

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

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To: Members of the Political Committee

From: Acting Chairman of the Political Committee

Subject: Report on Implementation of the Final Act : Review of Implementation

As requested by the Political Committee, I attach a draft report on the Review of Implementation. Advance copies of the draft report on Preparations for the Belgrade Meetings were sent to you on 10 November, 1976 and this later appeared as ISD/133.

2. As I suggested at the meeting of the Political Committee on 26 October, 1976, I propose that these two drafts should be considered at an all-day meeting on 18 November (and 19 November, if necessary).

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N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE

Third report by the Political Committee:
10th May, 1976 to December, 1976

REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction, summary and recommendation

1. At its meeting on 1st October, 1975, the Council agreed that a report on those aspects of the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE which have a particular importance for the members of the Alliance could be prepared by the Political Committee. This should be done, in collaboration with other relevant committees, for the Council on the eve of each Ministerial Meeting, within the larger framework of the examination of East-West relations and the general problem of détente. This is the third such report and it covers the period from 10th May, 1976.

2. The most important points to draw to the attention of the Council regarding developments during the period of this report are the following:

- (i) the Warsaw Pact countries have maintained the more coherent and self-confident stance towards implementation of the Final Act evident since early 1976, and are likely to persist in this approach up to the Belgrade meetings in 1977 (paragraphs 4-9);
- (ii) they have made a few additional proposals for implementation in areas of least difficulty to them though not on the scale of the Brezhnev proposals (paragraphs 5-7);
- (iii) they have continued to take a ^{limited} number of small steps in areas of importance for Western countries (CBMs, Basket III) (paragraphs 5-6);

- (iv) they have strengthened their criticisms of Western countries for alleged inadequate compliance with the Final Act (paragraph 8);
- (v) these developments indicate that the Eastern countries are attempting to build up an implementation record in all sectors of the Final Act, including some real, if mainly very limited, improvements in human contacts and working conditions for journalists;
- (vi) while this performance is far from satisfactory, nevertheless a process of implementation has begun, and there is ground for hope that continuing Western ^{encouragement} pressure might lead to further improvements in the behaviour of the Soviet Union and East European countries.

Recommendation

3. It is recommended that the Council should take note of this report.

Main Trends

4. During the last six months, the Eastern countries have continued steadily along the course which they apparently set themselves at the turn of the year, and which was described in the Political Committee's Second Report (C-M(76)26(Final) of 13th May, 1976). The self-confident and assertive stance towards implementation of the Final Act which they then adopted has been maintained. They have continued to use the Final Act as an instrument to pursue

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their established foreign policy aims (the legitimization of the status quo of Europe, the "irreversible" process of détente, "military détente", pan-European inter-state co-operation). They have emphasized those elements of the Final Act of particular interest to them, and tried to re-interpret and minimise the significance of those they dislike. They have claimed to be implementing all the provisions of the Final Act, and have continued to build up a record of implementation in all Baskets.

So far the Eastern approach does not seem to have had any effect on Soviet policy towards Berlin.

5. Early in 1976 the Eastern countries embarked upon a concerted programme of a few large-scale initiatives in areas of least difficulty to them (the Brezhnev proposals), together with a series of small steps in areas of special interest to Western countries (CBMs, Basket III). These were described in the Second Report. Since then, there has been some decline in the number of new initiatives by the Soviet Union, though certain of the East Europeans have maintained a modest level of momentum. It is possible that the Soviet Union has been assessing the likely course of East-West relations up to Belgrade before undertaking new steps. It may also be a tactic designed to lessen Western expectations by periods of inactivity. Moreover, Eastern countries might be saving some measures for the weeks preceding Belgrade, in the hope of having maximum beneficial effect on those meetings.

6. Nevertheless, the past few months have featured some examples of implementation by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. They have also given Western countries the first opportunity to assess the general behaviour of Eastern countries a reasonable length of time after the signature of the

Final Act. This assessment shows that Eastern governments have made a concerted effort to establish some record of implementation in all Baskets of the Final Act, including those areas of particular importance to Western countries, notably human contacts (except for Romania), working conditions for journalists and CBMs. In the case of two Western countries there has been marked improvement in movement of people from the Soviet Union, though extraneous circumstances have played a part. Otherwise, the general picture is of some very limited progress.

Consult

7. A new feature has been the bilateral agreements purporting to cover all the Final Act which Hungary has proposed to several Western countries. These proposals are a conspicuous part of the role of front-runner for the Warsaw Pact which Hungary seems to have assumed (though in fact since Helsinki Hungary has done very little by way of real improvements to its already comparatively liberal standards). It is reported that Poland intends to propose similar agreements. Such moves seem partly designed to emphasize bilateral implementation at the expense of unilateral; and perhaps partly to establish a Western record of non-compliance since it would be difficult for Western governments to accept some of the Hungarian ideas. However, Western governments are considering carefully to what extent the proposals can be used to open up new possibilities for progress.

8. Eastern governments are keeping up their campaign of criticisms of Western countries for inadequate implementation. In particular, they allege Western non-compliance with certain principles (especially that of "non-intervention in internal affairs") and with Basket II (non-extension of Most Favoured Nation

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treatment), as well as poor Western performance on such Basket III matters as visas, the translation and distribution of books and language training. Certain "Western sources" are accused of trying to slow down implementation and to undermine the Final Act. These attacks seem to be intended to divert attention from Eastern shortcomings, to counter Western attempts to secure Eastern implementation and to put the West on the defensive generally.

9. The main trends described in the preceding paragraphs were reflected in Eastern statements on the first anniversary of the Final Act, as well as in the proceedings and document of the Conference of the European Communist Parties in July. These provide further evidence of the care with which their approach is co-ordinated. Eastern policies were discussed again by the Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting in Sofia in June, and were presumably also considered at the recent Summit of Warsaw Pact leaders in Bucharest.

Declaration of Principles

10. The Declaration of Principles continues to be presented by the Warsaw Pact countries as the key section of the Final Act. It is cited by the Soviet Union to justify its foreign policy activities and to attack those Western activities which it dislikes. The Declaration is also used by Warsaw Pact countries as a means of defence against Western pressure for implementation of the other Baskets, principally Basket III. Eastern governments (except the Romanians) stress certain principles, such as the "inviolability of frontiers" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", while others, such as "respect for human rights" and the language permitting peaceful changes in frontiers, are quickly passed over. The Soviet Union is carefully propagating a re-interpretation of certain principles, especially those just mentioned. Moscow continues to

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imply that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" overrides the application of the Declaration of Principles to relations between socialist countries.

