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CHRONOLOGICAL

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
7th November, 1973

POLADS(73)26

MEMORANDUM

To: Expert Working Group on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(through Members of the Political Committee)

From: Chairman

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Since the beginning of October the Political Committee, taking up a proposal by the United States Delegation, has been exchanging views on Sino-Soviet relations. In the course of this discussion written contributions were made by the United States, the Netherlands, Canadian and United Kingdom.

2. The Political Committee agreed at its meeting of 23rd October that these written national contributions should be brought to your attention at the meeting scheduled to start on 12th November. The four papers concerned are accordingly attached to this note.

(Signed) J. de BEAUSSE

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This document includes: 4 Annexes

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

United States Contribution(1)

General Comments

1. The marked upsurge in Soviet polemics against China since mid-July, which has included an authoritative speech by Brezhnev and a carefully orchestrated campaign from most of Moscow's client States in Eastern Europe, has taken on added significance because of signs that the Soviets may be gearing up a drive for a new International Conference of Communist Parties. The evidence thus far, however, is insufficient to indicate that Moscow is embarking on a fundamentally new policy course toward Peking or is seeking to have China definitively expelled from the Communist movement.

2. Moscow's new round of anti-Chinese polemics is probably related both to the Crimean Conference of Warsaw Pact leaders in late July, at which China appears to have been an important topic of discussion, and to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which took place in the latter part of August and which confirmed the basic anti-Soviet thrust of Chinese policy. The Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers also provided an occasion for each side to question the other's Third World policies. Moscow's patience has also been strained by Peking's continual sniping at Soviet détente diplomacy and, in particular, by Chou En-lai's overt encouragement for a strong Western defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

3. Moscow clearly believes that the Chinese leadership's "anti-socialist" and anti-Soviet course (the latter inevitably implies the former in Soviet thinking) warrants condemnation by all orthodox parties, and the Soviets are making no secret of their unhappiness over Rumania's steadfast refusal to join a Warsaw Pact consensus to this effect. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue as a rule to observe a distinction between the Chinese leadership, which is said to have broken with Marxist-Leninist principles, and China itself, whose socialist accomplishments have been threatened but not entirely destroyed by Maoist policies. Moreover, Moscow's chances of having China read out of the international Communist movement appear no better now than before, given the certainty that North Vietnam, North Korea, Rumania and assorted non-ruling parties would oppose an attempt to excommunicate Peking.

(1) This paper circulated on 8th October was prepared in August and early September. It includes assessments prepared by the Department of State, the US Embassy in Moscow and the US Consulate General in Hong Kong.

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4. Nevertheless, Moscow may believe it can engineer a replay of the 1969 World Conference of Communist Parties. Whether or not such a conference could deal with the China problem in a definitive fashion, from the Soviet standpoint it could serve the useful purpose of demonstrating Peking's isolation in the movement and reaffirming Moscow's leading rôle. Current signs, however, are that Moscow will face hard going in convincing other parties that such a conference is desirable.

5. The results of the Tenth Chinese Congress could hardly have been gratifying to the Soviets, even though Chou En-lai at least formally left open the possibility of improved State relations. The Congress reiterated in strong terms the anti-Soviet impulse and pragmatic directions of Chinese foreign policy and branded the USSR as the chief threat to Chinese security. Chou specifically raised the possibility of a surprise Soviet attack against China, but he did not seem especially alarmed at the likelihood of this prospect, in line with Peking's general toning down of this issue. Privately, Soviet China specialists have sought to play down any anxieties they may have about the impact of the Congress on Sino-Soviet relations and have stressed the continuing uncertainties surrounding Chinese domestic affairs.

Peking Takes the Offensive

6. Over the past several months, the PRC has intensified its attacks on Soviet "social-imperialism", subversion, economic exploitation and "false friendship". The bitterest and most sweeping indictment of Soviet world power ambitions in two years appeared in a long NCNA article of 25th August which charged that "The two dynasties - the Romanov dynasty and the Krushchev-Brezhnev dynasty - are linked by a black line. That is, the aggressive and expansionist nature of great Russian chauvinism and imperialism". Also, People's Daily in a 24th August denunciation of Soviet non-use of force proposals concluded that "No appraisal is too great so far as the danger of Soviet social-imperialism is concerned". These articles follow strong denunciations earlier this month of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and of Soviet arms policies as well as a steady stream of articles on the Soviet threat to Europe, its naval expansion, its occupation of Japan's Northern Territories, its perfidiousness in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and its evil international trade, aid and maritime policies.

