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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION
IN EUROPE

BACKGROUND PAPERS

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NATO,
1110 Brussels.

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PRACTICES OF VARIOUS WARSAW PACT STATES AS THEY
RELATE TO THE FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, IDEAS
AND INFORMATION AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

Background Paper of the United States Delegation,
11th November, 1971

1. As part of the Alliance's preparations for any eventual Conference on European Security, the United States Delegation would like to submit the attached paper which briefly analyzes the practices of individual Warsaw Pact States in some of the areas falling under the proposed "Freer Movement" Agenda item. This analysis suggests that while there is a basic identity in the overall practices of the Warsaw Pact countries, there are also significant shadings of difference which may have a bearing on any eventual negotiation. Comments by other delegations on the points made in our paper would be welcomed.

I. The USSR

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to Non-Communist Countries:

2. Soviet policy on tourist travel to Western countries continues to be very restrictive. Foreign travel, particularly to Western countries, is generally a reward which the Party grants to its most loyal and successful members. Even for these classes of persons, individual travel to the West is almost unheard of, and well-chaperoned group tours remain the rule.

3. With the significant recent exception of Jewish immigration to Israel, Soviet policy on granting immigrant visas remains highly restrictive. In the case of the Soviet Jews, a very substantial increase in the number of exit documents granted has been noted in 1971. It has been suggested, however, that this reflects a conscious policy of allowing activists among the Soviet Jewish community to leave in the hope that the remaining Jews will be easier to control. Be that as it may, more time must elapse before any definite judgment can be made. Excluding cases involving immigration to Israel, the number of cases approved does not appear to have increased of late. Most of those receiving their exit documents are old, retired persons whose departure represents no loss (and possibly even a marginal gain) to the Soviet State.

(b) Jamming of Western Broadcasts:

4. As far as can be determined, the Soviets jam all Western broadcasts in one of the USSR's native languages (i.e. Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Turkish, etc.).

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However, the effectiveness of this jamming varies substantially from place to place, with major metropolitan areas receiving priority attention. Foreign language broadcasts (i.e. VOA English, BBC English, Deutsche Welle German) are not jammed. Jamming of VOA Russian and other Soviet-language broadcasts was resumed on 20th August, 1968 after a hiatus of four years.

(c) Distribution of Western (Non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals, and Films:

5. A few copies of Western European daily papers are sold in hotels which cater to foreign tourists. The numbers (perhaps 50 copies per day in a city such as Moscow) are insignificant. No non-Communist periodicals are sold. Major Soviet libraries and academic institutions have subscriptions to Western newspapers and periodicals. However, these publications are kept in special areas to which access is strictly controlled. The exposure of the Soviet population to Western films is relatively much greater, despite frequent criticism of this practice by more conservative Party publications. The official justification of continued showings of Western films is that this enables the USSR to sell its films in the West. Not surprisingly, many of the Western films shown in the USSR present Western societies in a less than favorable light.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

6. The Soviet Union is a party to neither international copyright convention (UCC or Berne Union) and shows no signs of joining either. In recent years, several approaches have been made to Soviet authorities by groups representing US authors, publishers, and composers in an attempt to promote Soviet adherence to one or the other Convention. These approaches, as well as those which we understand have been made by similar groups from other Western countries, have not yielded the desired results. Consequently, the Soviets consider themselves free to use any foreign publication as they see fit, and ignore authors' rights. This has not prevented them from using Western copyright practices to their advantage, such as in the case of Marshal Zhukov's memoirs. This book was first published in the West (in Russian) in order to qualify it for copyright protection under the UCC.

(e) Working Conditions for Western Journalists:

7. Soviet authorities attempt with varying degrees of success to restrict Western journalists to officially-approved sources of information. All contacts with government or economic officials must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's Press Department. Unofficial contacts are discouraged, both

through pressures on the Soviet citizen involved (including imprisonment) and pressure on the Western journalist (including expulsion). Journalists are subject to the same closed areas which apply to diplomats.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists Within the USSR:

8. As a general rule, Western tourists are subject to the same closed-area restrictions which apply to diplomats and journalists and have the effect of closing about 95% of the USSR's land area to foreigners. Individual travel is discouraged in favor of group tours, which are easier to control.

(g) Extent to Which Local News Media under Censorship and Cultural Life under Party Control:

9. In the case of the USSR, media censorship and Party control over cultural life approaches 100%. Since the advent of the current CPSU leadership in October 1964, the movement has been almost exclusively in the direction of tighter controls and less Party tolerance towards experimentation in the arts.

II. EAST GERMANY

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to non-Communist Countries:

10. The East Germans do not publish statistics on travel to non-Communist countries. However, during the last full year (1969) of its operation, the Allied Travel Office issued 8,577 temporary travel documents for travel to NATO countries. There is no reason to believe that this figure has decreased, but it is impossible to measure the change. This relatively small figure reflects the tight controls which the East German authorities maintain over most travel to the West. However, as a result of special conditions in Germany, a rather large number of East German pensioners are allowed to visit the Federal Republic of Germany each year under a 1964 law. During the last three years, slightly over 1 million East Germans have taken advantage of this law each year.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

11. Federal German television can be received throughout East Germany by means of an additional antenna, and there are no indications of interference with these broadcasts. (This would be technically very difficult in any event). In response to the German Federal Republic competition, East German television tends to show films and other programs not generally available in other Warsaw Pact countries. RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) broadcasts are jammed on medium wave 24 hours per day in major East German cities, but FM and shortwave broadcasts are not jammed. As far as we can determine, there is no jamming of Deutschlandfunk or Sender Freies Berlin.

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(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals and Films:

12. Western non-Communist newspapers and periodicals are not available on newsstands in East Germany. Under a 1963 law, university libraries and other approved institutions can obtain Western publications, but access to these publications is strictly controlled. Western films are occasionally shown in East Germany, some presumably because of their "progressive" content but most because of their entertainment value (i.e. "Funny Girl", Jerry Lewis films, etc.)

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

13. In August 1970, East Germany announced its simultaneous adherence to the Stockholm World Intellectual Property Convention and the Berne Copyright Union. We have no record of copyright violations since August 1970, but we also have no information on how royalties are paid.