Human Rights

11. Within the Declaration of Principles, that on Human Rights is of major importance to public opinion in Western countries. Eastern governments, however, continue to deny that this principle and related language in the Final Act, permit other countries to concern themselves with what they regard as their internal affairs.

12. There is no evidence that respect for human rights has improved since Helsinki in either the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, although standards continue to vary. The "Helsinki Group" of Soviet dissidents has drawn attention to the continued repressive state of affairs in the Soviet Union, and has claimed that the situation since July has worsened with regard to the number of arrests. They have also drawn attention to governmental interference with their postal and telephone communications.

13. The Soviet Jewish emigration rate remains only slightly above the level of 1975.

Confidence Building Measures

14. Confidence Building Measures are of major importance to Allied countries who have encouraged their implementation since the signing of the Final Act. They have liberally interpreted its provisions both with respect to notification of military manoeuvres and invitation of observers of other CSCE participants. The neutral and non-aligned countries have also been forthcoming in implementing CBMs. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact countries have so far taken a restrictive attitude with respect to their own

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implementation, although strictly complying with the minimum requirements of the Final Act. However, since CBMs are still something of a novelty, it cannot be ruled out that the Warsaw Pact countries might perhaps be more forthcoming in future.

Co-operation in economic and related fields

(to be discussed by Economic Committee)

Human Contacts and Information

15. With regard to the human contacts and information provisions of the Final Act, Eastern countries have continued to develop the more assertive and self-confident approach apparent since the beginning of 1976. While attempting to downplay the importance of these provisions and to make their implementation conditional on a number of factors (improvement in the state of détente, pre-eminence of the principle of "non-intervention in internal affairs", need for bilateral agreements), the Warsaw Pact countries have tried to build up their own implementation record.

16. They argue that for the most part Basket III provisions are already being implemented in their countries as a result of the "advanced" nature of socialist law. At the same time they continue to undertake some limited steps of implementation in areas of Western interest and of least difficulty to them, and attribute an importance to these steps out of proportion to their real significance. In addition Eastern countries are attacking the West both for over-emphasising Basket III and for alleged examples of non-implementation. This campaign is accompanied by proposals for bilateral implementation which raise difficulties for Western governments.

(a) Human Contacts

17. The position as regards human contacts is mixed and

less easy to interpret than in the case of the Second Report. The overall situation is one of some real but mainly very limited improvement.

18. Most Allies have experienced very little change in the Soviet performance. All the Allies have continued to have great difficulty with unresolved personal cases. There is no indication that the small procedural changes mentioned in the Second Report are having a general ameliorating effect, and the increased taxes and limitations on gifts from abroad will cause further hardship to aspiring emigrants. There has been no overall change in the pace with which the Soviet Union is solving family reunification cases or in their attitude to bi-national marriages.

19. However, a new development is the appearance of statistics showing a substantial increase in emigration from the Soviet Union to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the United States, as well as an increase in visits from the Soviet Union to the United States. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, this seems to be attributable to a significant extent to the Final Act, at least if that is seen as part of the overall détente process. In the case of the United States, extraneous factors (the closure of the Lebanon to emigrating Armenians) have perhaps played a major part in the emigration increase, while the rise in numbers of visits is part of a trend over several years. Nevertheless, despite all the necessary qualifications, these increases do constitute a real improvement and are partly attributable, though to differing degrees, to the Final Act. They are, however, exceptions to the overall restrictive picture in the Soviet Union.

20. In East European countries there has been only limited

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change related to the Final Act. In general, family visits and travel seem to have been the fields in which some East European countries have found it easiest to make small improvements relevant to the Final Act, while family reunification has been the area of most difficulty. On family visits, minor increases have been noted by some Allies on the part of Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent Bulgaria, with a general decline in visits from Romania. There has been some improvement in certain countries as regards family visits to "illegal" emigrants. As regards travel, Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia have made modest improvements in costs of exit documents and foreign currency allowances. On family reunification, the International Red Cross has observed no improvements since Helsinki in actual reunification, and most Western assessments generally concur. Romania, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, have become more difficult. Exceptions due to special causes are the increase to the Federal Republic of Germany from the GDR and Poland (special bilateral agreements) and to the US from Romania (Most Favoured Nation linkage). As for bi-national marriages, slight improvements have been reported with regard to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but Romania has become worse.

21. Taking the human contacts provisions as a whole, small but real improvements have been noted by some Allies in the still bad Czechoslovakian record. Conversely, the general Romanian attitude has hardened. Otherwise, apart from the special cases concerning the FRG/GDR and FRG/Poland, the other East European countries have shown only minimal improvements. However, as before Helsinki, their practices vary considerably from country to country, with Poland and Hungary being relatively liberal in all three categories of contact.

22. Eastern countries are continuing to criticize Western visa procedures and to highlight cases of visa refusals. Since May 1976, the Soviet Union and some East European countries have made proposals to Western countries for reductions in visa processing times and for waivers of visa requirements altogether. Western countries are studying these proposals carefully in the light of their very different security procedures. In the other direction one Ally has already made proposals to certain Eastern countries for the abolition of visa fees.

(b) Information

23. With regard to the information provisions of Basket III, Eastern performance since Helsinki has remained highly restrictive towards the dissemination of Western information in Eastern countries. There have been virtually no improvements. Despite evidence of small additional imports of Western newspapers into the Soviet Union and Poland, and claims on the part of other Eastern countries that they are doing the same, there has been no apparent improvement in access to these sources on the part of the Eastern public. The situation in Romania appears to have worsened.

24. The same virtual lack of change is found in the fields of films and broadcasting (apart from the much publicised Hungarian "linked" television programme on East-West relations).

25. Eastern countries remain hypersensitive to the content of Western news media generally, and to that of international radio broadcasts in particular. Jamming of certain radio stations continues. Using an argument rejected during the Helsinki/Geneva negotiations, they contend that governments are responsible for the content of their national news media, which should be put at the service of the "mutual acquaintanceship" of nations. This

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campaign on the part of Eastern countries contradicts the language of the Final Act on the "freer and wider dissemination of information".

