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VERBATIM RECORD

of the

SIXTY NINTH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

TUESDAY, 11TH DECEMBER, 1956 AT 10.30 a.m.

at the

PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS XVIIe

COMPTE RENDU

de la

SOIXANTE NEUVIEME SEANCE DU CONSEIL

tenue le

MARDI 11 DECEMBRE 1956 A 10.30 heures

au

PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS XVIIe

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.

Mr. MARTINO

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to open this Session of the NATO Council, and I wish to extend my cordial welcome to the distinguished Representatives of the Allied Countries.

I believe that I would not entirely fulfill my duties as Chairman if I merely expressed our satisfaction for being all of us here once again to co-operate for the security of our Nations, and if I did not mention at the same time the deep concern which we all feel about the present situation.

We meet in fact at a time of many and serious trials, and of deep anxiety for all peace-loving people. Events have demonstrated that our security is incomplete if our co-operation leaves out of account spheres of action extending beyond the area of our Alliance.

Our efforts to achieve closer relations strictly within the NATO framework, in order to strengthen its defence machinery, will obviously be insufficient if we allow serious differences to arise between members with respect to other problems.

Our prime duty is therefore to ensure in all circumstances the unity of our Organization. The Report of the Committee of Three, which we shall consider later, puts forward certain concrete suggestions which, if accepted, will help to this end.

Our duty is not merely to reinforce our solidarity, We have to go further and use that solidarity as a basis for concrete measures and future action over a broad field.

Our Agenda includes a survey of the international situation and, in particular, of the trends of Soviet policy. This should enable us to give the military authorities the political guidance for preparing our plans of defence, and also to examine means of facing the Soviet threat in the political and economic fields.

We must avail ourselves of this meeting to discuss frankly and thoroughly, not only the questions which are within the political boundaries of the Treaty, but also those which, although outside these boundaries, concern us directly, even if in a different measure. I am referring, first of all, to the situation in the Middle East.

The most important lesson to be drawn from the recent crisis is the evidence that the Soviet Government seems to be forcing its way into the Middle East in order to outflank our line of defence in Europe.

It seems hardly necessary to draw your attention to the importance of this Soviet move which aims at the control of the Suez Canal and of the oil fields, with the intent to undermine not only Western defence but also, by depriving us of essential supplies, to weaken Western economies.

Mr. MARTINO (Contd.)

In recent weeks public opinion both in NATO countries and elsewhere has been made to realise how false have been the Soviet smiles. Events in Hungary have shown all too clearly the ruthlessness of the Soviet leaders and their readiness to use force to achieve their ends. Our people have turned to the North Atlantic Alliance and to this Council for decisions which will result in effective action to counter the threats which are facing us.

The situation now existing in Eastern Europe now requires, more than ever, a common Western policy. Only in this way can we gain maximum advantage from the present troubles of the Communist world.

The anxieties through which we have passed have shown us we must be willing to fulfill our duties towards the Organization by bearing in mind, at all times, that no action should be undertaken by a member country that might endanger our solidarity. I hope that the result of our efforts will not fall short of these aims. It is encouraging to note that Western governments have already taken a number of steps to restore their solidarity by giving proof of their mutual understanding and moderation.

But let us look to the future rather than to the past and let us by our actions at this meeting prove that the Atlantic Alliance is indeed, as so many of us have stated, the cornerstone of all our foreign and defence policies.

I think the North Atlantic Council would wish to express to our Norwegian colleagues their very deep sympathy at the untimely death of General Lambrechts, Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Armed Forces. General Lambrechts was a tower of strength in the military effort of our Alliance.

Mr. LANGE

Mr. President: May I express our deep appreciation of the moving words you said in memory of General Lambrechts.

Mr. MARTINO

The first item in our Agenda is the Report of the Secretary General of progress during the period from April to November of this year. The document is C-M(56)135.

May I ask Lord Ismay to introduce the report?

Lord ISMAY

Mr. Chairman: I have nothing to add to that report. It is perfectly straightforward and I do not want to amplify anything or amend it in any way, but I am ready to answer any questions that the Council might wish to put to me.

Mr. MARTINO

Does anybody wish to speak? Then I suggest that the Council may take note of the Secretary General's report.

Mr. MARTINO (Contd.)

I suggest that for the next item of our agenda, Review by Foreign Ministers of the International Situation, the Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives should move to the smaller Council Room number 3; where it has been agreed that our advisers should be restricted to two for each nation. If there are no objections then this sitting is adjourned.

La séance est ouverte.

We now come to Item II on the Agenda; the Review by Foreign Ministers on the International Situation. Three reference documents have been listed on the Agenda, but I do not believe that it is necessary that we should discuss any of these papers which are for our background information only.

I suggest that the best method of handling this discussion might be for any Minister who is to make a general statement covering the whole world situation to do so now, After these statements have been made, we should discuss specific topics.

These, I think, might be first of all the Middle East situation, and secondly, the situation in Eastern Europe, to which is related the problem of the reunification of Germany. I suggest that discussion on the first of these topics should be initiated by the Turkish Foreign Minister and the second by the German Foreign Minister.

May I first ask if any minister wishes to make a general statement. Mr. Lange?

MR. LANGE

Mr. Chairman, we have met at this meeting of the North Atlantic Council to reinforce the unity and the strength of our Alliance, and I am sure we all agree that there is no task more necessary than this one, and that this task is more necessary now than at any time.

The tragic events in Hungary have demonstrated to our peoples that the Soviet regime, if it feels itself threatened, is as ruthless as ever and apparently impervious to the pressures of world public opinion.

The Soviet repression in Hungary has shattered the effects of the "charm" offensive and the illusions of a lessening of world tensions. It has convinced those who needed convincing of the continuing necessity of maintaining our joint defence efforts and of restoring mutual confidence within our Alliance and overcoming differences amongst ourselves in face of the continuing threat.

But do these tragic events in Eastern Europe and Soviet action in the Middle East crisis necessarily mean a relapse to the methods of Stalin's time? My answer would be partially and temporarily "yes", in Hungary certainly, in East Germany, probably in Albania, Bulgaria and Roumania.

Mr. LANGE (Contd.)

I am not so certain that such a relapse has occurred or will necessarily occur in the Soviet Union itself or in Poland, and I find it very difficult at the moment to judge about the prospects and trends in Czechoslovakia.

The changes in Soviet society which have occurred as a result of the industrialisation and organization of the Soviet Union cannot be undone. These changes have forced Stalin's successors to abandon naked mass terror as a chief weapon in their internal policies, and it is probably impossible to reverse this trend away from masked terror as a chief weapon, this so-called "liberalisation". If and when the Soviets have overcome the present crisis in Hungary, I feel it not unlikely that the trends which were apparent in the recent years and which were confirmed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, these trends will reassert themselves also in Soviet relations with the satellites.

We seem to agree also that the growth of Soviet economic strength has been sufficient to make the Soviet leadership confident that they can achieve their ends which certainly have not changed without resort to war in the foreseeable future and they seem to have realised that under conditions of atomic stalemates such as they exist today, the risk of all-out war is too great for them to take. I therefore believe that despite the revelation of the brutality of Soviet policies in Hungary, we shall probably be faced with a continuing Soviet offensive in the economic field and in the political and diplomatic fields as well. I would utter just one word of warning, there is I feel in one of the papers before us prepared by the Secretariat on economic trends in the Soviet Union, a certain tendency to over-estimate the rate of future economic growth in the Soviet Union. It seems to me it does not take sufficiently into account the very wide gap that still exists between levels of consumption in the Soviet Union and in the Western world. Neither does it take sufficiently into consideration the mounting need for amortisation and for the renewal of industrial equipment in Soviet industry especially. And both those things would tend to slow down the rate of economic growth although it will no doubt continue to be very considerable. I would also utter a note of warning against over-estimating the danger of Soviet economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. I believe that if we could really have a summing up of all that has been done in the way of economic assistance by the Western world over these post-war years, then what the Russians so far have been able to do would appear in its right and rather modest proportions. But having said this, I am quite convinced that the challenge with which we are faced in the economic field, as in the diplomatic and political field, is very serious indeed. And to meet this challenge we must, in my mind, in our internal policies, maintain and if possible accelerate the rate of economic growth in our own societies and in order to achieve that I am deeply convinced that we shall have to extend economic co-operation amongst ourselves continually and in this connection I think we could not under-estimate the importance of arriving as rapidly as possible on results, both in the work towards Scandanavian common markets, European common markets and the establishment of a free trade area in Europe. We must I fear reckon with serious setbacks for the next few months as a result of the Middle East crisis, but with the assistance of our friends on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, I feel confident that we shall, without too much difficulty, overcome that crisis.

Mr. LANGE (Contd.)