(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

14. There are only two Western (non-Communist) correspondents (Reuters and AFP) accredited in East Berlin, and only the Reuters man is resident in East Berlin. With occasional exceptions of Western journalists who offend, or whose publications offend, the East German authorities, Western correspondents may go into East Berlin on one-day passes. To enter East Germany proper, all Western correspondents must have visas, which are not easy to obtain. The visa application must outline the correspondents' program and the story he wishes to do. Surveillance is generally quite heavy.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists:

15. Tourist visas can normally be obtained at the border crossing points (which is not possible in the case of the USSR). Special passes are required to visit areas within five kilometers of the Baltic or the Federal Republic of Germany's frontier.

(g) Party Control of News Media and Cultural Life:

16. Control of the news media is tight and perversive. Although the Party keeps a tight line on East German artists, the easy access to the Federal Republic's television (see above) tends to weaken the effect of these controls.

III. POLAND

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to non-Communist Countries:

17. Although Polish policy in this area continues to be restrictive, there have been signs of liberalization during 1971. As regards immigration to the United States, for example, the numbers of persons receiving exit documents has increased substantially, particularly in those categories which were handled most restrictively in the past. Polish tourist travel to the United States has increased three times during the last five years and reached 7,410 in the period 1st July, 1970 to 30th June, 1971. It is also worth noting that Polish employees of Western Embassies, who previously were denied passports, are now allowed to travel relatively freely to the West.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

18. Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts 18 hours daily in Polish, is jammed on most frequencies. However, the persistent listener can generally find a frequency with reasonably good reception. VOA broadcasts two hours daily in Polish and is not jammed, nor are similar broadcasts by other Western stations.

(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals and Films:

19. Practically speaking, the Polish public has no access to Western non-Communist publications. They are not sold on newsstands and private citizens cannot subscribe to them because of a lack of hard currency. Even libraries and other public institutions must limit their purchases to the most essential items because of a lack of funds. Many Western films are shown in Polish cinemas. In 1970, 24 US films as well as smaller numbers of French, British and Italian films were purchased by the Polish film importing agency.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

20. Poland is a signatory to the international copyright conventions. This fact is vitiated somewhat by the requirement that royalties be paid in non-convertible zlotys which can only be spent in Poland.

(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

21. About a dozen Western non-Communist journalists are currently accredited and resident in Warsaw. Western newsmen can move about the country freely and have access both to officials and private citizens, but their news gathering operations are obviously circumscribed by the reluctance of Poles to speak candidly to representatives of the Western Press.

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Although overt régime harassment is rare, Polish authorities are clearly able to freeze the journalists out of a story, as was done in the case of the December 1970 riots. Although outgoing copy is not censored, Western journalists generally find it prudent to exercise a form of self-censorship in order to ensure their continued ability to work in Poland.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists within the Country:

22. Western tourists, businessmen, and even Embassy personnel (with the exception of the US Embassy on a reciprocal basis) are completely free to travel anywhere. Specific areas, such as the Baltic coastal cities in December 1970, are occasionally closed for brief periods.

(g) Extent of Party Controls over News Media and Cultural Life:

23. The Polish press is censored, and films, plays and books are carefully scrutinized before release. However, the severity of controls depends to a considerable extent upon the political situation at any given moment. Consequently, articles now appear regularly in the press which would have been suppressed during the Gomulka era, and a similar relaxation is noticeable in other fields.

IV. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

24. Following the Dubcek period, the general trend in the movement of people and ideas has been highly regressive, and conditions have deteriorated to a point even more restrictive than during the latter years of the Novotny period.

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to Non-Communist Countries:

25. Tourist travel to the West (and to Yugoslavia) is governed by a very restrictive regulation issued in October 1969. Under this regulation, exist visas are issued only to those persons who have close relatives in the country to be visited. In rare cases when persons without close relatives are given visas, they must travel in group tours and are restricted to \$100 in convertible currency. Compared with 1969 as a whole, tourist visas issued by Western Embassies in Prague during 1970 and 1971 have declined by 70%. Issuance of immigrant visas has always been closely controlled, but the policy has recently become even more restrictive. In 1970, 91 Czechoslovak citizens were allowed to immigrate to the US, compared with 170 in 1969 and 180 in 1968.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

26. Czech and Slovak programs on RFE are jammed, but there is no jamming of other Western stations.

(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals and Films:

27. Western newspapers and periodicals were temporarily banned in August 1969. This prohibition was made permanent in April 1970 and Western publications are not even available in the tourist hotels. A fair number of Western European and US films are shown.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

28. Czechoslovakia is a member of both the Berne Copyright Union and the UCC and adheres to their provisions.

(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

29. Although there is no physical harassment of Western journalists, they work in a generally hostile atmosphere. During the last two years, the number of accredited Western correspondents has dwindled to a very low figure as credentials were withheld or withdrawn and as Czechoslovakia became less interesting for their employers.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists Within the Country:

30. There are no closed areas for tourists.

(g) Extent of Party Controls over News Media and Cultural Life:

31. During the last two years, the régime has been successful in imposing almost complete control over all news media and all aspects of the country's cultural life. Controls are probably more severe than during the latter years of Novotny's rule.

V. HUNGARY

32. During the last ten years, the Hungarian scene has been characterized by gradual progress towards freer movement of people and ideas. While the present situation is undoubtedly unsatisfactory by Western standards, it reflects the country's general progress (i.e. higher living standards, more Western consumer goods, a relatively relaxed cultural climate with substantial Western imports). These developments demonstrate the Kadar regime's increased confidence and its decision to augment, piecemeal and without fanfare, Hungary's traditional ties with the West.

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(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to Western (non-Communist) Countries:

33. In April 1970, Hungary adopted a new passport law which was characterized by the significant provision that if a passport was refused, the reason(s) must be stated and the applicable point of law cited. As a practical matter, travel to Western countries is limited by currency restrictions (\$100 can be obtained every third year). Except in emergency cases or in the case of pensioners, Hungarians may travel to the West only every other year. Immigration is restricted to persons with immediate relatives abroad, although the regulations have been interpreted somewhat more liberally in recent years. According to Hungarian statistics, 184,665 Hungarians visited non-Communist countries in 1970. This compared with 165,254 in 1965 and 34,980 in 1960.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

34. Since 1964, Hungary has not jammed Western radio broadcasts, despite the fact that Hungarian authorities make no effort to hide their displeasure with the content of some broadcasts.