7. The Chinese Communist Party's Tenth Party Congress Communiqué warned "particularly" of the danger of a "surprise attack" by social-imperialism. But generally, current Chinese statements have not played up the possibility of imminent Soviet aggression against China. In speeches to women and trade union congresses in Sinkiang on 26th August, for example, leading Chinese Provincial Officials Saifudin and Yang Yung called for criticism of Soviet "aggression and subversion against our country" but did not project a sense of immediate danger. There is also no evidence that the current crescendo of verbal attacks is related directly to a specific Sino-Soviet bilateral issue. The border talks have apparently been in a state of suspension since early July and we have seen no evidence of serious tension on the frontier.

8. The major stimulus to the current spurt of Chinese polemics seems to come from external events. The verbal anti-Peking barrage from Moscow and its satellites has no doubt spurred the Chinese to greater efforts. Of particular concern to Peking is the current Soviet move to push its Asian collective security proposal, to exacerbate fears in South East Asia of Chinese chauvinism, subversion and aggression, and perhaps to promote a new World Conference of Communist Parties. Additionally, the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers, détente developments in Europe and the forthcoming visit of Tanaka to Moscow are probably also related to the timing of the Chinese propaganda offensive.

9. Moscow's attacks may in part be timed to influence domestic politics in China and the Chinese anti-Soviet campaign may in turn be meant to underscore the fact that policy toward the USSR is not subject to change. In a warning probably intended for its own people as well as for Europeans, the 24th August People's Daily warned that "Some day the new Czar in the Kremlin will again cook up an invitation from the government of a country in "request" of military assistance (and) ... then dispatch massive armed forces to carry out military occupation". However, the Tenth Party Congress Communiqué reference to the excommunication of Lin Piao did not repeat previous charges of his alleged intention to rely on the forces of "social-imperialism" to overthrow the régime.

10. In sum, the current wave of polemics seems to be more than a temporary excitement of the debate. Both sides seem to be girding up for protracted combat on the diplomatic, political and ideological fronts.

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Soviets Resume Press Polemics

11. Evidence is accumulating that the Soviets are gearing up a drive to convene another World Conference of Communist Parties. In addition to such indirect indications as preoccupation with previous such conferences in the 7th August Aleksandrov article in Pravda, Chinese diplomats have said that they believe such a conference will in fact take place.

12. It seems likely that elaboration of the proposition that China can no longer be considered socialist will be forthcoming from Soviet ideologists before too long. In a recent conversation, a Soviet specialist on China launched into an esoteric discussion of the relationship between superstructure and base. Also, a Soviet specialist on US developments when asked casually about the ideological justification for peaceful coexistence with China, likewise replied by discussing superstructure and base. This suggests that Soviet theoreticians are already disseminating inside the Party the theory that distortions in the Chinese superstructure have so profoundly affected the economic base in China that the Chinese system cannot be considered socialist.

13. If the Soviets are gearing up a conference, it would not be surprising that they would try to use it definitively to read the Chinese out of the movement. And it would be logical for them to be preparing the theoretical groundwork. Yugoslav sources while acknowledging that the Soviets seem to be aiming for a new conference, emphasize the difficulties of achieving such a conference over the inevitable opposition of the Rumanians, West European Communists, North Vietnamese and themselves. Yugoslavs acknowledge, however, that a conference attended by a majority of parties, even if some parties declined to adhere to all conference documents, could be useful for the Soviets.

14. In sum, there are strong indications that the Soviets are about to undertake a new political offensive against the Chinese.

"Aleksandrov" Returns to the Attack

15. The sharpest attack on the PRC in many months appeared in the 7th August Pravda over the byline of "I.M. Aleksandrov", a pseudonym used for authoritative articles on China. The article(1), which was pegged to the recent Crimea Conference, repeats the offer of a relationship with the PRC "on the principles of peaceful coexistence".

(1) An English translation was circulated in "Soviet and East European Documentation" No. 130

16. The relevant passage in the article states: "At the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee, our Party again affirmed its unchanging desire to normalize relations with the PRC on the principles of peaceful coexistence". In fact, the resolution published after that Plenum made no mention of "peaceful coexistence". The usage harks back to - and goes beyond - Brezhnev's ironic reference of 20th March, 1972, when he agreed to accept peaceful coexistence in bilateral relations "if people in Peking are not prepared for more in relations with a socialist state".