Now externally the challenge is one of Soviet diplomatic, political, economic and to some extent military penetration in the un-committed part of the world. It seems to me to be decisive for the future of free society who succeeds in winning the confidence and establishing re-incorporation with the so-called un-committed nations, who at the same time most of them are economically underdeveloped nations. And in this context Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the effects of recent events in the Middle East both on our inter-NATO relations and on the NATO countries' relations with nations of the Middle East and of South Asia. The absence of consultation, even of information, came as a blow to mutual confidence within our Alliance and I don't think any purpose is served, any good purpose is served, by denying that fact. It also came as a shock and surprise, at least to my country, to see two of our closest friends act on an interpretation very different from ours of the obligations we have all assumed under the United Nations Charter, obligations which are specifically re-affirmed in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the last sentence of which reads "... and to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations".

And thirdly, we felt and feel in our country considerable concern over the long-term effects of armed British/French intervention in Egypt. The long-term effects of this on the possibilities of the whole of the democratic west to counter Soviet moves, to win the confidence of Arabs and Asians and thereby enable us to defend both our immediate interests in that area and to secure further possibilities of economic growth and expansion in our part of the world and last but not least its effects on our possibilities of establishing long term ties of such a nature that we and not the Soviets will be the decisive outside influence in those areas.

I certainly have no wish, Mr. Chairman, to indulge in any way in recrimination, but I feel it is essential for the future of our Alliance that we should openly discuss the differences of view and of approach which have been revealed through the crisis through which we have just passed. I am leaving the discussion of the range of consultation of the nature of the obligation to consult, which I think we all have, until we come to deal with the report of the Committee of Three Ministers. But I think it is right at this stage to state the view of my Government of our obligations under the United Nations Charter and under Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We feel that by subscribing to the Charter we have all of us relinquished the right to act unilaterally except in self-defence against open unprovoked aggression and though the provocation no doubt has been heavy both for Israel and for Britain and France they were, as far as I can see, not subject to armed aggression of a nature to justify armed self-defence, at least not before having fully exhausted the possibilities of redress through procedures of the United Nations, and one of the papers recently circulated by the Standing Group on the military threat to NATO's southern flank, published as SG 255, seems to me to corroborate this judgement that there was no such immediate threat of armed aggression as to justify unilateral action under Article 51 of the Charter.

Mr. LANGE (Contd.)

Now we all of us certainly are painfully aware of the many weaknesses that the United Nations have and we all have experienced how United Nations debates often are a trying and frustrating experience, yet nevertheless in the United Nations reside the hopes of all our peoples in an international future based on the rule of law, and therefore to my Government's view, our obligations under the United Nations Charter must be paramount. But I hasten to add that peace is not enough - there must also be justice. And how is it possible to achieve just solutions of the conflicts with which we are confronted in the present Middle East situation. My Government feel that we cannot have any hope of achieving such just solutions through the use of armed force, and the United Nations emergency force certainly is not there to enforce the policies of the United Nations Assembly with regard to the solution of either the Arab-Israeli situation or the Suez Canal problem. The only means of arriving at just solutions, as we see it, is through negotiation through diplomacy, and that our aim now in the present situation must be to bring out the real community of interest that exists between us as a group and, on the one hand the oil producing Arabs, and the Asian and African nations east of Suez as users of the Suez Canal. Only by bringing out and making fully conscious and organized this real community of interest can we hope to establish sufficient pressure on Egypt to make them enter in good faith into negotiations for a lasting solution of the Suez canal situation. But we must also make a determined effort, as I see it, to bring round the Asian nations so that they join with us and North and South America in exerting pressure on Egypt and on the other Arab states to accept the existence of Israel as a State and to make peace with the Israeli nation. And if that is to be possible, it seems to me essential that we win the confidence both of the Middle Eastern and of the South Asian nations. And to win their confidence we feel we must demonstrate in action that there is no truth in the persistent allegation of Soviet, Arab and even Asian neutralist propaganda that NATO is a coalition in defence of the colonial interests of a certain number of Western European nations. The myth that colonialism is one, and the defence of colonialism is one of the main aims of NATO policies, must be destroyed and it can only be destroyed through our own policies; it must be destroyed because it constitutes to our minds one of the main obstacles to understanding and co-operation with the so-called "un-committed" part of the world. And this myth, must be replaced by conviction among these nations that NATO as a group stands for peaceful change, peaceful change both inside each member country and in the relations of our countries with the former colonial territories and in the relations between former imperial powers of the West and dependent territories still under their sovereignty. Only by consistently pursuing such progressive policies can we wrest from the Soviets the initiative in the great struggle ahead of us. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. DULLES

Mr. President, the United States believes that nations and groups of nations, like individuals, need to live by faith, by philosophy, and that that is particularly the case in times of crises. And therefore I hope that it will not be looked upon as irrelevant if I discuss somewhat the basic philosophy which it seems to me should underly our conduct and our action at this time when we face what is generally accepted as a critical period in the life of this North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We believe that this second post-war decade, into which we have now entered, is a decade which, on the one hand, holds out great promise and which, on the other hand, is wrought with very great danger. If we look at the status of the Soviet Communist world we cannot, I think, but be struck by the very great degree of disintegration which has begun to make itself manifest in that world. The position of today is in very striking contrast to the situation as it existed, at least superficially in appearance, two or three years ago. At that time, within the Soviet Union itself, there was an apparent acceptance of iron discipline to secure complete conformity of action and thought. The satellite world seemed to be completely under control and to afford the Soviet Union dependable advance bases in Europe and indeed dependable military forces which could be used at their command in the event of war. And in every country of the world there was a Communist Party, a satellite Communist Party, which obeyed without question a party line which was put out from Moscow by the Soviet Communist Party and which, acting under that central direction, was able even within the countries of the free world to exert a very considerable influence at critical and decisive points, and critical and decisive moments. That was a picture at the end of the first decade.

Now we see that the system of satellite Communist parties has very definitely disintegrated; there is no cohesion, there is no general acceptance of the party line from Moscow, parties are going in different directions, they have been greatly weakened in their effectiveness by desertions of important elements from their ranks. The satellite situation, it is developed that instead of having solid advance bases and satellite divisions which could be used, that the situation is one of peril to the Soviet Union and that if opportunity or occasion arose the satellite divisions would probably be fighting against the Soviet Union instead of at their command. And within the Soviet Union itself there is a growing demand for greater liberty, for more freedom of thought, for greater personal security and for greater enjoyment of the fruits of labour. This is really an astounding change which has occurred, making itself manifest although the underlying causes were long present, but the manifestation of this change has occurred rather rapidly within the last couple of years. And the fact of this deterioration of what seemed to be a solid and impregnable position, having its ramifications throughout the whole world, that development opens up to us a vista of hope because I think we can fairly judge that the forces which have brought this change about are forces which, in the long run, will prove irresistible. I do not say that they will be irresistible at every point, in every place, at every time, but the overall picture is one of forces of liberalisation, kind of things which reflect the aspirations of human beings everywhere. These forces are at work and at one place after another are undermining what seemed to be a solid and

almost irresistible structure that the Soviet rulers had created. That, as I say, gives the basis for good hope. On the other hand, that very state of affairs, in our opinion at least, brings with it certain dangers. The Soviet rulers no longer have easy decisions to make. They are faced by hard decisions, risky decisions, and whenever that situation avails in a despotism like that of the Soviet Union there is always a risk that some of these dangers and risky decisions may be taken in the field of foreign relations and not wholly in the field of what they regard as their internal affairs. We know when we start how often it is that as a domestic situation seems to deteriorate, that there is greater recklessness in the field of foreign relations. We know, because it is reported in Khrushchev's speech to the Party Congress last February, that there was recognition of the fact that the successes which had been achieved under Stalin's régime - he points out - made it, made the rigours of the régime acceptable at home, and it would not be without precedent in history if, at a time when there is stress and strain within the orbit of the Soviet Communist world, that there should be a renewed effort to gain successes which would perhaps relieve them of some of the internal problems which otherwise they face. That might be at least a calculation, and it would not be the first time that such a calculation has been made, and is a calculation which is the more likely perhaps because of the rapid development of the military power of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would be inclined, I think, to put a little more emphasis on the military danger than Mr. Lange has done; where he, I gather, seems to feel that the risk of a military aggression is relatively slight and that the Soviet offensive will primarily be in economic terms. That may be the case but I think it is the feeling of my Government that just because of the deterioration from certain causes of the Soviet Union's structure in terms of its satellite parties throughout the world and of its satellite states and even of its own internal situation in the Soviet Union, although it is doubtless less acute, that there is danger of greater recklessness in the field of foreign relations and possibly a greater willingness to risk a war.

