

# CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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## NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

### 1973 PERFORMANCE AND INDICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 1974

#### Note by the Chairman of the Economic Committee

The present report, based on statistics prepared by the International Staff(1), comprises:

- a summary of the main features of NATO countries' trade with the Communist countries(2) in 1973, an indication of developments in 1974, and prospects for 1975;
  - an Annex explaining the causes of differences of Soviet data from OECD statistics regarding values of Soviet foreign trade with the developed West;
  - a series of statistical tables and graphs.
2. It is forwarded to the Council for information.

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(1) AC/127-D/492 of 29th July, 1974, AC/127-D/497 of 10th October, 1974, AC/127-D/501 of 19th December, 1974 and Corrigendum 2 to AC/127-WP/420

(2) Communist countries:

Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the GDR  
USSR

China

Other Communist countries: Albania, Korea, North Vietnam, these three countries together represent less than 1% of NATO countries' two-way trade with the Communist countries

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIESEleventh Report by the Economic CommitteeI. MAIN FEATURES OF 1973 TRADE

1. In 1973 two-way trade of NATO countries with Communist countries expanded more rapidly (+51.3%) than their overall trade (36.7%). It continued, nevertheless, to account for a small part of NATO countries' total world-wide trade (3.8%: 4.3% for exports and 3.2% for imports): however, the importance of this trade to member countries varied quite substantially from one to the other. It was minimal in the case of Portugal and relatively small in that of the Benelux countries. On the other hand, exports of Germany (7.6%) to this group of countries were not much below those to the United States (8.4% of overall sales). Percentages were even higher for Greek (11.7%), Turkish (10.1%) and Icelandic (8.7%) exports, though the figures were well below their levels of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In all cases the share of Eastern Europe in this trade was much larger than that of the USSR or China. Although somewhat smaller, the share of Communist countries in certain NATO countries' imports remained significant, Iceland 8.9%, Turkey 8.5%, Germany 6.2% and Italy 5.8%(1).

2. In their trade with Communist countries the Allied countries had a surplus of \$3.4 billion, exports exceeding imports by 25%. Were it not for this positive factor the aggregate deficit (\$5.2 billion) of NATO countries in their world trade would have been greater by some 65%. The surplus resulted mainly from trade with the USSR (\$1,031 million), China (\$988 million) and Poland (\$816 million). The United States, as a result of large grain sales but also following the expansion of deliveries of other commodities, recorded the largest trade surplus amounting to \$1,900 million. The Federal Republic of Germany was a close second with a positive trade balance of \$1,760 million. A large proportion of the United States surplus accrued from trade with the Soviet Union (\$976 million) and with China (\$626 million). Two countries, Italy and the United Kingdom, have seen a very substantial increase in their trade deficits which reached \$538 million and \$460 million, respectively. All other European Allies, with the exception of the Benelux area and France, also registered deficits.

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- (1) The rôle of NATO countries in Communist countries foreign trade in 1973 - or in 1972 when more decent data are not available - was significant and, in some cases, substantial.
- Approximate share in total exports of: USSR 16%, GDR 17%, Poland 27%, Czechoslovakia (1972) 14%, Hungary (1972) 18%, Rumania 29%, Bulgaria (1972) 9%, China 20%.
  - Approximate share in total imports of: USSR 22%, GDR 19%, Poland 33%, Czechoslovakia (1972) 16%, Hungary (1972) 21%, Rumania 34%, Bulgaria (1972) 11%, China 40%

(Source: National Statistics, except China for which IMF, GATT and OECD trade statistics have been used to reach an estimate)

C-M(75)30

-3-

3. The growth in exports of member countries to the Communist area was impressive, almost 60%. Of exports totalling \$13.7 billion, nearly one-third (\$4.3 billion) were channelled by Allied countries to the Soviet Union. Sales to that country actually increased by 61% in 1973. The United States and Germany were the principal trading partners, each supplying almost 28% of total Allied exports. France came third with 13.4% followed by Italy with 8.2%.

4. Sales to Eastern Europe, growing by 47%, amounted to \$7.5 billion, with Germany providing nearly one-half of total NATO countries' exports to Communist countries. Poland, having purchased \$2.5 billion in goods or twice as much as in 1972, replaced the GDR (\$1.6 billion) as the most important customer of the area. Rumania came third with purchases amounting to \$1.1 billion: an increase of 39% in one year.

5. Exports to China registered a record growth of 130% and rose to \$1.8 billion. The United States, having raised its exports more than elevenfold, became China's principal supplier (\$690 million), but many NATO European countries also did quite well, in particular Germany with sales reaching \$310 million (+88%), and the United Kingdom with exports growing by 165% to \$207 million.

6. In 1973 imports of Alliance countries from Communist countries rose faster than their imports from the whole world 42%, against 35%, reaching \$10.3 billion. The increase in North American purchases, in particular the United States, was quite remarkable, \$767 million against \$503 million in 1972, but the driving force in the expansion were the imports by European members of the Alliance which went up by 40% to reach \$9.5 billion. All countries without exception increased their purchases in the Communist area.

7. Purchases in the USSR amounted to \$3.3 billion. The United Kingdom with \$808 million was the main customer, although a large part of certain Soviet goods which it procures, such as diamonds and furs, are subsequently re-exported. France was the fourth ranking customer of the Soviet Union, it developed its purchases there quite substantially by 48% to \$433 million. The United States performance was even more impressive, purchases increasing more than twofold from \$96 million to \$214 million. Eastern Europe delivered some 60%, \$6.2 billion, of NATO countries' purchases in the Communist area. Supplies from Poland accounted for 27% of the total, but were still some \$816 million short of Polish imports from the NATO area. The GDR took second place with \$1.4 billion, of which almost \$1 billion represented sales to the Federal Republic of Germany. The latter, with purchases totalling \$2.6 billion, remained

Eastern Europe's major customer. Imports from China totalled \$797 million, 45% more than in 1972. The bulk of the purchases, \$680 million, were made by the European members of the Alliance whilst North American sales, although expanding, reached a modest figure of \$117 million. Thus, whilst the United States sold to China goods to the value of some \$690 million, its purchases in that country were less than one-tenth of that figure, \$64 million.

