

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

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POLADS(77)9

MEMORANDUM

To: Political Committee

From: Acting Chairman

MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WITH EXPERTS ON
7TH FEBRUARY, 1977: PREPARATIONS FOR THE BELGRADE
MEETINGS

In response to requests from delegations following the last meeting of the Political Committee with CSCE Experts, 20th and 21st October, 1976, the International Secretariat has up-dated Annex A to POLADS(76)38 of 4th October, 1976, entitled "Eastern, Neutral and Non-aligned points of view on various questions concerning preparations for the Belgrade meetings."

2. Because of the considerable increase in information currently available to the International Secretariat, the up-dated version of the earlier document is a summary of the main points of interest only. If any delegation wishes to refer to the full compilation of information drawn up by the International Secretariat, would they please contact Mr. L. Edwards.

(Signed) E.L. KILLHAM

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

PREPARATION FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS

EASTERN, NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED POINTS OF VIEW ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING PREPARATIONS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS.

The following points of view have been expressed by the countries concerned to Allies or other contacts.

I. REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

1. General approach to review

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

Repeated assertions that Belgrade must further "relaxation of tensions", and that therefore the review should emphasize "positive experience". If not, Eastern countries will "go on the offensive" against the Western performance.

(b) Romania

Claims to favour an objective review.

B. Neutrals

Review is main purpose of Belgrade; should be thorough but avoiding confrontation (Austria, Finland, Sweden). Switzerland, as an exception, prefers less attention on review and more on development of détente.

C. Non-aligned

Review is the main task of Belgrade; but less interested than Neutrals in pursuing Eastern implementation (Yugoslavia).

2. Form of review

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

Each country should describe its own performance, positive aspects of development in relations with others, and what

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could be done in future. Should not concentrate on actions of separate states.

(b) Romania

Review should be conducted taking section by section within each Basket.

B. Neutrals

- (i) most have said that while the review should be conducted in a thorough manner, there should not be a "tribunal";
- (ii) not a "country by country" approach (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland);
- (iii) draw up a "balance sheet" (Austria);
- (iv) series of statements concentrating on one's own situation and not naming any other country (Sweden may well not be representative of most Neutrals).

C. Non-aligned

Each country should point to its own progress, and ask questions of other participants (Yugoslavia).

3. Where review should be conducted

A. East

No clear indication, except that Romania wants opening statements in plenary, then further work in committees, one for each Basket.

B. Neutrals

Opening statements in plenary, then thorough analysis in committees, one for each Basket (Austria, Finland, Sweden).
Switzerland, as an exception, wants the whole review in plenary.

C. Non-aligned

Opening statements in plenary, then into committees, one for each Basket (Yugoslavia).

4. Connection between review and new proposals

Committees, one on each Basket, should proceed section by section through each Basket, reviewing progress then drafting new texts on proposals and follow-up before moving on to the next section (Romania).

II. DEEPENING OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN THE FUTURE (i.e. NEW PROPOSALS)

1. General approach

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

- (i) Eastern views on the number and nature of new proposals seem still uncertain. They are indicating that they might forego detailed discussion of their own proposals: presumably they would do this if they thought they could either obtain a short anodyne meeting or avoid new proposals from others which cause them embarrassment. Meanwhile they are pursuing the Brezhnev Proposals and the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, apparently leaving open at present whether they want detailed discussion at Belgrade;
- (ii) Belgrade is merely "consultative" in nature, and there should be no revision of or shift of emphasis in the Final Act. New proposals should implement or (occasionally) "develop" Final Act provisions.

(b) Romania

- (i) strong interest in new proposals. Although it has said that only projects to implement the Final Act should be considered, it is nonetheless supporting the idea of developing the CBM provisions. Six to 10 new projects could be sanctioned but probably mostly by establishing expert groups to work on them after Belgrade;
- (ii) on organization of new proposal item, see I.4.