(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals, and Films:

35. Western newspapers and periodicals are generally available in the hotels which cater to foreign tourists, but they are not sold at public newsstands. Many Hungarian officials and professional people subscribe to Western publications. Western films are shown in Hungary, although the number is limited.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

36. Hungary is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and observes its obligations. While it is possible that violations occur, these are exceptional.

(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

37. There are no Western journalists permanently based in Hungary. Both US news agencies (AP and UPI) employ Hungarian stringers who report selectively through the agencies' Vienna offices. Visiting Western journalists are granted visas for set periods of time and are expected to work through the Foreign Ministry's Press Department.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists within the Country:

38. According to a 1958 regulation, a 15 kilometer zone along Hungary's frontiers with Austria and Yugoslavia is closed to all travellers (including Hungarians). In practice,

this regulation does not appear to be enforced. Efforts to obtain clarification from Hungarian Authorities regarding the status of this regulation have not elicited replies.

(g) Extent of Party Control of News Media and Cultural Life:

39. Although precensorship of news media does not exist, media professionals have generally absorbed enough orientation over the years to frame their output in terms of official lines while allowing themselves room cautiously to criticize foreign and domestic developments. These informal controls are most obvious in the case of foreign news reporting, which adheres closely to the Soviet view of the world. In the cultural field, Party controls continue, but the area allowed for experimentation in the arts continues to grow.

VI. ROMANIA

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to non-Communist Countries:

40. Romanian policy on travel to the West remains highly restrictive, and only minor procedural changes have taken place during recent years. In general, only Government officials or members of the elite are allowed to travel freely to non-Communist countries. Ordinary citizens interested in such a trip face a long delay in obtaining a passport (six months to a year). Unless the travel is officially sponsored, the traveller must have his expenses guaranteed in advance by a foreign sponsor before he can receive his passport. Passports for private travel are normally granted for very short periods, and the passport (which is legally State property) must be returned to the issuing authorities when the holder returns to Romania.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

41. None.

(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals and Films:

42. A very limited number of Western European daily newspapers are sold in the major tourist hotels in Bucharest (and in Mamaia during the summer tourist season). Substantial numbers of Western films are shown in Romanian cinemas and on television.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

43. The once standard practice in Communist countries of evading copyright regulations is still widely practiced in Romania. However, when confronted with a case of infringement, the Romanian authorities usually make amends.

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(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

44. There are currently no Western journalists permanently resident in Romania, although they frequently visit the country. Conditions range from non-productive to minimally acceptable, by Western standards. The atmosphere is friendly, however, and at least superficially helpful. All contacts, whether official or private, must in theory be made through the Foreign Ministry's Press Directorate. However, visiting Western journalists are frequently able to evade this requirement in practice.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists:

45. There are no closed areas.

(g) Extent of Party Control over News Media and Cultural Life:

46. Romanian news media are under strict Party censorship. Party control over the country's cultural life underwent a gradual relaxation for several years up to July 1971, and Western cultural influences and fads were evident, if not exactly rampant, particularly among the younger generation. This process has been reversed since July 1971 under a Party campaign to restrict foreign cultural influences and preserve ideological purity.

VII. BULGARIA

47. As a general observation, Bulgaria qualifies as the Eastern European country which most nearly approaches the Soviet Union in the degree of restrictions covering contacts with the West. In fact, the Bulgarians may even be "more royalist than the king" in certain areas.

(a) Granting of Exit Documents for Travel or Immigration to non-Communist Countries:

48. Travel to non-Communist countries is limited and has been relatively stable during recent years. In 1970, 45,339 Bulgarians travelled to non-Communist countries. With few exceptions, only Bulgarians in good standing with the régime are granted passports for foreign travel. Immigration is practically non-existent, except for ethnic Turks or Albanians. According to official figures, in 1969 only three persons not of Turkish or Albanian origin were allowed to emigrate.

(b) Jamming of Western Radio Broadcasts:

49. All Bulgarian-language Western broadcasts are regularly jammed in the Sofia area. In other parts of the country, jamming is less effective. On some occasions, even Yugoslav broadcasts are jammed.

(c) Distribution of Western (non-Communist) Newspapers, Periodicals and Films:

50. Western non-Communist newspapers and periodicals are not sold in Bulgaria, even in the tourist hotels. Western films are occasionally shown, but the choice indicates that they are selected for ideological reasons.

(d) Observance of International Copyright Regulations:

51. In January 1971, the Bulgarian Committee on Art and Culture proposed that the National Assembly completely revise the 1952 Bulgarian copyright law to eliminate conflicts with the Berne Copyright Union, of which Bulgaria is a member. This proposal was not adopted. Bulgarian publishing organizations publish works without the permission of the copyright holder, but royalties (in non-convertible Bulgarian leva) are frequently paid.

(e) Working Conditions for Western (non-Communist) Journalists:

52. There are only two resident non-Communist journalists in Sofia (one Japanese and one FRG). Their presence appears to be regulated by intergovernmental agreements. Given the existing controls, there is little information and no news available.

(f) Travel by Western Tourists:

53. In keeping with the régime's desire to earn hard currency, there are few restrictions on tourist travel within the country. The only closed areas are the border defense zones. In practice, travel and language difficulties confine Western tourists to a few major centers where their activities are easily controlled.

(g) Extent of Party Control over the News Media and Cultural Life:

54. Controls are tight and show no signs of relaxation.

PRACTICES OF WARSAW PACT STATES RELATING TO THE
FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

Background Paper of the United States Delegation,
7th April, 1972

1. This background paper on Warsaw Pact practices regarding freer movement of people supplements the information contained in the paper attached at Annex I. This paper focuses on Warsaw Pact practices with regard to three of the measures listed in the Agenda paper on freer movement of people: (1) the removal of arbitrary obstacles to the exit of individuals and their families from participating countries; (2) marriage and the reuniting of families; and (3) passports and foreign exchange restrictions. This analysis of Warsaw Pact practices should not be considered complete, and supplementary information by other delegations on the points covered in the paper would be welcomed.

I. THE USSR

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their families from Participating Countries:

2. The Soviet statute on obtaining passports and entry-exit visas has been published in a legal compendium, but it is difficult for an ordinary citizen to obtain.

(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families:

3. No additional information is available on Soviet policy towards the reunification of families.

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions:

4. While Soviet statutes on travel documentation fees have not been published, it appears that the passport fee for private travel to "non-socialist" countries is approximately 400 rubles, as opposed to approximately 30 rubles for travel to "socialist" countries.