## II. INDICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 1974

8. In 1974 NATO countries' trade with Communist countries recorded a surplus of \$3.8 billion - comparable to that registered in 1973 (\$3.4 billion). However, the Alliance members' trade balance with the Soviet Union showed an insignificant deficit amounting to approximately \$85 million compared to the \$1,030 million surplus registered in 1973(1). On the other hand, the exports surplus with East European countries recorded a twofold increase reaching roughly \$2.6 billion(2). The trade surplus with China rose 30% to \$1.3 billion(3).

9. The Alliance countries' exports to the Soviet Union, East European countries and China amounted approximately to \$4.7 billion, \$10.3 billion and \$2.3 billion respectively. There was a substantial variation in the growth rates of exports to different Communist markets; exports to East European countries grew very rapidly (+37%); exports to China increased by 29% while sales to the Soviet Union registered a 9% growth. Exports of the European NATO countries to the USSR however grew much faster - +44% - thus outpacing the 34% growth recorded in the industrialised areas world-wide exports(4). The volume growth in exports, however, is likely to have been considerably less because of price increases throughout the year and modifications in the exchange rates of various currencies (i.e. Deutschmark)(5).

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- (1) Estimates for all of the OECD countries' trade balance with the USSR in 1974, however, shows a much larger deficit, amounting to \$1.3 billion. This is due to large deficits incurred by Finland, Japan and Sweden totalling about \$500 million, \$400 million and \$200 million respectively
- (2) The trade balance of all OECD countries with East European states might show a slightly larger export surplus (about \$2.9 billion) than that of NATO countries. Among non-NATO members of the OECD Japan and Austria should benefit from a trade surplus of approximately \$300 million and \$200 million, while Sweden and Switzerland might incur a sizeable trade deficit of the order of \$400 million and \$250 million respectively
- (3) OECD countries' trade balance with China, however, might show a considerably larger surplus (approximately \$2.2 billion) than that of NATO countries. The bulk of the surplus accruing to non-NATO members of the OECD should benefit Japan (about \$600 million) and Australia (about \$200 million)
- (4) GATT/1159, 13th March, 1975
- (5) The world trade is estimated to have increased by 5% in 1974 in volume while in value terms its growth is estimated at 44% (GATT/1159)

C-M(75)30

-5-

10. The Alliance countries' imports from the Soviet Union, East European countries and China totalled \$4.7 billion, \$7.6 billion and \$1 billion respectively. Imports from the Soviet Union expanded much more quickly (+46%) than from China (+27%) or from East European countries (+23%). Growth in the imports of the Alliance members from the USSR thus kept pace with the increase of 45% recorded in the industrialised areas' imports from the world.

(i) Trade with the Soviet Union

11. Trade balances of NATO countries with the Soviet Union varied considerably. West Germany and the United States recorded export surpluses. Compared to the previous year West Germany's trade surplus increased by some 10% to about \$500 million while that of the United States registered a sharp decline, from \$976 million in 1973 to \$259 million in 1974. The United Kingdom continued to have a sizeable trade deficit with the Soviet Union. It registered \$569 million in 1973 and rose to \$671 million in 1974. Italy's trade deficit in 1974 was twice as large as in 1973 amounting to \$180 million. European NATO countries' trade balance with the Soviet Union therefore showed a rising deficit of about \$350 million compared to \$214 million in 1973.

12. NATO countries' exports to the Soviet Union of approximately \$4.6 billion in 1974 registered an increase of only 9% over the 1973 level; this was due to a large extent to a drop of almost \$850 million (presumably mostly grain) in United States and Canadian exports. European NATO countries' sales to the USSR on the other hand recorded a rapid growth of 44%. West Germany, which is the chief trading partner of the Soviet Union among European NATO countries, expanded its exports by roughly 50% to over \$1.7 billion; Italy by some 70% - almost twice as fast as in 1973 - to about \$600 million. Exports of France, totalling \$660 million, however, registered an increase of about 15% in 1974 compared to 71% in 1973.

13. Outlays for Soviet goods (about \$4.7 billion) rose 46% in 1974 compared to 52% in 1973. With the exception of Turkey and Canada all NATO countries contributed to this upturn in 1974. West Germany remained the major customer raising its imports by 70% to \$1.2 billion. Increases exceeding 100%, 75% and 64% respectively were registered by the Netherlands, Italy and the United States.

(ii) Trade with East European countries

14. In 1974 East European countries extended their lead considerably as the most important Communist markets for NATO countries, which earned a trade surplus there of about \$2.6 billion. Three-quarters of the total NATO country surplus and over four-fifths of the surplus of the European members accrued to West Germany which remained by far the most important trading partner of East European states, focusing especially on Poland and East Germany. West Germany's exports totalling roughly \$4.9 billion to the area grew faster - 35% - than its imports which rose by 15% to about \$2.9 billion.

15. Among East European countries Poland and East Germany remained the principal markets - over one-half of the total NATO countries' exports to East Europe - about \$5.5 billion out of approximately \$10.3 billion - were directed to those countries. Poland and the GDR were also the principal suppliers of the Alliance members, accounting for one-half of the total East European countries' exports - about \$7.6 billion - to the members. Moreover one-half of the total trade surplus earned by NATO countries in Eastern Europe was recorded in trade with Poland.

16. In contrast to the previous year when exports of the Alliance members to Poland marked a record-breaking increase of 98%, in 1974 exports to Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania registered the most rapid growth - about 65%, 50% and 45% respectively. The rapid rise in exports of the members, however, was not matched by as fast a growth in their imports. Imports from Bulgaria rose roughly by 4%, from Hungary 13% and from Rumania 37%.

