

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

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To: Members of the Political Committee

From: Acting Chairman

Subject: Implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE  
Seventh Report by the Political Committee  
Review of Implementation

I attach a draft report of the Political Committee reviewing implementation of the Final Act by Eastern countries covering the period 1st May-1st November, 1978.

This is the seventh of a series of documents reviewing implementation since Helsinki and follows directly on C-M(78)42 of 18th May, 1978.

I propose that we give first consideration to this draft at our regular meeting on Tuesday, 21st November with a view to submitting a completed report to the Permanent Council the following week.

(Signed) L. HEICHLER

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT CSCE

Seventh Report by the Political Committee  
(1st May-1st November, 1978)

Review of implementation by the East European states

I. Introduction

1. At its meeting on 1st October, 1975 the Council agreed that a report on those aspects of the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE which have a particular importance for members of the Alliance could be prepared by the Political Committee. This should be done in collaboration with other relevant committees for the Council on the eve of each Ministerial Meeting within the larger examination of East-West relations and the general problem of détente. This is the seventh such report and it covers the period from 1st May until 1st November, 1978.

2. It is recommended that the Council take note of this report.

II. General analysis

A. Multilateral CSCE process

3. During the period under review the first of the series of experts meetings decided upon at the Belgrade Meeting, the preparatory meeting for the Scientific Forum, took place in Bonn from 20th June till 28th July. This experts meeting, which was attended by about 150 diplomats and scientists from all CSCE states, adopted a concluding report which provides for a two-week Scientific Forum to open at Hamburg on 18th February, 1980. Both Eastern and Western participants were well aware of the wider political importance of the meeting. After the limited results in Belgrade a failure in Bonn would have endangered the CSCE process considerably. The approach of the East European

countries was quite different from the Western objectives. Most East European countries saw the Scientific Forum as a meeting of government experts and the Soviet Union tried in vain to obtain a guarantee that no human rights issues would be mentioned at the Scientific Forum. Nevertheless, a major breakthrough came after a month through solution of the question of the subject. After that there was growing Eastern willingness to compromise so that a positive result was reached. It can be noted that this experts meeting represents a positive element in the continuation of the CSCE process. It has paved the way to the Scientific Forum in such a way that there is hope that the Forum will be useful to scientists and promote the CSCE process.

B. Implementation by the East European countries:  
general trends

4. The general picture of the implementation of the principles and provisions of the Final Act by the East European countries shows no real change since the last report. Implementation is still mostly based upon an ad hoc approach and not on changed rules. The level of implementation varies greatly. Hungary shows the most positive development, although it has to take care now not to get too far out ahead of other East European countries. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are lagging behind. Also the performance of Romania is still very low despite the importance which this country attaches to the CSCE process.

5. However, with this restriction in mind, it is possible on closer examination to detect some nuances. As the prospect of the Belgrade Meeting in 1977 had the effect on the East European countries of trying to look good, notably in the field of human contacts, it could be expected that especially in this field implementation would slow down after Belgrade. Generally speaking this appears not to have been

the case. Only in Bulgaria there has been a slow-down in the solution of family cases, compared to obvious acceleration before the Belgrade Meeting.

6. There has been practically no regression in the field of human contacts after Belgrade (even though there has been no progress, either) now that the pressure of the Belgrade Meeting is no longer a factor. However, the prospect of high-level visits (for example, the visits of President Ceausescu to the United Kingdom and the United States) has the effect of producing similar pressure and such visits often lead to the solution of family reunification cases, binational marriages, etc., but of course only on a bilateral basis.

7. A negative post-Belgrade development has been what could be defined as a tightening of ideological discipline with effects on the implementation of the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) and of the provisions on information.

