

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

133

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
14th April, 1976

ISD/122

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE

Second report by the Political Committee, 1st December, 1975
to /15th May, 1976/

At its meeting on 1st October, 1975, the Council agreed that a report on those aspects of the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE which have a particular importance for the members of the Alliance could be prepared by the Political Committee, in collaboration with other relevant committees, for the Council on the eve of each Ministerial meeting, within the larger framework of the examination of East-West relations and the general problem of détente. This is the second such report and it covers the period from 1st December, 1975.

2. The most important points to draw to the attention of the Council regarding developments during the period of this report are the following:

- (i) The Warsaw Pact countries have now adopted a more coherent and aggressive stance on implementation of the Final Act in general, and the main lines of their policy leading to the follow-up meeting for Belgrade in 1977 have become clearer (see paragraphs 3-6).
- (ii) They have launched initiatives in areas of least difficulty to them, in particular proposals for three conferences on energy, transport and the environment (paragraph 10).

This document includes: 1 Annex

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (iii) They have also taken a few small steps in areas of special interest to the West e.g. CBMs, Basket III (paragraphs 8, 12-15).
- (iv) However, the few minor procedural changes on human contacts and information have so far had only a very ~~modest beneficial~~ ^{limited real} effect, and the general practice in these fields remains highly restrictive (paragraphs 12-15).
- (v) Initial exchanges of view have begun among various CSCE participants on the organization and content of the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977 (paragraph 17).

Main Trends

3. The current phase in Warsaw Pact policy emerged from the meetings of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Moscow on 15th-16th December and of Warsaw Pact Party Secretaries in Warsaw on 26th January. Since then, the Soviet Union has accelerated its policy of small and selective measures of implementation in areas of special interest to the West, though in the important fields of human contacts and information these measures have been largely procedural in nature and their real significance is still unclear (paragraphs 12-15). In addition, the Soviet Union has launched a major initiative in the economic field (the Brezhnev proposals for three conferences). Their main aim seems to be to build up a plausible case for compliance in respect of all the Baskets, while diverting attention from the minimal nature of their concessions in the human rights field by large scale initiatives in areas of less difficulty for them. They have also launched a considerable propaganda campaign which combines an overstatement of their own implementation with strong counter-attacks on the West for alleged non-compliance both with the Declaration of Principles and with specific provisions on such matters as visas, language training and books. It seems that these are the main lines along which the Warsaw Pact countries intend, over the coming months, to prepare their position for the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977.

4. Not all the details of the new approach appear to have been defined as yet. The rapid manifestation of Western pressure in late 1975 may have forced the East to develop an implementation policy much more quickly than was originally intended. The other Warsaw Pact countries (except Rumania) have followed the Soviet line with varying degrees of emphasis: Hungary, in particular, has been active in the propaganda campaign and in other aspects of the new policy, and may perhaps have been designated as front-runner for the East. This evolution of the East's approach does not seem to have had any effect on Soviet policy towards Berlin.

5. While the East's tactical approach to implementation has evolved in the way described, their basic strategy appears to continue along lines discernible ~~before, during and immediately after the CSCE.~~ The Final Act is presented as a document of historical importance, which is to be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the Soviet Union's established foreign policy aims. The Final Act is actively used as an instrument in pursuing such major Soviet goals as legitimization of the status quo in Europe, consolidation of the "irreversible process of détente", progress towards "military détente", and development towards pan-European inter-state co-operation. Nevertheless, despite the continuity of their basic aims and the confident stance of their new tactical approach, there is little doubt that the Soviets are still fully aware of their weak position on implementation, and, indeed, some evidence of caution as regards the degree to which they are able to exploit the Final Act. This uncertainty might explain, for example, Mr. Brezhnev's low-key treatment of the subject at the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

6. The East continues to place limitations on the scope of the applicability of the Final Act. The Soviet Union implies that the Brezhnev doctrine overrides the application of the Final Act to relations between socialist countries. It is strongly maintained that the Final Act cannot be held to inhibit Soviet conduct in pursuing ^{the} ideological struggle. Yet, at the same time, any Western criticisms of the East are claimed to be contrary to the letter and spirit of Helsinki, and the dissemination of

these criticisms in the East is restricted in a manner incompatible with the Basket III provisions on the free flow of information. The East denies any inconsistency between, on the one hand, the provisions of the Final Act and the declarations by the East at and since Helsinki that détente should be given a permanent and universal character, and, on the other hand, the Soviet intervention in Angola and the continuing expansion of its military forces outside its frontiers.