17. NATO countries' export surpluses with those three countries therefore increased considerably: the surplus with Hungary rose from \$8.8 million in 1973 to about \$340 million in 1974; the favourable trade balance with Bulgaria moved up from \$67 million in 1973 to \$285 million in 1974, and that with Rumania rose 75% and reached \$330 million.

18. The slowest rate of growth in the Alliance members' exports was registered in trade with Czechoslovakia. Exports rose some 20% to about \$1.3 billion while imports increased by about 15% to over \$1 billion.

(iii) Trade with China

19. NATO countries' export surplus of \$988 million in 1973 rose to \$1.3 billion in 1974. The bulk of the trade surplus again accrued to the United States (\$693 million) and to Canada (\$411 million).

C-M(75)30

-7-

20. NATO countries' exports to China rose some 30% - down from 130% in 1973 - to about \$2.3 billion, while their imports increased by 27% - half as fast as in the previous year - and amounted to approximately \$1.0 billion. The United States and Canada together accounted for over one-half of NATO countries' exports to China. The share of these two countries in the total NATO countries' imports from China, however, was much smaller - about 17%.

### III. TRADE PROSPECTS FOR 1975

21. East European countries: in 1975 as in the previous two years, NATO countries will most probably continue to have a sizeable surplus in their trade balance with Communist countries and in particular with Eastern European countries, although in 1974 the members' exports to the area expanded more slowly, about 37% compared to 47% in 1973. This trend may well continue over 1975 and might even deteriorate. The slowdown in the Alliance members' imports from East European countries in 1975, on the other hand, may be much more pronounced than in 1974 because of the present slowing of the economic activity in the West and a possible further slackening of demand for the type of goods which East European countries are exporting. Moreover, East European countries may be forced to divert some of their exportable goods from Western markets to the Soviet Union in order to pay for their purchases in the USSR of energy products and certain raw materials, the prices of which have increased considerably not only in the world markets but also within the COMECON area.

22. The bulk of the NATO countries' trade surplus with Eastern Europe will probably again accrue to West Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany is likely to remain the chief trading partner of the GDR with or without any governmental or other agreement on economic or industrial co-operation.

23. Poland and the GDR should remain the principal markets for NATO country exports, in particular machinery and equipment. Estimated Polish orders for machinery placed in NATO countries in 1974, part of which will be delivered in 1975, amounted to about \$1.1 billion, compared to \$254 million in 1973 and \$370 million in 1972. Poland will also probably continue to incur a sizeable trade deficit with NATO countries.

24. The relatively rapid expansion registered in NATO countries' exports to Rumania in 1974 may possibly decline in 1975. Rumania, which accounted for over 50% of total machinery orders placed in NATO countries by East European countries in 1973, reduced sharply its orders in 1974. The financial position of Rumania is quite weak: the burden of debt on Rumania's export earnings from NATO countries amounted to as much as 50% in 1973 which might constitute a serious constraint in 1975 on that country's trade relations with the Alliance members.

25. USSR: in 1975 NATO countries' trade with the Soviet Union may possibly be reconverted from a small deficit in 1974 into a surplus. Leaving aside the special trade in diamonds and furs, NATO countries' trade with the USSR might show a surplus for a number of reasons: as regards imports from the USSR, demand for Soviet oil and gas will no doubt remain strong. However, the price and/or volume of Soviet sales of raw materials could register a decline as a result of general slackening of economic activity in the West and the slowdown in demand in world markets for certain basic products. Furthermore, exportable surpluses in the USSR might also be reduced by growth of domestic demand or failures in meeting the objectives of the Plan.

26. In contrast, NATO countries' exports to the USSR in 1975 will probably grow faster than in 1974. The Soviet economy, not being affected unfavourably by the oil crisis and a general climate of recession as are NATO countries' economies, will maintain a relatively rapid rate of growth of demand for imports, particularly of Western machinery and technology. The improved financial situation which the USSR enjoys at present, due to the importance of its gold reserves and the high price of this metal on world markets, along with the export credit facilities available in NATO countries, also strengthens the capacity of that country to increase its purchases in NATO countries. Western equipment is increasingly needed by Soviet industries for exploitation of Soviet natural resources such as oil, coal, timber and metals for which there is a demand in world markets. The growing demand in the Soviet Union for Western machinery is already reflected in the volume of machinery orders placed in 1974 by the Soviet Union in NATO countries: \$4.5 billion(1) in 1974 compared to \$2.2 billion in 1973. Assuming that orders placed in 1974 are carried out over a period of five years, machinery and pipe exports from NATO countries to the USSR in 1975 may at least amount to \$1.5 billion, compared to roughly \$900 million in 1972.

27. But the size of the trade surplus in favour of NATO countries will greatly depend on how much grain the Soviet Union decides to buy from NATO countries, in particular from the United States and Canada.

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(1) This figure does not include the Soviet Union's machinery orders totalling \$2.4 billion placed in Italy, which are based on barter arrangements

C-M(75)30

-9-

28. The future development of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union still hinges on a number of political considerations and on the volume of credits which the Export-Import Bank is willing or able to grant to that country. Although the potential for a trade expansion exists, the rejection by the Soviet Union of the 1972 Trade Agreement with Washington makes it doubtful that US/USSR commerce will expand substantially in 1975. But if private American banks show more willingness to take risks by extending to the Soviet Union substantial credits without government guarantee(1), exports from the United States to the USSR may well rise considerably. Nevertheless there is a fair probability that the development of Soviet imports will still benefit some specific highly industrialised European countries like the FRG.