8. As regards the VIIth Principle, during the period under review Soviet Union held trials of Ginsburg and Viktor Pyatkus, two leaders of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups, and of Anatoli Shcharansky, a leader of the Jewish emigration movement. The trials provoked heavy protests in Western countries. In Czechoslovakia no major trials took place after Belgrade. The Charter 77 Movement kept a rather low profile, and the government took no special measures, except for the detention of a number of Charter 77 supporters as a precautionary measure during the visit of President Brezhnev. However, a new development occurred when the dissident movement got an international aspect: during August and September Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents met each other at the border three times. The third meeting was disrupted by the police. As a consequence the suppression of dissidents in Czechoslovakia increased again.

9. That part of the Chapter on co-operation in humanitarian and other fields, in which implementation has hardly started is information. This situation has even deteriorated since the Belgrade Meeting. Especially the availability of and access to Western news have become more restricted. In a number of countries control of foreign journalists has been tightened (e.g. GDR and Czechoslovakia). Harassment increased. An exception is Romania as far as working conditions of journalists are concerned. Here a positive development took place as this country became aware of the negative influence of strict control and difficult working conditions on reporting. Romania being very anxious for a positive image in the Western world, it allowed Western journalists relative freedom and gave better assistance, for example during the visit of Chairman Hua of the PRC.

10. The tightening of ideological control also affects co-operation in the field of culture and education. The ideological aspect has received greater emphasis in cultural and scientific exchanges, importation (and censorship) of books etc.

11. During the period under review the active implementation of the provisions on confidence-building measures was once more limited to the Soviet Union. For the first time a Soviet major military manoeuvre outside Soviet territory was notified, the manoeuvre Tarcza, which took place in the GDR (this manoeuvre was also notified by the GDR). The second Soviet major manoeuvre announced was held in the Caucasus, actually in a region outside the CBM area. To neither of the manoeuvres were observers invited. There were no indications that other major military manoeuvres were held in Eastern Europe. Although all East European countries were invited to send observers to three Allied manoeuvres, only the Soviet Union accepted the invitation in

one case, namely for the German manoeuvre Blaue Donau which took place in Germany itself. The reasons given by other East European countries for not accepting (if they replied at all) were still the same as before: that they had no accredited military attaché in Bonn and saw no point in sending other than military observers.

12. Soviet and East European performance in the Basket II (economic/commercial) area has also undergone little change since the conclusion of the Belgrade Meeting. Among positive developments is continued modest progress in certain countries in providing accreditation, business offices, and facilities to firms desiring commercial representation. In addition, the USSR and some other countries have allowed slightly improved access to end-users in certain cases. One other positive feature in most of the countries is the increasing encouragement being given to joint ventures or compensation arrangements, in order to help offset external convertible currency trade imbalances. On the other hand, the most glaring shortcoming during the review period has been in reduced provision of economic and commercial information, particularly in the USSR. The USSR in May also published a decree on proposed tax legislation, which could have a restrictive effect on foreign commerce.

13. Another post-Belgrade trend is a more aggressively defensive attitude on the part of the East European countries. This manifests itself in various forms. Of course the well-known appeal to non-interference in internal affairs, based on abuse of the VIth Principle (non-intervention) continued. However, despite this position the Eastern countries increased their attacks on the human rights situation in Western countries, denouncing "violations" of social and economic rights.

14. A new phenomenon of active defence was noted in Romania and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia. In those countries emigration visas are issued with the name of the new country of domicile filled in, without the country mentioned having been contacted before by either the applicant or the authorities. In many cases the applicants do not fulfil the requirements of the immigration law of the involved Western country and as a consequence the immigration visa is refused. Given the fact that the applicants have to sever all ties before they can get an emigration visa, this creates very difficult situations. The authorities blame the Western countries involved and reproach their "non-compliance" with the Final Act. There are strong indications that the Romanians have frequently granted passports to those who have no hope of qualifying under United States immigration regulations and have withheld passports from those who would qualify. The impression exists that this practice may be part of Romania's preparations for Madrid 1980, as this policy would allow that country to claim an inflated number of passports issued for emigration to the West, even though the bearers were not eligible for entry to the intended country of domicile. It should be noted, however, that emigration as such is not mentioned in the Final Act, although it can be related to the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).