17. "Aleksandrov" lists a number of serious charges against the PRC, among them: turning into a direct ally of the most reactionary circles of imperialism and holding the same positions as the imperialist military-industrial complex; opposing socialist efforts for security in Europe and counting on anti-Soviet arrangements with EEC and NATO members; in the UN, allying self with Portugal and South Africa to frustrate Soviet initiatives; renouncing class principles by peddling "lying thesis" of "two super powers"; waging a struggle from positions of social-chauvinism; and rejecting or ignoring Soviet proposals in recent years for development of bilateral relations.

18. The "Aleksandrov" article says that the Soviet Union is still ready for serious constructive talks with the PRC, but only if the Chinese leadership observes the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and if it discontinues its hostile activity against socialist countries.

19. The "Aleksandrov" article discussed the full range of Soviet foreign policy in the context of the 30th-31st July Crimea Communist Conference. It was preceded 4th August by the publication of a Politburo decision blessing the results of the Crimea Conference and noting the importance of the struggle "against "left" and right opportunist currents". These Soviet post-conference comments - plus the recent Polish blast against the PRC - are a further indication that China was very much on Brezhnev's mind in the Crimea, and that he was not happy with the omission of any reference to China in the Crimea Communiqué. The Soviet Politburo decision referred to the 1969 Communist Conference and the "Aleksandrov" piece referred to last three conferences - 1969, 1960, and 1957 - an indication that the Soviets are pressing the idea that the Chinese problem has made another conference necessary.

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20. The second authoritative article by "Aleksandrov" since the Crimea meeting appeared in Pravda, 26th August(1) and presented a detailed indictment of PRC foreign policy in a manner calculated to support the argument that China is no longer a socialist country. However, the article stopped short of asserting this explicitly and in some respects retreated from the 7th August article's treatment of the issue. While the earlier article spoke of normalization "on principles of peaceful coexistence" (which would imply China is non-socialist), the second "Aleksandrov" piece omitted the peaceful coexistence aspect. Indeed, Brezhnev refrained from using the peaceful coexistence formula in discussing China in his 15th August Alma-Ata speech, and the 26th August "Aleksandrov" article fell back on his language.

21. This seemingly esoteric point may explain why the Soviets felt it necessary to give China a second going-over just three weeks after the first. In the first "Aleksandrov" article, the peaceful coexistence formula was attributed to the April 1973 CPSU CC Plenum, but published documents of that Plenum do not bear this out. We speculate that the first "Aleksandrov" article was more than the traffic would bear at this juncture and may have jeopardized the delicate process of backing the Rumanians into a corner on the China question.

22. If he is backtracking, "Aleksandrov" takes a few pot-shots at his intra-bloc adversaries along the way. After developing the theme that the Maoists are seeking to split inclinations in the socialist countries, he accuses the CCP of trying to induce "certain Communist parties" to refrain from criticism of Chinese policies and to adopt a neutral position. This appears to fit the Rumanians like a glove. The prominent publication of this article in Bulgaria lends additional circumstantial evidence to the thesis that "Aleksandrov" is crossing swords with Rumania.

23. "Aleksandrov" leaves no stone unturned in buttressing his unstated conclusion that China is beyond the socialist pale. He reports that the PRC Delegation to the recent UNCTAD session petitioned the Secretariat to be inscribed as a developing country and removed from the list of socialist countries.

24. All of this suggests that the Soviets are inching toward a formal finding that China is not a socialist country, but are moving slowly because of opposition by the Rumanians and probably some non-ruling parties. The Soviets may regard this move as an essential part of their political-diplomatic-ideological offensive against China and as a preliminary to convening an international Communist conclave.

(1) An English translation was circulated as "Soviet and East European Documentation" No. 134

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Netherlands Contribution of 19th October, 1973

1. The question remains why just now the Soviet campaign against China has been stepped up. Since the fundamental differences between both countries are not new, an answer to the question may be found outside the context of Sino-Soviet relations. A possible reason could be the internal effects of détente with the West. Public reaction to détente within the Soviet Union is not entirely to the liking of the leadership. Just as any other totalitarian régime, the Soviet Government is constantly in need of an external enemy to be blamed for systematic activities against the Soviet Union, requiring a strong defence and sacrifices of its population. The people need to be incited towards bigger efforts in the fight for peace, the fight against subversive elements, the fight against imperialism, etc.