26. In contrast to their negative attitude towards the Western dissemination of information within their own countries, Warsaw Pact governments have shown willingness to make some minor improvements in the working conditions for Western journalists.

27. The USSR has followed up the earlier small improvements described in the Second Report by allowing foreign journalists in Moscow to have direct access to officials. ^{It} However the general position remains highly restrictive.

28. In the East European countries the situation continues to vary from country to country but, in general, is less restrictive than in the Soviet Union. The worst problem is access to sources, but even in this respect some slight improvements have been noted. The German Democratic Republic has allowed direct access on similar lines to the Soviet Union, together with some minor customs and frontier improvements, but there have also been refusals of visas and an expulsion of a journalist. To a still lesser extent, small improvements have also taken place in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and even in Romania. Poland and Hungary have continued with their relatively liberal approaches.

Culture and Education

29. Eastern countries remain most interested in this part of Basket III. It comprises provisions which they can use to disseminate Eastern social and political values in the West, while retaining a large measure of control, for example through the use of bilateral arrangements, on the selection and availability of Western culture. It also gives the East a fertile area wherein

to assert a favourable implementation record. Moreover, Eastern countries can claim a statistically superior level of implementation of certain provisions (thanks to their state control over such matters and their comparatively higher interest in Western films, books and languages than vice-versa), and demand a better performance from the West. In so doing they call for statistical reciprocity, a concept contrary to freedom of access as endorsed in the Final Act.

30. Implementation is proceeding on the basis of a wide range of arrangements and agreements that pre-date Helsinki and that have continued to develop since. The Final Act has brought no marked improvement in relations in the cultural/educational spheres, although in some cases new arrangements are being signed and negotiated, and programmes within existing agreements being developed, with slightly increased momentum. There has been only mixed success in getting Eastern countries to lower existing barriers to the entry of Western cultural information and to accept more individual contacts.

Neutrals and Non-aligned

31. Neutral and Non-aligned countries continue to exhibit a strong interest in CSCE implementation. The Neutral governments appear to be following policies similar to those of Western countries in pressing Eastern governments discreetly to implement the Final Act, especially as regards the human contacts provisions, and have had some minor success. In a common assessment, the Neutral governments have concluded that the Eastern countries have become somewhat more flexible. Yugoslavia has been positive towards implementation of the CBMs provisions; its approach to Basket III

is liberal, though its position on human rights in general rather less good. Allied countries have a strong interest in continuing close contacts and exchange of views on implementation with both Neutral and Non-aligned states.

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BASKET I - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

1. In most respects, the approach by the Warsaw Pact countries to the Declaration of Principles in the Final Act remains unchanged from that described in the Committee's two previous reports (paragraphs 15 to 21 of C-M(75)72(Final); paragraphs 1 to 8 of Annex to C-M(76)26(Final)). The period marking the first anniversary of the signature of the Final Act of Helsinki witnessed a number of statements and articles elaborating and emphasizing this approach. The document coming out of the Conference of European Communist Parties (CECP) also contained relevant material.

2. The Declaration of Principles is still emphasised by Eastern Governments over other portions of the Final Act. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Final Act, an editorial in Pravda concentrated solely on the Principles and Soviet adherence to them, and while referring quickly to other parts of the Final Act, made no mention whatsoever of Basket III. This imbalance runs counter to Eastern protests that Western emphasis on Basket III implementation is inconsistent with the "unity" of the Final Act, and that one part of the Final Act should not be stressed over another. One Soviet official has recently tried to explain that the USSR accepts the equality of the different parts of the Final Act, but nonetheless sees the principles as the "decisive" element.

3. The Warsaw Pact countries have also continued to stress the importance of certain principles, especially "inviolability of frontiers" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", and to claim that they are decisive factors for further progress in détente and co-operation (Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy, Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). Meanwhile other principles, such as "the respect of human rights", are downplayed.

4. Certain parts of the Declaration of Principles

have recently been subjected to attempts at re-interpretation. Although the document of the CEEC contended that its participating Parties would work to implement all the Final Act, its human rights section makes reference only to the ^(which contain "escape clauses") Covenants on Human Rights/ and ^{Universal} not to the/Declaration of Human Rights which is given prior mention in the Basket I principle.

Furthermore, an article in Pravda on 13th July, while giving rare attention to the possibility of peaceful changes in frontiers, nonetheless wrongly contended that this CSCE language was not linked to the principle on the inviolability of frontiers, and that it applied only to minor adjustments and rectifications and not to the major post-World War Two borders of Europe.

5. Eastern criticism of the West for alleged failure to implement the Declaration of Principles has continued. Their basic supposition is simple: any act which meets their approval and is in accordance with their foreign policy objectives is seen as consistent with the principles; any act which they do not approve is not.

6. The principle which the West is most constantly accused of violating remains that of ^{"non-}intervention in internal affairs" of states. This criticism has increased of late and includes the charge that Western states have interfered in the internal affairs of each other, as well as of the states of Eastern Europe. Western attempts to secure Eastern implementation of the Final Act's provisions, particularly those in Basket III, continue to be challenged by the East as being inconsistent with this principle, and to a lesser extent, the principle of sovereign equality. This theme was taken up in Eastern articles and statements on the occasion of the first anniversary of Helsinki. The USSR has objected to the United

States' CSCE Commission, established by Congress, on the grounds that undue emphasis is being placed on Basket III to the point of "interfering" in Soviet affairs. At the Conference of European Communist Parties, Mr. Brezhnev specifically attacked the West for "interfering" in internal Eastern affairs through the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

7. At the same time, the Basket I principles ~~apparently~~ do not restrain the East in its own conduct of the ideological struggle on non-Communist soil.

8. In the past few months there has been some development in the earlier implication that the Declaration of Principles does not apply to relations between the states of Eastern Europe. Contending that the Soviet Union still sees the Declaration of Principles primarily in the context of "peaceful co-existence" between states of different social systems, one Soviet official has elaborated that there were cases when certain specific principles would apply to relations between states with the same social system. Another Soviet official has said that since relations between the states of Eastern Europe are more profound than those existing elsewhere, the Declaration of Principles could not be the sole guideline to their relations. Nonetheless, in practice , Western countries have

seen some evidence of improved manoeuvrability on the part of some Warsaw Pact members in their dealings with the West since the signature of the Final Act.