Declaration of Principles

7. The part of the Final Act which is most frequently used by the Soviet Union to promote its foreign policy aims and to vindicate its action is the Declaration of Principles. This is presented as the most important part of the Final Act and given a quasi-judicial status. Certain principles are stressed, especially inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs, while others, such as respect for human rights, are ignored. ~~Eastern commentaries~~ on those principles of particular interest to them tend to claim that any action they favour is an act of implementation, while any action they dislike, such as criticisms of détente or improvement in NATO's defence capabilities, is in contradiction of the Final Act.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

8. One of the areas in which the Soviet Union has made some concession to Western pressure on implementation of the Final Act has been that of CBMs. Early in January, the Soviet Union notified other CSCE signatories of a military manoeuvre held in the Caucasus involving about 25,000 men, and invited observers from neighbouring states, including Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union now seems to have reasonable ground to claim that it has started to carry out the Basket I provisions on CBMs. However, CBM implementation so far has been restricted to major manoeuvres only. The Soviet Union has notified none of the small-scale manoeuvres held since Helsinki involving less than 25,000 men, and the practical opportunities for the observers to the Caucasus exercise to watch the manoeuvre activities were

~~rather~~ limited. In contrast, the West has notified seven military manoeuvres, including four small-scale manoeuvres involving less than 25,000 men and invited observers from all CSCE countries to one major manoeuvre.

9. An interesting recent development has been the action of Hungary in April in orally informing all Western military attachés of an exercise involving some 10,000 men. This may be a sign that at least some Eastern countries are prepared to notify also small-scale manoeuvres and thus take some further steps in order to strengthen their claims of full implementation.

Brezhnev Proposals for three Conferences

[The following draft text has not yet been approved by the Economic Committee.]

10. Next to the Declaration of Principles, the Soviet Union has always stressed Basket II as offering the most significant opportunities for East-West co-operation, and it is in this field that their most spectacular step in implementing the Final Act has been taken with the Brezhnev proposals for three conferences on energy, transport and environment. Various motives can be surmised for these proposals: pursuit of a pan-European approach at the expense of "regional" co-operation; creation of an impression of implementation of the Final Act while diverting attention from the East's poor performance in e.g. Basket III; deflection of the limelight from the follow-up meeting in Belgrade which may prove an awkward occasion for them; and minimizing the impact of their absence from the CIEC meeting in Paris or, alternatively, reshaping the latter stages of the CIEC so that they themselves would play a major part. All of these possible motives suggest the need for considerable caution on the part of the West. The general approach of Western governments so far has been to avoid appearing obstructive, but at the same time to question the need for such large-scale conferences. The West have pointed out that much of the content of the proposed conferences is already covered by the Economic Commission for Europe, the most appropriate forum for such matters, and have emphasized the need for careful study before reaching a decision.

Other Economic Matters

The following draft text has not yet been approved by the Economic Committee.⁷

11. Eastern countries have recently made references to the Helsinki Conference in COMECON's approach to the EEC for an agreement covering relations between these two bodies. Although the proposals made by the Chairman of the CMEA had no relation to the Final Act, mention of the latter was considered as a good propaganda move. Thus the Final Act or specific aspects of Basket II can be used by the East to justify or explain certain initiatives or claims in connection with its economic and trade relations with the West. However, in spite of insistence by the East that it is keen to implement the provisions of Basket II, progress has until now been particularly slow and not significant from the Western viewpoint. There is, therefore, need to continue multilateral pressure on the Eastern countries in order to obtain from them the implementation of their unilateral commitments under the provisions of the Final Act. Attempts by the East to seek trade-offs between Basket II and the other Baskets should be resisted.

Humanitarian Questions and Information

12. The Warsaw Pact countries remain firmly in control of the degree, method and timing of Basket III implementation. As noted in paragraph 3 above, the Soviet Union has recently adopted a more aggressive attitude as regards these provisions. They have stressed their intention to implement all parts of the Final Act, have claimed that the humanitarian and other provisions in Basket III are already implemented by them to a large degree, and have attacked the West for alleged examples of non-compliance. In addition, the Soviet Union has taken a series of minor steps in some areas of interest to the West and of least difficulty to the régime, and is giving them a propaganda value out of all proportion to their significance.