15. In Poland a variance of this practice is noted by the US. There appears to be a trend to issue, under the cover of family meetings, passports to applicants who, although they may be visiting relatives in the United States, have as a principal purpose of their visits to work for a period of one to two years in order to earn hard currency. The Polish authorities comply with this practice because of the benefit of hard currency input. However, US laws do not allow the issue of non-immigrant visas to such applicants and thus entry visas are refused. The Polish authorities reproach the US for "non-compliance" with the Final Act in those cases.

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16. An interesting new element has been introduced by the election of Archbishop Wojtyla of Cracow as Pope John Paul II. However, it is still too early to draw any conclusions about the influence which the new Pope may have on the implementation of the Final Act in Eastern Europe.

III. Country implementation

17. Bulgaria

- (a) The general assessment is that there has been no significant change in implementation during the period under review. Overall Bulgarian implementation remains minimal. The impression exists that after the Belgrade Meeting the general climate of CSCE implementation cooled down a little, although this cannot be proved in concrete terms by a number of representative examples.
- (b) With regard to the Declaration of Principles there was no change in the Bulgarian attitude. Bulgaria did not actively participate in the implementation of the provisions on confidence-building measures.
- (c) Bulgaria remains the most deficient of all the East European countries in implementation of CSCE provisions in the economic/commercial area. The contacts it allows with end-users remain limited only to those with directly "business-related" purposes, and the amount of economic and commercial information it publishes is still extremely limited in scope and detail, although certain useful additions have been made to the statistical yearbook, starting in 1976. There is little prospect for change in the provision of information, however, because of the existence of a broad anti-espionage law which can be taken to apply to much of this data. To save and



earn convertible currency, Bulgaria does favour co-operative arrangements with Western firms; but it is unwilling to offer sufficient inducement in the form of quality and managerial controls in order to attract many foreign firms into such arrangements.

- (d) The Bulgarian performance in the field of human contacts appears to have deteriorated since the Belgrade Meeting in contrast to the obvious speeding up, for example, of the solution of cases of family reunification before Belgrade. There are strong indications that many Bulgarians are still prevented from applying for visas because the government refuses their passport applications. Old cases which have been pending for a long time are not being disposed of in spite of approaches at the highest level. The impression exists that after Belgrade the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declined compared with that of the Interior Ministry in this field. Since it may be assumed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is prepared to show a more compromising attitude because it has to take into account the climate of bilateral relations and the effects on the international prestige of the country, this may account for a certain hardening of the Bulgarian position. On the whole the number of visas applied for and issued is rather limited. The same applies to the flow of tourism and businessmen.
- (e) Information: the availability of Western newspapers and magazines is practically nil. Certainly the average Bulgarian has no access to them since there are no generally accessible selling points and because prices are prohibitively high. Even this limited availability was reduced after Belgrade but the

situation has improved slightly since July. A new obstacle has been put in the way of the distribution of printed material of any kind by embassies. At the beginning of 1978 all local embassies received a Note Verbale from the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to which all printed material which is to be distributed has first of all to be submitted to the Ministry for approval. In this note explicit reference was made to the CSCE Final Act. The working conditions of journalists have not really changed.

- (f) The exchanges in the field of cultural and educational co-operation remain limited.

18. Czechoslovakia

- (a) In general there has been no real change in the implementation of the Final Act by Czechoslovakia, although high-level visits from Western countries have had temporarily positive effects.

The impression exists that the CSSR government regards the state of the bilateral relations with a particular country as a basis for the application of the provisions of the Final Act in relation with that country.

Since Belgrade the CSSR is very cautious about references to the CSCE; the interest of the Czechoslovak mass media in CSCE and related subjects has noticeably declined. The connection between the Final Act and the Charter 77 movement is obvious, and the CSSR leadership would like to avoid any further encouragement of destabilizing effects through CSCE references.