B. Neutrals

- (i) danger of new proposals distracting from review (Finland, Sweden); BUT more emphasis on new proposals than review (Switzerland);
- (ii) should not modify the Final Act: new proposals should elaborate existing commitments

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and be directed at more thorough implementation (Austria, Finland, Switzerland). Should not resurrect proposals rejected at Helsinki (Finland, Sweden);

- (iii) proposals should not be submitted too early in case they distract from evaluation (Finland) BUT early discussion even before Belgrade (Sweden).

C. Non-aligned

- (i) should "enlarge" Final Act in all three Baskets (Yugoslavia);

- (ii) early discussion of new proposals even before Belgrade (Yugoslavia).

2. Specific new proposals

BASKET I

Note: for new proposals in the CBMs field, see POLADS (77)7 dated 27th January, 1977.

A. East

- (a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

- (i) non-first-use of nuclear weapons and other disarmament questions

While the East will undoubtedly refer to this proposal at Belgrade, it is not clear that they will aim at detailed discussion there. It is also not clear that they want detailed discussion of any other disarmament question at Belgrade. In October/December, 1976 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR said that disarmament issues should be dealt with in detail in other existing fora, and not at Belgrade.

(GDR specified that this included the non-first-use proposal). Mr. Gromyko's call for a special meeting of CSCE states as soon as possible to discuss the non-first-use proposal shows that the East are determined to keep the proposal alive in a CSCE context, but leaves open whether they want it discussed in detail at Belgrade.

- (ii) MBFR. Belgrade should not deal in any detail with MBFR;
 - (iii) Swiss Proposal on peaceful settlement of disputes should be discussed, but not in detail and only a procedural decision;
 - (iv) opposed to discussion on human rights.
- (b) Romania
- (i) extension of CSCE principles to Mediterranean (Romania/Yugoslavia);
 - (ii) possible discussion on regional disarmament and on bilateral non-use of force agreements between CSCE participants.

B. Neutrals

- (i) Non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Cautious attitude. In principle against any such proposal at Belgrade (Austria);
- (ii) MBFR. Do not favour link between MBFR and CSCE (Sweden, Switzerland);
- (iii) Sweden uncertain whether to make same proposal on defence budgets as made in UN.
- (iv) Swiss Proposal on peaceful settlement of disputes. General support for procedural decision at Belgrade. Swiss are re-working their proposal but may not have completed their review in time for Belgrade.

C. Non-aligned

- (i) extension of CSCE principles to Mediterranean (Malta (probable), Yugoslavia/Romania);
- (ii) contribution in the field of human rights (Yugoslavia)
- (iii) discussion on regional disarmament problems including possible establishment of follow-up experts group (Yugoslavia);
- (iv) MBFR. Need for Belgrade to put new life into MBFR and some degree of link between CSCE and MBFR (Yugoslavia).

BASKET II

A. East

- (a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)
 - (i) Brezhnev Proposals. Will probably seek procedural decisions including possible establishment of follow-up working

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group, unless agreement before Belgrade. Several indications that do not want detailed discussion, though hint from Soviet Union that energy conference might be discussed in depth at Belgrade. (Eventual position at Belgrade will depend on proceedings of 32nd Plenary Session of Economic Commission for Europe, 18th to 29th April, 1977.)

(b) Romania

- (i) Brezhnev Proposals. West should submit at Belgrade proposal of their own within area of Brezhnev Proposals;
- (ii) discussion on navigation on internal waterways.

B. Neutrals

- (i) Brezhnev Proposals. Emphasis on rule of Economic Commission for Europe;

C. Non-aligned

- (i) Brezhnev Proposals. Procedural discussions at Belgrade but substance at ECE except for energy which should be discussed in a wider forum (Yugoslavia);
- (ii) traffic and transport in the Mediterranean area (Yugoslavia).

BASKET III

A. East

- (a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)
 - (i) opposed to discussion on human rights;
- (b) Romania
 - (i) Youth exchanges, theatre and folklore festivals.

B. Neutrals

- (i) would like new initiative on human contacts (Austria);
- (ii) considering initiative on written information (Switzerland).