2. Until recently the United States could be used as a scapegoat to this effect. This becomes increasingly more difficult when at the same time détente and co-operation with the United States are propagated. It is perhaps for this reason that during the last few months it has been strongly argued that, in spite of détente, ideological struggle is going on. But this reasoning may be not sufficiently convincing for the Soviet citizen: Soviet leadership may have grounds to worry about a slackening of political consciousness.

3. The population must be prepared to carry a defence-burden, which is heavier than in Western countries. Since a sudden attack from the West is now less credible to the Soviet citizen and he is moreover less receptive to the appeal for ideological struggle, an alternative enemy is needed.

4. Abstraction has been made here of the current war in the Middle East. A deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR would change this line of thinking and might furthermore already in itself be of effect on Sino-Soviet relations.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Comments by the Canadian Embassy in Moscow on the
United States paper of 8th October

1. There is no visible sign that the fundamental clash of interests and ideology between China and the Soviet Union has in any way abated and it is probably quite the contrary, given the upsurge in Soviet polemics against China and the Chinese verbal counter-offensive. Brezhnev has probably been aiming at a new international conference of Communist parties as a desirable and important corollary and complement to détente policies in CSCE, MBFR, SALT, and bilateral co-operation with the USA and other capitalist countries.

2. However, most of the recent Soviet statements concerning China, e.g. the Tashkent speech(1) and various Pravda articles have been made in the context of the growing and embarrassing difficulties in Soviet détente policies: slow progress in the economic deals with the USA and other Western countries, the problems with the dissidents and with the Jewish emigration and the sharp reactions in the West. The Soviet line on China in the Tashkent speech has seemed designed, in part at least, to answer domestic and foreign critics of Brezhnev's détente policies, and to bolster support for these policies, by demonstrating that the Soviet leaders had tried to move towards a settlement with China, going so far as to propose formally a non-aggression treaty, but that the intransigence and the hostile attitude of China made this impossible. As Soviet assertions of their own reasonableness were accompanied by continued denunciations of the Chinese leadership, they could hardly be interpreted as indicative of a softer Soviet line towards China.

3. The main point here is that the recent Soviet polemics against China do not necessarily mean that the USSR will seek an early conference of Communist parties nor that it currently aims at the expulsion of China from the Communist movement. The motivation may in large measure be defensive, and the maintenance of détente policy may well require continuing efforts of this kind to contain and isolate China. No doubt the Soviet leaders would like to be able to go beyond this, but they realize full well the difficulties and risks of convening a conference and the unlikelihood that China, whose international prestige has been growing so rapidly, notably among the developing and non-aligned countries, could be cornered and expelled at such a conference.

(1) An English translation of relevant extracts was circulated as "Soviet and East European Documentation" No. 137

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4. The moderation and the fairly accommodating attitude of the USSR in the talks with the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka tends to confirm the priority attached by the Soviet side to the maintenance of the détente strategy (including co-operation with major non-Communist countries) and the containment of China.

5. The Soviet stance in the Middle East conflict would seem also to corroborate this, though it is too early to permit an evaluation.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

United Kingdom Contribution(1)

1. Since the Party leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries met on 30th and 31st July for their annual conference in the Crimea the Soviet Union has launched a major public offensive against China. For many months until then, the Russians had contented themselves with reprinting criticisms initiated in the East European and Mongolian press. The Russians have now challenged the credentials of China as a socialist State and accused Peking of deviating from fundamental positions adopted at international Communist conferences of the past two decades. The attacks have been supported and repeated by some of Moscow's East European allies. The campaign is probably still developing.