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- (b) (i) Of the Declaration of Principles it is especially the VIth Principle (non-intervention), interpreted as non-interference, which plays an important part. The emphasis placed on this principle reflects the leadership's increasing alarm at the domestic political consequences of the CSCE process, which were not foreseen, and indicates that the leaders are making efforts to contain and eliminate this danger.

The situation with regard to the human rights and fundamental freedoms (VIIth Principle) has remained more or less unchanged. No major processes were held after Belgrade, although a number of members of the Charter 77 movement were put in jail.

The Charter 77 movement kept a rather low profile and the government took no special measures except for the detention of a number of Charter 77 prominents as a precautionary measure during the visit of President Brezhnev. However, in August and September a new development occurred: Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents met each other at the border three times. The third meeting was disrupted by the police and the Czech leader was put in prison. As a consequence the suppression of dissidents in Czechoslovakia increased again.

- (ii) Czechoslovakia did not actively participate in the implementation of the provisions on confidence-building measures.

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(c) Other than actively promoting co-operative arrangements with Western firms, Czechoslovakia has done little to improve its CSCE Basket II performance during the review period. Contact with end-users continues to be most easily effected at trade fairs; otherwise it must generally be arranged with a Foreign Trade Organization and, even then, has occasionally been denied. An American firm, for instance, was precluded from effectively bidding on a contract to modernize a plant, because it was refused permission to visit the installation. Hotel facilities are seriously inadequate, and office and residential space are in critically short supply; moreover, no immediate steps are being taken to improve the situation. Although general commercial information and economic statistics are readily available, tenders are not published and adequate information is not provided to arrive at meaningful market surveys.

(d) With regard to human contacts there appears to be an increase in the number of visas issued for family visits and family reunification. Nevertheless, the procedure remains very difficult. A new obstacle for family visits was introduced by the rule that persons who left the CSSR "illegally" are not to be visited. This measure coincides with pressure put on those "illegals" to opt for amnesty for those involved a very cumbersome and costly affair.

For family reunification one has to apply at least twice because normally the first time the application is refused automatically. In approximately 10% of cases the application has negatively affected the rights and obligations of the applicant or members of his family.

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The situation with regard to binational marriages has not changed. Waiting periods of six months for obtaining a visa are normal.

With regard to travel the unnecessarily complicated, detailed and time-consuming formalities have not changed. For a Czech it can be a matter of months. (Visas issued by FRG ±27,000, Benelux ±5,500, Canada ±1,750.) For Western visitors it is easier to obtain an entry visa, but the CSSR continues to refuse entry permits to members of specific professions such as members of the clergy, policemen and soldiers.

- (e) In the field of information the availability of Western newspapers continues to be strictly limited. Outside a few hotels there are practically no selling points. A subscription is possible only for foreigners, not for CSSR citizens.

The working conditions for journalists seem to be worsening. Although as a general tendency it became easier to obtain single purpose visas, it was impossible to obtain multiple entry visas. The harassment of journalists, even going as far as deportation, based on suspected contacts with dissidents, increased.

- (f) Cultural and educational co-operation is only encouraged by involving the Final Act in those cases where no destabilizing effects are to be expected and where it is possible to channel them through specific institutions. An expansion of exchanges is not apparent. The impression exists that the distribution of Western books is more restricted because the authorities are alert to consequences for the internal situation.

On the basis of the unpublished CSSR government decision No. 151/77, private journeys of Czechoslovak citizens "for occupational, training and studying purposes" are disapproved as a matter of principle.