13. In fact, the real effect of these measures has been very limited. In the field of human contacts, the Soviet Union has instituted a few minor changes in emigration procedures, but so far there is no evidence that these have led to any actual improvement in freedom of movement. Indeed, some other recent administrative changes may have made emigration even more difficult. It remains to be seen what effect these various measures will have in practice, and whether the procedural improvements will prove to be more than cosmetic. Experience up to now with the Soviet Union on specific divided family cases has been disappointing. Only a limited number of family reunification and bi-national marriage cases have been permitted to leave. Despite continued pressure by the West, a large number of such cases on lists presented by Western governments to the Soviet Union after Helsinki still remain unresolved.

14. In the field of information, the few procedural changes by the Soviet Union as regards working conditions for journalists (e.g. multiple entry visas, somewhat freer travel) and as regards newspaper circulation (e.g. an increase from 4 to 22 Western newspapers) have brought some marginal real improvements. But here also there have been some retrograde trends, such as the current campaign against certain Western overseas radio stations, and the general position remains highly restrictive.

15. Among the other Warsaw Pact countries the established policies in these fields vary considerably, but the same pattern is seen of only very modest real improvement attributable to implementation of the Final Act during the period covered by this report. Some retrograde trends are evident here too: in Rumania, in particular, the position on human contacts has significantly deteriorated.

Culture and Education

16. The East are showing considerable activity in the cultural and educational fields, probably partly to divert attention from their inadequate performance as regards human contacts and information provisions of Basket III. This activity is concentrated on those aspects which the East have long favoured, and in general exchanges continue to be based largely on pre-CSCE foundations. The West are to some extent on the defensive. For example, it is beyond the power of Western governments to meet Eastern demands for greater reciprocity in publishing and translating written material and in language instruction. In any case, the criterion of reciprocity is contrary to the Western principle of freedom of access for all peoples. Furthermore, financial stringency makes it difficult for the West to respond to Eastern demands for increased exchange quotas. The West, for their part, are keeping up their pressure on the East for greater individual contacts, but with only mixed results.

Belgrade Meeting 1977

17. The East's move onto the offensive as regards implementation of the Final Act seems to be planned as a concerted preparation of their position at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977. The first steps in the process of informal consultation among all the various participating countries about the content and organization of this meeting are now beginning, with Rumania taking the lead. The Yugoslavs, as hosts, have also begun tentative soundings. Some of the neutral countries have started consultations among themselves. In short, the Belgrade meeting has now become a live issue.

The West

18. Western governments have maintained discreet and persistent efforts to secure Eastern compliance with the Final Act. As the preceding paragraphs show, only a very modest start has been made by the East in areas of importance to the West, and a continuing effort of pressure by the West is clearly called for. Western governments themselves already implement most of the provisions, but where necessary they have taken initiatives, especially in the CBM field. However, as recent Eastern criticisms have emphasized, there are certain areas in which the West is to some extent vulnerable to accusations of unsatisfactory compliance, in particular, as regards entry visas, language training, circulation of books and films. The West will have to prepare its defence on these points with care.

Neutrals and Non-Aligned

19. Western countries have continued to exchange views with the neutral and non-aligned participants. The neutral governments appear to be following policies similar to those of Western countries in pressing the East discreetly to implement the Final Act, especially as regards the human rights provisions, and to have had some minor successes. The West's contacts with the neutrals and non-aligned will become increasingly important as preparations accelerate for the Belgrade meeting in 1977.

20. These questions are examined in detail in the Annex to this report.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0003 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

BASKET I - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

1. In most respects the approach by the Warsaw Pact to the Declaration of Principles in the Final Act remains unchanged from that described in the Committee's first report.

2. The Declaration of Principles is still emphasized over other portions of the Final Act, and accorded a quasi-judicial status. The meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in December confirmed that this was the most important section of the document. An article in Pravda on 3rd February, 1976, explained that it was the "multilateral political-legal foundation of the whole process of relaxation of tension in Europe".

3. The Warsaw Pact countries have also continued to stress the importance of certain principles, especially inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs, and to overlook those, such as respect for human rights, which they dislike. An exception is Rumania which appears to have been more active in recent months in stressing that all principles must apply in inter-state relationships, while giving special attention to the principle of sovereign equality.

