

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

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To: Permanent Representatives (DPC)

From: Acting Secretary General

COMMUNICATIONS AND OVERFLIGHTS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

At our private meeting on 15th May, we decided to commission from the International Military Staff a report on the four current problems raised by the Permanent Representative of Turkey, viz:

- Communications
- Regional Air Defence
- Overflights
- Exercises

This report is now available and is circulated at Annex.

2. Certain further clarification has been requested by the Turkish Authorities. Moreover, some delegations may feel that more information is required about the practical implications (and costs) of the recommendations on communications and air defence. It is understood that the problem of passage through the Athens Flight Information Region is the subject of bilateral discussions between the two countries concerned.

3. It is my intention to place this report, together with any additional material then available, on an Agenda of the DPC in September.

(Signed) P. PANSA CEDRONIO

This document includes: 1 Annex

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IMS FINDINGS

COMMUNICATIONS

1. The Turkish Authorities requested the DPC to authorize the MC to initiate the necessary action for re-routing the following communications circuits via communications satellite:

(a) Voice circuits

- (1) SHAPE to Turkish General Staff
- (2) AFSOUTH to Turkish General Staff
- (3) COMNAVSOUTH to Turkish Navy Command
- (4) COMAIRSOUTH to Turkish Air Force Command

(b) Telegraph circuits

- (1) COMAIRSOUTH to Turkish Air Force Command (including 2 weather data circuits)
- (2) SHOC to 1st SOC Eskisehir (2 circuits)
- (3) SHOC to 2nd SOC Diyarbakir (2 circuits)

2. The SHAPE staff advise that the proposal cannot be met by the SATCOM circuits presently available without an adjustment of priority. Further SATCOM capacity could be made available but there would be a requirement for additional links between users and the ground terminals. A contingency plan could be prepared so that these terrestrial links could be provided in an emergency in only a few hours. SHAPE staff further advise that permanent re-routing of the circuits via SATCOM would entail the rental of additional PTT circuits, an expenditure they consider unjustified in light of the emergency re-routing capability previously mentioned, and the fact that the ACE HIGH system through Greece continues to function normally as do also NATO communications over PTT circuits through Greece.

AIR DEFENCE

3. The Turkish Authorities requested the DPC to invite the MC to initiate the necessary action to close the gap between the 6ATAF and 5ATAF air defence regions, created by the Greeks' withdrawal from NATO air defence activities.

4. The NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) comprises national radars and additional common funded radars, computers, communication, data transmission and display systems. Together with Common Funded Early Warning Radars they provide an essential air picture of NATO and adjacent airspace and a weapon control capability. These systems have to be considered as a whole.

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5. The NADGE facilities in Greece prior to July 1974 consisted of a Sector Operations Centre (SOC), three Control and Reporting Centres (CRC), three Early Warning Radar sites, one Coastal Radar, and two Mobile Reporting Posts (MRP). Five of these sites were automated and five were manual, three of the automated sites were feeding information into ACE Early Warning System. The LARISSA SOC exercised tactical control of these units which were assigned to SACEUR in peacetime. The LARISSA SOC reported to the Izmir, Turkey Air Defence Operation Centre (ADOC), which in turn reported to the Regional Air Operations Centre (RAOC) at Naples, Italy.

6. The withdrawal of the Greek NADGE facilities would leave a gap of approximately 200 nm in radar coverage, approximately 158 nm is that area facing Bulgarian, Yugoslavian and Albanian territory. The lost coverage over Greece and to the North cannot be immediately replaced and relaxation of facilities is not feasible. The loss of this coverage isolates the air defence system in Turkey to the extent that sea and air-borne reporting posts would have to be maintained and new procedures and routing would be necessary to restore the air picture dissemination obtained from the Izmir, ADOC.

7. SHAPE staff agree that Greece has cut off the supply of early warning information to NATO and that Turkey is presently isolated from an air defence point of view. They recommend that a connection be established and maintained between the Turkish and NATO air defence systems as a matter of priority, certainly before the undersea cable between Sicily and Turkey becomes operational (estimated late 1976). It is considered in particular that the SOC at Bakishir, Turkey should be linked to the SOC at Martina Franca, Italy, and that the CRC at Cannakale, Turkey should be linked to CRCs at Jacotenente, Italy and Otranto, Italy. Provision of the circuits by SATCOM would entail the same implications as discussed under COMMUNICATIONS. The required PTT links between users and SATCOM terminals would on initial rough estimates cost about B.fr. 12 million annually. An alternative cheaper method suggested by the SHAPE staff might be to establish the required links via ACE HIGH from Turkey to Cyprus, via UK DON from Cyprus to the UK, and via ACE HIGH from the UK to Italy. This alternative is technically feasible.

