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COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA

Report by the Committee on Africa

PART I: THE AFRICAN SITUATION

In most of Africa, the objectives of the old colonial era are rapidly superseded by the more complex concerns of the new post-colonial states: the development of indigenous instruments of government, the promotion of forced economic growth, the search for amalgamations or modes of co-operation among the new states, the assumption of international responsibilities, the diversification of ~~mono-crop~~ economies, and in some cases the attempt sharply to reduce dependence on the former metropolitan centres. The relative stability of the colonial period has given way to grave instabilities arising from the emergency of many new, untested and weak régimes.

2. The opportunities for intervention by the Communist bloc are serious and the problems thus posed for the West must not be underestimated. At the same time, the West must avoid regarding as "communist inspired" every action by the new African states that may appear to jeopardise Western interests or to violate Western values. Our first obligation is to understand the problems of the new African states in African terms while at the same time endeavouring to make sure that the African governments understand the Western approach.

The March Towards Independence

3. The forces that brought about the independence of 17 former colonial African territories in 1960 continued to operate in 1961. Sierra Leone became independent on 27th April and the date for Tanganyika's independence has been set for 9th December. Several other territories are likely to become independent in 1962, among them Uganda, and Ruanda and Urundi (the latter probably as two separate states).

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4. Thus "Colonial" questions as such - though not their real or supposed legacies - have virtually disappeared in West Africa. The main pressures for self-government and independence are now being felt in Eastern and South-Central Africa, where they confront complications from which West Africa was comparatively free. The territories of East and South-Central Africa have had relatively less apprenticeship in self-government, and must deal with problems arising from multi-racial societies. They will hence have to face a continuing series of problems affecting their political stability as they move forward toward independence.

Problems of Nation-building

5. In the majority of African states, the trend at the present stage of political development is clearly toward régimes that either forbid an organized opposition or fetter the opposition sufficiently to make it politically meaningless. Prospects for the successful operation of Western democratic institutions are not bright, though in many countries there is concern to preserve at least the democratic ideas of political accountability and basic civil rights.

6. Autocracy in Africa is a response to the problem of building a nation. None of these states is founded on a deep, historical consciousness of nationhood; on the contrary, almost all are artificial creations of the colonial era, and the personal loyalties of most individuals extend no farther than the tribe. Having been recognised as independent national states abroad, their leaders now must create viable national societies at home. To overcome tribalism, great stress is placed on the person of the national leader and the legitimacy of the omnipresent national party.

7. There is also a movement in many African countries toward radical experiments in central planning to produce forced-draft economic growth. A largely illiterate, tradition-bound, isolated people must be brought in one great effort from immemorial tribalism to twentieth century nationalism and economic efficiency: this defines the aim of many African régimes. Political necessity dictates the same end. To rally and sustain popular support, many of the leaders of the new states feel compelled to give tangible evidence that political change has brought with it economic and social benefits as well.

8. The more radical of the new African states want centralised societies, monolithic parties, and state-directed economies. The problems thus posed for the West are serious. For some radical African leaders, relevant models for developing societies are not discernible in the opulent, "libertarian" societies of the West, but rather in the disciplined,

directed, regimented East. This is not to say that all African radicals are Communists. Even the leaders who call themselves Marxist, see their future not in terms of a Communist order, but in terms of an African order. However, many radicals have an affinity for the East arising from their distrust of the West, their ignorance of Communist imperialism in Europe and Asia, and, above all, their interest in Communist experiments in political centralism and rapid, planned economic growth.

African Groupings

9. Pan-Africanism remains a powerful slogan in African politics though the developments of the last years have shown how difficult it may be to put it into practice. Pan-Africanism embraces the desire for greater unity among the African States and a search for an appropriate expression of the uniqueness of African life. In the course of the emergence of an independent Africa the political expression of the objectives of Pan-Africanism has varied. Although there may be agreement as to the objectives to be pursued, it has gradually become clear that there has been none about the ways and means of achieving them. As a result, various and sometimes competing groups have emerged and taken on a more definite shape during the period under consideration. There are now three major groupings: the Casablanca Group, the Monrovia Group and the Brazzaville Group, the latter two overlapping to some extent.

