

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
25th January, 1972

DOCUMENT
C-M(72)1

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Note by the Chairman of the Economic Committee

The last report of the Economic Committee to the Council on demographic trends in the Warsaw Pact area was in November 1963(1). In 1965 a report on the Labour Situation in the area was submitted(2). In accordance with the work programme approved by the Council(3), the Economic Committee decided to convene a meeting of specialists to consider trends in demography and labour supply in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Papers were submitted by the United States on the USSR, by France on Poland and Rumania, by the Federal Republic on East Germany and Bulgaria, and by the United Kingdom on Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Belgium and Denmark also sent specialists to attend the meetings in June and September 1971. This report is based on discussions in Committee as well as on the papers presented.

(Signed) Y. LAULAN

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

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- (1) C-M(63)82
(2) C-M(65)16
(3) C-M(70)2 and C-R(70)8

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Report by the Economic Committee

Demographic problems are of mounting concern to the authorities of the Warsaw Pact countries, as is indicated by the increasing number of demographic institutes and the rapid growth of literature on the subject. One aspect of the matter was recently brought out by Kosygin. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet in November 1971, he stressed the prime importance of productivity and the relatively modest contribution of labour to future economic growth. Over the next five years "labour resources", he said, would grow by some 10 million, of which only 4.7 million would work in the sphere of material production. If there were no increase in productivity at all, 37 million extra workers would be needed to achieve the increase in output planned.

The main points which emerged from the papers presented and the discussion of experts were:

- (a) The concept of the small family has now become firmly established in the Warsaw Pact area, as indeed in nearly every industrialised country. However, the steep and rapid fall in the birthrate since the mid-fifties, entailing a notable slowdown in population growth, must have been caused to some extent by factors peculiar to the region. The authorities have shown some concern about this development, but so far no consistent population policy has emerged.
- (b) Until the early sixties the Warsaw Pact population, though distinctly smaller than that of the NATO countries, was increasing faster. As a result of the marked fall in Eastern birthrates, this trend has now been reversed, and the population gap will, in the foreseeable future, widen in favour of NATO.
- (c) Within the Warsaw Pact area, the Soviet population comprises over 70% of the total, a share which is expected to rise further in future. Inside the Soviet Union itself, the "Great Russians" still constitute a majority, while other "European" elements account for over a quarter. The non-European peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia, though at present a minority of about 20%, are increasing much faster than the "Europeans", because of their much higher birthrates.
- (d) The fall in the birthrates in the Warsaw Pact area means that the younger age groups are gradually diminishing, relative to those of working age and beyond. This "ageing" of the population is reinforced by rising longevity.

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- (e) The declining weight of the younger elements does not, however, mean that there will be any shortage of military manpower over the next decade or so, as the number of men of military age, in the USSR at any rate, is still rising and will be more than sufficient to meet the likely needs of the Armed Forces.
- (f) Industrial growth in the past was largely dependent on a rapid expansion of the labour force, through the recruitment of young people, transfer of young peasants to the towns, and increased participation of women. In future, while an appreciable number of young people will be reaching working age, the reserves of peasants and women are about exhausted. Hence industrial growth will depend almost exclusively on higher productivity.
- (g) Though the migration from country to town will continue in the Warsaw Pact area, it does not seem likely that the problems of urbanisation will be posed so starkly as in the West.
- (h) Within the Soviet Union labour migration from European Russia to Siberia has been smaller than the authorities appeared to have wished, and it is possible that Eastern development may be somewhat slowed down because of this. Between the countries of the Warsaw Pact, migration from labour-surplus to labour-deficient regions has been very slight, though some observers believe that arrangements to this effect are likely to be achieved in future.

(Signed) Y. LAULAN
Chairman

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

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GENERAL TREND

1. Population in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe is still expanding but at a slower rate, a trend likely to persist over the next two decades. The expert from the United States Bureau of the Census provided comparative figures of population trends in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries up to 1985. It was pointed out that projections for the future are based on certain assumptions which may not turn out correct and all that is claimed for these figures is that they do indicate the trend.