Now, we are given this analysis of the situation. What are the conclusions that we should draw? Basically it seems to us that there are two conclusions to draw of a general order. The first is that we must maintain the moral pressures which are helping to bring about the deterioration of the atheistic, materialistic, militaristic rule of the Soviet over so many peoples. Only moral forces can be an effective offensive and those moral pressures we must maintain. On the other hand, we must also maintain a military defensive to meet the risk that the Soviet might decide to gamble on military adventures. And I would like, Mr. President, to take up these two aspects of the problem that we face - the moral aspect which, as I say, constitutes our offensive means and the military aspect which constitutes our defensive mechanism. We believe that it is extremely important at this juncture to conform to the high ideals that are expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and which are to a significant extent reaffirmed, as Mr. Lange has pointed out, in the Article No. 1, the first Article, of our own North Atlantic Treaty - the renunciation of the use of force

MR. DULLES (Contd.)

for purposes other than those permitted by the Charter of the United Nations which is, under Article 51, defence against armed attack. Now we are quite aware of the inter-connection between peace and justice and it is very difficult to preserve peace in the face of flagrant injustices. I personally expressed myself on that inter-connection on a number of occasions. Some of you here may have heard me do so at the second London Conference on the Suez Canal matter which was held during the month of August. I also expressed the same view at the Emergency Session of the United Nations which was called at the end of October, but I have always expressed that inter-connection not as justifying the use of force but as calling for greater efforts to seek justice. Wherever we look around the world we can find serious injustices. In the Far East there is the partition of Korea which is regarded by the Republic of Korea as a very grave injustice indeed, and indeed that is also the position in the United Nations itself which has pronounced on the matter. There is the subjection of China to what the Republic of China on Taiwan regards as forcible aggression from without. There is the partition of Viet Nam. In South Asia there is the problem of Kashmir which each of two great countries regard as creating a grave injustice as far as it is concerned. Here in Europe we have the partition of Germany which is surely a very great injustice indeed and we have the suppression and oppression of the nations of Eastern Europe. In the Middle East there is the problem of Israel and the risk which has been alluded to already by Mr. Lange which we are all very alive to at the moment, the risk that the production of essential oil, essential transportation of that oil may pass into unfriendly or hostile hands with great jeopardy to the economic life of Western Europe. These are only a few of the many situations around the world which involve what many rightly believe to be very great injustices and in many of these cases there is a very strong temptation to resort to force to correct those injustices. But I think we must all recognise that we dare not, cannot, under present conditions, accept the concept that each nation, group of peoples, who are subjected to what they regard as grave injustices, have the right to attempt to remedy those injustices by resort to force. That would set loose in the Far East and South Asia, in the Middle East and in Europe, forces which almost surely would lead to World War III. That likelihood is the greater, given the fact that the Soviet rulers may more readily than at any time heretofore, be disposed to accept excuses for a more vigorous, a more militaristic foreign policy. I realise that the concept of what has been called the "just war" is a concept which in the past has been very deeply rooted in our thinking and indeed in much of our religious thinking and that it has been accepted in the past that it was justifiable to go to war if that war was a just war. But I think that there is a growing tendency to doubt whether under modern conditions there can be this thing that used to be called a just war, other than of course a war which is clearly imposed by the aggression of others and which is a war of self-defence because under modern conditions a modern total war almost inevitably inflicts and gives rise to greater injustices than the injustices which are sought to be cured. It seems to us that both morality and

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MR. DULLES (Contd.)

indeed expediency combine to require the rejection of war as an instrument of national policy. That indeed is our engagement, our engagement under the United Nations in the case of those of us who are members of the United Nations, and also our engagement under the North Atlantic Treaty itself. It seems to us that the restraint which is exercised by many nations in the face of very great provocation is a proof not of irresolution, is not a proof of unwillingness to fight if war be thrust upon us and become a war of defence, but contrary, that self-restraint is in our opinion proof of moral strength, and it serves to create the climate in the world, which gives stimulus and encouragement to the forces which are working to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet Communist empire, built as it is upon denial of the moral law, the use of force whenever it is expedient, denial of the dignity, sanctity of the human individual.

In this connection I want to say that I consider that a very notable achievement in this respect has been the acceptance by the United Kingdom and by France of the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly with respect to this Middle East situation. However we may have disagreed with the initial phases of that operation, there is no use concealing the fact that we did disagree. Nevertheless, the demonstration of respect for, to use the words of our Declaration of Independence, "the decent respect for the opinions of mankind", is now reflected through the General Assembly of the United Nations. That I believe constitutes the moral asset of immense value to our cause, and of course it stands out in striking contrast to the disregard of the opinions of mankind, the flouting of the opinions of mankind, as exhibited by the Soviet Union in relation to Hungary.

The fact of that action by our friends in relation to the Middle East enables us more clearly, more effectively, more dramatically, to bring out the immorality of the Soviet conduct in Hungary.

Now we are aware of the fact, as illustrated by these two cases, contrasting cases, of the attitude of our British and French friends in relation to the Middle East, the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to Hungary, and the contrast of their response to the United Nations, illustrates the fact that there does exist in the world what is sometimes referred to as a double standard, and that it is indeed difficult at times, to live in a world where double standards of conduct prevail, and where for example, certain of us feel impelled to pay respect to the opinions of mankind, the voice of the United Nations, other nations feel free to treat those views with contempt. And, I think we must all bear in mind the existence of this double standard does bear heavily upon some countries; and also that it bears more heavily upon some than upon others. Sometimes we wonder how long we can go along in a world where this double standard prevails.

We believe, Mr. President, the standards by which we live are right, that they will prevail, and indeed that they are already prevailing, and that if we are to adhere to them, we can confidently look forward to the day when this double standard will have come to an end.

Mr. DULLES (Contd.)

We believe that as we adhere to our standards the impact upon the Soviet, Chinese Communist world, will become ever greater and that it will accelerate the deterioration of the evil aspects of these régimes. We had hoped that this dangerous division of the world will come to an end. I do not predict it for tomorrow, for next year, but the trend in that direction is definite and I believe that with our help it will become irresistible. Now many of the difficulties which result from this double standard from our perplexing international problems are soluble. Certainly there is much more that could be done I think and is being done within the areas that are subject to the influence of what we call the free nations to promote justice. Much more can be done and is being done through co-operation, through increased resourcefulness to meet the problems that confront us. And also I believe that we should all recognise the fact that since the burdens of the double standard do not fall equally upon all free nations, a consideration for each other is not charged. The United States has in the past tried to act in accordance with that principle, I hope that we shall continue to do so for the future. I have spoken of the United Nations and its standards, its actions, its recommendations, I do so with full awareness of the fact that the United Nations is an imperfect organization and that the voting procedures that are to be found both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly are perhaps not those which are best adapted to make the United Nations an effective world order. Perhaps some day we can bring about some changes in those respects. Surely the United Nations has gained great stature during these recent weeks. Some nations, as I have already indicated, some nations, despite their own views about their national interests, have conformed to the recommendations of the United Nations' General Assembly. Also this Assembly has been able to organize, on short notice, a military emergency force. One of our NATO members, Canada, Mr. Pearson, took a very leading and significant part in that important development at the United Nations. And even in the case of Hungary although the views of the United Nations have been flaunted, nevertheless, the United Nations has provided a forum which has made it possible to focus world opinion and world condemnation upon the efforts of the Soviet rulers to suppress freedom in the world, notably in Hungary. So we believe that despite its imperfections the United Nations has developed a prestige and an influence which makes it a power for good. Of course we cannot rely upon the United Nations to do everything. We must always remember that the United Nations is nothing more than the states which make up the United Nations, it is not an independent sovereign entity. It is an association of states such as we are here and it cannot and will not do everything, it cannot be expected to do everything and many things will have to be done outside of the United Nations. On the other hand to take action which would undermine, perhaps lead to a disguarding of the United Nations will, in our opinion, be a very great disaster. Indeed I fear that such a treatment of United Nations would again be an action which would seem to discard the principles of the United Nations or the enunciation of forces would open a way also surely to actions in different parts of the world which would precede another global war. We believe

Mr. DULLES (Contd.)

that any such action would be the more inexcusable, because we can I think begin to see the end of the road. I don't think we are ever going to get to a time when peace is going to be so safe and assured we can all relax, but I do believe that we can begin to see the possibility of a correction of some of the grave injustices which today afflict the world and that a change in the character of the world division which has been with us now since the end of the second world war, that that becomes a realistic possibility.