(i) The Casablanca Group

10. This Group derives its name from the Casablanca Conference of January 1961 in which the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Mali, Guinea, Ghana and the self-styled GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne).

11. These countries have agreed on a sharply anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, neutralist policy, which, for all practical purposes, is anti-Western. This does not mean, however, that the leaders of these countries wish to become subservient to the Communist bloc. They are first and foremost Africans who wish to be independent and that, to them, implies economic as well as political independence of their former rulers. They therefore denounce as "neo-colonialism" the continuation of close economic ties between independent African States and the former colonial Powers, particularly association with EEC. Even behind the most altruistic Western proposals they tend to see the spectre of colonialist and imperialist motives. They are prone to invoke the aid of the Communist bloc against what they regard as neo-colonialism. In doing so, they wish to use the Communist Bloc for their own purposes and do not realise that they are being used for the purposes of the Communist Bloc.

12. The Casablanca Group is not homogeneous. They manage to preserve their unity on negative attitudes but when resolutions envisaging the establishment of common organs have to be implemented, the Group has difficulty in reaching agreement. Causes of dissension include the traditional conflict between Arab North Africa and Black Africa and the rivalry for leadership between Nkrumah and Nasser, on the one hand, and Nkrumah and Sekou Touré on the other.

13. Other causes of dissension, peculiar to certain States, have also become apparent. The UAR and Morocco are the enemies of Israel, whereas Ghana, as a non-Moslem state, maintains friendly relations with that country and even Mali and Guinea show no hostility towards it. Morocco has endeavoured to induce the other members of the group to share its attitude towards Mauritania. Libya defaulted from the group at its second meeting and Tunisia has not followed up its participation in the Accra Conference of February, 1961. The control of the various organs of the group, such as the Liaison Bureau and the Joint General Staff, is a bone of contention between the Arab and Black African States.

14. At the core of the Casablanca group is the Ghana-Guinea-Mali "Union of African States" which, on 29th April, adopted a charter providing for quarterly meetings of Heads of State, the organization of a common system of defence, concerted diplomacy, and an economic committee to co-ordinate economic and financial policy. The Union was intended as the nucleus of a "United States of Africa", open to all countries accepting its aims, which include "the complete liquidation of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism in Africa". The Union's charter provides for co-ordinating committees to achieve a common ideological orientation for the mass organizations - political, trade union, women's and youth - in each member state. The representatives of the government parties in the three states met in Conakry on 12th-13th August and decided to convene meetings of labour, women's and youth groups simultaneously on 6th-8th November at Accra, Bamako, and Conakry, respectively. A meeting of the Heads of State in June approved measures to ensure closer radio and road links, the exchange of postal money orders, and co-ordinated civil aviation policies.

15. For practical purposes, the "Union" has little significance; both Touré and Keita appear to suspect Nkrumah of being chiefly interested in capturing the limelight for himself. At the meeting of the three leaders at Bamako in late June, Nkrumah proposed a monetary union which the other opposed, partly, it would appear, because such a union would have given the Ghanaian president too much control. The initial willingness of Guinea and Mali to join the co-sponsors of the Monrovia conference and their subsequent withdrawal under pressure from Ghana suggest continuing differences among the radicals over the tactical approach to the more conservative Brazzaville group.

(ii) The Brazzaville Group

16. This group derives its name from the Brazzaville Conference of December 1960, whose participants were the Heads of State of Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroun, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville) and Madagascar (which does not consider itself an African country). Of the countries of Black Africa formerly administered by France, only Guinea and Mali, belonging to the Casablanca group, and Togo, which has gone its own way, but is associated with the EEC, did not participate.

17. These countries are advocates of close co-operation with France and the EEC; they set particular store by the maintenance of cultural ties with France. The Casablanca group accuses them of playing the part of vassals. So far, the Brazzaville countries have shown little sympathy for the communist bloc and are under no illusions as regards the communists, though little by little contacts are being established with bloc countries. They are aware of the fact that colonialism and imperialism are not monopolies of the West, - to wit the statement by the President of Senegal, Léopold Senghor, that there are countries under Soviet control which have yet to be de-colonialised.