C. Non-aligned

- (i) European Year of Culture (Yugoslavia);
- (ii) abolishment or simplification of visa requirements and easier procedure for passports (Yugoslavia);
- (iii) promoting youth travel (Yugoslavia);
- (iv) co-operation between news agencies and TV organizations (Yugoslavia);
- (v) in Mediterranean area, co-operation in culture, tourism, emigration and sports (Yugoslavia);
- (vi) brief discussion on emigration in Europe (Yugoslavia).

III. FOLLOW-UP TO BELGRADE

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

- (i) Experts groups. Unclear attitude. Some indication that they want to avoid experts groups as much as possible, apart from experts meeting on Swiss Proposal and possibly working group on Brezhnev Proposals; but other indications that they would prefer the establishment of experts groups to a prolonged Belgrade;
- (ii) Further Belgrade. Apparently still uncertain;
- (iii) New CSCE. No interest;
- (iv) Permanent secretariat. No interest.

(b) Romania

denies wish for institutionalization but proposals for pattern of political/technical follow-up meetings come close to this.

- (i) Experts groups. Favours 5-8 ad hoc groups with specific tasks, e.g. on CBMs;
- (ii) Further Belgrade. Favours "regularity" if not "periodicity": at Belgrade decide date of next such meeting only;

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- (iii) New CSCE. In five years at the earliest
- (iv) Permanent secretariat. Not advocating this.

B. Neutrals

Some (Finland, followed by Sweden) are sympathetic to institutionalization but Austria is less interested.

- (i) Experts groups. Sympathetic to ad hoc groups with precise mandates (Sweden). Experts meeting required on Swiss Proposal (Switzerland); on CBMs (Austria, Switzerland);
- (ii) Further Belgrade. Belgrade should set the date for the next meeting (all Neutrals): favours "indicative periodicity" with Belgrade setting date by which "Belgrade III" should be held (Finland);
- (iii) New CSCE. Little interest at present;
- (iv) Permanent secretariat. No interest;
- (v) Follow-up questions should be discussed in plenary at Belgrade (Austria).

C. Non-aligned

- (i) Experts groups. Advocates establishment on, e.g., CBMs, disarmament problems (Yugoslavia);
- (ii) Further Belgrade. Belgrade should set the date for the next meeting in 2-3 years (Yugoslavia).

IV. PREPARATORY MEETING

A. East

- (a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

The Soviet Union has apparently dropped its hopes for a substantive preparatory meeting which would prepare the way for a brief formal main meeting. It now concludes the preparatory meeting will last 4-6 weeks and simply set the date, agenda and organization of the main meeting.

- (b) Romania

Although it once thought the preparatory meeting would be substantive, it appears now to advocate a technical meeting of 4-6 weeks duration.

B. Neutrals

The Neutrals too seem to have once thought that the preparatory meeting would include substantive work over a long period. Despite some remaining fears that substance will be unavoidable, they now seem to prefer a short technical meeting.

C. Non-aligned

The preparatory meeting should set only the date, agenda and modalities of the main meeting; the duration from 4-10 weeks (Yugoslavia),

V. MAIN MEETING

1. Organization

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

There are no up-to-date firm indications from Eastern countries on preferred organization. The Soviet Union said in July, 1976 that the meeting should avoid the mixture of main and sub-committees which existed at Phase II of the CSCE. Since then there have been only two vague references from other Eastern countries to the need to avoid "too organized" a meeting which would compete with Helsinki, and to the desirability of giving priority to plenary sessions.

(b) Romania

Plenary for opening statements, then committees for review and new proposals.

B. Neutrals

(i) Plenary

- for opening statements and then review discussion (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland);
- plus general discussion on détente (Finland, Sweden);
- plus Mediterranean and follow-up questions (Austria);
- plus all review discussion (Switzerland);
- plus concluding session (Finland);

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(ii) Committees

One for each of three first Baskets: for detailed discussion on review and new proposals (Austria, Finland, Sweden).

C. Non-aligned

(i) Plenary: for opening statements and general review discussion (Yugoslavia);

(ii) Committees: one for each of four Baskets: for detailed discussion on review and new proposals (Yugoslavia).