9. As noted in previous reports, Romania does not agree with all the interpretations placed on the Declaration of Principles by other Eastern countries. In the past months a Romanian official

has confirmed that Romania continues to give all principles equal weight. The same official also said the principles applied to relationships between all CSCE states irrespective of their social systems, and strongly implied ^{that} / the GDR/USSR Treaty of Friendship, of October, 1975, was incompatible with the Final Act. While the period since the last report has witnessed some rapprochement between Moscow and Bucharest, there is no indication that Romania's special view in these respects has changed.

10. Western countries for their part have maintained their own interpretation of the Declaration of Principles and tried to counter Eastern misinterpretations where possible. In particular, they have stressed both that all parts of the Final Act are of equal status, and that within the Declaration all principles are of equal importance. They have also emphasised that the Declaration of Principles applies to relations between all participating states.

Human Rights

11. Eastern countries, continue to claim that the Final Act does not give Western countries a "droit de regard" ^{over general} / the/question of human rights in their countries. This ignores ^{the principle on human rights in the Declaration as well as preambular} of Principles, / ^{language in Basket III.} The East has, nonetheless, tacitly recognized their vulnerability on this matter by making further attempts to confuse the exact meaning of the language on human rights in the Final Act. The example of ^{the} final document of the Conference of European Communist Parties has been noted above (paragraph). Another example is the proposed UNESCO symposium on "The Effects of the Coming into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights, in Light of ^{in which Western countries have declined to participate.} the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference" / Emphasis in both these instances was placed on the ^(with their escape clauses) Covenants /in an attempt to

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lessen the significance in the CSCE context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Eastern commentators have also stressed economic rights, and laid less emphasis on political and legal rights of individuals.

12. There is no indication that the Soviet Union has changed its repressive approach to human rights since the signing of the Final Act. A number of dissidents have cited the provisions of the Final Act in appealing to the Soviet authorities but to no avail. Marking the first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, a new "Helsinki" group of Soviet dissidents contended that there had been no improvement/^{so far,} and that the USSR did not intend to honour its human rights commitments under the Final Act. Nonetheless, the group believed that the CSCE document was still a valuable tool in pushing authorities towards a better performance in the human rights field. Other dissidents have concluded that respect for human rights in the USSR has deteriorated since Helsinki.

occupation with Citing pre-
/in the United States / the recent Presidential elections/ as a possible factor,
the
"Helsinki" group of dissidents has recently reported a new
campaign of repression in the Soviet Union: 80% of the known arrests
of dissidents since Helsinki/^{are said to} have occurred since the start of July.
There has been no improvement in the situations in other/^{Eastern} countries,
although conditions vary. In Romania there were press reports in
June of increased repression of minority and dissident groups.

BASKET I - CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

13. It has been constant Allied policy to interpret liberally the CBMs provisions of the Final Act and to encourage a satisfactory implementation by the Warsaw Pact. Since 1st August 1975, Allied countries have notified a total of 13 national and multinational military manoeuvres, involving a number of personnel well below the minimum required in the provisions. Notification to other CSCE participants were made within the prescribed time-frame and the notification texts contained an adequate amount of information. On several occasions Allied countries have also invited observers from some or all CSCE countries to attend the manoeuvres, granting those observers the necessary facilities to assist them in carrying out their task. They endeavoured to give CSCE observers a worthwhile insight into the manoeuvres.

14. As for the Warsaw Pact countries, in general their practice - both with regard to notification and invitation to observers - has been restrictive and selective in character, though they have responded to the strict minimum required in the Final Act provisions. Since 1st August, 1975 the Warsaw Pact countries have given notification of and invited observers to only three military manoeuvres, namely, two Soviet national exercises each of about 25,000 men held in the Soviet Union and one multinational Warsaw Pact manoeuvre of about 37,000 men conducted in Poland. The Soviet Union invited observers only from immediately bordering countries and the Poles extended invitations also to neighbouring countries. In each case, the observers were not given the possibility of adequately performing their basic task. In addition, on two occasions, in April and October 1976, the Hungarians informed resident foreign military attachés of two small scale manoeuvres of 10,000 and 15,000 men respectively. However these notifications cannot be said to

constitute meaningful implementation of the Final Act in view of the paucity of information and shortness of notice.

15. There is evidence that the situation in the CBMs field has slightly improved during the course of the last twelve months. The Warsaw Pact countries have behaved in a manner which enables them to avoid being accused of circumventing the Final Act provisions. They have also been somewhat less critical about Allied manoeuvres.

BASKET II - CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, ETC.

[To be discussed by Economic Committee.]

BASKET III - CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER AREAS

16. The implementation of the provisions of Basket III on co-operation in humanitarian and other fields is of major importance to Western countries and to Western public opinion. Since the main burden of implementation lies with the East, Western governments have continued since May 1976 to encourage full Eastern implementation of these provisions.

17. Western countries have also continued to bear in mind their own responsibilities for implementation. For instance, the United States has opened up additional areas to travel by Soviet diplomats, and has signed an accord with Czechoslovakia ending restrictions on ports of entry for Czech diplomats. Some Western countries have agreed to Soviet proposals to make visas of each others' resident diplomats valid for full tours rather than specified renewable periods. Other Western governments have made this a practice for some time. The United States has proposed a reduction in visa fees to several Warsaw Pact countries. The United States has also inaugurated a plan to promote tourism in the USSR and proposed to the USSR consultations on journalists' working conditions in each country. A number of Western states continue to "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" through radio broadcasts to Eastern states, despite a campaign from the East against them. Many Western countries are pursuing consular, cultural and educational agreements with Eastern countries, promoting the full use of existing agreements and encouraging the private sector to seek co-operation with opposite numbers in the East in a variety of fields.

18. As for Eastern countries, their general approach to Basket III

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provisions remains largely as described in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the last report (C-M(76)26(Final)). They recognise Western interests in Basket III implementation and continue to be sensitive to Western pressure. At the same time they have continued to adopt an

_____ assertive and self-confident stance. This approach is likely to persist up to and during Belgrade; it contains a number of elements.

19. To begin with, Eastern ^{countries} /claim that ^{they are} /fully implementing all provisions of Basket III. They stress the already compliant nature of socialist laws and society with these provisions (see Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy writing in Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). They have taken a number of limited steps which give them the least difficulty in areas of importance to the West and have sought to achieve maximum propaganda value from them. (These measures are described in previous reports and, for the period since May 1976, below).