II. POLAND

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their Families from Participating Countries:

5. Poland does not require exit visas.

6. Polish passport and visa regulations are published in the Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws). However, the laws include the statement that a passport can be denied for "other reasons of state". This means, in effect, that denial of a passport need not be explained to the applicant.

(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families

7. There are apparently no restrictions on marriages between Poles and foreign nationals. Moreover, the Polish Government will, in general, grant passports to persons traveling to join spouses, to minors joining parents, and to elderly parents travelling to join their children. Problems do arise, however, in cases of doctors, engineers, and others whose skills are considered essential to the economy.

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions

8. Although the Polish Government does not require exit visas, its passport fees are exorbitant. For example, a tourist passport valid for travel to the United States currently costs 7,000 zloties (this is reduced to 1,000 zloties if transportation costs are paid in hard currency). A tourist passport for travel to Western Europe costs somewhat less (5,000 zloties), and a student may go abroad for only 500 zloties. An immigrant passport (to the United States) costs 5,000 zloties.

9. Currency restrictions in Poland are still rather severe, although the situation has recently improved somewhat. Polish tourists are now allowed to purchase \$100.00 every three years to finance travel in the West.

III. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their Families from Participating Countries:

10. Regulations and procedures for applying for passports and permission to travel to the West are well publicized, and the right to "appeal" refusal of permission to travel is made clear on the refusal notice. Appeals, however, must be submitted to the passport and visa office of the Interior Ministry, where reversal of a decision by local authorities would seem highly unlikely. Appeal of that office's decision is apparently not possible.

(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families:

11. The divided families issue is particularly relevant to the CSSR with regard to the children left behind by parents who left "illegally" after the August 1968 invasion. From June to the end of November 1971, the CSSR Authorities quietly began to allow some children to emigrate to join their parents. Since December, however, authorities are apparently again refusing exit permission to these children. On the other hand, the Czech Authorities have usually permitted emigration in cases where Czechoslovak nationals have married non-Czechs.

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions:

12. Current Czechoslovak travel documentation fees for tourist travel to the West are high but not prohibitive. The total cost of application, passport, exit permit (for one trip) and customs declaration fees is about 340 Czech crowns, amounting to 17-20 per cent of the monthly salary of an average Czech. 300 crowns of this is for the obligatory "customs declaration", allegedly for goods taken out of the CSSR. Travellers to other socialist countries pay only 50 crowns for the customs declaration, bringing the total cost of their travel documents down to about 90 crowns.

13. Travel document fees for emigration are considerably higher. Czech regulations provide for a sliding scale of fees, depending mainly on the educational level of the prospective emigre. Czechoslovak nationals who apply in Czechoslovakia for emigration can be charged from 500 to 10,000 crowns for a passport. (For example, most applicants for United States visas have fallen in the 6,000 to 7,000 crown range). The fee for Czechoslovak citizens who apply abroad for an emigration passport (in order to "regularize" their stay) can run as high as 20,000 crowns, payable in hard currency at the official rate of 6.55 crowns to \$1. The fee abroad is determined by Czechoslovak Embassies, apparently in light of the emigre's ability to pay.

IV. HUNGARY

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their Families from Participating Countries:

14. Hungary's passport and exit visa regulations are published and publicly available, and anyone whose application is turned down must receive a written explanation. However, the expressed right of Hungarian citizens to travel abroad is immediately qualified by the statement that passports may not be issued to persons whose sojourn abroad is "prejudicial to the state".

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(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families:

15. The question of divided families is a continuing problem in Hungary. Passports, for example, are refused from time to time (but not universally) on the grounds that a relative left Hungary illegally, or is "a member of an organization carrying on activities hostile to our socialist country".

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions:

16. Hungarians must pay more for visits to the West than for travel to other socialist countries. Although fees vary, the usual cost of a tourist passport valid for Western travel is 600 forints (about \$23), whereas a travel document for socialist countries costs only 100 forints. Travellers are also limited by hard currency restrictions. Forints may be exchanged for hard currency to a maximum of \$119 every three years. Trips to the West not involving hard currency exchange may be made every two years.

V. RUMANIA

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their Families from Participating Countries:

17. Rumanian policy on tourist travel to the West is highly restrictive. Even those Rumanians who appear to qualify for tourist passports under the strict Rumanian criteria often have their applications turned down, usually without explanation. Moreover, the well-known "hostage system" is still very much alive in Rumania - i.e. a whole family is rarely able to leave together on a tourist trip. Finally, Rumanians with advanced professional qualifications or those who have relatives abroad are unable to obtain permission for travel, even to other socialist countries. In short, only the very old or very young or those whose skills are not considered essential by the state have a relatively easy time going abroad for tourism.

18. In the case of emigration, as with tourism, every citizen theoretically has the right to apply for a passport and exit visa. In practice, however, this policy is often nullified by various administrative controls which are exercised at the lower level. Often, for example, it is difficult or impossible for the would-be emigrant to obtain the necessary passport application forms, thus effectively preventing the submission of exit requests. In other cases, positive action is taken on exit requests only after hard currency payments have been made by relatives or friends abroad, and other such "unofficial" barriers also exist.

(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families:

19. The question of divided families is a problem in Rumania, although the problem is not so serious as in some other Eastern European countries. If the person living abroad has left Rumania legally, or has subsequently regularized his status vis-à-vis the Rumanian Government, his immediate family generally is able to join him, although often only after prolonged delays.

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions

20. The problem of passport fees is not of major concern in Rumania since such fees do not vary according to the traveller's destination. Moreover, even though the cost of a passport is somewhat high in relation to the average Rumanian's income, it is not exorbitant. The fee for a tourist passport is 120 lei (about \$7.50) and for an emigration passport 320 lei (about \$20.00).

VI. BULGARIA

(a) The Removal of Arbitrary Obstacles to the Exit of Individuals and their Families from Participating Countries:

21. Bulgarian working regulations on passports and exit visas are not published.

22. An individual desiring to travel abroad must submit to the local militia a passport application, together with a certification that all his taxes have been paid, and an affidavit from a foreign sponsor that he will pay all costs (if the travel is for tourism).

(b) Marriage and the Reuniting of Families:

23. In general, Bulgaria has no announced policy of facilitating emigration for the purpose of reunifying families. A significant exception, however, is the Turkish/Bulgarian agreement for the repatriation of ethnic Turks who have immediate family in Turkey.