Now, I have been speaking so far of the moral forces present in the world exemplified by the United Nations and exemplified by our own conduct in accordance with the principle of the United Nations, as creating a powerful moral influence which as I say is our most effective instrument of offence, as against the immoral atheistic and materialistic structure which has been erected by the Soviet rulers. Our offensive must be in terms of moral influences and not of military efforts. But our defensive I think must include military strength. We have in the Soviet Union a military capacity which is very great indeed and which the Soviet rulers have been working with great intensity and with a great sacrifice imposed upon their people to make the greatest military force that there is in the world. Now for a time there was an illusion in some quarters, although that illusion was never reflected in any of the estimates made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But there was an illusion in some quarters that we did not need to pay much attention to this vast military machine being developed by the Soviet rulers because it was happily assumed by some that even though this has been done at great cost, great sacrifice and at some risk, that it, of course, never entered the minds of the Soviet rulers that they would use this great machine, which they were building up. I think recent events in Hungary have shattered that illusion wherever it existed. And certainly in the view that we take of the situation, it is of the utmost importance that the military strength of the free nations should be maintained and particularly that the strength of NATO should be maintained and also that there should be no doubt whatever of our willingness to use that strength if, unhappily, events should require it. It's no use just having military strength if the other side assumes that you would not use it. There's been a curious thought I find expressed in some quarters that because the United States opposed the recent use of force that that indicated the United States had gone pacifist and would not fight in pursuance its obligations for the defence of itself and its allies. We took the position we did because we believe it was the position to which we were bound by certain engagements that we had taken including the engagements of Article 1 of the United Nations, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But because in the face of great difficulties and great misgivings, of our heart at least, we took that position of living up to one Article of the Treaty, it seems to be assumed that that's proof that we would not live up to the other Articles. I think that the argument is the other way round and the fact that we did, despite the inclinations of our heart and our friendship, live up to one Article of the Treaty, I think that you and all the world can be more confident that we will live up to the other Articles of the Treaty. Certainly, I give you that unqualified assurance and I hope that no one anywhere in the world will have the slightest doubt upon

Mr. DULLES (Contd.)

that score. I believe that as I see that from the events that have occurred in Hungary as the Red tanks rolled into Hungary so also we must assume that they might roll on into Western Europe if they thought that there was no effective capacity or will to defend that area. Certainly I think we must proceed on that assumption. Now I recognise that we all face the very difficult problem of striking a proper balance between military and economic expenditures. The free nations are not willing, and indeed from the political standpoint are not able, to treat their working people as slave labour. Every one of our countries faces a need to find ways to improve living standards and over the future to find ways to give those who labour a greater share of the rewards of their labour. And if we should not find ways to do that, not necessarily every day or every year, but over a period of years, if we cannot find ways to do that then we will be exposed to other dangers from subversion for example, dangers which could be serious, perhaps as serious almost as military weakness. Surely our military policies must not be policies so extravagant that they invite economic collapse. And now I would like just at this point to say that the United States endorses very strongly the point of view expressed by Mr. Lange with reference to development of common markets and their like which will enable greater economic strength to be developed in quarters which are now weakened economically by the smallness of their markets and the difficulty of effective mass and consequently cheaper, production. The United States believes that it is possible to find an acceptable balance between our economic necessities and our military necessities and to maintain with growing and expanding economies the strength adequate to repel, deter we hope, if need be, repel, Soviet armed aggression and one of the great advantages of the collective security system which we exemplify here is the fact that in this military respect we help each other. No one of us has to assume alone the burden of being able to deter or repel Soviet attack. For any one of us to attempt it alone would be an almost superhuman task and would really raise almost insoluble problems as to a balance between military and economic development. Under our collective security system we are able to divide and share the burdens. Now of course a principle element in the deterrent is atomic retaliatory power and this potential largely resides at the present time in the United States but it is aided and very importantly aided by the many countries within and without NATO who contribute bases necessary to ensure inter-communication which is very important from the standpoint of atomic retaliatory power and its protection through diversification. But we cannot I think assume that atomic retaliatory power solves all of our military purposes. One of the few things that is certain is I think that we cannot be certain as to what will be the character of a future war. If we assume that we can be sure about what the next war will be like we will be taking indeed a very great risk which would be reckless on our part to put all of our eggs into one basket. We feel that there must be diversity of capability and there must be flexibility. Also there must be a fair sharing of the burdens of this collective defence effort so the burdens may not become excessive for any one of us, so that there is no fatal gap because of the inadequacy of any one of us.

Mr. DULLES (Contd.)

These are matters which presumably will be discussed further in more detail when we come to the Item on our agenda dealing with the political directive which we will be expected to give to our military authorities. It is enough perhaps to say here that the United States sees both the necessity and the possibility of creating, through our joint and combined effort, through creating a situation such that the Soviet rulers despite the temptations to which they may be subjected by their internal problems, their need of taking certain hazardous decisions in respect to certain matters, despite those temptations to which the Soviet rulers may be subjected, we believe that we can create, should create, the strength necessary to prevent them taking those decisions by any thought of attacking the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Now, in addition to the moral offensive which we need to undertake and the military defence which we need to undertake, there is of course the matter of our own organization and the necessity of bringing about a closer and more intimate understanding between us with respect to our foreign policies particularly those foreign policies which seriously affect each other. The need for this has I think been strikingly demonstrated and requires no elaboration. At prior meetings we alluded almost casually, as I recall, a year ago this December and last April or May to the problem of the Middle East and of oil, but as I say it was only a passing reference and we did nothing really to seek to help at arriving at common policies with respect to these and other matters of which we were all conscious which vitally affect the very life of our Alliance. These recent developments will, we hope, prove a re-inforcement which we do not welcome or want but which is here, will prove a re-inforcement of the report of the Three Ministers whom we commissioned last May to consider ways and means for strengthening our organization and the United States will be prepared to discuss that matter more fully when that Item is reached on the Agenda. And I merely want to say here that we realise the great importance of that and hope that positive results will come from that report.

So in conclusion, Mr. President, I want to merely repeat what I said at the beginning that the future is we believe one of great opportunity as well as one of great danger, but I would rather in conclusion reverse the order of those words and say that it is a future of danger but of opportunity because I believe that the dangers will be overcome and that the final result will be that we will have seized and availed of our opportunities and perhaps have brought to an end this period of great danger through which we have been and still are passing.

Mr. SELWYN LLOYD

Mr. President. I am certain that the first thing you would like me to do on behalf of us all is to express our joy that Mr. Dulles is with us, our pleasure of the recovery which he has made from his illness, and the delight with which we have listened to his very remarkable speech just now.

I do not say I agree with every word of it, but still I will come to those matters. We are delighted that he has made such a good recovery.

Now, sir. I do not propose to cover the whole of the ground which has been covered in the two speeches before mine. We are meeting in a period in which there are, there have been, two crises, one in Eastern Europe constituting a threat to Soviet interests, and one in the Middle East, constituting a threat to Western interests, and I think both of them throw some light on the nature of Soviet policy. And I think before we look at Soviet policy in the light of those two specific crises, I think it is worth while just considering shortly the long-term elements which determine the thinking of the Soviet leaders which form the background to their behaviour. And I would like to say we do, the United Kingdom Delegation, does welcome very much the two papers on long-term Soviet policy prepared by the International Staff and the appropriate Working Groups, and I think they ought to be congratulated upon the work which they have done.

Now, the first of the two reports analyses the political factors which form the basis of Soviet policy-making. And its main arguments have been condensed into a summary and incorporated into the draft political directive to the NATO military authorities which we shall take under Item IV of the Agenda. Now, I think one over-riding consideration emerges from it; and that is the extent to which Soviet planning is, like our own, overwhelmingly influenced by the existence of thermo-nuclear weapons, and by the certain total destruction which will be inflicted on the Soviet Union in the event of world war.

I think it was at the last meeting I did refer to what Bulganin and Khrushchey had, the impression they had made upon us during their London visit. They were very conscious of that fact, and the Soviet Union wished to avoid the risk of world war. Now, I quite agree that there is always the possibility that people may go mad, that you may get a paranoiac in charge, or something, or internal troubles may set something off, which was not expected. But I still think myself that that is unlikely, and I think the starting point that we should take in trying to assess our policy towards the Soviet Union is that they are determined, if they can, to avoid thermo-nuclear war. I do not think that affects their hostility towards us; I think they would be just as hostile, but I think the limit to what they will do is set by the thermo-nuclear bomb.

I think if we look back, we can see the Soviet Government have been consistently careful to avoid definite commitments which might involve them in a chain reaction leading to global war. And therefore the Soviet threat is not an immediate one, which is likely to face us in the near future with military emergencies, but it is a long-term one. One cannot cater for accidents, but I think that that is the sort of broad approach. The main danger, therefore, is not early aggression by the Soviet armies, but it is the long-term steady build-up of their power through economic development and at the same time, their penetration by subversion and infiltration from without. All the time what they want to do is to overthrow what they describe as