20. The Eastern countries have also attempted to exaggerate the significance of

minor examples of implementation (e.g. cultural agreements) and to claim as implementation activity only marginally related to Basket III (e.g. the implementation of the Brezhnev proposals would also be in accord with Basket III provisions on human contacts and information, Pravda, 7th May, 1976).

In
21. /addition, the Eastern countries are attacking the West for alleged non-implementation of certain Basket III provisions. They point to refusals by certain Western countries to admit Eastern "labour representatives" and others. They have criticised the West over the length of visa-processing times, and the USSR and others have made proposals to some Western countries to reduce processing times or eliminate visa requirements altogether -

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proposals which they know at least in some respects will give the West difficulties because of Western security procedures and requirements. There has been criticism of the limited teaching of Eastern languages in Western countries.

22. One aspect of Eastern criticisms has been their attempts to resurrect the principle of ^{statistical} reciprocity as a factor in implementation, asserting for example that the West is obliged to match for its part the high Eastern figures on imports of Western books and films. This is totally inconsistent with the concept embodied in the Final Act of a "freer and wider dissemination of information", which implies the ^{criterion} of public demand unfettered by artificial barriers. This "revisionist" tendency is especially evident in Eastern attacks on Western broadcasts to Eastern countries, which, they contend, are contrary to the Final Act in spite of its call for "freer and wider dissemination" and its expression of hope for a continued expansion of radio broadcasts. Moreover, the final declaration of the Conference of European Communist Parties in July, distorted the approach of the Final Act by calling for the mass media generally to be placed "in the service of mutual acquaintanceship, and the dissemination of ideas for better understanding and the strengthening of an atmosphere of trust and co-operation among peoples". In UNESCO, the Soviet Union has been attempting to

wider
gain/international support and
acceptance of this position.

23. Finally, the Eastern countries continue to maintain, as they have from August 1975, that the implementation of Basket III provisions is limited by certain so-called legitimate considerations.

In accordance with their claim that the Declaration of Principles has a predominant position in the Final Act, they insist that Basket III provisions can only be implemented in a manner subordinate to the Declaration, particularly with regard to the principle of "non-intervention", often loosely interpreted by the East to mean "non-interference in internal affairs". Furthermore, the East has regularly resurrected its Helsinki/Geneva argument that progress in Basket III depends on improvements in the political atmosphere (Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy writing in Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). Implementation of Basket III must proceed bit by bit without departing from the "spirit of realism" in a manner "fully compatible with the actual state of détente", and even on the condition that there be "universal guarantees against eventual inimical acts in the political and ideological domains" (Tass, 13th May, 1976). The need for implementation on the basis of bilateral agreements rather than by unilateral action, as implied by the Final Act, has also been reiterated.

24. At the 99th Session of the UNESCO Executive Board the German Democratic Republic, with the backing of other Eastern members, unsuccessfully attempted to broaden UNESCO's multilateral rôle in CSCE implementation to include human contacts and information aspects of the Final Act.

(a) Human contacts

25. The position as regards human contacts is mixed and less easy to interpret than in the case of the second Report. Trends, even within individual countries, are contradictory, and the linkage with the Final Act is sometimes uncertain. The evidence does suggest

a conscious attempt by every Warsaw Pact country (except Romania) to go some way towards meeting Western pressure and to establish an implementation record in all sections of the Final Act. However, the results are patchy and often lacking in real effect. There are also some instances in which practices have become more, rather than less, restrictive. In general, the overall situation is one of some very limited real improvement. Only the situation in Romania continues to be worse than before Helsinki, with no sign of improvement.

26. In the Soviet Union most Allies have experienced very little change in the Soviet performance. There have been no additional improvements in exit procedures to those noted in the last report (list attached to Annex of C-M(87)26(Final)); in fact, effective 15th June, 1976, a new regulation increases the duties from 100% to 600% on gifts from abroad and limits the number of articles per package, which will make existence more difficult for the many aspiring emigrants who lose their means of livelihood. In addition there is no indication that the previous small improvements are having a general ameliorating effect across the board in increasing the numbers of departures from the USSR for family meetings, reunification, emigration and travel. There has been no change in the Soviet Union's "reluctantly tolerant" attitude towards bi-national marriages. All the Allies have continued to have great difficulty with unresolved personal cases. For example, over the past six months the United Kingdom has obtained satisfaction with respect to only six out of 50 such cases. The United States has solved the cases of about one third of 109 families between August 1975 and August 1976, just less than for the previous period.

27. Nonetheless, while most Western countries have experienced little if any improvement in Soviet performance, the Federal Republic of Germany has reported a large increase in the number of Soviet Germans emigrating to the Federal Republic of Germany (364 in August, 1975; 1,129 in August, 1976) which the German Authorities believe to be largely attributable to the Final Act, if that document is seen as part of the whole détente process. They also have noted a slight improvement in travel for family meetings.

28. The United States reports similar positive developments in some areas, though they are less clearly attributable to Helsinki. Soviet emigration to the United States is over twice 1975 levels (1162 in 1975 : 1303 in first half of 1976), but the increase is largely comprised of Armenians prevented from emigrating to their preferred destination of the Lebanon. Visas for travel to the United States (including family meetings) are up 40% over 1975 / (about 1,000) but this is consistent with a trend established over a number of years, not just since Helsinki.

29.. The Netherlands has also seen a considerable increase in visas for family meetings.

30 . Some Western countries have noticed a general rise in the number of tourist groups from the Soviet Union. For its part, the USSR claims to have made travel to the Soviet Union easier through relaxed foreign currency controls and to have extended technical co-operation with the West (N.S. Nitkin, "International tourism in the post-Helsinki period", date unknown).

31. In Bulgaria the situation remains basically unchanged, although one Allied country has observed that humanitarian cases

generally receive "a certain amount of understanding". The United States reports some improvement since late 1975 in the number of Bulgarians permitted to visit relatives in the United States who are not recognized by Bulgaria as "legal" emigrants. The United States has also had its first successful reunification case of the same order, although American Authorities are inclined to think that both these developments are related more to bilateral factors than to the CSCE. On the negative side, Canadian Authorities have experienced an apparent hardening of Bulgarian procedures in family reunification cases. The Embassy's access to prospective emigrants for interviews is more difficult, and Bulgaria is now asking for a Canadian Government "guarantee" of the authenticity of invitations from Canadian relatives. It has also been reported that, as of 1st January, 1976, Bulgaria dropped the visa waiver for non-Warsaw Pact tourists.