Population Trends in NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries
(1950-1985 mid-year)

	millions						
	1950	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
USSR	180.1	214.3	230.9	242.8	254.2	266.6	280.2
Eastern Europe(2)	88.5	96.5	99.9	103.1	106.6	110.4	113.9
Warsaw Pact(1)	268.6	310.8	330.8	345.9	360.8	377.0	394.1
United States	152.3	180.7	194.2	204.8	217.0	231.9	248.6
Western Europe	252.3	277.3	293.6	307.6	322.6	338.7	356.2
NATO (including Canada)	418.3	475.9	507.4	533.8	562.9	596.1	632.6

2. These figures clearly indicate that whereas in the 1950s population in the Warsaw Pact countries was growing rather faster than in those of NATO, the position is now reversed. In 1965, the population of the Warsaw Pact countries was over 65% that of NATO, by 1985 it should fall back to just over 62%. The table below shows the growth rates implicit in these figures.

Average Growth of Population over 5-year Periods (%)

	1950/55	1955/60	1960/65	1965/70	1970/75	1975/80	1980/85
USSR	8.9	9.3	7.7	5.2	4.7	4.9	5.1
Eastern Europe	5.0	3.9	3.5	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.2
Total	7.6	7.5	6.4	4.6	4.3	4.5	4.5
United States	8.9	8.9	7.5	5.5	6.0	6.9	7.2
Western Europe	4.5	5.2	5.9	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.2
All NATO	6.5	6.9	6.6	5.2	5.5	5.9	6.1

(1) For Warsaw Pact countries no migration is postulated.
(2) Excluding Yugoslavia and Albania.

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3. From these figures it is also clear that the population weight of the Soviet Union within the Warsaw Pact is increasing and will continue to do so. The Soviet share in the total Warsaw Pact population rose from 67% in 1950 to 70% in 1970, and will continue to rise in future(1).

IMPACT OF VITAL RATES

4. Although the general population trend of the Warsaw Pact countries is roughly similar to that in the industrialised West there are certain differences due, primarily, it would seem, to the fact that the demographic cycle has not affected the areas simultaneously. It is interesting, however, to note that the fall in birthrates in the East, while coming later, has been much more abrupt than in the West.

5. The fall in infant mortality and in death rates generally (which gives rise to rapid population growth until birthrates eventually decline and a new population balance is achieved) was in Western countries spread over many decades of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the subsequent fall in the birthrates was also a long drawn out process. In most of the Eastern countries, the fall in death rates took place in the first half of this century, while it is since 1955 that the birthrates have dropped significantly.

6. Death rates in the Eastern countries were still 25-30 per thousand at the end of the century; by the 1920s a figure of 20 was more usual, and by 1958 this had fallen to around 15. Before the war infantile mortality was still high relative to Western countries but in the post-war period great progress has been made, notably in the USSR. At present death rates are everywhere low, and very similar to those in the West.

7. Birth rates in Eastern Europe were high in the early 1950s, higher indeed than in 1938 except in the USSR and Rumania. During the decade, however, they began to fall and this trend continued to the mid-sixties. Taking the six East European countries together the birth rate was 24.4 in 1950, 18.8 in 1960 and 16.0 in 1965. As is shown in the Table at Annex, whereas in 1950 the birth rate in Eastern Europe was higher than in Southern Europe or in the countries of North and Western Europe, by 1965 this was no longer so. It should be noted, too, that the trend in the USSR is similar to that of Eastern Europe but that there is a time lag of about half a decade.

(1) Within the North Atlantic Alliance, the share of the United States population is likely to increase marginally from about 38% in 1950 to 39% in 1985).

8. The effect of the fall in the birth rates can be judged by the fact that the number of births in the USSR in 1950 was 4.8 million, in 1970 4.2 million. In East Europe as a whole 2.2 million births were registered in 1950, and less than 1.6 million in 1965. The "natural increase" declined in the USSR from 17.0 to 11.1 (per thousand) in the period 1950-65, in Eastern Europe the decline was from 12.7 to 6.6 per thousand. It will be noted that the birth rates in the USSR still remain high relative to Eastern Europe as a whole. This rate, however, is an average of a whole range of birth rate patterns from well below 15 in the European regions to over 34 in Central Asia. The following table shows birth rates in the various Soviet Republics in 1959 and 1969. It should be borne in mind that the birth rates only imperfectly reflect the fertility pattern of the ethnic groups since in the RSFSR there is a considerable minority of non-Russians while the Russian element in Republics like Kazakhstan is very large.