4. There has been strong and growing Eastern criticism of the West for failure to implement the Declaration of Principles, in contrast to the faithful adherence by the East. The balance sheet given by Pravda on 3rd February, 1976, divides the righteous and unrighteous according to whether the actions in question accord with established Soviet foreign policy.

5. In addition, many of the continuing Western efforts to promote Eastern implementation of other provisions of the Final Act, Basket III in particular, as well as to implement the Final Act unilaterally (particularly the free exchange of information through radio broadcasts), have been regarded by the East as inconsistent with the principles of "non-intervention" and "sovereign equality". Soviet commentators have labelled some such efforts as "subversive anti-Communist propaganda....and ideological sabotage". On the other hand, they have claimed that,

ANNEX to
ISD/122

-2-

if the West would only implement the Basket III provisions in accordance with the two principles mentioned above (obviously interpreted according to Eastern dictates), then these provisions would serve as an example of "modernized refined methods of conducting an ideological struggle" (Tass, 27th November, 1975 quoting Kommunist). The East have also charged the West with non-implementation of the principle of sovereign equality for attempting to promote "evolution" of the Socialist system through policies designed to moderate Soviet conduct.

6. At the same time, the Basket I principles apparently do not restrain the East in its own conduct of the ideological struggle on non-Communist soil. Over the past months, the CPSU has repeated its claim to be the guiding centre of international Communism, and to have the right to control the strategies and tactics of Communist Parties in Western countries. The USSR has also continued its subversive activities abroad. As an outcome of Western reaction to its policies in Angola, the USSR has made it clearer than ever before that the process of relaxation of tensions with the West does not rule out Soviet support for any group it may wish to label a national liberation movement.

7. The Soviet Union has also criticised the West for non-implementation of the principle of "co-operation between states" on the grounds that Western defence efforts are counter-productive to co-operation between States of different social systems.

8. There continues to be the strong implication that the Declaration of Principles does not apply between the States of Eastern Europe. The proposed revision to the Polish Constitution, which would have tied the foreign policies of Poland and the USSR closer together, illustrates this point. References to the Declaration of Principles as the "European Charter for peaceful co-existence" (Pravda, 3rd February, 1976) points in the same direction.

9. The West for their part have maintained their own interpretation of the Declaration of Principles and tried to counter Eastern misinterpretations. In particular, they have stressed both that all parts of the Final Act are of equal status, and that within the Declaration all principles are of equal importance. They have also emphasized that the Declaration of Principles applies to relations between all participating states.

10. The position of the neutral and non-aligned participants of the CSCE on the Declaration of Principles closely resembles that of the Western Allies, since these countries see the Declaration as strengthening their independence and security as neutrals. Yugoslavia continues to take special care within this group to stress all of the principles, including those of sovereign equality and non-interference, and Yugoslav officials have even expressed a wish to see the Declaration strengthened at Belgrade in 1977.

BASKET I - CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

(a) Notification of Military Manoeuvres

11. Since 1st August, 1975, the NATO Allies have notified a total of seven military exercises in which their ground forces were engaged, including all three major manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 men. Among the neutral and non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia, for obvious political reasons, has from the beginning placed high priority on CBMs. It has consequently taken the initiative of notifying to all CSCE participants one manoeuvre with about 18,000 troops. It also notified Austria of a small-scale exercise comprising approximately 3,000 men near the Yugoslavian/Austrian border. Switzerland also gave notification of a major-scale manoeuvre.

ANNEX to
ISD/122

-4-

12. As regards the Warsaw Pact countries, for the first time since the signing of the Final Act, the Soviet Union notified other CSCE signatories early in January 1976 of a military manoeuvre held in the Caucasus region involving about 25,000 men. In addition, the Hungarian Authorities briefed orally all Western attachés on 5th April that an exercise would take place on the following day involving about 10,000 men. Little additional information was given. It was stated that this information was offered "in the spirit of Helsinki".

(b) Exchange of Observers to Military Manoeuvres

13. All CSCE states were invited to send observers to the major NATO manoeuvre CERTAIN TREK. Observers attended from 8 NATO and 7 neutral countries. Switzerland invited observers to their manoeuvre. The Soviet Union invited Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to the CAUCASUS exercise: however, the observers were restricted to seeing only two set piece battles for a few hours.