18. The Brazzaville group has decided on close economic, political and military co-operation. To this end they have established the Union Afro-Malgache (UAM) which set up its principal agencies at the Tananarive Conference in 1961. The Union has its seat at Cotonou (Dahomey), and the Organization of Afro-Malgache de Coopération Economique (OAMCEO) at Yaoundé, and the military organization will have its headquarters at Ouagadougou. The Heads of State of these countries meet every six months. The UAM has a flexible structure which respects, insofar as basic decisions are concerned, the principle of national sovereignty, in accordance with the inclinations of President Houphouët Boigny, while admitting, at the level of committees of Ministers and experts, the rule of the majority, closely in line with the federalist theories of President Senghor, giving at least the impression of a further step towards African unity.

19. Within the group a number of sub-groups may be distinguished viz.: the Conseil de l'Entente, consisting of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey, and a loose form of co-operation between Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic and the Congo Republic (Brazzaville); this latter sub-group will probably in due course include Cameroun.

20. The Brazzaville States have generally maintained a unified approach towards African affairs although there have been some differences of opinion between its members.

(iii) The Monrovia Group

21. The Monrovia Conference in May 1961 represented broadly speaking an effort by the moderate and more conservative African states to counter the moves of the radical, activist Casablanca group to capture the leadership in inter-African affairs(1). It was also a logical outgrowth of earlier statements and proposals by President Tubman, Houphouet-Boigny and other moderate leaders who believe that prospects for a politically unified Africa depend essentially upon recognising the sovereignty of existing states rather than on pressing for the rapid merger of political entities. The unity sought at Monrovia was not at the moment the political integration of sovereign African states but rather a unity of goals and action.

22. The conference contributed constructively to inter-African relations by stressing the principles of non-interference by African states in the affairs of their independent neighbours, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for the United Nations against those attempting to weaken it or oppose its efforts in the Congo. "Non-interference" was a response to the alarm of several participants at what they regarded as adventurist activities by the Casablanca group, particularly Ghana and Guinea.

23. The conference also decided to establish an advisory organization of African and Malagasy states. It created a technical commission of experts to work out details for economic, educational, cultural, scientific, and technical co-operation, and for the co-ordination of communications and transportation systems. These will be discussed at the next formal conference of the Monrovia group, to be held in Lagos, probably early in 1962, open to all African countries, including those of the Casablanca group.

24. The Monrovia conference was far more restrained than the Casablanca group in its criticism of the West. Nevertheless, the "anti-colonial" tone of several resolutions indicated that the Monrovia group shared many of the views of the Casablanca group. Thus, for example, support of the Africans in Angola, South West Africa, and South Africa was not considered "interference" in the domestic affairs of other states.

(1) 20 states participated in the conference: the Brazzaville "12" plus four from West Africa (Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo) and four others (Libya, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Somalia)

(iv) Possible East African Grouping

25. Functional links between British dependencies in East Africa may be preserved after independence, and the idea of some form of political federation is in the air. Such an association, formed at the initiative and free choice of leaders of the emerging states concerned, could prove an important factor for stability in the area. Its potential influence of the development of the groups with all-African pretensions discussed above would be considerable.

The Africans in the United Nations

26. The number of African states at the United Nations has increased sharply over the last year and will continue to grow. The admission of Sierre Leone and Mauretania raised African representation to twenty-seven members (not counting the Republic of South Africa). Tanganyika which becomes independent on 9th December, may shortly be also admitted.

27. The African states participated actively in the General Assembly and, despite shortages in personnel and resources, are active to some degree in all the major councils and committees of the United Nations. They are pressing hard to expand their representation on the different United Nations bodies and for lack of an agreement to amend the Charter, they try to achieve their aims by seeking a redistribution of seats at the expense of other nations - so far of Western Europe.

28. The increased representation of Africa has strengthened the fluctuating or non-aligned vote in the United Nations. The impact of this African bloc on the United Nations is undoubtedly considerable, though it has been lessened by its frequent failure to vote as a bloc let alone to vote with Asian countries. They are often deeply divided on African issues e.g. the Congo problem. Nor is there agreement on cold-war issues concerning which many African states prefer not to commit themselves. They tend to concentrate on colonial issues and on issues considered by them as such. In this field they have achieved their greatest unity of purpose and they can be expected to exercise greater and more concerted pressure in future.