19. The German Democratic Republic

- (a) The general picture of implementation of the Final Act indicates no change after Belgrade. From time to time high-level visits lead to a temporary improvement, especially in the field of human contacts.
- (b) (i) With regard to the Declaration of Principles the GDR follows the East European habit of using the VIth Principle (non-intervention), wrongly interpreted as non-interference, as its basic defence against criticism from the Western countries. The situation with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms (VIIth Principle) has deteriorated. Two dissidents, Rudolf Bahro and Niko Huebner got heavy sentences. A positive development, however, was noticed in the relations between State and Church, especially after a meeting between Party Secretary Honecker and Bishop Schön<sup>h</sup>herr of the Evangelical Church.
- (ii) The German Democratic Republic did not actively participate in implementing the provisions on CBMs, with the exception of the notification of the Soviet manoeuvre Tarcza, which took place on its territory.
- (c) CSCE compliance in the GDR remains pretty much status quo, although the business atmosphere appears to be favourable to the expansion of contacts with Western firms, especially those interested in

counter-trade and other co-operative arrangements. A large new Trade Centre capable of providing office space for many firms was opened in East Berlin in September 1978; hotel and living space is already adequate, and modern hotels are being constructed both in East Berlin and Leipzig, site of the country's principal trade fairs. On the other hand, the GDR has not provided a complete country breakdown of its exports and imports since 1974, and gives no detailed information on its national accounts; most of its economic statistics are highly aggregated and available only after a long interval.

- (d) In the field of human contacts the situation remains very difficult. There were indications that in many cases people who would have been eligible for an exit visa for family visit reasons (because they were retired, or their request was related to a special family event or serious illness) were put under pressure to abstain from asking for a visa. In cases where embassies had intervened the answer remained negative.

Similar indications prevailed as regards requests for family reunification.

The positive development in granting permission for binational marriages which set in before (and in the prospect of) Belgrade seems to continue.

The number of GDR businessmen visiting Western countries still increases. Touristic visits, however, are highly exceptional.

- (e) The availability of and access to information such as Western newspapers remains very low. In a number of cases permission for press distribution by embassies was refused by the Foreign Office (to which such requests have to be submitted 48 hours in advance). The working conditions of journalists deteriorated in various ways. Control has tightened, harassment has increased, and it has become more difficult to get a visa. During the review period the GDR refused transit visas for journalists five times.
- (f) Cultural and educational co-operation remained unchanged on a low level.

20. Hungary

- (a) The general picture is one of continuous, albeit slight, improvement of implementation of the Final Act. Hungary undoubtedly already has the highest level of implementation compared with other East European countries.

The impression exists that the Hungarian government welcomes the Final Act as providing a semi-judicial basis for doing what it wishes to do anyway, notably to liberalise gradually unspectacularly, without seriously offending the Soviet Union. However, it obviously has to avoid getting too far ahead and to be singled out too much for Western approval in a period in which relations between the super-powers have cooled down.

In view of this delicate situation in which Hungary found itself during the reviewing period the relatively few negative tendencies, alongside some positive improvements of substance, are on balance encouraging.



- (b) (i) With regard to the Declaration of Principles, Hungary falls in very vocally behind the Soviet line on "interference in internal affairs" and related matters of principle. Despite this insistence on non-interference there have been more numerous and aggressively critical attacks in the press against the West in general on topics such as terrorism, law and order and unemployment. As far as the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is concerned, there are still no organized dissident groups. The handling of dissidence problems is rather relaxed.

Relations between Church and State are improving steadily with government authorities giving acte de présence at various official Church celebrations.

- (ii) Hungary did not participate actively in the implementation of the provisions on confidence-building measures.
- (c) In economic and commercial matters, Hungary has shown continued efforts at increased compliance with CSCE provisions. Access to Hungarian officials and end-users shows signs of improvement, moreover, the principle of end-user contact has been embodied in a US-Hungarian Trade Agreement signed in December 1977. Possibilities for Western firms to establish offices in Hungary may have been improved as a result of the Trade Agreement which requires Hungary to give most-favoured nation treatment to office applications of US firms. Hungary is especially active in promoting co-operative commercial arrangements. It has over fifty such agreements in force with US firms alone,

including three active joint ventures, one on Hungarian soil. CSCE compliance is most lacking in the areas of adequate hotel accommodation and commercial and economic information. It is still relatively difficult to obtain detailed trade data as well as the names and addresses of certain officials and organizations.