29. China: NATO countries should continue to have a sizeable trade surplus with China in 1975. This, however, would depend on the level of China's purchases of agricultural produce which probably accounted for almost one-half of its imports from NATO countries in 1974. If China continues to import as much foodstuffs in 1975 as in the period 1973-1974, its import surplus with NATO countries may well exceed \$1 billion. In such a case the bulk of the trade surplus accruing to NATO countries should benefit mostly North American NATO members whose trade surplus with China in 1973 and 1974 accounted for over four-fifths of total NATO countries' surpluses. On the other hand a sharp reduction of China's imports of foodstuffs in 1975 - although rather improbable - would considerably reduce the size of NATO countries' surplus with China. In that case the surplus may well amount to \$600 million compared to about \$1.3 billion in 1974 and may be distributed more or less evenly between European NATO countries and North American NATO members. In 1974 exports of the NATO European members rose by about 27% - down from 77% in 1973 - to approximately \$1 billion, while imports from China, growing by 23%, amounted to roughly \$840 million. This gave rise to a trade surplus totalling \$190 million in favour of European NATO countries. It is reasonable to assume that in the present economic world situation trade relations between European NATO countries and China will not differ very much from that registered in 1974. In this case exports of the European members of the Alliance to China should rise by some 30% to \$1.3 billion while imports, growing approximately 20%, would probably reach \$1,000 million.

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(1) The Financial Times reported that some American banks agreed to extend credits to the USSR of the order of \$500 million

30. China may continue to rely on Western credits to cover its trade deficit; with European members of the Alliance this deficit may well total \$300 million in 1975 and with North American NATO countries some \$300 million. Indeed, China now seems to accept supplier credit as a normal complement to machinery and complete plant purchases. China can, therefore, be expected to increase its use of Western credit to overcome its short-term foreign exchange problem. Thus, China would avoid an immediate drain on its reserves (estimated at about \$3,000 million) while continuing or increasing its purchases of badly needed Western technology. China's growing interest in Western machinery and equipment is reflected in the growing size of its orders placed in the West in recent years (nearly \$1.4 billion in 1973 and \$760 million in the first eight months of 1974). Outside NATO countries China's trade will probably grow most rapidly with Japan which has recently become an important customer of China's fast-growing oil industry. Indeed, China's oil exports to Japan are expected to rise to eight to ten million tons in 1975.

CAUSES OF DIFFERENCES OF SOVIET DATA FROM OECD  
STATISTICS REGARDING VALUES OF SOVIET-WESTERN TRADE

1. Data recently published in the West and in the East differ in regard to the balance of Soviet trade with industrialised Western countries in 1974. This note examines the causes of these differences.

2. It appears that for the year 1974 there is a difference of the order of \$1,000 million between (i) the Soviet trade surplus with OECD countries as reflected in OECD data and (ii) the Soviet trade surplus with industrialised Western nations as indicated in Soviet figures. This discrepancy has appeared in earlier years as well and for comparable amounts.

	1971	1972	1973	1974
(1) OECD data (Soviet trade balance with OECD countries(a))	+420	-456	-456	+1,300(c)
(2) Soviet data (Soviet trade balance with industrial West(b))	-129	-1,215	-1,120	+250(d)
Difference: (2)-(1)	-549	-771	-764	-1,050

- (a) Statistics of Foreign Trade, OECD (monthly bulletins)
- (b) Foreign Trade of the USSR, Moscow (statistical yearbooks); for 1974 figures, Economic Gazette, Moscow, No. 15, April 1975
- (c) Advance estimate (partly by extrapolation) on basis of OECD figures which show trade of some Western countries for only 10 or 11 months (see Table III and also AC/127-WP/420, 27th January, 1975 and Corrigenda)
- (d) Advance estimate (see Table III, footnote (d))

In effect, Soviet data reflect a trade balance that has been several hundred million dollars less favourable to the USSR than that shown in OECD figures.

A. Main factors explaining the discrepancy

3. The following are the better-known factors that are believed to cause the apparent inconsistencies between the two series of data:

- (i) Differences in Western countries included in trade totals. This discrepancy is easily rectified but that does not solve the problem. In the Soviet definition "Industrialised Western countries" consist of Common Market nations, Canada, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Austria, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. On the other hand, OECD countries include these plus Turkey, Greece, Iceland, Spain and Portugal. Deduction of these five countries from the OECD list reduces but does not eliminate the discrepancy between trade balances:

SOVIET TRADE SURPLUS WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST

(million dollars)

	1972	1973	1974
(1) OECD data	-576	-592	+1,050
(2) Soviet data	-1,215	-1,120	+250
Difference: (2)-(1)	-639	-528	-800

Tables I through III show the differences between the two data series in more detail, comparing the magnitudes of Soviet exports, imports, and balance for the industrial West as a whole and for the Western areas where most of the discrepancy was reflected. Such variations have been so appreciable that one Western authority termed it "pointless to compare magnitudes from Western sources with those from Soviet sources".

- (ii) The time factor. Many Western goods exported in December 1973 did not arrive in the USSR until January 1974; these transactions thus appeared under different years in OECD and Soviet statistics on foreign trade. This situation would be especially likely for Western countries that are geographically distant - e.g. the United States - from Soviet ports and might thus explain part of the statistical deviations as regards these countries in 1972 and 1973 (see Tables I and II). The Soviet trade deficit with the United States in 1973, for instance, was more than \$200 million greater in Soviet data than in OECD figures. This might conceivably reflect

sizeable deliveries in early 1973 of grain that was shipped from the United States in late 1972; if so, the value of such shipments would be included in 1973 Soviet imports in Soviet but not in United States accounts.