There are a number of assessments that the attitude of Czechoslovakia since Helsinki seems to have improved slightly with respect to family visits, including visits to "illegal" emigrants, and in travel abroad generally. This is partly balanced by little evidence of improvement in its tough position on family reunification. Canada was recently told that in "overall implementation" of the Final Act, and to remove a negative element in bilateral relations, Czech Authorities were prepared to resolve several outstanding reunification cases involving children; there was no reference to other outstanding cases however. Only the Federal Republic of Germany has experienced a significant rising trend in family reunification. One country has seen a mild improvement since 1975 in the speed with which Czechoslovakia has handled its bi-national marriage cases. The foreign currency

allotment for travellers abroad was increased in 1976 from \$180 to \$220. The Czech Authorities have claimed to have opened two new frontier posts with Austria and to be considering further such moves.

33. In the case of the German Democratic Republic, there have been significant improvements in human contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany, but these are mainly the result of bilateral agreements and contacts. The Federal Republic of Germany has experienced a marked increase in family visits and travel to the GDR, but only a slight increase in family visits to the FRG. There has also been a significant rise in family reunification, and procedures for processing such cases have somewhat improved; but, nevertheless, great difficulty is still experienced and there are large numbers of unresolved applications. A new development has been the recent large increase in the numbers of East Germans applying to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany.

34. Other Allies have found the GDR much less co-operative, though the picture is mixed. The Netherlands has reported an increase in the number of visas issued, but otherwise little or no improvement is evident in family visits or travel. The GDR attitude towards bi-national marriages remains very restrictive. Austria and the Netherlands have had considerable success in solving outstanding personal cases since Helsinki, but others have noticed no improvement. A small positive step has been the reduction in March of the cost of an exit visa from Mark 16.50 to Mark 15.-

35. While Hungary continues to be the least restrictive of Eastern countries in its approach to human contacts, most assessments are that Helsinki has so far brought no significant improvement other

than a slight increase in the numbers of visas to the United States. Figures for family visits, emigration and travel remain at earlier levels, and Canada has reported a number of cases of Hungarians who returned home after earlier emigration to Canada and who now find they are having difficulty in re-emigrating.


36. One country has concluded, however, that there is a slow trend to more liberal behaviour, and cites as evidence the reduced cost of an emigrant passport (\$72 to \$48) and the increased allotment of foreign currency now given to travellers (\$173 from £156).

37. In Poland too, there have been no significant changes since Helsinki, though once again, it has proved to be among the least restrictive of Warsaw Pact countries. Family visits continue to be relatively easy to make, although the United States noted a less flexible approach in late 1975 and early 1976 both to family visits and family reunifications, with a subsequent upturn later in 1976.

Canada has continued to have problems with the re-unification of families of "illegal" emigrants in Canada. On the positive side, the Federal Republic has been able to report large increases in emigration of German Poles to the Federal Republic of Germany, but this is the result of the bilateral agreement worked out between the Federal Republic and Poland at the Helsinki Summit. There has been no change in the number of Poles travelling abroad.

38. The situation in Romania has not improved since Helsinki, and except for the special experience of the United States, is worse in a number of respects. Several countries have reported a decline in family visits although one has noted a pick-up in 1976. The same has been reported with respect to family re-unification. A patriotic propaganda campaign has been continued along with tighter controls and social pressures to discourage emigration. President Ceausescu speaking to the Party Congress in June decried emigration as inhuman and an act of "family disintegration". Only the United States has seen an increase in the numbers of family visits and family reunifications; but, particularly for reunifications, this seems a result of the conditions imposed by the U.S. Congress on the Most Favored Nation treatment given to Romania. All countries

have experienced a marked decline in the number of bi-national marriages and large numbers of cases are at present outstanding. Ceausescu has explained that Romania will not approve marriages with foreigners without taking into account the wishes of relatives and without appropriate guarantees from the other country involved that persons leaving Romania will enjoy adequate living and working



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conditions. Some countries have seen a decline in tourist travel from Romania, but one has noted a slight improvement in group travel as a result of bilateral efforts between tourist organizations.

39. While there has yet to be a significant ^{general improvement} / ^{in Eastern} practices on travel abroad by their nationals, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent Hungary and some other Eastern countries, have continued to press for improvements in Western visa procedures. (See paragraph 31 of C-M(76)26(Final)). In recent months the Soviet Union has made two separate proposals to a number of Allied and neutral countries, one calling for a series of set, short processing times for all kinds of visas, the other suggesting that visas for resident diplomats be made valid for the full length of tour rather than renewable at set periods. Hungary has included some visa proposals in its bilateral implementation "suggestion lists" to some Western countries. Both Bulgaria and Romania have shown interest in abolishing visa requirements.

40. This seems to be a co-ordinated effort among Eastern countries to build a record of compliance in Basket III in an area which is easy for them but difficult for the West because of the differences in security systems and procedures applying to foreign visitors. Nonetheless, Western Governments are examining the Eastern proposals to see if some might be acceptable. Some have already agreed to the Soviet proposal on the validity period of diplomatic visas. As for the first Soviet proposal, some Western countries have noted that their own visa procedures are in some respects at least as good if not better than those suggested by Moscow. Consideration is also being given to making counter proposals to the East, such as suggesting a reduction or elimination of visa fees. In fact, the United States has already made this proposal to some Warsaw Pact countries and has

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to date received refusals from the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, presumably because they need the foreign currency such fees bring in.

41. In other aspects of human contacts, one country has reported success in arranging reciprocal pre-Olympic team visits with the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR, Poland and Hungary permitted representatives from their countries to attend the international Eucharistic Conference in the United States in August. On the negative side, however, Eastern organizers of the "European Youth Security Conference" did not include representatives from the two main American youth groups in their preparatory work, and eventually invited them to the Conference only as observers even though the meeting was supposed to be inspired by the CSCE Final Act.