(c) Passports and Foreign Exchange Restrictions:

24. Passport fees vary according to the duration of the visit abroad and the destination. For example, a passport valid for Eastern European countries costs about 8 leva, while a passport for an extended visit to the United States costs about 50 leva. The passport must be revalidated, and the fees must be paid, for each visit.

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25. The full cost of tourist travel, including transportation, must usually be funded by external sources, such as relatives, friends, institutions, etc.

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YOUTH EXCHANGES

Background Paper of the United States Delegation,
18th February, 1972

1. If CSCE discussions on cultural relations were to lead to increased multilateral events involving young leaders of East and West, Western policy interests would be advanced. Western negotiators should, however, be aware of potential difficulties associated with youth exchange programs.

East European Participation

2. The nature of East European participation in any such program raises important considerations. In recent years, in the face of moves by West European youth groups for expanded contacts with their Eastern counterparts, the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) has arrogated to itself the rôle of representing all East European youth organizations. This compels the West to deal in effect with Moscow alone in any bridge-building among organized youth. Were WFDY to be assigned a rôle in connection with a CSCE-sponsored youth program, it would not only permit Moscow to control all East European participation, but it might also open the door to participation by West European Communist youth groups on Moscow's terms. These groups are members of WFDY but are not included in the national youth councils of most West European countries. It is one thing for such groups to participate as part of national delegations organized with the tacit approval of their national government, but another to have their representatives designated by a WFDY invitation.

Proposed European Youth Foundation (EYF)

3. As originally envisioned, the EYF would be legally constituted as an independent body within the Council of Europe, with headquarters at Strasbourg, and would maintain close links with the European Communities. The organization would not carry out projects of its own but would make grants to existing youth organizations, including national youth councils and some international non-governmental organizations, for new experimental and pioneering activities in the youth field. The foundation would be controlled by a grant-making body composed in equal parts of representatives of governments and youth. It would be financed through governmental contributions based on relative GNPs, with the cost in the first few years to be held to about DM. 5,000,000.

4. The idea was supported by the European Youth Conference held in Munich in December 1970 under the joint sponsorship of the German National Committee for International

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Youth Work (DNK) and the Council of European National Youth Committees (CENYC). The conference attracted delegates from 26 countries and 17 international youth organizations. WFDY observers remained skeptical towards the EYF, but indicated they were not closing the door on the matter. The conference proposed that the Council of Europe be considered a provisional framework until a structure representative of all Europe could assume that function. It is expected that the question will be discussed at the Council of Europe Ministerial Meeting in May, and it is possible that an EYF could be established in 1972.

Assessment of EYF Proposal

5. The proposed European Youth Foundation, if it should come into being, may help advance broad Western goals by opening up greater contacts between East and West, albeit a West that does not include the US or Canada. As a "bank" that would respond to appeals by non-governmental organizations in the youth field to fund their suggested programs, it may, incidentally, help shore up the financially hard-pressed Council of European National Youth Committees, an organization that has served a useful purpose in the past.

6. However, there are problems with the European Youth Foundation as a CSCE Agenda item. By failing to provide for US and Canadian participation, the EYF proposal tends to reinforce the Soviet view that these countries are involved in European affairs "by invitation only", whereas they are involved by right. Furthermore, it seems possible that the EYF, originally conceived as a Western European organization with funding responsibilities, would not bring about the kinds of East-West youth exchanges desired by the West.

7. For these reasons, it would be preferable to keep the EYF proposal out of the CSCE context, unless it can be modified to provide for North American participation and to assure the kinds of youth exchanges desired by the West.

8. In any case, a conference of national youth organizations to establish an EYF seems unnecessary and undesirable. The Munich Conference has already accomplished all of the useful purposes of such a gathering, and an additional conference would add little. Furthermore, like most youth gatherings of this sort, the potential for resolutions or actions contrary to Western interests is high.

FILMS AND TELEVISION

Background Paper of the United States Delegation,
18th February, 1972

1. It is widely recognized that films and television are highly potent forces, both reflecting and shaping ideas and attitudes. This point has not been missed by the Warsaw Pact states, which keep the closest control on materials in both media designed for domestic consumption. In addition, the Soviets, the Czechs, and the Poles have active film industries which produce films for export. They have regular access to the major Western film festivals, and some of their efforts have received critical acclaim in the West (e.g., Knife in the Water, The Cranes are Flying, Quiet Flows the Don, etc.). Furthermore, they have access to Western film distribution channels, and many of these same films have received extensive showings in Western theaters.

2. The reverse, however, is not the case. Although constrained to accept some Western films in order to protect their access to the Western film markets, and partially to satisfy local demand, the Pact countries have imposed numerous restrictions on Western films entered in their own film festivals and have almost totally excluded such films from regular distribution to their own theaters unless the régimes believe that the film content is innocuous or serves their own domestic political purposes.

3. Much the same situation applies to television materials. The level of interchange of television materials among Western networks is large and growing rapidly in spite of linguistic and technical compatibility problems. These exchanges are facilitated by EUROVISION, as well as numerous bilateral and multilateral governmental and commercial agreements. "Real-time" programming is made possible, even on a transcontinental basis through such facilities as synchronous satellites under INTELSAT. Although there have been some exchanges with INTERVISION, the Pact network, in general the Eastern countries have remained largely apart from this development. Some materials of a non-political nature are exchanged from time to time, but this is rare. Western television materials of a non-flattering character, designed to show the West in a unfavorable light, are shown particularly in news and information programs when the Eastern régimes believe it is in their interest to do so. With these exceptions, the level of exchange of television materials is very low.

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4. As long as the Soviets and their allies attach such great importance to isolating their populations from Western influences, the prospects of substantial improvement in East-West exchange of film and television materials on a non-discriminatory basis will remain poor.

5. International efforts to deal with the problem in an East-West context have not met with major success. UNESCO has done considerable and productive work in this field without, however, having any noticeable effect in getting Western films shown in Warsaw Pact theaters on a regular basis. The best results in the fields of film and television have been achieved through bilateral cultural agreements and normal commercial channels, where the West has had somewhat greater leverage, and has been able to put forward highly detailed and specific proposals.

6. Bilateral agreements and commercial channels apparently continue to be the most promising means for improving East-West film and television exchanges.