- (iii) Re-exports. Some Western countries re-export to the USSR goods originating in developing countries. Such transactions may appear in Soviet accounts as imports from the Western re-exporter. The latter, however, may consider such a shipment as a Soviet import from the developing country concerned; in this case it would be excluded from OECD data on Western commerce with the USSR. Similarly deliveries to Eastern Europe of US grain paid for by the USSR have appeared as a Soviet import in Soviet statistics (because the USSR was the purchaser) but not in US figures (because the shipment was attributed to the East European country where it was delivered).
- (iv) Differences in valuation of shipments: FOB vs CIF. While the value assigned to Soviet imports is FOB ("free on board") in both data series, they differ as regards Soviet exports, which are valued FOB by the USSR but CIF (cost, insurance and freight) by Western Europe and Japan. The insurance and freight charges are usually estimated at about 7% of the cargo value. These extra costs make the Soviet trade balance more positive or less negative in OECD data than in Soviet figures, where they are considered instead as part of transport payments under "invisible" accounts.
- (v) Flexible exchange rates. Since 1971 values of shipments by industrial Western countries in foreign trade have fluctuated considerably during the year because of shifts in rates of exchange among world currencies. By using dollar figures to express trade magnitudes over a year, the OECD and Western governments have attempted to convert the value of each shipment from the currency in which it was transacted into US dollars at the rate then prevailing. In the case of commerce with the USSR, this means that the dollar value of a Soviet shipment sold, e.g. for Deutschmarks, could vary considerably depending upon the precise time during the year when the transaction took place. This may not be the case in Soviet accounts, which apparently assume relatively constant exchange rates during a given year.

ANNEX I to  
C-M(75)30

-4-

- (vi) Change of destination of shipment en route. Instructions regarding a given shipment from a Western country might occasionally be changed while the cargo is en route. If the USSR is the ultimate destination, the transaction would appear as a Soviet import in Soviet data; Western statistics, however, might attribute the shipment to the original destination noted in the export invoice filed at the port of departure.
- (vii) Extrapolation made when using OECD data. At the time the advance estimate of the 1974 Soviet trade surplus was carried out, relevant OECD data were incomplete: i.e. for some Western countries, figures were available for only 10 or 11 months of 1974 (see Table III, footnote (c)). In such cases, the estimate of the trade balance with the USSR was based on extrapolation plus adjustments to take into account the expected impact of the recession on Western demand and imports.

B. General comments

4. From the practical point of view of the users, one should also remark that while OECD and Soviet data indeed give different information as regards levels of Soviet-Western exchanges, they may nevertheless be in step with each other concerning another significant feature - i.e. year-to-year trends in this commerce. In this respect the two series of statistics have agreed and yielded similar indications. As Table IV shows, both OECD figures and Soviet data reflect the same feature of:

- (i) very little change in the Soviet trade balance in 1973 as compared with 1972; and
- (ii) a pronounced shift from deficit to surplus in 1974.

5. The two statistical systems do not yield much different results and thus both can be regarded as useful and relevant for policy-makers in NATO. The Alliance is interested in assessing whether Soviet economic capabilities are becoming stronger or weaker, whether the potentials of the USSR as customer and supplier are increasing or decreasing. An important part of the answer to such questions is information on year-to-year changes such as OECD and Soviet figures provide - and without contradicting each other to a significant degree.

6. In regard to levels of Soviet-Western exports, imports and trade balances, discrepancies are inevitable and - for 1974 - are considerable, as shown above. In view of the number of factors involved, however, the magnitude of the discrepancy seems quite understandable and acceptable. Moreover the trends reflected in both series are much alike.

TABLE I

SOVIET EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST(a), 1972: DIFFERENCES OF SOVIET FROM OECD DATA

(million US dollars(b))

<u>Type of Data</u>	Soviet Exports		Soviet Imports		Balance		
	OECD	Soviet	OECD	Soviet	(1) OECD	(2) Soviet	Differ- ence(c) (2)-(1)
<u>Industrial West</u>	-	-	-	-	-576	-1,215	-639
Japan	590	465	505	540	+85	-75	-160
EEC	1,824	1,660	1,716	1,860	+108	-200	-308

- (a) The industrial West consists of Common Market countries, Canada, Norway, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland
- (b) Dollar figures shown under the "Soviet" columns are derived from rouble figures in Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1973, Moscow at an exchange rate of \$1.215 per rouble
- (c) The minus sign signifies that Soviet data indicated a Soviet trade balance that was more negative or less positive than OECD figures

TABLE II

SOVIET EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST(a), 1973: DIFFERENCES OF SOVIET FROM OECD DATA

(million US dollars(b))

<u>Type of Data</u>	Soviet Exports		Soviet Imports		Balance		
	OECD	Soviet	OECD	Soviet	(1) OECD	(2) Soviet	Differ- ence(c) (2)-(1)
<u>Industrial West</u>	-	-	-	-	-592	-1,120	-528
Japan	1,080	835	480	500	+600	+335	-265
US	216	167	1,190	1,375	-974	-1,208	-234

- (a) See Table I, footnote (a)
- (b) See Table I, footnote (b), with exception that exchange rate for 1973 was \$1.345 per rouble
- (c) See Table I, footnote (c)

ANNEX I to  
C-M(75)30

-6-

TABLE III

SOVIET TRADE BALANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST(a), 1974:  
DIFFERENCE OF SOVIET FROM OECD DATA

(million US dollars(b))

<u>OECD DATA(c)</u> (1)	<u>SOVIET DATA(d)</u> (2)	<u>DIFFERENCE(e)</u> (2)-(1)
+1,050	+250	-800

- (a) See Table I, footnote (a)
- (b) See Table II, footnote (b)
- (c) Advance estimate on basis of OECD Statistics on Foreign Trade, February 1975, which reports trade of some Western countries in 1974 for only 10 or 11 months
- (d) Approximate value, indicated by article in Economic Gazette (Moscow, No. 15, April 1975) which implied that the surplus was between about 100 and 300 million roubles (i.e. \$135 to \$400 million)
- (e) See Table I, footnote (c)

TABLE IV

SOVIET TRADE BALANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST, 1972-1974:  
COMPARISON OF YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES

(million dollars)

	(1) 1972 Value	(2) 1973		(3) 1974	
		Value	Difference (2)-(1)	Value	Difference (3)-(2)
OECD data	-576	-592	-16	+1,300	+1,892
Soviet data	-1,215	-1,120	+95	+250	+1,370

SOURCES: Tables I to III

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TABLE I

NATO COUNTRY EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS  
A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTAL EXPORTS