- (d) In the field of human contacts there are relatively few obstacles. A recent law approved Western travel for Hungarian citizens who are related to political refugees, while previously applications for passports were normally refused. On the other hand, there are still cases in which an application for family reunification negatively affects the rights and obligation of the applicant or members of his family. The total number of entry and exit visas applied for and issued still increases and is relatively high.
- (e) In sharp contrast with the performance in the field of human contacts stands the situation in the field of information. The availability of Western newspapers is very limited. There are practically no selling points outside a few of the major hotels. However, it appears to be possible for Hungarians to subscribe to Western periodicals. Working conditions for journalists are relatively good.
- (f) Cultural and educational co-operation remained unchanged. The very difficult Hungarian language appears to be a serious obstacle for educational co-operation.

21. Poland

(a) The general picture of the implementation of the Final Act by Poland is one of mild improvement. This improvement concerns marginal aspects. The principal obstacles (censorship; the fact that the Polish citizen does not dispose of his own passport) remain unchanged.

(b) (i) With regard to the Declaration of Principles the Polish Government adheres to the East European broad interpretation of the non-intervention principle. On the other hand they reproach the Western countries on their stand on human rights which is denounced as hypocritical because of the "massive violation of human rights committed daily in the West". As far as the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is concerned, Poland tries to keep its relatively good record. Dissidents are intimidated, harassed and sometimes arrested for a short time but very seldom sentenced to a long term in jail. There is a certain level of tolerance.

Between State and Church there exists a special balanced relationship in Poland. The election of Archbishop Wojtyla of Cracow as Pope John Paul II was a great national event and for the first time a Church celebration was broadcast by television. Moreover, many Poles received permission to go to Rome in a remarkably short time. (The requests of three leaders of the Human Rights Campaign, however, were refused.)

It is still too early to draw any conclusions about the influence Pope John Paul II may have on the CSCE process in Poland and in Eastern Europe generally.

- (ii) Poland did not actively participate in the implementation of the provisions on Confidence-Building Measures.
- (c) As far as economic and commercial matters are concerned little change has occurred in working conditions for Western businessmen since the Belgrade Meeting. Poland maintains one of Eastern Europe's most open stances on doing business with the West. Contact with end-users remains relatively free, and new Western business offices continue to be accredited. Hotel accommodation is adequate, although expensive, and additional new hotels are under construction. Co-operative arrangements, including joint ventures, are encouraged, although insufficient financial inducement is given to attract large numbers of foreign businesses. Information is readily available on most commercial topics, although detailed economic statistics are lacking and data are generally unavailable on foreign debt, gold reserves, and other financial matters.
- (d) In the field of human contacts the Polish performance is relatively good. They strive for an abolishment of visa regulations. However the positive effect of this is marginal as long as a Polish citizen cannot dispose of his own passport. The number of visas (exit and entry) issued increases and is relatively high. (For Poles visa policy also under paragraph 15.)

- (e) The situation in the field of information has slightly deteriorated since the Belgrade Meeting, due to a tightening of the ideological discipline. The availability of Western newspapers and periodicals, already scarce, has decreased; the world news on radio and television is clearly censored and critical Western films are not shown anymore.

The working conditions for journalists have not changed.

- (f) The cultural and educational co-operation is increasingly put under the aegis of the ideological discipline.

22. Romania

- (a) Despite the prominent rôle Romania plays in the multilateral CSCE process and the great importance it attaches to the Final Act, its implementation of the provisions of the Final Act remains unchanged on a very low level. In the period under review there were no new departures in the overall policy and no relaxation in any sphere of activity. However, Romania proved very sensitive to the need for a good image during high-level visits. On those occasions implementation, especially in the field of human contacts, improved, albeit temporarily and on a bilateral basis.
- (b) (i) With regard to the Declaration of Principles there is no real change, although in the field of the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) there is a negative development because a new and potentially serious obstacle to normal contacts of Romanians

with diplomatic missions in Bucharest was raised. On 5th October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to all embassies requiring that all contacts with individuals be mediated through the protocol section of the Ministry. This new rule has yet to be tested in practice, but if it is conscientiously applied, it will constitute retrogression to one of the most characteristic limitations of earlier years imposed by the Communist régime in Romania.