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"capitalism". Now, it is the second paper which deals with the economic side; I do not propose to deal with that at any length. It may be that the danger is exaggerated. It may be there will be these heavy demands for renewal of their plant and equipment. But I would have thought it is fairly certain that the rate of growth is going to be considerable. That, that is the trend, that the Soviet Unions on the whole are going to catch up, and that they may by 1970 or 1975, or whenever it is, be turning out great quantities of capital consumer goods, many of which will be available for disposal in the world markets, and the beginnings of the danger of economic competition are with us already, and that danger will grow. We cannot afford to wait for events to test the accuracy of the arithmetic of the experts, we have got to face the problem now. Now, so far as the more immediate matters are concerned, I would like to say just a word about the position in Eastern Europe and our policy towards the various countries in that area. I think in Poland, above all in Hungary, we have seen how strong is the resentment of Soviet domination, and I think we have all been filled with admiration at what the Hungarian people have done. Now, their declaration, the Soviet declaration of 30th October, on relations with the satellites, shows that the Soviet leaders themselves have become aware that their past policies had made them hated, and it shows that the Soviet leaders were prepared to make certain concessions to placate nationalistic feelings in the satellite states. But I think those concessions were very strictly limited; I think they were determined to maintain the Communist regime by force if necessary; they were determined by force if necessary to prevent secessions from the Soviet bloc. But allowing for these two things, they were prepared to permit a certain latitude. They were prepared to discuss the status of Soviet troops in Poland and Roumania, and in Hungary, but they were not prepared to withdraw their forces from those countries. And it may be that the stubbornness of the Hungarian resistance will cause the Soviet Union to alter its ideas on that matter. But I would think it is probable that for the time being the Russians are prepared to use force to prevent the defection of any satellite state from the Communist bloc. So far as Hungary is concerned, I think their actions fell into two distinct stages. From October 23rd, they moved considerable forces into Hungary - we estimate about four divisions, but they still did seem to be prepared to permit a semi-independent regime on the Polish model to exist. But the second stage came, which I think is the indication to the action they would take in similar circumstances anywhere else in the Soviet bloc, the second stage came on November 2nd when Nagy denounced the Warsaw Pact, demanded free elections and a neutral status for Hungary. And that, I believe, is something the Russians were not prepared to stomach. My own view is that they were not affected by what was happening in that decision, they were not affected by what was happening elsewhere in the world, but they were not prepared to go further than, as I say, a semi-independent status which they had conceded to Poland. And what sealed the doom, or the temporary eclipse, it all depends, of Prime Minister Nagy and his colleagues, was their declaration of neutrality and the prospect of free elections. Well, may be that the brutality used in

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suppressing the Hungarian uprisings will have results in the satellite countries. Hatred of the Soviet must have increased considerably and, if there are further uprisings, I think there will be considerable pressure on the West to intervene militarily. And I think that faces us with a practical problem of great importance and possibly great danger, because I think military intervention in any state which is a member of the Warsaw Pact would involve the risk of a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, when he was in London, said that the USSR would only go to war in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union or on any country associated with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact. And I think that is a warning which must be taken seriously and I would think that for that reason we would be wise to rule out the possibility of military intervention in the event of further uprisings in Eastern Europe. I mean by that, direct military intervention by one or other of us. Now if that assumption is accepted as sound, I think we have to be very careful not to do anything to incite the peoples of Eastern Europe to military uprisings which would follow and, we, it would be interesting to hear the views of my colleagues upon this matter, but we have - the British Broadcasting Corporation, for example, has followed and is following a cautious policy in its broadcasts to the satellites - and I think, myself, it is wise to avoid inflammatory appeals to the peoples of Eastern Europe. I think the best hope is the policy of gradualism on the Polish model. It maybe that for the time being the Soviet Union will succeed in preventing the other satellites from following the Polish example but I hope that they will find that policy increasingly difficult to maintain and I think our attitude towards Poland should be to encourage it to be as independent as possible without provoking a violent Soviet reaction. We should seek gradually to develop contacts and exchanges of all sorts. And I think there is an issue there which we have to face, as to whether we want to push matters to a crisis, whether we do want to provoke people to these uprisings, whether we do want continually to try and whip up their feelings of indignation, or whether it is better to play the game more gradually and slowly build up the kind of pressure which, as in the case of Poland, has produced a change, but produced it peacefully. And that is a matter upon which judgements may differ very much and I think it is the sort of thing which we should discuss.

With regard to the question of Hungary, there is just only one word because that I think will be discussed in detail later on. We think that of course the objective in Hungary should be neutrality and free elections. We don't feel that this government at present should be encouraged, the Kadar government, because I think that would appear to condone its behaviour. We think that the Hungarian question should be kept before the United Nations and we think that the Secretary General should continue to seek to visit Hungary. We think it is important that the western governments should maintain their missions in Budapest and therefore we, for our part, have deprecated a concerted effort to refuse recognition to the Kadar government. I don't think it is necessary for us to make public announcements formally

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granting them recognition because they are there but it would seem to us that if we were to withdraw our missions there might be a feeling of great depression among Hungarians that they were losing their last link with the West.

For the moment we see no need for change in our policy towards Czechoslovakia, Rumania or Bulgaria. The governments of these countries have all approved the Soviet intervention in Hungary and all seem to be at pains to prevent any developments in their own countries on the Polish or Hungarian model. But I should have thought that in these countries too the intelligentsia must by now be thoroughly discontented and there is a case for the cautious development of cultural relations and information work with selected individuals from these countries. And since our resources are limited we, for our own part, will limit ourselves in the first place to Czechoslovakia.

And as regards Yugoslavia, I think our feeling is that the Soviet policy of rapprochement came to an end with the circular warning the satellite Communist Parties against Marshall Tito. And I think as a result of the events in Hungary and the kidnapping of Nagy and his associates, I think Soviet-Yugoslav relations have deteriorated further and it looks as if the two states are now committed to a doctrinal battle. I should think it is doubtful whether Marshall Tito at the moment has much influence in the Soviet Union or in the satellite states but I should think it is also doubtful whether the Russians will try to overthrow him. The possibility cannot be excluded that Marshall Tito's influence in the satellite countries - and perhaps indirectly in the Soviet Union again - will increase after this temporary eclipse. Now so far as our relations with the Soviet Union itself are concerned, I think those should be based on a continuing, on a reappraisal of the continuing hostility of the Soviet leaders and the ruthlessness with which they maintain their hold over Eastern Europe. I think they are faced with greater difficulties than they have known since the war. They do their best to exploit our troubles and we have got to take, do what we can to take advantage of theirs. Now so far as their troubles are concerned, we have begun to see reports of discontent among the students, among the intelligentsia and, indeed, among the workers. From Hungary we have had reports of misgivings in the minds of individual officers and soldiers in the Soviet Army. There have even been some reports, I don't know whether they are true, of defections in the Soviet Army. Now I quite agree it is a mistake to indulge in wishful thinking and to over-emphasise these things, but I do not think their importance should be under-estimated. I think they are probably only the beginnings but they may be the beginnings of events of great importance, and therefore I think that we should, in our propaganda, try to encourage the growth of the critical faculty behind the Iron Curtain, particularly among the Soviet youth,

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Eastern Europe and these tendencies in the Soviet Union may be of inestimable value to us in our propaganda if properly used, by helping us to destroy the myth, that time, history, is on the Communist side. I think many of us felt that there is a country that has only got to be 10 years or 15 years in the hands of a Communist régime and all the children would grow up to be Communists and the rising generation would be Communist and the country would be gone for good. I think what has happened in Eastern Europe is the most striking denial of that thesis, and I think, however, there are many people in the underdeveloped countries who do feel there is a sort of inexorable onward towards Communism. I think we have got to make use of what has happened in Eastern Europe in our propaganda there, very much indeed.

Well, so far as our personal relations are concerned - I mean those of the United Kingdom Government with the Soviet Union - there is no doubt there has been a revulsion of feeling in Great Britain against them, and public opinion would not stand really for an attitude of frenzied relations.

We have therefore suspended work for the development of Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges, we have abandoned the proposed exchanges which would have attracted the most publicity, and so far as visits by the scientists and the technicians and the economists, I think our approach will be pragmatic; we will consider each proposal on its merits and we shall only grant approval if we think it is really in our interests to do so and not incompatible with NATO policy. But I think that, as I have said before, the governing criterion in our decision will be this question of the possibility of encouraging the visitors to develop a critical judgment. Of course, I am dealing now with the short terms. On the major problems which divide East and West, such as Germany, European Security and Disarmament, I think we should stand firm on our present policies which have been the result of long and careful consideration. Now in what I have said about our attitude towards the Soviet Union there is nothing hard and fast. We do attach great importance to NATO working out a common policy on these matters, and therefore our decisions will be governed very much by what we hear during this week.