(b) Information

42. Over the past few months there has been little in the way of meaningful implementation on the part of Eastern countries in the information field. Small steps have been taken here and there, principally/in the area of working conditions for journalists,

Combined with performances over the previous periods, the overall view is one of little or no meaningful implementation in the way of improving access to Western information by Eastern publics, but a slightly better performance in working conditions for journalists, which is less troublesome and gets more attention in the West. As before, Eastern efforts seem to be directed more to self-justification, promoting reinterpretations of the Final Act (see para. above) and attacks on Western performances and news media, than to implementation of the Final Act.

43. In the Soviet Union there appears to be no greater access by Soviet citizens to Western printed information, despite evidence

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that there has been a ^{small} increase, as promised, in the number of titles of foreign newspapers imported. Most of the new material remains confined to places frequented only by tourists and privileged Russians, and the possible admission of further news-institutions papers has been termed a "social" and foreign exchange problem. Subscriptions to Western publications are still confined to certain. The Federal Republic continues with negotiations now nine years old to gain approval from Soviet authorities to publish an embassy bulletin.

44. Elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact, although conditions vary from country to country, there has been no discernable improvement either since May 1976 or since Helsinki. Bulgaria remains particularly isolated to outside printed information, as does Czechoslovakia where it has been reported that resident foreign businessmen were no longer able to receive subscriptions to "bourgeois" newspapers after Helsinki. / GDR authorities have excluded the idea of an increase in the importation of printed information. Hungary has not increased its dissemination of Western information, but the United States has had some long-standing restrictions lifted on its official information activities. While the situation in Poland is probably the best of all Warsaw Pact countries, there has been no improvement in Polish performance other than a small increase in the importation of ^{copies of the} Newsweek and Herald Tribune. As in the field of human contacts, Romania's performance is the most disappointing. Some countries have seen a worsening in the situation, including reductions in subscriptions even for "official" use, and legal action has been taken against persons selling Western newspapers, normally available only in tourist hotels, to Romanians. The only positive note, but of bilateral significance, has been the local publication of articles by members of the American Embassy on the occasion of the US bicentenary.

45. In the field of filmed and broadcast information there is even less of significance to report. Eastern countries continue to contend that they^{are} implementing the Final Act better than the West by importing more films from Western countries than vice-versa, and to demand reciprocity in numbers from the West. This not only ignores the unrepresentative nature of films imported by Eastern countries (usually those showing the West in a bad light) and the use of censorship, but also the principle, implicit in the Final Act, / ^{that public demand,} not reciprocity, should determine the flow of information between East and West. In fact, one country has found the Soviet Union to be more restrictive in the kinds of films imported. Generally, however, there has been no change in Eastern performance except in the GDR, where more American films critical of the West are being shown, and in Poland, which has shown some greater interest in USIA films.

46. The attitude of Eastern countries towards access by their citizens to the spoken word continues to be highly restrictive, although, as regards the use of their own broadcasting media, there have been a few successful "television exchange days" between certain Eastern and Western countries. Canada has noted a decided improvement in relations between its broadcasting authorities and their Soviet counterparts. The most notable event in the past months has been the open debate on CSCE and other East-West issues broadcast by Hungarian television in August and in which media representatives from both East and West participated.

47. With regard to the content of foreign broadcasts, Eastern attitudes are tough and uncompromising, and remain as described in paragraph 38 of the last report. Soviet attacks on broadcasts of Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL) and other Western radio stations have continued. Mr. Brezhnev even felt compelled to carry

these attacks to the floor of the Conference of Eastern Communist Parties. The Soviet Union still jams RFE and RL, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia jam RFE, and the GDR continues partially to jam Radio in the American Sector. The Eastern campaign is unremitting in its efforts to charge Western governments with the responsibility for the content of these broadcasts as well as the content of Western news media generally. The Eastern attempt to put news media "at the service of mutual acquaintanceship" has already been noted above (paragraph).

48. In spite of this campaign Western efforts have succeeded in regaining some ground lost earlier this year. The RFE and RL won the right to send their journalists to the Montreal Olympics after failure to get accreditation at Munich because of Eastern pressures. Western reaction to the expulsion of three FRG radio journalists to the Spring Leipzig Fair apparently prompted the GDR to approve accreditation for the same three journalists to the Fall Fair.

49. Since Helsinki, the Soviet Union has recognised the importance of improving to some extent working conditions for Western journalists. At the beginning of 1976 it took a number of steps in this direction (paragraph 34, C-M(76)26(Final)). These have now been followed by an additional procedural improvement in access to sources. Repealing a 1947 Law on contacts with foreigners, a decree of the Supreme Soviet, 29th June, 1976 permits government ministries and departments to have direct contact with foreign journalists without the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting as intermediary. The practical effects of this new decree are still uncertain, though at the present time it has brought no improvement and journalists themselves have expressed doubts whether it will improve access markedly. Apparently some ministries still

consult the MFA, and there is the danger that the MFA can frustrate access simply by telling journalists to find their own contacts within the huge government bureaucracy.

50. Apart from this development, the Soviet Union also has allowed FRG and US television teams to use their own cameramen. (This permission, however, has only been granted to Canada for one visit) In addition, permission from the MFA is no longer required to send out films and tapes. One country sees a more forthcoming attitude on visiting journalists' visas. On the other hand there has been a campaign during the past few months against three American journalists for having alleged links with the CIA. This aside, the overall situation in the Soviet Union for journalists has undoubtedly improved to some small degree since Helsinki, although it is still highly restrictive.

51. A similar approach from the other Eastern countries has been somewhat slower in coming, but recent assessments now point to some very limited steps in the direction of better working conditions, though access seems to be generally regarded as still far from satisfactory. Bulgaria's performance seems to have been rather good for a number of years. One country has noted some improvement in access, albeit on the rather limited experience of journalists attending the Bulgarian C.P. Congress. In Czechoslovakia some minor improvements seem to have taken place: a German correspondent now has his own camera team, a press centre was set up at the Czech C.P. Congress, government ministries have recently established press spokesmen, and the number of journalists' visas are up, including one to a previously expelled US journalist. On the negative side, Czechoslovakia remains the only Eastern country consistently to refuse entry to journalists for alleged "hostile reporting".