#### OVERFLIGHTS

8. The Turkish Authorities invited the Alliance to assist Turkey in reopening the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) to air traffic.

9. In July 1974, the Hellenic Authorities ceased passing flight plan information and radar cross-tell to Turkish Authorities for use in both air traffic control and for correlation with radar early warning. The Turkish Authorities published Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714 which established compulsory reporting points at a distance sufficiently removed from the Turkish border so as to make air defence feasible. The Greeks responded by closing the airspace to essentially all air traffic transiting the Athens FIR.

10. The closure of airspace within the Athens FIR makes it necessary for Turkish aircraft flying west to take a longer southern route or a northern route over Warsaw Pact countries. The southern route increases the cost of Turkish air operations, while the northern route has the potential for creating incidents with Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. In addition the denial of airspace is a very serious irritant and one that could lead very quickly to reprisal action and/or open incidents. The airspace problem also seriously impacts upon the planning and conduct of NATO exercises. Furthermore the impact would be even more serious in times of crisis and emergency, having a most profound effect on the employment of reinforcements and operations in the area.

11. Greece and Turkey recently began negotiations on the use of airspace with the Athens FIR, and it is important that nations provide all support necessary to encourage successful conclusion of these negotiations.

NATO MILITARY EXERCISES

12. The Turkish Authorities requested that the reasons why they did not take part in WINTEX 75 should be set out, in order to avoid a similar occurrence in future exercises.

13. The withdrawal of Turkey from the NATO-wide OPX, WINTEX 75 (March 1975) was related to their problems with Greece. Turkey indicated that its withdrawal from the exercise was predicated upon exercise artificialities involving Greece's military withdrawal, citing that these exercise artificialities imposed too great a burden for meaningful exercise plan.

14. NATO military exercises provide an essential testing ground for determination of the adequacy of the Alliance's capacity for performing its defensive mission. To this end, military exercises must be as realistic as possible. While it is fully appreciated that certain artificialities will always be present, because wartime priorities cannot be totally

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duplicated in exercises, every effort must be expended to preclude introduction of wholly unrealistic constraints on manoeuvres and exercises. Scenarios should pose plausible situations as background for reasonable military responses to posed stimuli. Turkey did not believe WINTEX was sufficiently realistic because of problems raised by Greece's withdrawal from the NATO integrated force structure and their subsequent imposed overflight restriction and non-participation in NATO air defence and early warning activities.

15. NATO military exercises afford multiple benefits to participants. In addition to the immediately obvious military benefits of training in various military skills, the political facets are of great value. By and through the multinational co-ordination efforts, the solidarity of the Alliance and its capacity for mutual protection of participants are demonstrated to any potential enemy. The implications of absence of solidarity are obvious.

16. Military exercises, to be effective, require extensive and detailed staff planning, which frequently occupies months of effort. In circumstances where military exercises are subject to cancellation or major modification late in this planning cycle, much of the staff work is wasted. In so far as is practicable, military exercises should be designed to accomplish specific aims and objectives, and once these are determined, they should be carried out.

17. The current situation in the Southern Region poses serious problems for NATO military exercise planners. Among these problems are:

- (a) uncertainty of participation in scheduled exercises by either Hellenic, Turkish, or both forces;
- (b) major modifications in scope, or magnitude, of exercises to accommodate withdrawal or absence of participation by Hellenic, Turkish, or both forces;
- (c) the denial to NATO military forces and NATO national forces of access rights through national waters and airspace. Problems such as those cited above, result in the loss to participants of exercise experience and require major modifications to exercises which substantially defeat the purpose of the programme. Such activities adversely affect the combat readiness of national and NATO forces. Combat readiness is directly proportional to the adequacy and frequency of training.

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Protection of exposed flanks of the Alliance requires a capability to reinforce rapidly. Denial of direct transit routes to the flank extremities could delay arrival of essential reinforcements with attendant serious implications. When artificial restrictions are imposed on training in the Southern Region, the combat readiness and combat capability of the Alliance to defend its Southern flank is in jeopardy.

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