whether there would be any point in referring the problem back to the Working Group, since a complete deadlock had arisen in the Group. There was a question of principle involved which it was, in his opinion, for the Council to decide. He asked whether the Standing Group Representative could give the military view of the proposals put forward by the Working Group.

38. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that the military authorities fully approved the system proposed by the Working Group.

39. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE asked whether the military authorities would approve a system for Central Europe similar to that adopted for Southern and Northern Europe.

40. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that he could not answer this question until a concrete proposal for Central Europe on the lines suggested by the French Representative was submitted.

41. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the main difference dividing the French Delegation from other delegations was the desire of the former to see greater authority given to the national divisions, and less authority to the Central Agency. This was essentially a political problem, involving the question of abandoning some degree of national sovereignty. The other NATO countries concerned in the Central Europe pipeline system - The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium - were prepared to give up some part of their sovereignty to ensure an effective pipeline system. The French authorities were not prepared to go as far as other governments. Could the French Representatives state the degree of authority he wished to see given to national divisions?

42. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that the view of his Expert at the beginning of the discussion of this problem had been close to the view expressed by the French Representative. However, the Netherlands Expert had altered his view owing to the fact that SACEUR had emphasised that the system now proposed by the French Delegation would not be acceptable to him as Supreme Commander. His Delegation had therefore come round to the view that the system proposed by the Working Group was the best. Quite apart from the political issues involved, and on this point he shared the views of the Belgian Representative, he was convinced that a really efficient system could only be brought about under the procedure proposed by the Working Group.

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the French Representative had asked why a different system had been proposed for Central Europe from that proposed for Southern and Northern Europe. The problem in Central Europe was a very different one, in that a number of countries were involved. Since several frontiers had to be crossed, there must be one controlling unit to operate the system efficiently. This was the Experts' view and he endorsed it. It was true that national interests must be safeguarded, but efficiency would disappear if the authority of the Central Operating Agency were diluted.

44. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE urged that the technical problem should not be exaggerated. As he had pointed out before, no great difficulty was found in administering railway systems where several frontiers had to be crossed. With regard to the political issue referred to by the Belgian Representative, he said that the French Government did not wish rigidly to insist on maintaining every particle of its national sovereignty, but thought it essential to devise a system in which national authorities could work efficiently with a central co-ordinating agency. Could the Experts reconsider the problem, taking into account the French

desire, first to see a single national division established for France and, secondly, to make the Central Agency more of a co-ordinating body?

45. Mr. MOREAU replied that the Experts might be able to put up an alternative scheme for a single French national division, though there would be considerable difficulty in so doing. However, he doubted very much whether any compromise on the authority of the Central Operating Agency, along the lines proposed by the French Representative, could be worked out by the Experts. They had already discussed this question at very great length.

46. The CHAIRMAN said that if the problem were referred back to the Working Group, the latter must be given precise instructions. He did not think it would be easy to do this. He therefore wondered whether the better policy might not be to adopt the system proposed by the Experts on a purely experimental basis, fully recognising that experience might show that it should be substantially modified.

47. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE supported the proposal made by the Chairman. So far as calling the Experts together was concerned, he doubted whether the highly qualified Experts necessary could be convened at short notice.

48. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Council's task might be made easier if the French Delegation could state precisely the amendments they would like to see in connection with two points:

- (a) the strengthening of the authority of national divisions;
- (b) making the Central Operating Agency more of a co-ordinating, and less of an executive body.

49. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that other delegations might be able to meet the French point in setting up a single national division for France. So far as the rest of the procedure was concerned, he urged the French Delegation to accept the Chairman's proposal that the Working Group's proposals should be accepted on a purely experimental basis.

50. The COUNCIL:

- (1) invited the French Representative to submit, as soon as possible, a memorandum setting out the amendments they wished to see embodied in the present proposals for the control, operation and maintenance of the NATO POL Pipeline System;
- (2) agreed that on receipt of this memorandum the Council would further consider this problem;
- (3) took note of the points made in the course of discussion.

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X. DEFENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ICELAND AND THE UNITED STATES

Previous reference: C-R(56)36
Document: C-M(56)92

51. The CHAIRMAN said that delegations had now received

M.C. 63(Final), in which the Military Committee had given its views on the importance of the defence of Iceland and the continued necessity for the maintenance and utilisation of the facilities in peacetime as well as in the event of war. He thought it was now for the Council to prepare recommendations to the two Governments, embodying the views expressed by the Military Committee and the Council's views on the political issues. A drafting group might be set up as soon as the Council had expressed its views on the main political issues. As he saw it, a vital point to make was the following: when Iceland had joined NATO, it had been agreed that there would be no foreign armed forces established in Iceland in peacetime. In 1951 the Korean crisis had developed, war appeared to be imminent, and the Icelandic Government had agreed that United States armed forces and installations should be established in Iceland. The Icelandic Government now felt that the danger of war was less imminent and that the abnormal position arising out of the Korean crisis could be brought to an end. He believed that the Icelandic Government wished to have the views of the Council on this aspect of the problem.

52. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE suggested that the International Staff might prepare a draft reply, in consultation with delegations. This could serve as a basis for Council discussion.

53. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported this view. The question was one to which his Government attached great importance, particularly because it believed that the threat from the USSR was still real.

54. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that, though there might have been a change in Soviet tactics, they had in no way weakened their military potential. The fact that they had demobilised a large number of their troops was offset by the continuous effort they were making to build up their air and atomic power. Further, their claim that they were aiming to bring about a détente in international relations was belied by the policy they were following in the Middle East. He believed that the step proposed by the Icelandic Government would be a disaster, if carried out, in that it would mark the first breach in the solidarity of the West. Further, as the military authorities had pointed out, Iceland was vital to the strategy of the Alliance.

55. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the views expressed by the French Representative. His Government consider the Icelandic proposal not only as dangerous from a military point of view, but also from a morale point of view. If the Icelandic Government carried through its proposal, the solidarity of the West would be weakened, with grave consequences in countries like Italy, where there was a substantial communist party.

56. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE supported the procedure proposed by the United Kingdom Representative. He thought that the points proposed in Annex B to M.C. 63(Final) as suitable for publication were too narrow. If the Council's recommendations were to be published it would surely be necessary to include some of the material set out in the body of the document.

57. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the point made by the Netherlands Representative. If the United Kingdom suggestion that the staff should prepare a draft reply were accepted, he suggested that the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, who would be responsible for the draft, should use his own initiative in deciding how much of the information given by the military authorities should

be made public. The Standing Group's views would, of course, be sought.

58. The COUNCIL:

invited the Secretary General to prepare, in consultation with delegations, a draft, for consideration by the Council, of the recommendations which the Council might send to the two governments concerned.

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XI. VISIT OF MR. SHEPILOV TO ATHENS

59. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that Mr. Shepilov had given his hearers the impression of a man with a strong personality, clever and collected. The leit motif of his statements had been the "détente". Shepilov said that he considered present tension completely unjustified and added that, in the view of the Moscow Government, NATO and the Baghdad Pact represented alliances whose purposes were aggressive. However, the USSR was strong enough to try to work for more normal international relations despite these two pacts. After the failure of collective efforts for disarmament, Russia had begun to disarm unilaterally, and to reduce its troops in Germany. It would continue to do so if the West followed its example.

60. Shepilov emphasised on several occasions the fact that Greece ran no risk so far as the USSR was concerned, and that Greek fears were the result of a psychosis. He added that he could see no justification for the size of the armed forces maintained by Greece, which represented a heavy charge on Greek economy. At the same time, he said that the USSR understood the Greek position and would not attempt to embarrass Greece by asking it to leave NATO or to break its other friendly ties.

61. Shepilov had suggested that Greeko-Russian trade relations should be expanded. He had also suggested that the Russians should help in carrying out projects needed in Greece for industrialisation, under very favourable conditions. He stressed the fact that the conditions would not include participation by Russia in control of the firms or of their profits, and that Russia would not try to obtain, indirectly, any political influence in Greece through this work.

62. With regard to the political problems discussed, Shepilov had said that, so far as Cyprus was concerned, the USSR would continue to support the right of the Cypriots to self-determination, a principle to which Soviet Russia was firmly attached. He had claimed to be unaware of difficulties existing between Greece on the one hand and Albania and Bulgaria on the other, in particular the ban on navigation in the Corfu Channel. But he referred several times to the fact that Greece was in no danger of being attacked by its norther neighbours. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had the impression that the USSR would do its best to work out a guarantee for the inviolability of Greek frontiers if the Greek Government so desired.

63. On their side, the Greek Ministers told Shepilov that Greece was only too anxious to improve economic and political relations between the two countries, provided that Greek sovereignty was fully respected and it was understood that Greece would remain faithful to its alliances.

64. Finally, Shepilov suggested that the Greek Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs should pay an official visit to Moscow. The Prime Minister thanked him, and said that he would be happy to do so as soon as the ground had been sufficiently cleared to render such a visit worthwhile. On the other hand, the Greek Government accepted a further invitation from Shepilov to send a commission of economists and technicians to Moscow in the near future for talks.

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XII. CANADIAN REPLY TO THE BULGANIN LETTER

65. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE circulated the reply his Government proposed to send to the Bulganin letter. The reply would be dispatched in the very near future, but his Government had wished to give delegations the opportunity to comment on it before it was sent.

66. The COUNCIL:

agreed that Permanent Representatives who had any comments to make on the proposed Canadian reply should send them at once, direct, to the Canadian Delegation.

XIII. POZNAN RIOTS

67. On the proposal of the Canadian Representative, the COUNCIL:

agreed to hold a special meeting to discuss the Poznan riots at 4.30 p.m. on Friday, 13th July.

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XIV. FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

68. A special meeting with General Gruenther at SHAPE: Friday, 13th July, at 10.00 a.m.

Restricted meeting: Friday, 13th July, at 4.30 p.m.

Formal meeting: Wednesday, 18th July, at 10.15 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

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STATEMENT TO COUNCIL ON CANADIAN MUTUAL AIDING
OF F-86 AIRCRAFT TO GERMANY

In an exchange of Notes which took place on 7th July, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany accepted an offer of the Government of Canada to make available to the Federal Republic of Germany, under the Canadian Mutual Aid Programme for the fiscal year 1956-57,

- (a) 75 F-86 Sabre Mark V reconditioned aircraft powered with Orenda Series 10 engines, together with 75 spare engines;
- (b) spares including six months' pipeline plus one year's consumption;
- (c) special ground handling equipment, tools and test equipment, but excluding standard items such as refuellers.

2. The equipment is being made available to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with a recommendation of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander and with the concurrence of the Standing Group. It is also being made available in accordance with the terms and conditions governing Canadian Mutual Aid which were described to the North Atlantic Council as recorded in NATO Document ISM(56)11 dated 18th May, 1956.

3. The details of the transfer of these aircraft and parts will be worked out between the appropriate experts of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the German Air Force.

4. A public announcement about this exchange of Notes will probably be made in Bonn by the Government of the Republic of Germany to-morrow, 12th July.