2. Agenda

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

No clear indication.

(b) Romania

Simple agenda based on text of Basket IV:

- (i) review;
- (ii) new proposals;
- (iii) follow-up.

B. Neutrals, and

C. Non-aligned

Little indication.

3. Procedures

CSCE rules of procedure to continue to apply (Romania, Switzerland).

4. Level of attendance

A. East

Soviet Union and others

Preparatory meeting: officials. Main meeting: officials with possibility of temporary presence of Deputy Ministers: at no point should it exceed level of Deputy Minister.

B. Neutrals

Preparatory meeting: officials. Main meeting: Vice-Ministers at main sessions.

C. Non-aligned

Preparatory meeting: officials. Main meeting: officials with Deputy Ministers at opening and closing sessions (Yugoslavia).

5. Duration

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

Not too long, and confined to 1977. Bulgaria recently said perhaps 2-3 months, but added that it should last as long as necessary.

(b) Romania

Begin 1st October and continue until finished - 2-4 months.

B. Neutrals

Duration of secondary importance (Finland, Sweden). If necessary continue beyond 1977 (Finland).

C. Non-aligned

Begin 1st or 15th September or on 1st October. Continue until end of 1977. Termination by consensus (Yugoslavia).

VI. CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

No "new Final Act" or "great political document". Might be a final communiqué (GDR).

(b) Romania

Document of about 10 pages in three parts:

- (i) factual summary of proceedings;
- (ii) conclusions of evaluation;
- (iii) decisions on future proposals, including the mandates of experts groups.

B. Neutrals

Should not compete with Final Act. Early Neutral idea that should be a series of documents, but latest Finnish comments suggest one document with several

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parts including texts of opening statements and any rebuttals and new proposals.

VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION

- (i) public general debate (Romania, Yugoslavia);
- (ii) public opening session, debate on détente and general debate on review (Finland);
- (iii) each Delegation should inform the press of its own interventions and not those of others (Finland).

VIII. SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. Participation by non-CSCE Mediterranean countries

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)
Unclear.

(b) Romania

Supports participation by these countries, but not special participation of any sub-regional group.

B. Neutrals

Support participation as at Geneva but opposed to large rôle (Sweden), including those who did not appear at Geneva (Switzerland).

C. Non-aligned

Participation on same basis as Geneva (Yugoslavia); presentation to Belgrade of a common position on part of non-aligned Mediterranean States (Yugoslavia, Malta).

2. Mediterranean issues

A. East

(a) Soviet Union and others (excluding Romania)

Indications that they wish to avoid discussion of Mediterranean issues.

(b) Romania

Favours extension of Principles to Mediterranean; stress on economic questions rather than security in Mediterranean area; against separate final document on Mediterranean.

B. Neutrals

Cautious towards discussion of Mediterranean questions, especially political and security questions, at Belgrade (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland).

Handle Mediterranean questions in plenary perhaps with follow-up experts groups but not to discuss applying CBMs to Mediterranean (Austria).

C. Non-aligned

Mediterranean should be a main topic at Belgrade, though not to overload the agenda. Present ideas include:

- (i) Mediterranean "ocean of peace";
- (ii) development of maritime context within CBM section with application to the Mediterranean;
- (iii) Non-aligned character of Malta to be recognized by all;
- (iv) extend Principles to Mediterranean;
- (v) co-operation in
 - (a) traffic;
 - (b) transport;
 - (c) tourism;
 - (d) environment;
 - (e) emigration;
 - (f) sports;
 - (g) co-operation between ports;
 - (h) co-operation with UN Regional Commissions for Europe, Africa and the Middle East in the fields of science and technology (Yugoslavia; Malta (i)-(iv)(probable)).

Yugoslavia plans to take an initiative before Belgrade to implement the invitation of the Colombo Non-aligned Summit to "Non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean to consult among themselves with a view to arriving at a common position, reflecting the aspirations of the Non-aligned movement as a whole, to be presented to the CSCE review conference in Belgrade".

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