Now the other crisis is the Middle East crisis, and I think I would like to say a word or two about that. Now I welcome frank speaking upon this matter and I have listened with close attention to what both Dr. Lange and Mr. Foster Dulles have said with regard to the actions of the British and French Governments. I would simply put forward some considerations for the consideration of my colleagues. I do not think that an inquest into the past is necessarily very profitable, and I know this is the general feeling that we look to the future and not to the past when we seek to build up together again. However, as some references have been made to the past, I think I must just put one or two considerations before you. Now first of all there is the idea - I am not saying it has been uttered today - the idea that France and Britain burst, on the 30th or 31st October, into a sort of orderly, peaceful part of the world. Of course, in fact, there had been a situation

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deteriorating so rapidly that I think every one of us must have been profoundly frightened as to what was going to happen. Between September 10th and October 11th, 160 men, women and children had been killed on the frontier of Jordan and Israel alone. 160 men, women and children in that month, and in that month, between September 10th and October 11th. That was one factor. And I must say, in fairness, a situation about which the United Nations had been able to do absolutely nothing. Condemnation and so on, a few observers, but a steadily mounting toll in human lives, and, as I said, some of them women and children. Then there was the question of the Soviet penetration. Now that had been going on apace. We knew a certain amount about it; we knew of the approximately 1,000 technicians having penetrated into Egypt; we knew roughly the weight and the scale of the arms deliveries, but I think what has been discovered since and the information given us by the Israeli Government showed that that penetration was on a much greater scale than we thought 7,000 tons of ammunition in the Sinai Desert, a great deal of it for guns with which the Egyptians had not yet been committed. They had been equipped and one wonders what was going to happen. Then the third matter beside the deteriorating situation on the frontiers, the Russian penetration, was the extent of the ambitions of the ruler of Egypt and the danger of the perversion of the nationalism which we all admire and support. And the carefully laid plots in the surrounding countries for the elimination of pro-Western régimes and so on, of which we have had information - of which something had been said in public. Now that was the situation on the 29th October. I have no doubt it was the situation which led to the Israelis crossing the armistice lines. Mention has been made about that being a collusive attack. Well, even the Labour Opposition in the British House of Commons - who don't particularly like me on this topic - have dropped the word "collusive". Now the allegation is "fore-knowledge" - not that there was a conspiracy, but that we knew beforehand. Well, we knew the facts which I have set out, and after the Israeli mobilisation had started, it was quite obvious that anything might happen anywhere, and I find it very hard myself to describe their action as aggression.

If they have been clearly told that they are going to be exterminated by a country which has got £150 million worth of Russian arms, if they see this build-up, and an election has taken place in Jordan putting into power a pro-Egyptian majority, if then there has been a common command between Egypt, Syria and Jordan set up and, as I say, all the time the object is the extermination of Israel, I cannot find it myself, my own judgment, to describe their action as aggression. Now, so far as the action of the British and French Governments are concerned, we acted in good faith, we thought, to stop the expansion of that war. I know many of you think we were wrong. Some think we were right, but as I said in the House of Commons last week, we did at least stop the war.

Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (contd.)

after the communication from the French and British Governments he gave orders to them to stop so that, at all events was a result. However, I don't think this, I hope you will excuse me saying as much as I have said, but I think there is perhaps more to justify our action than has been from time to time damaged. But what we have got to do now is to deal with the situation as we find it and I don't believe that our action will prove to have damaged Western interests provided we take advantage of the opportunity which is being created and I don't claim that we alone have created the opportunity. I think that would be vainglorious. The opportunity which has been created by the collective action of the United Nations, of our friends and of all of us. I believe we have given the United Nations an opportunity in the Middle East which will not recur. I think if it doesn't accept, I think the organization will very nearly be finished. I think if after what has happened we go back to a situation of 200 meetings of the Security Council passing a lot of resolutions, none of which result in anything, if that happens again I think that people will get tired of the United Nations and really will regard it as a futile institution. Now it has got a great opportunity. I think the presence of the United Nations force in the area is one of the most significant features and I agree entirely with what Mr. Dulles said about Mr. Lester Pearson's part in the setting up of that force. I know there is a certain amount of argument about what its functions should be, and how long it should stay there and whether its been invited in and whether it can be ordered out and all that, but I would hope that we would not be too legalistic or specific on those matters. I know there are certain other countries who don't want international forces on their own territory or in disputed areas and therefore those countries will be very anxious to curtail the operations, both in time and scope, of the United Nations force; but I hope that we, the members of this Alliance, shall give full support to that force and will encourage so far as they can an extension of its functions. I think myself that it may be the only way to keep the peace between Israel and all her Arab neighbours and therefore I would hope that our influence would be directed towards the spreading, as I say, of its efforts both in time and in scope. I think there has been a set-back to the Soviet Union, a physical set-back. Now you may say "Oh, but the action of two Western countries has given them enormous propaganda advantage in the Middle East." Yes, to some extent, but on the other hand their military protégé has been strikingly defeated, first by Israel and then his air force or most of it was almost painlessly eliminated and I think there is a certain loss of military prestige by a man who after all is the head of a military junta and that is a situation of which advantage can be taken at the present time. It may be temporary, it may be that all the arms will come back again into the Middle East, it may be that by getting complete control of Syria they control the pipelines, by getting complete control of Egypt they then control the canal and the Soviet influence and power in the area will be greatly increased, that is one of the dangers which we have to consider; but I think temporarily owing to the complete defeat of the Egyptian forces, with very, very few casualties, I think the military prestige of the present military régime in Cairo is somewhat diminished. Now I don't want to appear in any way to be scornful of the power or the importance of moral force:

Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (contd)

I think it is a tremendous factor in the world; but I think we also have got to realise that the forces of evil are there to make progress by physical means. We, the United Kingdom, in the past has had the responsibility for policing large areas of the world. We have tried to keep law and order and at the same time have regard to the rights of the individual, but there are unfortunately now so many places that can be described as a vacuum and where there is not the international policeman or the great power governing itself by some sort of standards and therefore we have really got, I feel, to face that sort of situation with realism and perhaps one of the causes of this late situation over Suez, is that perhaps we didn't together face that situation with the necessary realism. Now the reason I have said what I have said is not only because of what Dr. Lange and Mr. Foster Dulles said in their speeches, but because I think that one of the matters we have to consider very seriously in this week's meetings are our flanks. I mean it is all very well having a nice solid front but its absolutely useless if your flank can be turned and therefore I believe that we have very much to broaden the scope of our interest and our concerting of common policies. I think that, whatever you may say against the action of the British and French governments, it has brought a good many problems to a head and has given not only the United Nations an opportunity, I think it has given this Alliance considerable opportunities and we for our part will do our best to work with our allies and with them to concert a common policy.

M. PINEAU

M. le Président. Je voudrais, moi aussi, remercier M. Lange d'avoir évoqué un problème qui, s'il n'avait pas été discuté dès le début, aurait certainement pesé sur nos délibérations, et de l'avoir fait avec suffisamment d'amitié pour qu'il nous soit plus facile de lui répondre. Je voudrais d'abord répondre au reproche qui m'a peut-être été le plus sensible, c'est celui qui consiste à croire que nous avons manqué d'esprit de solidarité à l'égard de nos collègues de l'OTAN. A aucun moment, telle n'a été notre intention. Mais je crois qu'il faudra, puisque la question a été posée sous cet aspect, que nous discussions entre nous quelles sont les limites géographiques et politiques de cette solidarité. En effet, nous avons agi dans une région du monde qui n'est pas couverte par le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, et la question se pose de savoir si nous devons donner ou ne pas donner de limites géographiques à la solidarité qui doit nous unir. Personnellement, je suis de ceux qui pensent qu'il est extrêmement difficile de constituer une alliance valable pour une région déterminée du monde sans que cette alliance soit valable pour d'autres régions, surtout lorsque les événements politiques et militaires qui se passent dans cette région sont susceptibles d'influencer ceux qui se passent en Europe. Par conséquent, je crois que si nous voulons parler de solidarité, il faut d'abord définir les limites géographiques de notre activité. En ce qui concerne notre solidarité politique, je crois qu'il serait peut-être en effet nécessaire que nous examinions davantage à fond tous les problèmes qui se posent aux uns et aux autres dans les différentes régions du monde, mais que nous ne les examinions pas au moment où l'un d'entre nous est obligé de prendre une décision urgente, mais que nous les examinions à partir du moment où ils se posent.

M. PINEAU (Suite)

C'est ainsi que nous aurions peut-être eu intérêt davantage à examiner entre nous les problèmes qui se posaient entre Israël et les pays arabes, et dont nous savions bien qu'ils devaient nécessairement un jour menacer la paix dans le Moyen-Orient; que nous aurions pu peut-être discuter entre nous les problèmes qui se sont posés à la suite de la nationalisation du Canal de Suez. Je sais bien qu'il y a là un danger, c'est le danger que, discutant entre nous de ces problèmes, nous puissions donner l'impression que nous éliminons de la discussion un certain nombre d'autres pays, notamment les pays afro-asiatiques, ce qui explique d'ailleurs que nous ayons réuni à Londres une Conférence où nous avons cherché à faire un équilibre entre différentes régions du monde. Et je crois que, il ne sera vraiment possible de parler de solidarité, que lorsque nous aurons préalablement défini entre nous jusqu'où doit s'étendre cette solidarité et dans quelle condition elle doit jouer.