Trend in Birth Rates in the USSR 1959-1969

	1959	1969
USSR	25.0	17.0
RSFSR	23.6	14.2
Ukraine	20.9	14.7
Belorussia	25.2	15.9
Moldavia	31.5	19.0
Latvia	16.6	14.0
Estonia	16.6	15.5
Lithuania	22.8	17.4
Georgia	24.2	18.7
Armenia	40.2	22.8
Azerbaijan	41.5	29.3
Uzbekistan	37.2	32.7
Kazakhstan	36.6	23.3
Tadzhikistan	30.3	34.7
Kirghizia	33.6	30.1
Turkmenistan	39.3	34.3

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9. In the late sixties in Eastern Europe there was a slight rise in birth rates which was due in some countries to a stricter application of the abortion laws and to some extent to positive pro-natalist measures. It is doubtful whether some of the increases achieved can be sustained.

Recent Movements in the Birth Rate

Year	USSR	Bulgaria	CSSR	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Rumania
1965	18.4	15.3	16.4	16.5	13.1	17.4	14.6
1966	18.2	14.9	15.6	15.7	13.6	16.7	14.3
1967	17.3	15.0	15.1	14.8	14.6	16.3	27.4
1968	17.2	16.9	14.9	14.3	15.1	16.2	26.7
1969	17.0	16.9	15.5	14.0	15.0	16.3	23.3
1970	17.4	..	(16.4)	13.9	14.7		21.1

10. Population trends, and indeed the birth rate itself, can be influenced by migration, although the main factor determining the trend is fertility. In the Warsaw Pact area migration played a certain rôle in the early post-war period, indeed a very important one in East Germany, but its influence is now slight. Declining fertility is emphatically the major demographic phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Although this is well reflected in the birth rate, it is even more clearly brought out in the gross reproduction rate, that is, the relationship between the number of women of child-bearing age and the number of female children born. The table below shows the rates in the Warsaw Pact area.

Trend in Gross Reproduction Rates(1)

Year	USSR	Bulgaria	CSSR	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Rumania
1950	137	119(2)	148	115	124	179	149(2)
1955	137	115	138	115	135	174	154
1960	135	112	116	115	98	144	113
1965	118	100	115	122	88	122	93
1968	117	105	98	110	99	112	174

- (1) Number of female children born to 100 women during the lifetime if the age specific fertility rates during the indicated year prevailed throughout the period. A rate as low as 100 means that ultimately, deaths would exceed births, and the population would decline.
- (2) 1951.

CHANGES OF FAMILY ATTITUDES

11. The fertility of women is largely dependent on (i) the desire to have or not to have children and (ii) the ability to realise this preference. To a certain extent it has always been possible to limit the number of births, but the knowledge and the means to do this have not been generally available to the mass of the population, partly or even largely because of social and moral attitudes. The social acceptance of contraceptives and the legal sanction for abortion are clearly the result of a changing attitude in society in modern times, which itself no doubt, is the result of the fact that with the fall in death rates and the rise in life expectancy, a small family is sufficient to maintain the population balance.

12. The emergence of the small family pattern means that individual couples have to make decisions, both as to the number of children they wish to have and means they use to achieve this. These decisions are influenced by the social and economic situation of the couple; in practice the young wife may find herself preferring not to conceive or bear a child for one or other of the following reasons:

- (a) Their housing space is so limited that a child, or a further child, would mean serious inconvenience.
- (b) The husband's income being inadequate for basic needs, the wife is obliged to work. This means she cannot look after her child and, unless there is someone able to do this at low cost, she will avoid having one. A divorced woman or one abandoned by her husband will also normally have to work.
- (c) The husband's income is adequate for basic needs, but the couple want the wife to work in order to acquire certain durables, to travel or to save. This is the popular dilemma - baby v. car.
- (d) The wife wishes in any case to work outside the house either because she wishes to exercise the profession for which she has been trained or because she dislikes the monotony of staying at home.