BASKET II - ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

/The section of this report on Basket II matters will be contributed in due course by the Economic Committee.7

BASKET III - CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

14. Of all the Final Act, the implementation of the Basket III provisions on human contacts and information remains the matter of strongest interest to governments and public opinion in the West. Since Western policies have long incorporated these provisions, the West considers that the main burden of implementation rests with the East. The preponderant part of Western efforts are therefore devoted to encouraging Eastern countries to implement fully the provisions of Basket III. On matters such as travel in Western countries by Soviet journalists, several Western governments have eased retaliatory regulations in response to similar Soviet moves. In addition, Western authorities are considering whether any initiatives are required, for example, to improve still further Western performance as regards entry visas (see paragraph 23).

15. The Warsaw Pact countries, led by the USSR, continue to exhibit strong sensitivity to Western pressures and criticism with respect to their implementation of the Basket III provisions. While claiming that they will implement all provisions of the Final Act, they have continued to stress the limiting conditions for their implementation of Basket III which were outlined in paragraph 35 of the Committee's first report. It has been confirmed repeatedly that Basket III provisions will not be implemented in such a way as to permit Western "interference" in the internal affairs of Eastern States. The requirement for further East/West bilateral action and agreements to achieve implementation on the basis of reciprocity has also been stressed again (Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja, writing in Kulpolitika, January 1976). Eastern leaders have confirmed privately that they will permit the Basket III section to be implemented only gradually and selectively.

16. Nonetheless, since December, the East has also displayed a less defensive and a more aggressive approach to Basket III matters. This approach is clearly intended to prepare a strong Eastern position for the Belgrade meeting in 1977 and in an area where Eastern countries can expect the West to be tough. It consists of three separate aspects. First, there is some small movement to implement those provisions which cause the least difficulty to Soviet and Warsaw Pact régimes. These are described below.

17. Secondly, there is a more direct and confident tone in Soviet and East European interpretations of Basket III implementation and in their statements of "good" intent. Hungary has been particularly quick to pick up the new theme (Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja, writing in Kulpolitika, January 1976). They maintain that most Basket III provisions have already been implemented to a considerable degree in the East in accordance with progressive "socialist" law, and where implementation is undertaken, they attempt to get the maximum propaganda value out of it.

ANNEX to
ISD/122

18. Thirdly, since December 1975, the Eastern countries have moved more to the attack in charging the West with non-implementation of several Basket III provisions, pointing to delays in providing visas to Easterners, to the lack of circulation in the West of Eastern newspapers, books and films, and to the limited teaching in the West of Eastern European languages as evidence.

(a) Human Contacts

19. In the field of human contacts, there has been only a very modest start to implementation of the Final Act by the Warsaw Pact countries. In January, some small improvements took place in Soviet emigration procedures (see list attached to this Annex), but these have not yet been matched by a noticeable increase in successful family reunification and emigration cases. Indeed, the tightening of Soviet regulations on financial remittances from abroad could add to the difficulties of emigration. It remains to be seen what effect these various changes will have in practice and whether the procedural improvements will be anything more than cosmetic.

20. The general experience of Western countries with the Soviet Union is that only a limited number of individuals involved in family reunification cases have been permitted to depart since August 1975, leaving a large number of cases outstanding (though the Swiss have had all their outstanding cases resolved); and that in several cases the Soviet Union is still refusing exit permission for bi-national marriages. The UK, for example, has 45 personal cases outstanding, about five having been settled since the Final Act.

21. There has been still less action attributable to implementation of the Final Act in the other Warsaw Pact countries. Nonetheless, their established policies are generally not as severe as those of the USSR and a few further, small, positive steps have been taken in some of these countries since Helsinki.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0003 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