Ceci dit, je ne veux pas répéter ce qu'a dit M. Selwyn Lloyd et qui rencontre tout à fait mon approbation. Mais je voudrais tout de même que vous revoyiez par la pensée l'enchaînement des événements dans le Moyen-Orient. Depuis un très grand nombre d'années - pour ainsi dire depuis la création de l'Etat d'Israël - les Nations Unies se sont penchées sur les problèmes qui se posent entre Israël et les états arabes, comme le disait M. Selwyn Lloyd, ont voté des résolutions, ont envoyé des observateurs mais, en réalité, ne se sont jamais très sérieusement attachées à la solution des problèmes. Et nous en sommes arrivés, petit à petit, à cette situation qu'Israël a toujours considéré qu'une attaque qui serait un jour dirigée contre elle poserait un problème infiniment plus grave que dans toute autre région du monde, car ce serait une question de vie ou de mort. Et lorsque par exemple, le Maréchal Boulganine déclare un jour qu'il pose le problème de l'existence d'Israël en tant qu'état, il ne peut que renforcer ainsi les dangers de guerre puisqu'il donne à Israël cette impression qu'il n'a que trop tendance à éprouver, que le jour où un certain nombre de pays auront décidé sa perte, en quelques jours, sinon en quelques heures, par des bombardements aériens, l'Etat Israélien aura cessé d'exister. Ainsi s'est développé, peu à peu, chez Israël, une sorte de complexe qui fait que la guerre préventive - et nous pouvons peut-être le regretter - est devenue pour lui le seul moyen d'existence. Je crois qu'il y a là une situation à laquelle nous avons le devoir, et à laquelle l'Organisation des Nations Unies avait le devoir de mettre fin.

En ce qui concerne l'attitude de l'Egypte, il faut tout de même reconnaître que des pays comme la Grande-Bretagne et comme la France avaient, à maintes reprises, affirmé à l'égard de l'Egypte - malgré bien des menaces - leur bonne volonté. Le Gouvernement britannique avait quitté la région du Canal de Suez, le Gouvernement français n'avait répondu qu'avec beaucoup de prudence; dans mon propre pays, cette prudence était même taxée de faiblesse - aux actes que le Colonel Nasser avait pu accomplir à l'égard de l'Afrique du Nord et que l'arraisonnement du bateau "L'ATHOS" a tout de même très clairement démontré. Est venue la nationalisation du Canal de Suez. Nous avons espéré très longtemps pouvoir résoudre ce problème par des moyens pacifiques.

M. PINEAU (suite)

La première conférence de Londres, il faut le reconnaître, nous avait donné de grands espoirs. La visite de M. Menziès au Caire qui a transmis au Colonel Nasser les vœux exprimés par la première conférence de Londres a déjà refroidi considérablement notre espérance. La deuxième conférence de Londres nous a, elle, beaucoup déçu en ce sens qu'elle a fait apparaître à quel point notre unité était faible et à quel point les thèses que nous défendions sur le régime futur du canal étaient différentes. Néanmoins, nous ne nous sommes pas découragés, ni le Gouvernement britannique, ni le Gouvernement français, dans le désir de régler ce problème d'une manière pacifique et nous sommes allés devant les Nations Unies. Sans doute avons-nous pu alors, par le Conseil de Sécurité faire voter six principes, sur lesquels nous sommes toujours d'accord, concernant le régime futur du canal mais, lorsque nous en sommes arrivés aux mesures d'application, nous avons rencontré, pour la 63ème fois je crois depuis l'histoire des Nations Unies, le veto soviétique. Et nous nous sommes trouvés devant une sorte de vide que n'ont pas comblé les conversations qui ont eu lieu par la suite dans le cabinet du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU entre M. Hammarskjöld, M. Selwyn Lloyd et moi-même. Nous avons été déçus de ces conversations et surtout parce qu'il nous a semblé - et il nous semble toujours - que l'attitude du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à New-York, lorsqu'elles démontrent un certain désir de conciliation, n'est pas toujours soutenue par des déclarations semblables au Caire, ce qui montre à quel point il est difficile à des pays démocratiques de discuter avec des pays de dictature, car les uns, lorsqu'ils prennent un engagement engagent l'ensemble de leur pays et leurs propres paroles, alors que les autres doivent être toujours soumis à la décision finale du dictateur. Et je dois dire que cet échec des négociations sur le Canal de Suez a beaucoup contribué à la crainte qui s'est manifestée dans l'Etat d'Israël à la fin du mois d'octobre; car Israël savait de manière pertinente par des renseignements qui ont été depuis lors vérifiés, que la prochaine victime des entreprises du Caire serait précisément l'Etat d'Israël. Et en vertu du complexe de guerre préventive dont je vous donnais tout à l'heure les raisons, Israël a été amené à prendre la décision de se livrer contre l'Egypte à ce qu'il considérerait comme une action de police et de défense.

C'est alors que les Gouvernements britannique et français ont été saisis de la question de savoir quelle devait être leur attitude dans le cas où Israël se livrerait à l'action que vous savez à l'égard de l'Egypte. Nous pouvions ne pas intervenir, et cela eût été inconstestablement plus conforme à la lettre de la Charte des Nations Unies telle que l'a rappelé tout à l'heure M. Lange. Ne vous faites pas d'illusions : si l'intervention d'Israël avait dû être isolée, je suis absolument convaincu pour ma part, que le Canal de Suez aurait été obstrué exactement dans les mêmes conditions qu'il l'a été à la suite de l'intervention franco-britannique; et que par la suite, du fait même de l'obstruction du canal par le Colonel Nasser, nous aurions sans doute été amenés à agir et à agir malheureusement par des moyens militaires. Nous avons tenté d'agir pour limiter les dégâts. Limiter les dégâts, cela voulait dire empêcher que la guerre entre Israël et l'Egypte se poursuive sur le territoire égyptien, ce qui aurait fait de cette guerre une guerre infiniment plus cruelle qu'elle ne l'a été. Et nous avons voulu aussi, il faut le reconnaître, tenter de protéger au maximum la région du canal.

M. PINEAU (suite)

Je m'excuse si j'ai l'air de manifester un peu de cynisme, mais je crois que nous devrions tous regretter que dans notre respect des décisions des Nations Unies, nous ayons été amenés à interrompre notre action, à mon avis, deux jours trop tôt; car, si nous avions occupé l'ensemble de la région du canal, notre action aurait été infiniment plus justifiable. En effet, il ne faut pas oublier que le Colonel Nasser a détruit un certain nombre de bateaux dans le canal après le cessez-le-feu qui nous avait été imposé par les Nations Unies, et que si au contraire nous avions pu occuper la région du canal, l'obstruction aurait été moins grave, et du fait des moyens matériels que nous avons amenés à pied d'oeuvre, nous pouvons penser légitimement que la circulation sur le canal serait peut-être aujourd'hui rétablie, et qu'un certain nombre de pays ne se trouveraient pas soumis aux conséquences économiques des événements d'Egypte.

Voilà quelles sont les circonstances matérielles que je voulais exposer en complément de ce qu'a dit mon ami M. Selwyn Lloyd. Mais je voudrais me pencher maintenant sur l'aspect moral de la question puisqu'aussi bien M. Lange que M. Foster Dulles y ont insisté. Je voudrais d'abord que nous fassions très attention à ne pas prendre ici trop absolument l'engagement de respecter toujours la lettre de la Charte des Nations Unies, car faites attention aux conséquences que pourrait avoir cet engagement. Je me pose la question suivante: supposons qu'au moment de l'agression communiste en Corée, par une sorte de hasard historique le gouvernement soviétique ait été présent au Conseil de Sécurité au lieu d'en être absent, il y aurait eu le veto soviétique à la décision du Conseil de Sécurité d'une intervention en Corée, et l'intervention de Corée qui a été parfaitement légitime parce qu'elle a été couverte par les Nations Unies, serait devenue alors parfaitement illégitime du seul point de vue de la Charte des Nations Unies. Que demain nous ayons une agression dans une région quelconque de l'Europe et sur l'un quelconque de nos pays, si nous devons suivre la Charte des Nations Unies nous ne devons en principe intervenir qu'après avoir consulté le Conseil de Sécurité; et pour peu que nous ayons - ce qui paraît certain - un veto soviétique, nous n'avons pas stricto sensu, le droit d'intervenir à partir du moment où le veto soviétique ne nous a pas permis de faire entériner une décision du Conseil de Sécurité. Or, je pense que ceci n'est dans l'esprit d'aucun des membres de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Il y a donc un certain nombre de cas qui peuvent se produire où nous ne pourrions agir dans l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies, mais où il ne nous sera pas toujours possible d'agir dans la lettre de la Charte des Nations Unies.

Ce qui me paraît aussi nécessaire, c'est que nous définissions entre nous, à partir de quel moment commence une agression et je crois que ceci peut se poser peut-être un jour en Europe car si l'agression ne commence qu'à partir du moment où il est fait usage des moyens militaires conventionnels, cela peut peut-être nous mener très loin, car il y a tous les phénomènes qui doivent nous préoccuper et qui sont la préparation d'une agression, tous les éléments politiques et militaires que constitue la préparation d'une agression.