2. In a speech on 13th July, Suslov, the Soviet Politburo member chiefly responsible for ideological affairs, had already spoken of China's "complete breach with Marxism-Leninism". This phrase was repeated in an article in Pravda of 7th August over the signature of I. Aleksandrov, a pseudonym indicating high-level endorsement. In the harshest language used against the Chinese in recent months, Aleksandrov wrote that "the Peking leadership acts literally in every respect as a force that is hostile to the policy and interests of the socialist world and ever more frequently turns into a direct ally of the most reactionary imperialist circles". Aleksandrov argued that the Chinese try to present their differences with the Soviet Union as a bilateral dispute between two countries, whereas in fact they are attacking the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the programme elaborated by the International Communist Conferences of 1957, 1960 and 1969. Aleksandrov described the Chinese position as "social-chauvinistic" (a rather crude counter to the Chinese accusation of "social-imperialism"). As if to drive home the point that China is no longer to be seen as a member of the socialist community, Aleksandrov stated that the USSR was ready to normalize relations with China on the basis of "peaceful coexistence". This term is normally reserved by the Russians for their relations with non-Communist States. In 1972 Brezhnev made the same offer in response to the original Chinese proposal of 1969, but he added the gloss that it was a pis aller.

3. Pravda published a second major article, also signed by Aleksandrov, on 26th August. This repeated all the main accusations which had been put forward earlier in the month.

(1) Circulated in the August edition of "Communist Policy and Tactics"

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It went on to list the aspects of international affairs where Chinese policies were hostile to those of the Soviet Union. These included relations with Western countries, Asian affairs, the attitude to national liberation movements, disarmament and the affairs of East European countries. The purpose of this article seemed to be to show that in every important field the Chinese were trying to undermine the positions of the USSR and her allies. Aleksandrov repeated the Soviet willingness to normalize relations, quoting a speech by Brezhnev of 15th August to this effect. But the article added that this was only possible if the Chinese leadership would drop their policy of hostility to the socialist States. The tone of this second article is illustrated by its application to China of the following adjectives: reactionary, anti-Soviet, subversive, unprincipled, hegemonic, anti-socialist, nationalist, hostile, separatist, frantic, sharp, reckless, shameless, double-faced, demagogic, brazen, clamorous, demonstrative, arrogant, cynical, selfish, unprincipled, anti-popular, chauvinist, inconsistent, harsh, slanderous, absurd and voluntarist.

4. Most of the allies of the Soviet Union have now joined in the campaign against China. The first Aleksandrov article was reproduced in the major newspapers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. The second article has already been reprinted in the Bulgarian press and may soon appear elsewhere. Anti-Chinese themes have been especially persistent in the Polish press. Poland has traditionally been zealous in support of the USSR in Sino-Soviet polemics, and in early August the Polish Party leadership was already urging that socialist countries should take a "decisive position in regard to the leadership and harmful Maoist course of the Chinese Communist Party".

5. Rumania is a conspicuous absentee from this chorus of anti-Chinese propaganda. Rumania has long insisted on maintaining much better relations with China than have the more orthodox members of the Warsaw Pact. It was noticeable that the communiqué issued by the Crimean meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders, which Ceausescu attended, contained no word against China. It seems possible that the Soviet leaders, may have hoped to use this Crimean meeting to launch the offensive against China, on the basis of Suslov's speech of 13th July quoted above. If so, their plans were foiled, presumably by Rumania. This obliged the Russians to proceed alone, with such other support as they could muster. The first Aleksandrov article of 7th August was ostensibly a commentary on the outcome of the Crimean meeting even though its main interest was in its anti-Chinese polemics. Similarly, a Soviet Politburo statement issued to endorse the results of the meeting also roundly condemned the Chinese leadership. The Soviet leadership evidently organized these authoritative statements to compensate for the failure of the Crimean meeting to deal with the problem of China.

6. The crescendo of Warsaw Pact propaganda against China built up during August is clearly not without some purpose, but it is still too early to say definitely what it is. Chinese propaganda against the Soviet Union particularly during recent weeks has similarly increased, with a number of major articles in New China News Agency and a continual barrage of smaller pinpricking articles and commentaries on a scale unseen for a considerable time. One of the major articles dealt with Soviet disarmament policies, which have long been a target of Chinese abuse. Another was a swinging attack on Soviet expansionism, linked with the fifth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. These two were among the most forthright anti-Soviet articles to appear since 1969.