There are no recognised dissident groups in Romania. Apart from ethnic and religious groups who wish to emigrate because of cultural and family ties outside Romania, dissidence is confined to individuals and small groups who are prepared to defy the authorities, usually in order to secure permission to leave the country.

During the Summer some Romanians have used the hunger strike as a tactic to win attention in their fight to leave the country. The impression exists that for the sake of avoiding publicity the Romanian authorities have issued passports to some of them. In general the police deal firmly with dissidents although there are no reports of systematic brutality. For the Romanian emigration visa policy see paragraph 14.

- (ii) Romania did not actively participate in the implementation of the provisions on Confidence-Building Measures.

- (c) As far as economic and commercial matters are concerned, some Western businessmen have experienced decreasing difficulty in establishing contact with Romanian Ministries, Foreign Trade Organizations, and end-users, especially when they have readily marketable products and some knowledge of the Romanian market. The climate for doing business and entering into co-operative arrangements with Western firms appears to be good, although neither the volume of trade nor number of co-operation agreements has significantly increased. On the other hand, lack of office space and living accommodation remains a problem, which no immediate steps are being taken to rectify. Decree 243 passed in 1977 continues to create difficulties for Western businesses concerning the hiring and employment of Romanian nationals in business offices in Romania. The amount and timeliness of economic and commercial information also leaves much to be desired, and statistical gaps appear to be increasing. In the spirit of complying with CSCE provisions, however, Romania did publish useful pamphlets on its Foreign Trade Organizations, industrial centres and research institutes and on other economic topics in 1978.
- (d) In the field of human contacts there is no improvement. Although the number of family visits increased substantially the total number remains limited and, for example, the FRG total is still below the number of family visits during 1973 and 1974 (before the signature of the Final Act!).

The procedure for Romanians to get an exit visa remains very cumbersome. Action on individual cases is wholly unpredictable and capricious. Thus travel abroad by Romanians remains highly restricted but during the reviewing period for the first time a few instances occurred where all members of a family have been allowed to travel together, something which before was always refused. Performance with regard to bilateral marriages has improved tremendously, although the approval rate remains erratic.

- (e) The Romanian government has not yet begun to implement the provisions on the exchange of information. No increase has been noted in the very limited and haphazard availability of Western newspapers. An improvement in the working conditions of journalists is reported as Romania became aware of the negative influence of strict control and difficult working conditions on the reporting. In order to improve its image Romania allowed Western journalists more freedom and gave better assistance, for example, during the visit of Chairman Hua of the PRC.
- (f) Cultural and educational co-operation is very restricted by the Romanian authorities. This appears to be the case in particular in relation with the FRG, where no language barrier exists for the many German-speaking Romanians.



23. USSR

(a) The general picture of Soviet implementation of the Final Act during the reviewing period is overshadowed by the trials of leading dissidents which took place after the Belgrade Meeting. The trials and heavy sentences provoked strong reactions from Western countries. Apart from increased suppression of dissidence, the assessment is one of stand-still.

(b) (i) Of the Declaration of Principles the VIIIth Principle non-intervention (wrongly interpreted as non-interference) in internal affairs remains the basic defence argument against Western criticism. On the other hand the Soviet Union now actively denounces human rights situations in the Western countries. A recent example was the television broadcast dealing with "violations of human rights" in the United States.

The Soviet attitude toward the VIIth Principle (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is characterised by the increased suppression of dissidence and the trials of those involved. The suppression of religion continues. It remains to be seen whether Pope John Paul II, who sent the churches in the Soviet Union a message in their own languages during his speech at his inauguration, will bring any change in this situation.