M. PINEAU (suite)

Dans le cas de l'Egypte, le fait de vendre à l'Egypte ou de donner à l'Egypte un matériel militaire considérable, dont tout permet de penser qu'il ne pouvait pas être utilisé sans le concours de techniciens soviétiques, le fait, à l'heure actuelle, de tenter de recommencer une opération semblable en Syrie, non peut-être pour se livrer à une agression caractérisée à l'égard d'Israël, mais pour exercer une sorte de pression politique sur des pays comme l'Irak, comme la Jordanie, et à créer dans cette région du Moyen-Orient une zone d'influence soviétique qui permettrait par la suite à l'Union Soviétique de s'étendre vers l'Asie et vers l'Afrique ; ce sont là des dangers que nous ne pouvons pas écarter. Supposons que demain nous nous trouvions, en Europe, dans la situation suivante - et je pense que M. von Brentano ne manquera certainement pas, lorsque nous examinerons les problèmes européens, d'évoquer ce problème - supposons qu'au lieu des événements de Hongrie, nous nous soyons trouvés devant des événements semblables dans l'Allemagne de l'Est, quelles en auraient été les conséquences ? Est-ce que vous pensez que nos amis de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest auraient pu laisser massacrer leurs frères de l'autre côté d'une frontière artificielle sans aucune réaction ?

Vous voyez que nous pourrions être ainsi entraînés dans des voies où nous serions amenés à agir sans qu'il y ait agression proprement dite, au sens pur et simple de la Charte. C'est la raison pour laquelle je crois qu'il faut faire extrêmement attention lorsque nous évoquons la lettre de la Charte des Nations Unies.

En ce qui concerne maintenant les Nations Unies elles-mêmes, vous n'avez pas pu manquer - et M. Lange, le premier, qui est un homme juste - vous n'avez pas pu manquer d'être frappés par cette différence profonde que M. Dulles appelle la différence d'étalon, cette différence profonde qui existe et dans l'attitude des Nations Unies à l'égard de certains problèmes, et dans l'attitude des pays qui sont visés par les Nations Unies, dans le respect qu'ils témoignent à l'égard des décisions des Nations Unies. En ce qui concerne les délibérations des Nations Unies elles-mêmes, pourquoi en réalité, il faut avoir la franchise de le dire entre nous, pourquoi en réalité les Nations Unies ont-elles à un certain moment, insisté davantage sur l'affaire de Suez que sur l'affaire de Hongrie ? Et bien, c'est parce qu'elles savaient très bien que la France et l'Angleterre tiendraient compte des décisions des Nations Unies et qu'elles savaient parfaitement que l'Union Soviétique n'en tiendrait aucun compte. Et, par conséquent, on a fait porter le maximum de son action sur le point précis où l'on espérait avoir le maximum de résultats. Mais, avouez que puisque nous nous sommes placés tout à l'heure d'un point de vue moral, ceci n'est peut-être pas extrêmement encourageant, car cela voudrait dire que les pays démocratiques sont des pays qui, par définition, respecteront toujours les décisions de l'Organisation internationale, alors que les pays de dictature en seront finalement dispensés.

Quant au respect que nous avons montré à l'égard de la Charte des Nations Unies, nous ne regrettons nullement de l'avoir fait. Nous sommes, au contraire, particulièrement fiers d'avoir obéi aux recommandations des Nations Unies et je remercie M. Dulles d'avoir bien voulu le souligner tout à l'heure.

M. PINEAU (suite)

Mais ceci nous incite alors à insister davantage pour que l'Organisation des Nations Unies fasse un effort supplémentaire pour montrer plus d'efficacité à l'égard des pays qui, comme nous, et qui, contrairement à nous, ne respectent pas les décisions de la Charte. Et il est très frappant de voir, qu'un certain nombre de pays - je ne les cite pas mais beaucoup d'entre vous les reconnaîtront - qui se font très souvent les champions de la morale internationale, ont voté contre nous lorsqu'il s'agissait de l'affaire de Suez, mais se sont très prudemment abstenus parce que leurs intérêts politiques n'étaient pas les mêmes lorsqu'il s'est agi de l'affaire de Hongrie. Et ceci non plus, je pense, n'est pas conforme à la morale internationale.

Je crois donc qu'au sein des Nations Unies l'attitude des pays qui sont membres de notre groupe devrait être de faire un effort pour éviter ce qu'il y a de plus dangereux dans le domaine moral et qui est la morale unilatérale. Car si nous devons fonder toute notre action politique sur ce principe de la morale unilatérale, cela voudrait dire que nous laisserions peu à peu les Russes, sans qu'ils se livrent jamais à une agression proprement dite, conquérir par des moyens détournés un ensemble de régions particulièrement vulnérables, notamment en Asie et en Afrique, et que nous pourrions nous trouver un jour dans des conditions géographiques et politiques telles, que notre défense même ne pourrait plus être assurée.

Enfin, dernier point sur lequel je voudrais répondre à M. Lange, c'est lorsqu'il nous parle du colonialisme. Je suis d'accord avec lui pour reconnaître que le colonialisme est un mythe, qui au cours de ces derniers mois particuliers a donné de nombreux prétextes à un certain nombre de pays pour essayer de critiquer l'action des puissances occidentales, et plus particulièrement de celles d'entre elles qui sont les plus intéressées à ces problèmes. Il y a incontestablement dans les reproches qui ont pu être faits à certaines puissances occidentales, une très grande part de vérité, mais il y a aussi dans l'utilisation du mot colonialisme une très grande part d'abus car il est maintenant très facile et très usuel d'employer le mot colonialisme pour défendre des intérêts qui sont très particuliers. En particulier, beaucoup de pays emploient le mot colonialisme à partir du moment où ils estiment que c'est une justification pour ne pas tenir leurs engagements internationaux. Et ceci est infiniment dangereux.

Je vous rappelle qu'à la dernière séance de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, j'avais défendu un plan d'aide aux pays sous-développés, auquel je suis toujours particulièrement attaché. Mais l'aide aux pays sous-développés, sous quelque forme qu'elle se présente, elle suppose au moins deux éléments essentiels.

Le premier c'est le respect de tous les engagements pris, que les engagements soient pris à l'égard d'un pays déterminé ou à l'égard d'une collectivité de nations comme l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ce n'en sont pas moins des engagements internationaux qui doivent être respectés.

M. PINEAU (suite)

Et le deuxième point, c'est l'ordre qui doit tout de même régner dans ces pays, car si l'ordre ne règne pas, comment voulez-vous que des capitaux s'investissent dans les régions intéressées. Comment voulez-vous qu'une aide technique puisse être exercée. Comment voulez-vous que nous envoyions des entreprises, que nous envoyions des techniciens dans des pays où la vie même de ces techniciens ne serait pas suffisamment protégée.

Par conséquent, il y a tout de même un certain nombre de problèmes que l'on ne peut pas examiner à la seule lumière de ce mot-clé que l'on appelle le colonialisme.

Je prends l'exemple français : nous avons fait un très grand effort pour rendre leur indépendance à deux pays comme le Maroc et comme la Tunisie. Je ne dirai pas que nous en avons été particulièrement récompensés sur le plan politique, et ceux qui ont entendu des discours qui ont été prononcés aux Nations Unies, peuvent penser que nous avons ressenti parfois un peu d'amertume. Mais ce que je voudrais que vous pensiez, c'est que quelques jours après avoir entendu le discours de M. Bourguiba ou le discours du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Marocain, faisant de vifs reproches au Gouvernement Français, le même Gouvernement Français faisait voter par son Assemblée Nationale 48 milliards d'aide technique au Maroc et à la Tunisie ce qui, dans la situation actuelle de la France, constituait un sacrifice considérable. Les discours, c'est très joli, les 48 milliards, c'est la réalité des faits. J'aurai l'occasion tout à l'heure, peut-être un autre jour, lorsque le Président estimera le moment convenable d'évoquer devant vous plus à fond le problème de l'Algérie, mais je voudrais tout de même vous dire qu'il y a certaines expériences que nous ne tenons pas à faire, et que ce que nous voulons en tout cas éviter dans la solution du problème algérien, c'est précisément cette anarchie que nous constatons dans un certain nombre de pays qui parlent beaucoup de colonialisme et qui ne sont pas à même de répondre à la notion de l'Etat telle que nous la comprenons.

Voilà pourquoi je crois que dans l'emploi d'un certain nombre de formules, il nous faut être extrêmement prudents, ainsi que dans les jugements que nous portons les uns sur les autres. J'ai répondu à M. Lange avec autant d'amitié qu'il en avait témoignée à notre égard; je comprends sa position, je comprends les positions morales qui ont été prises par lui et par M. Foster Dulles; je voudrais ainsi qu'ils comprennent quelles sont nos nécessités, quelles sont les justifications de la politique que nous avons menée et qu'ils comprennent aussi que nous ne sommes pas plus étrangers qu'eux-mêmes aux problèmes moraux, mais que nous essayons de les concilier avec la réalité du monde qui n'est pas telle que nous pourrions le souhaiter.

M. MARTINO

I believe that the time has come to adjourn. Shall we meet this afternoon at 3.30 in the same room and with the same number of advisors. The meeting is adjourned.