22. Only Hungary has displayed a widely positive attitude, which dates from before Helsinki. Still, at least one Western country has been disappointed with the limited movement by Hungary on divided families. At the other end of the spectrum, in the last few months Rumania appears to have taken an even more restrictive attitude with regard to family reunification and meetings, bi-national marriages, and travel abroad, though two Western countries have reported some progress and success in personal cases. Available Western visa statistics show a consistent pattern of steady and considerable decrease of persons leaving Rumania since 1973, and late in 1975, the Rumanians somewhat further tightened their emigration procedures and launched an anti-emigration propaganda campaign. Western countries have had mixed reactions from the GDR: some have found a more restrictive attitude to family reunification and some aspects of travel abroad; others have found a modest increase in the number of persons permitted to leave in order to join relatives, combined with a mixture of toughness and restraint in exfiltration cases. The position in Bulgaria remains generally bad as regards bi-national marriages and family reunification, though one Western country has obtained permission for a few members of divided families to leave. A similarly poor situation applies in Czechoslovakia, with little or no improvement being noted by Western countries. However, a positive development has been the recent permission for three Greeks to marry Czechs. With the exception of one report of progress the Poles have not proved very responsive on divided families: indeed, one Western country has found that their overall immigration visas for Poles, most of which concern divided families, have decreased in recent years, including the period since the Final Act. As regards family visits, some Eastern European countries, such as Czechoslovakia, refuse to grant entry visas to naturalized

ANNEX to
ISD/122

-8-

citizens of Western countries wishing to visit their country of origin, while Poland is preventing the departure of some such visitors. However, it should be noted that some special, pre-CSCE, bilateral arrangements between Eastern countries (e.g. FRG and Poland) provide exceptions to this largely restrictive pattern as regards human contacts.

23. Since Helsinki there seems to have been little change in Eastern practice on travel abroad by their nationals for personal or professional reasons, including little or no apparent improvement in the difficult procedures in most Warsaw Pact countries for the acquisition of passports (two reported improvements in the USSR are listed in an attachment to this Annex). Yet the USSR and some other Warsaw Pact countries have recently referred to the Final Act in seeking improvements in Western visa procedures, especially in the application approval time and, in some instances, the termination of visa requirements altogether. Eastern internal security systems would enable the East to accept more lenient Western attitudes towards visas without any loss of control on the movements of their own nationals. Moreover, their effective control of foreign visitors would permit their own governments to adopt more lenient visa procedures in order to demand Western governments to do the same for reasons of reciprocity. The US has agreed in principle to the Hungarian proposal to reduce from fourteen to seven days the processing of visas for official Hungarian visitors, and the UK expects to be able to go some way towards meeting Soviet proposals to reduce current time limits for the issue of visas.

24. The East is attempting to deny that the Final Act gives the West the right to concern itself with any aspects of human rights other than those specifically listed in Basket III. It is in this field where the East, led by the USSR, has been most adamant in attacking the West for "interference in internal affairs" (Pravda, 20th February, 1976). For example, the Soviet Union denies that emigration other than to reunite families is covered by the Final Act (such as the emigration of Soviet Jews which in 1975 fell to half the 1974 figure). They ignore the fact

that Basket I of the Final Act contains a principle on human rights and also that Basket III contains widely-phrased preambular language, including general language on facilitating freer movement. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has altered its basic highly repressive approach to human rights since the Final Act, though they continue to show themselves occasionally responsive to Western pressure in specific cases. Although the established policies of other Warsaw Pact countries vary considerably, there, also the Final Act seems to have brought about no changes. In several Eastern countries dissidents have tried unsuccessfully to appeal to the Final Act for an amelioration in conditions.

25. The USSR succeeded in obtaining in the UN Human Rights Commission a resolution - a Yugoslav-Cuban "compromise text" - which distorts the human rights language of the Final Act by making such rights subordinate to the need for international peace and security. All Western governments voted against this text (except Austria, which abstained) and several have expressed their disappointment to the Yugoslavs at their pro-Soviet stance.

(b) Information

26. While pursuing some minor implementation of Basket III humanitarian provisions since December 1975, the Soviet Union has put its main emphasis on those concerning the freer flow of information. In mid-December 1975, the United Kingdom and Norway were added to the six CSCE participants mentioned in paragraph 36 of the Committee's first report, whose resident journalists in the USSR are now issued multiple entry/exit visas. This relaxation is understood to cover technicians. On 31st December, 1975, the USSR announced that effective 1st March, 1976, it would give Western journalists the same travel privileges in the Soviet Union as were accorded to Western diplomats - a minor improvement - stressing that reciprocal action was expected. In addition, the journalists of some Western countries have experienced somewhat greater ease of access to contacts and a removal of restrictions on transmission of tapes and undeveloped film out of the Soviet Union.