- (ii) As far as Confidence-Building Measures are concerned, for the first time a Soviet major military manoeuvre outside Soviet territory was notified, the manoeuvre Tarcza, which took place in the GDR. The second major military manoeuvre announced was held in the Caucasus, actually in a region outside the CBM area. To neither of the manoeuvres were observers invited.

Although the USSR was invited to send observers to three Allied manoeuvres it accepted only the invitation for the German manoeuvre Blaue Donau, which took place in Germany itself.

- (c) Soviet performance in the economic/commercial area shows both modest progress and a serious retrogression. Most notable has been certain progress in allowing access to end-users: under arrangements made with the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, visiting British businessmen are finding it somewhat easier to include at least one guided tour of a Soviet factory in their programmes. Although other contacts with end-users remain difficult, a further improvement may soon come about from a newly published decree reorganizing the Soviet Foreign Trade Corporations: under the terms of this decree, representatives from customer enterprises and Ministries may play a greater rôle in the negotiation of commercial contracts. There has also been some movement in the extension of accreditations, office space, and accommodations to Western businesses and

businessmen, despite preoccupation with preparations for the 1980 Olympics. Soviet authorities have regularised the temporary accreditations of two US firms and granted at least four new accreditations to US and British firms. In addition, they have made improved office space available to two US firms and provided living quarters for two other US firm representatives.

On the other hand, the USSR has also seriously fallen back during the review period from previous standards in its provision of economic and commercial information. The two main sources of statistical information of the Soviet economy, Naradnoye Khozyaizstvo and the Soviet Foreign Trade Handbook, in their 1977 editions both contained less information than previously, much of which is of vital interest (for example, data on the population, industry, and agriculture), and were published in smaller print runs than their 1976 editions (5,000 copies less of Naradnoye Khozyaizstvo and 300 copies less of the Foreign Trade Handbook). Particularly unsatisfactory is the Foreign Trade Yearbook's omission of total quantity statistics on Soviet commodities traded, in direct contravention of explicit CSCE Final Act agreements, as well as a breakdown of statistics separately showing Soviet exports of oil, natural gas, non-ferrous metals, and other agricultural and industrial raw materials; as of 1977, the value of these exports is so aggregated that specific commodities are not identifiable. A sole

mitigating factor in the USSR's performance in providing economic data in the period under review is its publication in the August 1978 issue of its magazine Foreign Trade of a commodity breakdown of 1976 and 1977 Soviet foreign trade in the English language.

Two other occurrences with potentially negative CSCE implications in the period under review were the arrest, trial, and expulsion of American businessman Francis J. Crawford, and the introduction of a legislative measure which could tend to restrict foreign commerce: without warning, the USSR in May published a decree outlining various proposals to tax foreign companies and individuals in their commercial dealings with the Soviet Union.

- (d) The situation in the field of human contacts has not improved. It remains very difficult for a Soviet citizen to obtain an exit visa for whatever purpose. The cumbersome procedure takes at least three months but more often several years.

There are estimates that the number of persons wanting to get an exit visa is at a minimum 50-60,000. The increase in family visits begun after the signature of the Final Act still continues after Belgrade.

Also the number of family reunifications increased after Helsinki, but after Belgrade a stand-still and even a certain decrease was noted. In a number of cases the presentation of an application negatively affected the rights of the applicant or his family.

Real improvement in the sphere of travel has not taken place.

- (e) Availability or access to information such as Western newspapers remain unchanged and very low. Working conditions for journalists were unaltered. There is a persistent resistance of Soviet officials, for example by refusing facilities to transmit reports.

Harassment continues and found its climax in the suit brought by the Soviet State television and radio against the resident correspondents for the Baltimore Sun and the New York Times. Of late the general appreciation was that the Soviet made a clear miscalculation and ultimately had little choice but to back down.

- (f) Cultural and educational co-operation remains very difficult and on a low level.