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52. The German Democratic Republic has been the most active Eastern country during the past few months in bringing some small improvements for journalists. These steps were taken after international criticism of the expulsion of a Western journalist from East Berlin and of the refusal of visas for several visiting journalists. Effective June 1, 1976, journalists, technical staff and dependents are able to travel to West Berlin and to the Federal Republic of Germany, press cards are issued to wives and children (over 18), customs facilities, especially for technical equipment, are easier, and there has been more rapid handling of journalistic projects. Along similar lines to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic has also made it possible, since July, for journalists to approach government ministries directly for information and interviews. In contrast, Hungary has not instituted any obvious improvements in its already liberal approach to journalists, although one country has discerned an improvement in "atmospherics" in that senior officials seem more available for interviews and are willing to discuss controversial subjects. Poland too has not brought any improvement to what many Western countries term a basically satisfactory situation. One country has noted that telex facilities were reduced during the food price crisis in late June. Romania has made some attempts at small improvements. Officials have told the Federal Republic of Germany that they are prepared to cross-accredit German journalists resident in Vienna and Belgrade. One country has reported less difficulty in the import of equipment, another in freedom of movement, and another in access to basic information. Despite the above improvements, one country reports Romania to be less helpful in facilitating contacts with persons other than those specifically named in requests. Access, in Romania as elsewhere in the East, is still the main problem area for journalists.

(c) Culture and education

53. The development of relations in the cultural and educational fields between countries of the East and West, and the rôle played by the CSCE Final Act, continue generally along the lines described in the last report (paragraphs 16-17 and paragraphs 39 to 44 of the Annex). In many cases, co-operation in these fields was well underway before Helsinki. The CSCE Final Act has not had a significant effect on a wide scale, although some countries believe it has been a positive influence in the pace and direction that cultural/educational arrangements have taken. Portugal's cultural relations with Eastern countries are the only ones to have improved considerably since Helsinki, but this is not CSCE-related.

54. Eastern countries plainly see the provisions on culture and education as areas where they can establish a good implementation record with a minimum of difficulty. They are especially keen to conclude cultural agreements in the context of the Final Act, and to work out additional exchange within existing agreements. They favour, however, confining these exchanges to such agreements; they prefer group activity and have been more resistant to the idea of individual contacts. They are also quick to use openings for dissemination of Eastern cultures in the West, while being restrictive to similar Western activities in their countries. The Soviet Union has also made it clear that unlimited exchanges are out of the question for the reason that Western mass culture is "spiritually bankrupt" (Pravda, May 15) and contaminating to Socialist society. The East must seek co-operation with the "democratic revolutionary" elements of Western culture. At the same time, Eastern countries place restrictions on contacts by non-conformist intellectuals with the West. The recent refusal of Czech authorities to permit the

dissident writer Kahout to visit the West, is an example of this.

55. Specific experience with Eastern countries over the past few months has reflected these general approaches. Canada's cultural agreement with the USSR continues to function properly, while other Eastern countries have suggested similar agreements. The Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement with Poland in June, 1976, and both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are presently working out agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The United States is also negotiating with Bulgaria. While the United States has seen some new developments with the East in the educational field particularly, they are on long established lines. Ideological differences, national interests and the availability of funds (for the West) continue to set limits on what might otherwise be possible. Treatment of activities connected with the US Bicentennial celebrations in the East was generally favourable.

56. The situation with respect to the USSR seems unchanged from that described in the last report. Among Eastern countries, Hungary and Poland remain the most liberal in the cultural field, though in neither have there been any striking improvements related to Helsinki. In fact, Hungarian officials have said they need consider no new steps since they have already been making a greater effort than the Western countries. Nonetheless, Hungary has placed some cultural proposals (in the translation and publication of books) in its bilateral implementation on "suggestion lists" given recently to a number of Western governments. In Poland there has been a more liberal approach to cultural exchanges, dissemination and visits with the Federal Republic, but German authorities see it more an indirect outcome of the Polish-German agreement on the emigration of

German Poles. In Romania, the situation seems a bit better than was noted previously. One country has experienced some positive developments. A Romanian official has claimed that the distribution of Western films, books and periodicals has been improved.

57. An important part of the Eastern approach to the cultural/educational provisions of Basket III continues to be their use of statistics to criticize the West for not importing Eastern films, books and periodicals, for not translating and publishing Eastern books and for not teaching Eastern languages, on the same scale as the East vis-à-vis the West. The virtual demand for reciprocity ignores the rôle played by free choice in the flow of cultural and other information. This and related efforts on the part of the East to put the West in a defensive position, along with certain Western activities in response, were noted in the previous report (paragraphs 42, 43 and 44 of the Annex).

58. In the multilateral field, UNESCO remains active in furthering cultural/educational co-operation in the context of the CSCE. Some vigilance has been necessary, however, in blocking Eastern attempts to expand UNESCO activity beyond these fields (see paragraph above).

NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED

59. Neutral and Non-Aligned countries generally share a similar position to the Allied countries in their interpretations of the Final Act and their views on how it should be implemented. Yugoslavia has expressed some concern, however, about the apparent decline in overall implementation in mid-1976, which it has blamed on the alleged "bloc to bloc" approach being taken by some countries.

60. The Declaration of Principles as a whole is seen as strengthening their security and independence. Yugoslavia has been especially careful to stress all the principles and not to neglect those on "sovereign equality" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", though it has also been less than consistent in its approach to human rights, supporting an Eastern approach attractive to many of the Third World. The Trieste Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia is viewed as an important example of implementation of the Declaration of Principles.

61. All members of the Non-Aligned and Neutral groups attach importance to the CBMs provisions, and have been conscientious in their application. During the period since the last report Switzerland and Sweden have each notified one manoeuvre and Yugoslavia notified two. The Swiss also invited observers to attend its manoeuvre, and the Yugoslavs invited observers to one of theirs.

62. The approaches of the Neutral countries to Basket III implementation closely resemble those of Allied states. They have enjoyed some limited success in realizing progress vis-à-vis Eastern states. At a meeting in Helsinki in April, they collectively concluded that, after an uncertain start in late 1975, Warsaw Pact countries have become somewhat more flexible, though differing in specific approaches from country to country. Yugoslavia's assessment of Eastern implementation is not known, but its own performance is considerably better, especially on human contacts and culture.

63. Western countries have no special problems with Yugoslavia, but citing the Final Act, Yugoslavia has begun seriously questioning the Austrian policy towards the Slovene minority in Austria.

(In a lower key it has also referred to the relevance of the Final Act to its minority problem with Bulgaria.) This development between Yugoslavia and Austria could have a bearing on the possibility of co-operation between Neutral and Non-Aligned groups in the lead-up to Belgrade.