ANNEX to
ISD/122

-10-

27. On 21st January, TASS announced in its foreign edition only that eighteen additional Western newspapers would be put on sale in the Soviet Union during 1976, adding to the four already available. The Soviet Union has also allowed the circulation of a small number of copies of a USIA publication since last autumn. However, no more than a limited improvement in the availability of some Western papers at newsstands in places frequented by Western tourists and privileged Russians has been noticed to date. These few, but highly visible, steps have resulted in little real progress in information matters and overall Soviet performance remains contradictory. The refusal of a visa in February to a Norwegian journalist to cover the CPSU 25th Congress illustrates the ambivalent attitude of Soviet officials. One positive note has been the reluctant Soviet agreement to exchange lecturers with Canada and Norway.

28. There has been no noticeable improvement in the information field in other Warsaw Pact countries, some of which were already more open than the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia continues to take a particularly harsh line with Western journalists. The GDR has recently shown a hardening of policy, illustrated by its refusal to accredit three FRG radio journalists to cover the Leipzig Trade Fair in March 1976 and the expulsion of a Speigel correspondent in December 1975. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister claimed at the end of December last year that Bulgaria was importing more Western publications, but so far there is no evidence of greater availability to the general public. In Hungary, there is an analogous situation as regards Western newspapers, while the number of available Western news magazines seems even to have declined.

29. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries continue to be hypersensitive to the content of Western news media, and have strongly criticized them for distortion of fact and for slander of the East in contravention of the Final Act. They draw the conclusion that these malpractices fully justify the

imposition of restrictions on the availability of Western media in Eastern countries. The East has even insisted that Western governments must bear responsibility for the content of the news media of their countries, including material on East-West relations and on Eastern countries intended only for Western audiences, and have pressed this line of argument in international organizations such as UNESCO. This is, of course, contrary to the Western concept of freedom of the press and other media.

30. Nowhere is Eastern sensitivity greater than with respect to Western radio broadcasts. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and other Western radio stations have been recently attacked for "interfering" in the internal affairs of Eastern states and for acting contrary to the letter and spirit of the Final Act. The jamming of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continues. The Eastern campaign was responsible for the exclusion of journalists from these two stations from the Winter Olympic Games in February 1976. The Poles tried unsuccessfully to include in their cultural agreement with the FRG a statement that these two stations did not serve the spirit of Helsinki. The refusal of visas to three FRG radio journalists by the GDR has been mentioned above. The Soviet authorities have protested about the content of Deutsche Welle broadcasts, an unusual step for them in recent times. The Soviet Union has also complained that the international broadcasts of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation have been contrary to the spirit of Helsinki, and Czechoslovakia continues to prohibit CBC written material. The US is still experiencing difficulties with the GDR over partial medium-wave jamming of radio in the American Sector, but has managed to resolve a related problem with the GDR regarding allocation of station frequencies on this wavelength.

(c) Culture and Education

31. Cultural and educational exchanges between the East and West continue to be based largely on pre-CSCE foundations. Some Western countries have seen no real improvement in this field since Helsinki. Others consider that the Final Act may

ANNEX to
ISD/122

be positively influencing the atmosphere - if not directly influencing the pace and direction of - cultural and educational arrangements. Both East and West are tending to use the Final Act mainly to argue for measures which they have long favoured. The East is showing considerable activity in this direction, probably partly to divert attention from its inadequate performance on the human contacts and information provisions of Basket III.

32. Western experience with the Soviet Union has been mixed. Some have found a slow but definite progress dating from before Helsinki, including a growing acceptance of more direct contacts. Others discern no change in Soviet external cultural relations since the Final Act and even some tightening of control in the internal cultural field. The Soviet Union has made clear that the influence of "capitalist" and "amoral" Western culture will not be permitted to contaminate "socialist realism" (Suslov, speech to USSR Academy of Arts, 26th December, 1975).

33. Experience with other Warsaw Pact countries has followed a similar pattern. Most Eastern European countries seem to want to limit exchange programmes to those areas included in bilateral exchange agreements. A particularly negative development since Helsinki has been the Rumanian directive to its media requiring critical presentation of Western culture, though some small positive signs have also been noticed in that country. On the other hand, Poland is being especially active in looking for implementation activity in areas of interest to them.