	1960	1971	1972	1973	1974(2)
Belgium/Luxembourg	3.7	1.5	1.7	2.4	3.0
Denmark	3.9	4.0	3.5	3.2	3.8
France	4.0	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.1
Federal Republic of Germany(1)	6.6	6.8	7.0	7.6	8.2
Greece	22.0	13.0	13.6	11.7	11.7
Iceland	23.1	10.9	12.1	8.7	12.5
Italy	5.8	5.4	4.7	4.8	5.8
Netherlands	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.5
Norway	4.8	2.8	3.7	3.5	4.3
Portugal	2.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8
Turkey	12.2	12.3	11.9	10.1	10.9
United Kingdom	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.1
<b>Total NATO Europe</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>5.2</b>
Canada	0.8	2.1	3.1	2.7	2.1
United States	1.0	0.9	1.8	3.5	2.3
<b>Total NATO North America</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>2.2</b>
<b>Total NATO</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.3</b>

- (1) In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany the figures cover both exports to the Communist countries and deliveries to the GDR
- (2) Percentages are approximations, see footnote (\*), Table VI

ANNEX II to  
C-M(75)30

-2-

TABLE II

NATO COUNTRY IMPORTS FROM THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS  
A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTAL IMPORTS

	1960	1971	1972	1973	1974(2)
Belgium/Luxembourg	2.2	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1
Denmark	4.9	3.3	3.4	3.8	4.6
France	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.1	2.9
Federal Republic of Germany(1)	7.1	5.8	5.9	6.2	6.4
Greece	7.9	5.0	5.5	5.5	4.6
Iceland	22.7	10.2	10.4	8.9	13.5
Italy	6.1	6.0	6.2	5.8	4.9
Netherlands	2.6	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.2
Norway	3.4	4.2	3.2	3.0	2.8
Portugal	1.5	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.7
Turkey	9.1	10.4	10.8	8.5	7.5
United Kingdom	3.6	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.2
<b>Total NATO Europe</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>4.0</b>
Canada (fob)	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
United States (fob)	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0
<b>Total NATO North America</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.9</b>
<b>Total NATO</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.1</b>

(1) In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany the figures cover both imports from the Communist countries and deliveries by the GDR

(2) Percentages are approximations, see footnote (\*), Table VI

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TABLE III  
NATO COUNTRIES' BALANCE OF TRADE WITH THE  
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES  
(US \$ million)

	1960	1971	1972	1973	1974(2)
Belgium/Luxembourg	53.16	-46.68	-16.44	102.96	259.9
Denmark	-30.48	-6.36	-19.80	-95.88	-156.4
France	96.00	187.44	175.32	287.88	327.5
Federal Republic of Germany(1)	25.29	351.53	903.55	1,760.48	2,822.4
Greece	-10.56	-18.83	-9.98	-19.71	27.1
Iceland	-4.80	-5.04	-1.10	-6.56	-28.6
Italy	-78.00	-156.48	-333.48	-538.44	-288.6
Netherlands	-49.32	-22.44	-12.48	45.60	61.3
Norway	-6.60	-98.88	-21.12	-21.96	35.5
Portugal	-0.72	-15.49	-12.37	-17.95	-10.9
Turkey	-3.36	-29.89	-56.85	-46.34	-100.4
United Kingdom	-99.12	-244.20	-304.20	-460.32	-549.1
<b>Total NATO Europe</b>	<b>-108.51</b>	<b>-105.32</b>	<b>291.05</b>	<b>989.76</b>	<b>2,399.7</b>
Canada (fob)	26.52	276.84	473.52	498.00	445.8
United States (fob)	114.00	155.76	526.20	1,903.80	1,233.4
<b>Total NATO North America</b>	<b>140.52</b>	<b>432.60</b>	<b>999.72</b>	<b>2,401.80</b>	<b>1,679.2</b>
<b>Total NATO</b>	<b>32.01</b>	<b>327.28</b>	<b>1,290.77</b>	<b>3,391.56</b>	<b>4,078.9</b>

- (1) In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany the figures cover trade with the GDR  
 (2) Figures are partly extrapolated, see footnote (\*), Table VI

## NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX II to/ANNEXE II au  
C-M(75)30

TABLE IV/TABLEAU IV

RECAPITULATION OF OVERALL DEVELOPMENT 1959-1974 FOR NATO EUROPE, NATO NORTH AMERICA AND TOTAL NATO  
RECAPITULATION DU DEVELOPPEMENT GLOBAL 1959-1974 POUR OTAN EUROPE, OTAN AMERIQUE DU NORD ET TOTAL OTAN1. EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPE, THE USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE WORLD  
1. EXPORTATIONS VERS L'EUROPE DE L'EST, L'URSS, LA CHINE COMMUNISTE ET LE MONDE

Millions US Dollars (Annual Totals) - Millions de Dollars EU (Totaux annuels)

		EASTERN EUROPE EUROPE DE L'EST			USSR URSS			COMMUNIST CHINA CHINE COMMUNISTE			TOTAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TOTAL DES PAYS COMMUNISTES			WORLD MONDE		
		NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO
(0)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
1	1959	963	107	1,070	403	20	423	330	2	332	1,696	129	1,825	38,282	22,778	61,060
2	1960	1,066	182	1,248	624	48	672	335	9	344	2,025	239	2,264	45,512	25,861	69,373
3	1961	1,187	159	1,346	691	70	761	156	121	277	2,034	350	2,384	46,724	26,448	73,172
4	1962	1,237	147	1,384	733	23	756	134	138	272	2,104	308	2,412	49,205	27,293	76,498
5	1963	1,282	184	1,466	630	162	792	157	97	254	2,069	443	2,512	53,767	29,393	83,160
6	1964	1,470	342	1,812	585	439	1,024	164	126	290	2,219	907	3,126	59,927	33,785	93,712
7	1965	1,760	194	1,954	590	227	817	313	97	410	2,663	519	3,182	67,118	35,111	102,229
8	1966	2,283	218	2,501	587	338	925	423	171	594	3,322	734	4,056	73,407	39,871	113,278
9	1967	2,461	178	2,639	870	180	1,050	531	84	615	3,887	447	4,334	76,938	42,082	119,020
10	1968	2,436	201	2,637	1,154	140	1,294	451	151	602	4,069	495	4,564	86,233	46,963	133,196
11	1969	2,766	159	2,925	1,399	155	1,514	435	113	548	4,667	391	5,058	96,974	51,742	148,716
12	1970	3,220	270	3,490	1,474	215	1,689	473	135	608	5,197	625	5,822	112,382	59,361	171,743
13	1971	3,704	263	3,967	1,451	287	1,738	417	202	619	5,603	763	6,366	128,071	61,813	189,884
14	1972	4,753	336	5,089	1,825	833	2,658	456	322	778	7,073	1,503	8,576	158,968	69,854	228,821
15	1973	6,781	685	7,467	2,802	1,482	4,285	808	977	1,785	10,531	3,169	13,699	219,171	95,510	315,681
16	1974(1)	9,314	957	10,271	4,035	639	4,674	1,027	1,282	2,309	14,682	2,933	17,615	282,410	130,894	413,304