Film Festivals

7. One of the proposals contained in the most recent NATO study (C-M(71)69(Revised)) would encourage greater promotion of film festivals at a CSCE. Film festivals, in the West, serve a highly useful rôle of exposing sophisticated audiences to the best works of foreign film-makers, and thereby have contributed substantially to cultural interchange. This benefit accrues, however, primarily to those films which receive substantial acclaim at the major festivals, and thereby obtain wide viewership at neighborhood theaters in many countries. The benefits obtained by direct viewership at the festivals themselves are marginal in comparison. It is therefore highly improbable that sponsorship of additional, major international film festivals would, of itself, significantly increase East-West exchanges in this field. Local film festivals, on the other hand, need no further stimulation. They are already proliferating in the West at an astounding rate.

8. It should be kept in mind that Eastern European films which win top awards at Western film festivals can count on wide distribution and thus commercial success and badly needed hard currency in the West. Western films which win awards at Eastern film festivals (a somewhat rarer occurrence) cannot count on receiving wide distribution in the Warsaw Pact countries unless the film paints the West in distinctly unflattering colors. This being the case, there is little advantage in increasing the number of East-West film festivals unless the Warsaw Pact states change their practice with respect to distribution of Western films.

Joint Ventures in Film Co-operation

9. In the West, the commercial and artistic results of joint production ventures have been checkered, at best. Italian-French co-operation has scored some notable successes, and several outstanding American-British ventures could be mentioned. Generally speaking, however, these results have been achieved by retaining production control directly under one firm, and the direction strictly under one director. The extent of co-operation has thus been largely limited to selection of on-site and sound studio locations and mixed casting and crews. Some producers are somewhat skeptical of the practicality of having more than one producer, and highly skeptical that having more than one director could ever work.

10. Other problems in joint ventures involving Western countries such as languages, financing, work-rules, union jurisdictions, copyright protection and technical difficulties have on occasion been overcome. In an East-West context, however, all of these problems would be greatly accentuated. Whether joint-ventures in films between East and West could be accomplished in a technical sense (to say nothing of being commercially and artistically successful) is problematic even if the political climate were right. As noted above, Eastern countries keep films under tight control in most cases, and the political problems would probably prove to be insurmountable.

11. In sum, since the prospects for joint ventures in film-making are not good, promotion of this notion at a CSCE would be essentially meaningless.

COPYRIGHTS

Background Paper of the United States Delegation
18th February, 1972

1. Nearly all European nations, and most other countries, are parties to the Berne Convention of 1886 (as revised) or the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) of 1952 (as revised) or both. The United States is a party only to the UCC. All other NATO Allies are parties to both conventions with the exception of Turkey, which is party only to Berne. The European neutral and non-aligned states are all parties to both conventions. Czechoslovakia and Hungary are parties to both, while Poland, Romania and Bulgaria are parties only to Berne. The Soviet Union and Albania are the only states in Europe which have refused to adhere to either of the conventions.

2. The failure of the Soviet Union to adhere to either of the conventions or otherwise protect foreign authors is increasingly becoming a sore point for Western artists, scientists, publishers and authors. The Soviet Union regularly "pirates" a large quantity of materials, especially scientific and technical works, without authorisation and without providing just compensation. As a consequence of the lack of copyright relations, Soviet works are similarly unprotected in the West. On a few occasions, the Soviets have entered into licensing agreements with Western firms whose works they wish to publish, such as Doubleday and Company, in the US, and MacDonald and Company, in the UK, and through these arrangements have paid individual authors a royalty. However, these royalties are unusually small by international standards, and are almost invariably made in inconvertible rubles.

3. Various allies have made representations requesting that the Soviet Union adhere to a copyright agreement. The Soviets fear that becoming party to one of the conventions will result in substantial net outflows for royalty payments. However, the allies could point out that the Soviet Union has a large and growing quantity of scientific and technical material, and to a lesser extent literary and artistic works which are being reproduced in the West without compensation to the Soviet Union (the works of Soviet novelists alone would bring in handsome royalties). It could also be mentioned that Soviet failure to abide by international standards and to uphold copyright protection for foreign authors is undermining the image of the Soviet Union in the West, especially in the scientific community.

4. Because of the growing sophistication of their inventions, and in part in response to international pressure, the Soviets agreed in 1965 to adhere to the "Paris Union" Industrial Property Convention (on patents and trademarks) but to date they have shown no indication of a willingness to change their position on copyrights.

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The Problem of Paying Royalties and Fees in Convertible Currency

5. As noted above, the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent some of the other Warsaw Pact states, when they do provide compensation to foreign authors and publishers, often pay in inconvertible currencies. A solution of the copyright issue would almost entirely eliminate this problem, since authors and publishers under both UCC and Berne have the right to withhold authorisation to publish unless it is agreed in advance that they will be paid in convertible currency.

6. For these reasons, a declaration which expresses the intent of all parties to a CSCE to pay foreign authors, scientists, artists and lecturers in convertible currencies such as the language contained in paragraph 48 of C-M(71)69(Revised) is at best an item of marginal interest, and little harm would be done if it were dropped from the discussion. On the other hand, mention of the need for payment in convertible currencies would serve to emphasize the misbehavior of the Soviet Union in the past, and would serve to eliminate any ambiguities about the need in all cases for payment of royalties and fees in convertible currencies.

ILLUSTRATIVE DECLARATION ON
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CO-OPERATION

Circulated by the United States Delegation
7th April, 1972

IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT new scientific knowledge is beneficial to all mankind;

CONSIDERING THAT scientific inquiry flourishes best in an atmosphere of free interchange among scientists and research institutions throughout the world;

RECOGNISING THAT, consonant with the laws of each country, a full and free exchange of scientists, technologists, scholars, information and ideas - including direct co-operation on projects of common interest - is an important element of peaceful relations among states, in that it contributes to increased friendship and understanding, to expansion of trade and commerce, and to general well-being and normalisation of relations;

REALISING THAT particular benefits are to be gained by facilitating contacts arising spontaneously within their scientific communities as a result of shared scientific interests; and

DESIRING TO reduce as far as possible specific barriers to increased and more productive exchanges in the field of science and technology -

THE PARTIES declare their intent to consider further measures that they might take domestically or in an international context:

- (1) To facilitate direct contacts, including co-operative projects
 - between scientists, technologists and scholars,
 - between institutions, both private and governmental, and
 - between institutions and individual scientists, technologists and scholars of their respective countries,

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wherever a common scientific interest exists, in order to focus the available talent on problems of common scientific concern, to the benefit of all.