13. There is some doubt as to the reasons why so many couples in Eastern Europe should have decided to have so few children. The United States expert called attention to the fact that despite considerable variety in beliefs, in standards of education, in the degree of industrialisation, urbanisation and female employment, in the incidence of housing shortage and social arrangements such as child care, fertility levels throughout the area seem to be converging to a remarkable degree. The small family concept has obviously been accepted,

and there seems to be a preference for a 1-2 child family. The effect of economic circumstances on decisions of this kind is not always the same. In some societies, notably traditional ones, large families are the rule among the poor, whereas those who aspire to higher standards have fewer children. Other cases have been noted, however, where rising standards are accompanied by a rise in the birth rate. It could be that in Eastern Europe and among the European elements of the Soviet people there are several distinct anti-natal influences operating simultaneously:

- (a) the chronic lack of living space in towns and the absolute need for women to work which affects a large segment of the working population;
- (b) the rising possibility of access to durables, which, however, are very expensive, so that to acquire them the wife has to work;
- (c) a certain instability brought about by political and economic change, a feeling that one should not be unduly immobilised by a family;
- (d) the growing dissociation, on the part of women, of sex from childbearing and even from marriage. The "liberation" of women is an old Soviet concept. It is, however, offset by certain practical disadvantages summed up in the Soviet saying: the man bears the responsibility, the woman carries the bricks.

14. The means of holding down the birth rate in the Warsaw Pact area in the last decade and a half has been abortion; except in East Germany and Czechoslovakia contraceptives play a minor though slowly increasing rôle. Since the liberalisation of the laws on abortion in the mid-fifties the number of legal abortions has grown enormously. It is reckoned that 60% of all pregnancies are aborted in Hungary (probably in the USSR too), 44% in Bulgaria, 36% in Czechoslovakia and 23% in Poland. The Church in Poland heads the opposition against easy abortion and seeks to defend the traditional family concept. Thus after the troubles last December it argued that it should be economically possible for young mothers to look after their own children personally.

15. There is no doubt that by the mid-sixties the authorities in most of the countries of the area had become concerned about the fall of the birth rate. Considerable publicity has been given to the problem which is being studied in institutes and periodicals but so far no consistent policy appears to have emerged. The motives of the authorities are mixed.

16. On the Soviet side there has been a tradition of hostility to Malthusian concepts and an unwillingness to see future population growth jeopardised, accompanied however by the desire to accord women freedom in the matter of child-bearing and a policy of persuading them to work. The tightening up of abortion laws in the thirties lasted until the mid-fifties. It would appear that, by that time, death rates were low enough to guarantee population stability at much lower birth rates and the authorities opted for the economic advantage of getting more married women into the labour force. The downswing has probably gone further than was anticipated, and attempts may be made to redress the trend somewhat.

17. In Eastern Europe the situation must have appeared to the authorities as more critical since various attempts have been made to raise the birth rate. In Rumania for instance the abortion law was tightened up severely, with the spectacular result that the birth rate jumped from 12 (per thousand) in December 1966 to 40 in September 1967. Since then, no doubt due to gradual resort to contraceptives and illegal abortions, the rate has steadily declined to 20 in the first quarter of 1971. It is evident that stricter rules for abortion will not, of themselves, result in a high birth rate in present circumstances, though they may be required on other grounds. The Hungarian approach to the problem, that is, encouraging working mothers to have children by providing tangible benefits is more likely to be the line taken. This may provide the necessary economic encouragement for couples to have, say, two children.

ETHNIC PROBLEMS

18. There was some change in the ethnic composition of the Soviet population between 1959 and 1970. The Great Russian element is still dominating, despite what one would expect from an examination of the birth rates. Its proportion (53.4%) has hardly fallen. It seems very likely, however, that there has been some degree of assimilation; the low rates of growth or even absolute decline in certain ethnic groups (e.g. Jews, Poles) point in this direction. The two other main Slavic groups, the Ukrainians and Belorussians grew less rapidly than the total and the three Slavic groups together comprised 74% of the population in 1970 as against 76.3% in 1959. Apart from constituting over 80% of the population of their own republic (RSFSR) the Russian element is spread among the other republics accounting for over 40% in Kazakhstan and less than 3% in Armenia.

19. Some of the other Warsaw Pact countries have ethnic problems but not on the same scale as the USSR. On the whole, populations within national frontiers are more homogeneous than before the war, due largely to the expulsion of German minorities, exchanges of populations and certain frontier changes. There is, however, some uncertainty about official data on minorities as much depends on the policy of classification.