7. The initiative in this round of polemics has clearly come from Moscow. Presumably the Russians were hoping to preempt any major pronouncement from Peking during the Chinese 10th Party Congress. This Congress was eventually held in the last week of August and Chou En-lai's Political Report did in fact devote considerable space to a reiteration of Chinese condemnation of Soviet external and internal policies. It was probably in anticipation of this that Moscow organized its portmanteau denunciation of Peking's activities and objectives, contrasting these with Soviet concern for socialist unity as well as for international détente. The Soviet leaders are both vulnerable and sensitive to charges of bilateralism and super power hegemony, a Chinese theme which they may believe is doing definite harm to Soviet political interests in the Third World and also in Europe. To portray the Chinese rather than elements in the West as the arch-enemies of Soviet détente policies has a certain value to the Soviet leadership in presenting these policies to doubters at home. And by emphasizing the contradiction between "the Mao group" and the true interests of the Chinese peoples, the Russians may also have been hoping to foster dissension at the Chinese Party Congress, and in the longer term to assist those in the Chinese leadership who advocate an accommodation with the USSR. Chou En-lai specifically castigated exactly this type of Soviet interference in Chinese internal affairs in his political report.

8. If the Chinese Party Congress was indeed the reason for the Soviet attacks on the Chinese, these can now be expected to abate. There is, however, an additional explanation which at this stage must remain tentative. Although most of the Soviet charges against China are not new, the tone of Moscow's campaign goes beyond what was required for the purposes of the Chinese Party Congress. It suggests a considered attempt to discredit in the eyes of the world the Chinese claim to be a

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socialist State. The recent campaign could therefore be the first stage of an attempt to use a new conference to drive China definitively out of the world Communist movement. This could be done at a new international Communist conference: and indeed there has been a number of indications in past months that the Russians are thinking of convening one, possibly later this year. This interpretation would explain Suslov's statement that China has broken with Marxism-Leninism, an accusation never expressed so unequivocally before. The references by Aleksandrov (as well as in other recent articles) to the earlier Communist conferences, and recent calls in Soviet and East European statements for regular meetings of Communist parties "to perfect and deepen mutual relations" and for "collective analysis" of current issues, all tend to support the view that another conference is planned. This may be why the Resolution issued by the Plenum of the Soviet Central Committee in April said that the CPSU was ready to take part with fraternal parties in "specific initiatives" aimed at strengthening the political and ideological unity of the Communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

9. If it is the case that the statement issued by the Crimean meeting contained no mention of China because Rumania refused to associate herself with an attack on the lines of the Aleksandrov articles, this is an indication of the difficulties which the Soviet leaders would have to face if they tried to secure a final denunciation of China at an international conference of Communist parties. Yugoslavia would be as reluctant as Rumania, and these two would probably be supported by Communist parties from Western countries as well as by some of those from Asia, including North Vietnam. Ideally, Moscow would no doubt like to demonstrate the unity of the world Communist movement under Soviet leadership. But if the Soviet leaders do intend to press this to a decision at a conference, they can only think that a denunciation of China by an international Communist conference, would be of some value even if some parties abstained or voted against. Unanimous condemnation of China is not to be expected.

10. Concurrently with this propaganda campaign against China, the Russians have recently been pressing their earlier proposals for Asian collective security. Every major Soviet foreign policy statement in the last month has put lengthy emphasis on the importance of devising a system of collective security in Asia. However, the Russians have not yet defined their proposals precisely. Obviously, it would be difficult to do so without frightening off one or more Asian States. The Soviet aim is evidently to secure gradual agreement from Asian countries that a system of collective security is necessary.

Iran has already twice expressed her support in principle for such a system. "Collective security" is a convenient formula and rallying-point for Asia as similar Soviet phrases have been in Europe. In Asia this line has the extra purpose of isolating and encircling China in a ring of states where Soviet influence is strong. This aspect alarms many Asian States as much as it does the Chinese, and Soviet protestations that their proposals are designed to protect the security of all Asian countries, including China, are not likely to carry conviction. Since it must be clear to the Russians that no system of Asian collective security can be effective until the Sino-Soviet dispute has been resolved, the Soviet proposals must be seen mainly as a propaganda slogan for extending their influence in Asia, rather than as a realistic objective of a concrete kind.

11. The possibility that the Soviet leaders are preparing for a decisive ideological struggle with China is only tentative at this stage. But if the trends outlined above were to continue (intense public hostility towards China, preparations for an international Communist conference, and emphasis on Asian collective security) this explanation would become more plausible. The excommunication of China would of course be a step of very great importance for the Soviet leaders to take and could not fail to have implications for other aspects of the USSR's foreign policy.

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