- (2) To encourage the convening of national and international scientific and technological conferences, symposia, and meetings in their countries, and to facilitate the attendance of the scientists of other countries at such meetings, in the knowledge that this is an essential component of international scientific communication, including -
 - (a) supporting the freedom of scientists from all countries to attend such gatherings and to travel abroad for this purpose, without political discrimination,
 - (b) facilitating, in connection with such gatherings, visits by scientists to research institutions, alone or together with their colleagues in the host country,
 - (c) working toward elimination of travel restrictions within their respective countries for scientists of other countries engaged in scientific research, exchanges or joint field studies.
- (3) To facilitate visits of both short and long duration to the universities and research institutions of their respective countries for purposes of consultation and/or conducting research, including facilitating access to libraries, laboratories and scientific archives in connection with or in anticipation of co-operative activities, inasmuch as such visits and such access are also important to successful scientific co-operation.
- (4) To seek to assure a freer flow of scientific literature between their countries, including
 - (a) direct exchanges of journals and bulletins among libraries, laboratories, universities and research institutions,

- (b) direct exchanges of preprints and other informal communications between individual scientists, and
 - (c) participation in international abstracting and indexing programs.
- (5) To welcome the receipt by individual scientists in their countries of invitations to attend scientific gatherings, to conduct research, to lecture, or to visit in other countries and to facilitate the travel of their citizens alone or in groups to other countries for such purposes.
- (6) To facilitate the provision to visiting scientists, and delegations of scientists, of itineraries and programs in advance of their visits, including the provision of advance information on any limitations imposed on either itineraries or programs.

INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO EAST-WEST
CO-OPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Background Paper of the United States Delegation
7th April, 1972

A. New or Existing Machinery

1. In deciding whether to involve a post-CSCE mechanism or, alternatively, to use or adapt existing institutions for new East-West Scientific and Technological (S and T) co-operation, one should bear in mind, inter alia:

- (a) the relationship of the S and T activities to economic and strategic considerations;
- (b) Western interest in promoting freedom of movement for Western scientists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and freer exchange of scientific information;
- (c) cost factors;
- (d) the undesirability of duplicating existing machinery; and
- (e) drawbacks of political involvement in such activities. Industrial technology and high technology (atomic energy, electronics, space, etc.) in particular relate closely to broader issues of trade and military security.

2. Except in rare instances, existing bilateral and multilateral institutions in Europe seem quite adequate or might be easily adapted to conduct S and T exchanges and co-operation among the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact systems and the non-aligned countries of Europe. Moreover, their utilization could save much in costs, assure greater use of facilities currently under-utilized and avoid the bickering over organization, prerogatives, site and financial contributions which always seem to attend the establishment of new international institutions. Related to the preceding point, Western countries should try to identify the institutions which have worked well and with a minimum of political interference.

B. Bilateral Mechanisms

3. Various allies have already established S and T relations with several of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the prospect for expansion is promising. None of these, however, operate to the full satisfaction of the participants. During

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their CSCE consultations the Western countries should frankly share their experience and seek to identify successful bilateral media and techniques, as well as consider the differences in receptivity and co-operation among the various Eastern countries.

C. Multilateral Organizations

4. Several multilateral organizations are already involved across the East-West frontiers of Europe in science and technology. These include ECE, UNESCO, IAEA, and UN specialised agencies. Other organizations whose operations do not cross the frontier, such as the OECD, the European Communities, and CEMA (in Eastern Europe), have S and T programmes. The NATO science programme has several components which might be adapted to an East-West mechanism.

5. Extensive technological problems of modern industrialised society are examined in a variety of contexts in the European Communities (EC), the OECD and, presumably, in CEMA. A "systems" approach to such problems will be undertaken in the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA - Colloquially known as the "East-West Institute"), which might well be established this year. At the same time, care must be taken not to weaken present Western efforts at co-operation (eg. COST), by attempting to extend them. Provision is also made in the charter of the Institute for non-member participation (institutions of three Eastern countries are scheduled to be charter members viz., the USSR, Poland and East Germany). The Committee on Science and Technology (COST) of the EC has already initiated co-operative projects in seven broad fields (computer sciences, telecommunications, new modes of transportation, metallurgy, pollution, meteorology, and oceanography), financed by means of direct national contributions. Moreover, the EC has three major under-utilised research facilities (Ispra, Italy; Petten, Netherlands; Mons, Belgium). It is considering contractual utilisation of them by non-member countries. Similarly, OECD, under Part II of GHE budget, conducts joint S and T ventures financed by direct national contributions.

6. Thought might be given to inviting East European countries to participate in some of these projects (to the extent that security considerations permit), on the basis of reciprocity by CEMA and national financial contributions.

7. Both UNESCO and ECE have programmes in science in which countries of the East and West participate. While UNESCO would certainly lend itself to additional specific co-operative projects, it would not be the best "umbrella" organization for such East-West collaboration for several reasons. In particular, UNESCO is large and engaged in a variety of activities in diverse areas throughout the world which already have established claims on its

resources. In addition, the majority of UNESCO's membership are nations outside of Western and Eastern Europe. These conditions, together with possibility of the Soviet Union's manipulating the attitudes of non-European UNESCO members, would restrict the usefulness of UNESCO for achieving Allied goals in a CSCE context. And further, if UNESCO were to be the organizational focus for such East-West co-operation, the resulting polarisation could lead to an increase in the polarisation of UNESCO, to its detriment.

8. The Science and Technology programmes of ECE have worked well, particularly in fields related to commercial applications. Recently, there has been an emphasis on the environmental field. The US and Canada, as well as Western Europe, have a rôle in its programmes, which under the new senior science advisors' machinery, are still in a rudimentary stage of development.

D. Adaptation of Successful NATO Programmes to a Broader Framework

9. Several highly successful NATO science programmes appear readily adaptable to the ECE framework. One might examine the lean NATO Science Secretariat S and T machinery and attempt to introduce its efficiency of operation under the ECE senior science advisors. At the same time, it must be made certain that ECE adoption of these institutions will not lessen the value of the present NATO programmes.