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20. Only in Rumania and Bulgaria do minorities constitute over 10% of the populations. In Rumania, the Hungarian element still constitutes an important group whereas former minorities - Germans, Jews and Gypsies - have been considerably reduced in number. In Bulgaria the Turks are the largest minority, which has grown in number despite the exodus of the early fifties. Czechoslovakia before the war was extremely heterogeneous; apart from the two main groups, Czechs and Slovaks, there were the large German and Hungarian minorities as well as Ukrainians, Jews, Gypsies and others. Today, only the Hungarians constitute a considerable element. In the pre-war period the Czechs outnumbered the Slovaks 3 to 1, now the relationship is almost down to 9 to 4.

21. Pre-war Poland, which had a very mixed population, is now much more homogeneous ethnically but there is some question as to precise status of over a million Germans classed as Poles. Both East Germany and Hungary are very homogeneous ethnically, the former especially so.

MIGRATION

22. In the post-war period there has been little emigration from or immigration to the Soviet Union(1). On the other hand there has been some considerable movement from region to region, and of course the movement from country to town continues.

23. If one takes the period between the two censuses in 1959 and 1970 and distinguishes three main areas of the USSR - the West including the Urals, the South (the Caucasian Republics, North Caucas, Moldavia and the Southern Ukraine, and East of Urals (Siberia and the Central Asian Republics); one finds that whereas the overall increase in population was 15.8% the increase in the regions was: West - 12.4%, South - 25.7%, East - 27.7%. The areas in which population increased most were: Central Asia, the Far East and the Caucasus, whilst there was a net loss of population in parts of Central European Russia. The reason for the loss of population in these areas was agricultural stagnation, not compensated by industrial development. It is to be noted, however, that the increase of population in both the Urals and Western Siberia was well below the national average; more people are moving out (including country people) than are moving in.

24. The development of urban areas at the expense of the rural continues. During the period 1959/1970 the urban population rose 36% while that of rural areas fell nearly 3%. In 1959 only 48% of the population lived in urban areas, in 1970 the figure was 56%. The total urban population grew by some 36 million. Almost 14% of this increase - 5 million - was simply the result of converting rural into urban communities. Of the remaining 31 million, 14½ million can be accounted for by natural growth while over 16 million represent the migration balance.

(1) An unknown number of Poles and Jews have left the country, while some Armenians have come in.

25. In Eastern Europe very important migrations of people took place at the beginning of the post-war period, affecting especially, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Since then external migration, except in the case of East Germany, has been smaller while internal migration, largely a movement from country to town, has been important.

26. In Poland large numbers of Germans left the newly acquired Western territories while Ukrainians and Belorussians living in the part ceded to the USSR became Soviet citizens. Subsequently about 300,000 Poles immigrated from the USSR, while about half a million people left Poland for Germany, the United States and Israel. Internal movement has been on a large scale - at well over a million a year until the early sixties, somewhat less in recent years.

27. In Czechoslovakia the mass exodus of Sudeten Germans at the end of the war left the Hungarians as the only considerable minority. External migration has been on a small scale over the last twenty years, even taking into account emigration in the second half of the sixties. Internally, there was a considerable movement of people from Slovak villages to Czech towns but in recent years this has slowed down.

28. East Germany, which absorbed several million expellees from East Europe at the end of the war, was the only country of the area significantly affected by external migration after 1950. About 2½ million people left the country for West Germany mainly in the period before August 1961 when the Berlin Wall was built. Internal migration has been a relatively minor phenomenon in East Germany.

29. The external movements of population affecting the other East European countries were on a smaller scale. It is estimated that about 150,000 Turks were expelled from Bulgaria in the early fifties, that about a quarter of a million Jews left Rumania during the years 1950-1967 and that Hungary lost over 150,000 citizens in the year 1956/1957. Internal migration has been going on all the time in connection with the drift from country to town.

30. As in the USSR so in East Europe there has been a sustained movement of the population from the country to the towns. Over the post-war period the proportion of urban population in the total has risen from 41 to 52%. Changes have been most marked in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria which have more than doubled their urban population. Increases have been more modest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and especially East Germany.