34. The Soviet Union has made proposals to some Western countries for implementation of the Final Act as regards publishing, translation and language instruction. The Soviet Union has also pressed several Western countries for improvements in issuing visas for cultural exchanges. Another area of pressure by the East has been for more liberal exchange quotas. The Soviet Union and several other Eastern countries have also made a considerable effort to get more of their material onto Western radio and television. A common argument in pressing their demands is the need for reciprocity in such matters. This is of course contrary to Western insistence that obstacles should be removed to the exercise of free choice by the peoples of all countries.

35. Several Western countries are actively considering schemes for new exchanges with the East. The main limiting factor is finance. In addition, the West has great difficulty in meeting some of the Eastern demands on e.g., circulation of books, because these activities lie in the private sector. The West is keeping up its pressure on the East for greater individual contacts, with mixed results, often negative. Some Western countries have also used the Final Act to argue for freer access to cultural attachés, but there has been no noticeable easing so far.

36. The East has made a concerted attempt to insert references to the Final Act into the various bilateral cultural agreements which have been concluded since Helsinki. Some Western countries are opposed to this practice: others favour it, subject to certain conditions.

37. Most neutral and non-aligned countries are in the same position as the West vis-à-vis their implementation of Basket III provisions and their attempts to secure Eastern implementation. Sweden views Eastern implementation with "moderate optimism". Finnish officials have been rather charitable to the East in claiming that the Warsaw Pact countries have already done a lot in the way of implementation and were planning to do more. Yugoslavia's post-CSCE attitude to Basket III subjects is more hesitant than those of the other countries of this group, but still relatively positive, especially on human contacts and culture, in comparison with other Communist régimes. Western countries are experiencing no special problems with Yugoslavia. Repressive measures in the human rights field in Yugoslavia seem directed primarily against pro-Soviet elements.

BASKET IV - FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

38. The Rumanians have taken the lead so far in consulting participants about the content and organization of the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977. Ambassador Lipatti, former Rumanian Delegate to the CSCE, has undertaken a tour of participating countries to put to them a detailed outline of Rumanian views. These include provision for a series of frequent further follow-up meetings after Belgrade.

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX to
ISD/122

-14-

39. The Yugoslavs, as hosts, have also made tentative soundings, as have the Poles, Some of the neutrals recently held a meeting on CSCE follow-up including discussion on Belgrade 1977.

40. There was an initial exchange of views on Belgrade 1977 among NATO representatives during the meeting of the Political Committee with Experts on 18th and 19th March.

41. The momentum of activity among participants in preparation for Belgrade 1977 is bound to accelerate considerably during the coming months.

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

-14-

REPORTED IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET EMIGRATION AND
TRAVEL PROCEDURES

A. Emigration

1. The cost of a passport for emigration purposes has dropped from 400 (\$540) to 300 (\$406) roubles. (This improvement does not seem to be in force in all parts of the USSR. Emigrants to Israel must still pay an additional 500 roubles (\$676) charge for the required renunciation of Soviet citizenship.)

2. In family reunification cases, children under 16 may now be listed in parents' passports thus obviating the need for purchasing separate passports. (This measure seems to apply only in some parts of the USSR.)

3. Aspiring emigrants no longer lose a 40 rouble application fee each time their requests to emigrate are refused. Instead, Soviet officials are now only collecting the fee from successful applicants after permission to emigrate has been granted. There are also reports that this fee will be reduced from 40 to 30 roubles.

4. There is an apparent greater willingness to change the country of destination stamped in emigrant passports, thus permitting an emigrant denied entry to the country of his first choice a chance to emigrate to another country using the same passport. (This willingness has been noticed so far only in respect of emigrants from Soviet Armenia).

5. The completion of emigration application formalities have apparently been simplified to omit or lessen the need for "character references" from one's employment supervisor, local trade union leader and local party chief.

6. Applications for emigration which have been refused by Soviet Authorities can now be renewed after six months instead of one year.

ATTACHMENT to
ANNEX to
ISD/122

-16-

B. Travel

1. The cost of passports for private foreign travel (non-emigrant) have been reduced from 361 (\$456) to 261 (\$347) roubles.

2. There seems to be a modification in Soviet regulations with respect to travel abroad of persons who:

- (1) have knowledge of state secrets;
- (2) are classified as "criminals"; and
- (3) are leaving dependent children behind.