(1) Figures are partly extrapolated, see footnote (\*) in Table VI

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E DANNEX II to/ANNEXE II au  
C-M(75)30TABLE V/TABLEAU V

RECAPITULATION OF OVERALL DEVELOPMENT 1959-1974 FOR NATO EUROPE, NATO NORTH AMERICA AND TOTAL NATO  
 RECAPITULATION DU DEVELOPEMENT GLOBAL 1959-1974 POUR OTAN EUROPE, OTAN AMERIQUE DU NORD ET TOTAL OTAN

2. IMPORTS FROM EASTERN EUROPE, THE USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE WORLD  
 2. IMPORTATIONS EN PROVENANCE DE L'EUROPE DE L'EST, L'URSS, LA CHINE COMMUNISTE ET LE MONDE

Millions US Dollars (Annual Totals) - Millions de Dollars EU (Totaux annuels)

	EASTERN EUROPE EUROPE DE L'EST			USSR URSS		COMMUNIST CHINA CHINE COMMUNISTE			TOTAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TOTAL DES PAYS COMMUNISTES			WORLD MONDE			
	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	NATO EUROPE	NATO NORTH AMERICA	TOTAL NATO	
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
1 1959	957	62	1,019	642	30	672	191	5	196	1,790	97	1,887	40,080	20,885	60,965
2 1960	1,145	67	1,212	758	26	784	231	6	237	2,134	99	2,233	47,494	20,515	68,009
3 1961	1,202	71	1,273	790	25	815	181	4	185	2,173	100	2,273	50,131	20,054	70,185
4 1962	1,256	76	1,332	858	18	876	159	4	163	2,273	98	2,371	54,295	22,101	76,396
5 1963	1,450	76	1,526	930	24	954	163	5	168	2,543	105	2,648	60,354	23,113	83,467
6 1964	1,554	101	1,655	896	24	920	220	9	229	2,670	134	2,804	67,504	25,652	93,156
7 1965	1,781	123	1,904	1,098	52	1,150	293	14	307	3,172	189	3,361	73,213	29,268	102,481
8 1966	2,037	168	2,205	1,216	60	1,276	361	19	380	3,623	248	3,871	79,219	34,669	113,888
9 1967	2,143	187	2,330	1,323	63	1,386	320	24	344	3,796	273	4,069	82,085	37,066	119,151
10 1968	2,249	191	2,440	1,388	78	1,466	322	22	344	3,977	291	4,268	90,558	44,553	135,111
11 1969	2,568	203	2,771	1,519	63	1,582	376	25	401	4,499	291	4,790	106,557	49,188	155,745
12 1970	3,016	209	3,225	1,643	81	1,724	353	18	371	5,050	309	5,359	123,526	53,271	176,797
13 1971	3,496	232	3,728	1,790	70	1,860	378	28	406	5,708	331	6,039	137,891	61,062	198,953
14 1972	4,236	311	4,546	2,023	111	2,134	469	81	550	6,782	503	7,285	162,501	74,477	236,979
15 1973	5,771	412	6,183	3,016	237	3,254	680	117	797	9,541	767	10,308	228,444	92,427	320,871
16 1974(1)	6,950	703	7,653	4,387	372	4,759	838	178	1,016	12,282	1,255	13,537	308,460	132,953	441,413

(1) Figures are partly extrapolated, see footnote (\*) in Table VI

TABLE VI

NATO COUNTRIES TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, EAST EUROPE AND CHINA IN 1974(\*)

(In US \$ million)