10. These unique NATO programmes were devised over a decade ago for the purpose of bringing the scientists of the West together, not only for the advancement of science, but also to reinforce the bonds of the Atlantic Alliance. In the East-West context, analogous devices could be equally effective in developing a closer association with elite elements of Soviet and East European societies. They would be a test of Soviet and East European readiness for freedom of contact, movement, and exchange of scientific information. The programmes are attractive in that they supplement national initiatives, require little overhead and administration, and are subject to a minimum of political interference.

11. These NATO programmes may be summarised briefly as follows:

(a) Advanced Study Institutes

Each year some 50 summer study sessions comprising from 50-100 lecturers and post-doctoral "students" meet for 2-4 weeks in Europe or the US to explore in depth a specific scientific discipline. Since 1958, over 10,000 European and American scientists

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have met and shared viewpoints on scientific subjects - frequently producing definitive reports and leading to subsequent co-operative research and exchanges of information. The programme is administered by the NATO International Staff, based on decisions of a panel of scientists from 6-8 member states and periodic review by the Science Committee.

Yearly cost: \$930,000

(b) Joint Research Programme

A panel of scientists from various disciplines grants funds to support joint research involving scientists of two or more member countries. The grant augments funds and facilities provided by the participants. The programme is administered by the NATO International Staff, pursuant to the guidance of the panel and review by the Science Committee.

Yearly cost: \$625,000

(c) Research Evaluation Conferences

The NATO Science Committee sponsors two or three research evaluation conferences yearly in areas of special interest to the countries of the Alliance, to assess what has been accomplished and directions for research in those fields in the future. These have proved to be especially valuable in preparation for the research and other programme work of the committee in a major selected field. The cost for holding a conference is \$20-30,000.

Yearly cost: \$40-60,000

E. Sharing of Facilities

12. The Allies might prepare an inventory of unique or under-utilised research facilities (like the above listed EC facilities) for possible use in an East-West context. In those instances in which facilities do not exist, especially those involving "large science", the facilities for which are beyond the capacity of individual countries, consideration should be given to the means for providing them.

AREAS FOR SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION
WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Background Paper of the United States Delegation, 10th April, 1972

1. Although there is a justifiable assumption that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, being behind in most areas, have the most to gain from scientific contacts and co-operation with advanced non-Communist countries, there are many fields in which the latter also stand to benefit. These tend in the Warsaw Pact countries to be related in the first instance to technological developments in high priority areas of military, industrial, space, and regional development. While the emphasis is on applied science, there is an inevitable impact on related pure sciences as well.

2. One of our problems is lack of knowledge about many scientific advances in the Soviet Union, and this places a value on scientific exchanges as a means of learning more about the "state of the art". Leaving this consideration aside, however, our experience in dealing with the USSR, and several East European countries, indicates that, notwithstanding certain co-operation already taking place under bilateral or multilateral arrangements, it could be useful further to develop reciprocal relations in the following fields: (This list is illustrative and non-exclusive. The areas of co-operation are not listed in order of priority).

- (a) Magneto Hydrodynamics (MHD) and Nuclear Fusion - The USSR and certain East European countries are doing interesting work in developing and refining electric production using the principles of MHD and nuclear fusion. In many respects they are ahead.
- (b) Oceanography - Because of geographical considerations and its emphasis on naval, merchant marine and fisheries development, the USSR (and, to a lesser extent, Poland and the GDR) is doing considerable work in oceanography, including human undersea activity, marine biology, and air-sea interaction, especially in the Arctic. For reasons of common scientific interest and shared regional interests (Bering Sea), mutually beneficial co-operation is a possibility worth exploring.
- (c) Arctic and Antarctic Research - There are many mutual benefits in the north, in fields where the USSR is frequently ahead. The treaty on Antarctica provides a vehicle for bilateral or multilateral co-operation.

- (d) Meteorology - Because of the extensiveness of the Soviet land mass and adjacent seas, as well as bloc advances in this field for military and aeronautical purposes, co-operation in weather monitoring, prediction, and modification offers interesting prospects.
- (e) Metrology - This field is basic to the sharing of experience and data in Science and Technology. As the countries of the East become more closely associated industrially and technologically with the advanced countries of the West, this science will assume increasingly greater significance. Our current exchange with the USSR provides a promising start in this direction.
- (f) Science Information Policy and Processing - Most of the non-military and non-proprietary material in the West is in the literature or is available through abstracting and other services. As this is not the case in the East, exploratory exchanges and subsequent arrangements for information sharing would clearly have value for Western countries.
- (g) Agricultural Sciences - Particularly for Western countries having similar geographical characteristics, sharing with the USSR information on some of the problems in arid and permafrost regions could yield benefits. The Soviets have conducted extensive experiments in these areas.
- (h) High Energy Physics is a possible candidate for future co-operation. It will, however, be necessary to consider the implications of collaboration involving costly facilities for particle acceleration and data collection over the next generation of proton and electron machines before taking any initiatives with the Warsaw Pact countries.
- (i) Atomic Energy - The USSR and, to a lesser extent, Poland have achieved much in certain atomic energy and related areas which could benefit the Allies. For example, the American Atomic Energy Commission has found its co-operation with its Soviet counterpart to be useful in the fields of plasma physics (fusion reactors), the processing of irradiated materials, reactor technology and peaceful use of nuclear explosives. Co-operation in some of these and other atomic energy related areas, such as

reactor safety, and fast neutron research for high flux reactors should be pursued on the basis of reciprocity. Reactor technology does not appear to be an appropriate field for intensified collaboration at this time.

- (j) Space - There is substantial experience to be shared in various aspects of space research. For example, the US has found its agreement for exchanges and data sharing in docking techniques, space medicine, space exploration and in the area of the natural environment useful. Here too, co-operation should be pursued on the basis of reciprocity.
- (k) Systems Analysis and Cybernetics - While we are far ahead of the East in many aspects of these disciplines, the USSR now has at least a score of institutes working on various aspects of methodology. Strictly reciprocal exchanges and co-operative work might usefully be undertaken, as is contemplated in the context of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (East-West Institute), which is in the process of establishment.
- (l) Health Sciences - In a number of fields of health and medical sciences there are opportunities for exchanges of experience and co-operation. A bilateral US-USSR agreement already calls for joint work on cancer, cardio-vascular diseases and environmental health, and the UK has contacts with the USSR on cancer research through international Red Cross channels.

3. This list might be usefully supplemented, based on the experience of all the Allied governments and of private scientific organisations in NATO countries.