THE MANPOWER SITUATION

31. Labour migration between Warsaw Pact countries has hitherto been on a very minor scale given the surplus of labour in a few countries and the shortage in others. A certain number of Bulgarians are in fact working in the USSR, and some Poles in

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the DDR, but the possibilities of labour exchange have been poorly exploited. One expert believes that these possibilities, however, are likely to be much more utilised in the future, no doubt in connection with COMECON integration.

32. The trend in the size of the population has important economic implications: an increase implies both extra mouths that have to be fed and extra hands to do the work. A falling birth rate, as in the Warsaw Pact area, means that less capital need be earmarked for nurseries, schools and, possibly, houses, but also that at a later date the annual intake of young people into the labour force will diminish. This does not necessarily mean that the labour force as a whole will shrink. Other factors have a rôle to play - the size of the armed forces, the participation of women in the economic process, the age of retirement, and the contribution in fact made by people beyond retirement age.

33. A continued fall in the birth rate could cause some economic embarrassment to the economies of the area in a generation or so. For the immediate future, however, it is the combination of other factors that is giving some concern. Aside from increased productivity, rapid economic growth has been due to the fast-growing industrial labour force, the result mainly of the increased participation of women and the drift of population out of agriculture. Both these sources of extra labour are drying up and, as yet, there is no indication that immigrants from outside the areas will be attracted.

(a) Civilian Manpower

34. There was some disagreement among experts as to whether the USSR will really experience a shortage of labour. The United States expert provided the following basic figures:

Increases over 5-year Periods(1)

millions

	1961/65	1966/70	1971/75	1976/80
Able-bodied population(2)	4.9	7.5	12.8	11.5
Labour force(3)	7.9	5.4	11.0	12.0
Civilian employment(4)	12.6	10.9	7.6	7.9

(1) Date 1961/70 from Soviet sources; 1971/80 projections based on trends.

(2) Males 16-59 years, females 16-54 years.

(3) All who declare that they have a job (census).

(4) Average annual reported employed.

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35. In the period up to 1965 the number of people claiming to have a job (labour force) increased more than the working age population. This was because more women were drawn into the labour force thus raising the participation rate. The still more pronounced increase in civilian employment was due to the fact that people belonging to the labour force were more intensively occupied.

36. In the years 1966/70 the labour force grew less than the working age population largely because of the growing number of students. Figures for civilian employment grew very considerably, due no doubt to more intensive use of available labour.

37. The position in the present 5-year period is rather uncertain. The able-bodied population will increase by 12.8 millions and it is estimated that the labour force will increase by 11 millions. Despite this the United States expert argued that the rise in civilian employment would be proportionately less, on the grounds that the present high participation rates cannot be maintained: some women will go over to part-time work and some agricultural workers may reduce their working time when they qualify for pensions.

38. The consequence of this will be that labour will be rather tight in the coming period. The Soviets have admitted that the sources of extra labour are drying up. It is not that there will be no extra labour at all, just that economic growth planned cannot be achieved as in the past on the basis of large labour inputs but rather on large increases in productivity.

39. A problem not obvious from the figures quoted is the degree to which the industrial labour force will continue to benefit from recruitment from the countryside. In the first place it is argued that far fewer workers can now be drawn out of agriculture. It is true that a large number are employed in agriculture including those working privately, but many are middle-aged and will eventually retire. Few young people take up agriculture as a profession although new investment really requires trained young people. Secondly, the non-industrial sectors of the economy - e.g. services, are claiming an increasing share of total labour force.

40. Not all the participants at the meeting agreed with the US Delegate as regards the future labour position. One particular difficulty is that certain figures of the 1970 census have not yet become available making it very difficult to construct projections for the future.

41. The labour situation in the other countries of Eastern Europe is reasonably clear. In the immediate future only the GDR is acutely short of labour though the labour market is also taut in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. At the moment there is no

labour shortage in Rumania and Bulgaria, and there is a surplus in Poland. In the longer run, Hungary will continue to be short, the position will be easier in Bulgarian, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and there will be adequate labour in Poland and Rumania. There is, however, a general problem as in the USSR. The pool of housewives and agricultural manpower is drying up and in the drive for rapid economic expansion and industrialisation, this relative shortage of manpower must inevitably be a drawback.