	USSR			EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES			CHINA			OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES		
	Exports	Imports	Trade balance	Exports	Imports	Trade balance	Exports	Imports	Trade balance	Exports	Imports	Trade balance
BELGIUM	354.9	256.7	+ 98.2	457.6	292.7	+ 164.9	33.3	46.7	- 13.4	19.4	9.2	+ 10.2
DENMARK	42.6	125.2	- 82.6	236.6	299.0	- 62.4	14.2	29.4	- 15.2	4.3	0.5	+ 3.8
FRANCE	660.2	587.6	+ 72.6	950.5	739.2	+ 211.3	160.4	183.7	- 23.3	102.8	35.9	+ 66.9
FRG	1,743.9	1,215.2	+ 528.7	4,966.3	2,971.9	+1,994.4	408.7	190.0	+ 218.7	103.3	22.7	+ 80.6
GREECE	71.7	55.9	+ 15.8	143.8	135.4	+ 8.4	2.1	1.9	+ 0.2	4.7	2.0	+ 2.7
ICELAND	23.7	49.1	- 25.4	17.5	20.4	- 2.9	0.2	0.5	- 0.3	-	-	-
ITALY	595.8	775.4	- 179.6	981.7	1,076.9	- 95.2	103.4	116.4	- 13.0	21.4	22.2	- 0.8
NETHERLANDS	169.9	228.1	- 58.2	569.1	410.2	+ 158.9	48.0	97.6	- 49.6	16.1	5.9	+ 10.2
NORWAY	36.0	68.7	- 32.7	160.1	153.6	+ 6.5	72.0	9.9	+ 62.1	-	0.4	- 0.4
PORTUGAL	1.2	1.4	- 0.2	15.8	25.1	- 9.3	0.6	0.7	- 0.1	-	1.3	- 1.3
TURKEY(1)	77.5	95.0	- 17.5	67.9	162.5	- 94.6	16.7	4.7	+ 12.0	0.8	1.1	- 0.3
UNITED KINGDOM	257.3	928.6	- 671.3	746.8	662.9	+ 83.9	167.4	156.2	+ 11.2	32.9	5.8	+ 27.1
<u>TOTAL OF EUROPEAN(2) NATO COUNTRIES</u>	4,034.7	4,386.9	- 352.2	9,313.7	6,949.8	+2,363.9	1,027.0	837.7	+ 189.3	305.7	107.0	+198.7
CANADA (FOB)	30.0	21.7	+ 8.3	135.4	162.8	- 27.4	474.8	63.7	+ 411.1	54.9	1.1	+ 53.8
UNITED STATES (FOB)	609.2	350.3	+ 258.9	821.8	540.1	+ 281.7	807.5	114.7	+ 692.8	0.5	0.5	-
<u>TOTAL OF NATO COUNTRIES</u>	4,673.9	4,758.9	- 85.0	10,270.9	7,652.7	+2,618.2	2,309.3	1,016.1	+1,293.2	361.1	108.6	+252.5
<u>TOTAL OF OECD COUNTRIES(3)</u>	7,002.9(3)	8,307.9	-1,305.0	11,448.0	8,562.8	+2,885.2	4,693.6	2,542.8	+2,150.8	722.0	258.1	+463.9

(1) Data supplied by the Turkish Delegation, except those concerning trade with "other Communist countries", which has been drawn from statistics

(2) Exports FOB, Imports CIF

(3) Figures for total OECD countries' trade may diverge from the individual members' aggregate trade figures, because the annual figure for total OECD countries' trade is extrapolated by using the eleven months average quoted in the OECD statistics, published in February 1975, whereas in the case of each member country annual figures are given where available, or extrapolation is made on the basis of the average for ten or eleven months depending on current data availability

Sources: Statistics of Foreign Trade OECD/OCDE, February 1975, Wirtschaft und Statistik 1/75  
Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden Verlag W. Kohlhammer


(\*) Where full data for 1974 are not given estimates have been made on the basis of figures available for ten or eleven months as the case may be

GRAPH I - GRAPHIQUE I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE  
WITH THE WORLD AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1959-1974

LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN  
AVEC LE MONDE ET LES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1959-1974

NATO EUROPE EXPORTS 1960 = 100 (\*)  
EXPORTATIONS OTAN EUROPE 1960 = 100 (\*)



(\*) The absolute values (million US \$) for 1974 would read as follows :  
USSR = 4.035; Eastern Europe = 9.314; Communist China = 1.027; World = 282.410

Les valeurs absolues (en millions de \$ EU) des exportations pour 1974 s'établissent comme suit :  
URSS = 4.035; Europe de l'Est = 9.314; Chine Communiste = 1.027; Monde = 282.410


(x) 1974 : Partly extrapolated figures  
1974 : Chiffres en partie extrapolés

GRAPH II - GRAPHIQUE II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE  
WITH THE WORLD AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1959 - 1974

LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN  
AVEC LE MONDE ET LES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1959 - 1974

NATO EUROPE IMPORT 1960 = 100 (\*)  
IMPORTATIONS OTAN EUROPE 1960 = 100 (\*)



(\*) The absolute values (million US \$) for 1974 would read as follows :  
USSR = 4,387; Eastern Europe = 6.950; Communist China = 838; World = 308.460


Les valeurs absolues (en millions de \$ EU) des importations pour 1974 s'établissent comme suit :  
URSS = 4,387; Europe de l'Est = 6.950; Chine Communiste = 838; Monde = 308.460

(x) 1974 : Partly extrapolated figures  
1974 : Chiffres en partie extrapolés

**GRAPH III - GRAPHIQUE III**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE  
WITH THE WORLD AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1959 - 1974**

**LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN  
AVEC LE MONDE ET LES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1959 - 1974**



(\*) The absolute values (million US \$) for 1974 would read as follows :  
USSR = 639; Eastern Europe = 957; Communist China = 1.282; World = 130.894

Les valeurs absolues (en millions de \$ EU) des exportations pour 1974 s'établissent comme suit :  
URSS = 639; Europe de l'Est = 957; Chine Communiste = 1.282; Monde = 130.894


(x) 1974 : Partly extrapolated figures  
1974 : Chiffres en partie extrapolés

GRAPH IV . GRAPHIQUE IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE  
WITH THE WORLD AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1959 - 1974

LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN  
AVEC LE MONDE ET LES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1959 - 1974

NATO NORTH AMERICA IMPORTS 1960 = 100 (\*)  
IMPORTATIONS OTAN AMERIQUE DU NORD 1960 = 100 (\*)



(\*) The absolute values (million US \$) for 1974 would read as follows :  
USSR = 372; Eastern Europe = 703; Communist China = 178; World = 132.953


Les valeurs absolues (en millions de \$ EU) des importations pour 1974 s'établissent comme suit :  
URSS = 372; Europe de l'Est = 703; Chine Communiste = 178; Monde = 132.953

(x) 1974 : Partly extrapolated figures  
1974 : Chiffres en partie extrapolés

GRAPH V - GRAPHIQUE V

III - C1 - NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1969 - 1974

III - C1 - COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN AVEC CHACUN DES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1969 - 1974



III - C2 - NATO COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1969 - 1974  
III - C2 - COMMERCE DES PAYS DE L'OTAN AVEC CHACUN DES PAYS COMMUNISTES 1969 - 1974