(b) Military Manpower

42. Judging by certain US projections, the number of men in the age group 18-34 in the USSR should rise as follows:

million

1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
29.00	30.3	31.2	36.9	39.2	37.7

In other words the total will continue to grow until the mid-eighties, when it will fall somewhat. The number of men reaching military age - about $2\frac{1}{4}$ million per year at present - will also grow to about $2\frac{1}{2}$ million by the early eighties when it too will begin to fall a little.

43. Over the next decade or so, there will clearly be no problem in finding sufficient manpower for the Armed Forces such, for instance, as had to be faced in the early sixties; more exactly there is no problem vis-à-vis Europe or the USA. As regards China with its immense manpower, the problem is rather different.

44. In the other countries of Eastern Europe it has been calculated that the male population of military age will increase from 13.8 million in 1970 to 15.8 million in 1980 and continue at roughly the same figure until 1990. The number of young men reaching military age each year (about a million at present) will begin to diminish slightly by the mid-seventies. However, there does not seem to be any particular problem of obtaining military manpower over the next twenty years.

45. Neither the Soviet Union nor the East European countries are likely to resort to reductions in armed forces because of lack of manpower. Their economic development is such that they could of course make good use of the manpower at present tied up in defence, but the numbers that would be released as the result of any likely East-West agreement would be too small to have a significant effect on economic development.

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N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E DANNEX to
C-M(72)1I. VITAL RATES IN EUROPE

	WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES										EUROPE		
	Bulgaria	CSSR	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Romania	East Europe	USSR	South Europe	North & West Europe			
Death Rates	1938 1950 1960 1965	13.7 10.2 8.1 8.2	13.2 11.5 9.2 10.0	11.9 11.9 13.7 13.5	14.2 11.4 10.2 10.7	13.8 11.6 7.6 7.4	19.1 12.4 8.7 8.6	14.3 11.7 9.4 9.4	17.5 9.7 7.1 7.3	15.9 10.5 9.4 9.3	12.6 11.3 11.2 11.1		
Infant Mortality	1938 1950 1960 1965	144 95 45 31	110 78 24 25	55 72 39 25	131 86 48 39	140 111 55 41	179 117 75 44	133 98 52 36	161 81 35 27	119 78 54 45	59 44 27 21		
Birth Rates	1938 1950 1960 1965	22.8 25.2 17.8 15.3	16.7 23.3 15.9 16.4	18.0 16.5 17.2 16.5	19.9 20.9 14.7 13.1	24.5 30.7 22.6 17.4	29.5 26.2 19.1 14.6	22.5 24.4 18.8 16.0	37.5 26.7 24.9 18.4	23.9 21.8 20.6 20.2	16.9 17.9 17.7 17.9		
Natural Increase	1938 1950 1960 1965	9.1 15.0 9.7 7.1	3.5 11.8 6.7 6.4	6.1 4.6 3.5 3.0	5.7 9.5 4.5 2.4	10.7 19.1 15.0 10.0	10.4 13.8 10.4 6.0	8.2 12.7 9.4 6.6	20.0 17.0 17.8 11.1	8.0 11.3 11.2 10.9	4.3 6.6 6.5 6.8		


N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

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ANNEX to
CM-72(1)

GRAPH I

USSR : POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS (1959 - 1975)
URSS : POPULATION PAR GROUPE D'AGE (1959 - 1975)



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
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GRAPH II

USSR : VITAE RATES 1950 - 1970

URSS : TAUX DE NATALITE, MORTALITE ET ACCROISSEMENT NATUREL




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GRAPH III


POPULATION GROWTH IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
CROISSANCE DE LA POPULATION DANS LES PAYS DE L'OTAN ET DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE
(MILLIONS)




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GRAPH IV

WARSAW PACT : GROWTH RELATION WEIGHT OF POPULATIONS 1958, 1970, 1985
PACTE DE VARSOVIE : CROISSANCE ET IMPORTANCE RELATIVE DES POPULATIONS 1955, 1970, 1985
(MILLIONS)




 USSR
URSS
 EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE DE L'EST

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ANNEX to
CM-72(1)

GRAPH V
ELEMENTS OF SOVIET POPULATION (1970)
REPARTITION DE LA POPULATION SOVIETIQUE (1970)



Russians
Russes 129 millions

Europeans, non Russians
Européens, non Russes 64 millions

Non Europeans
Non Européens 49 millions

TOTAL 242 millions

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