29. The African states regularly caucus together but the only group that votes as a group is that of the Brazzaville countries. The Monrovia Conference has not been translated into an effective United Nations coalition. The Casablanca group on the other hand, because of its strident assertion of leadership, sometimes has an influence exceeding its numbers.

30. The admission of so many new states in so short a time has introduced into the United Nations some new ideas and a new flavour. The uninhibited attitudes of some of the younger members of the United Nations might tend to involve this organization in resolutions and actions which would exceed its powers as laid down in the Charter.

The United Nations in Africa

31. The United Nations' main involvement in Africa during the period under review has been in the Congo. The United Nations assisted in reassembling Parliament which resulted in the formation of a Central Government in August. The success of this effort to reintegrate Stanleyville has however been compromised by Gizenga's return to independent political activities in his provincial capital.

32. Numerous contacts took place during May and June between the UNO and the Belgian authorities with a view to collaborating in the implementation of the resolution of 21st February relating to the withdrawal of the foreign "mercenaries" and of the political advisers. The Geneva talks between Mr. Hammarskjöld and Mr. Spaak in July had resulted in a common and progressive solution to the problem. On 28th August, the United Nations suddenly arrested the Belgian officers who were serving with the Katanga army.

33. On the 13th September, the United Nations undertook its controversial direct intervention in Katanga. Some experts are of the opinion that this action was motivated mainly by the desire to expel the remaining mercenaries, whereas others think that the intentions of the local United Nations authorities went much further and comprised the forcible subjection of Katanga to the authority of the Central Government in Leopoldville. Whatever their motives for the action may have been, it turned out to be a failure and has weakened the position of the United Nations as a mediator between conflicting factions. Settlement of the relationship between Katanga and the Central Government as well as the prevention of civil war remain serious problems for the United Nations.

34. The United Nations Committee on South West Africa toured extensively in Africa during the summer to interview political refugees and report on conditions in the territory. They were not permitted by the South African Government to enter the territory, but have submitted a report recommending that South Africa's mandate should be revoked and the United Nations made responsible for the administration of the territory.

35. Two resolutions on apartheid in South Africa are before the General Assembly. One, sponsored by the African delegations, condemns South Africa and calls for its expulsion from the United Nations and for diplomatic and economic sanctions. A second resolution, originally proposed by India, repeats in somewhat stronger language the recommendations of

the apartheid resolution passed by the XVth Session condemning South Africa, but asks members to take individual action against South Africa.

36. The Chairman of a special United Nations Committee on Angola was received by the Portuguese Government in Lisbon and given, in his personal capacity, information about the territory, but the Committee was not permitted to visit Angola.

37. Another United Nations commission was appointed to observe the arrangements for elections in Ruanda-Urundi and reported that they were satisfactory.

38. In accordance with a resolution of the XVth General Assembly, the North Cameroons have joined Nigeria and the South Cameroons the Cameroon Republic as the result of a plebiscite.

39. Resolutions on the Implementation of the Declaration on Colonial Independence and a Nigerian proposal for the independence of all colonial territories in Africa by 1970 are also being discussed by the XVth Session.

40. Concerning the activities of United Nations-related bodies in Africa, the most significant was the joint UNESCO-ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) conference on African education held at Addis Ababa in May. Agreement was reached in principle on the scope and guidelines for a major long-term programme, but no financial arrangements were made.

41. United Nations programmes for economic development and technical assistance under ETAP (Expanded Technical Assistance Programme) and the Special Fund have continued to aid independent and emerging African states.

Africa's Institutional ties with the West

42. Formal institutional working relationships with the West changed little during the last six months, although there was increased ferment over future relationships between Africa and the European Economic Community(1). With the decision of the United Kingdom Government to negotiate terms of entry into the EEC, this problem now extends to the African Commonwealth members. The main African anxiety is that attachment to European trading systems might produce divisions in Africa, subordinate African development to European needs for primary products, and imply a dependent status for Africa.

(1) In addition to the Brazzaville countries, Somalia, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Togo and Mali are associated with EEC.

43. African states presently associated with the EEC favour continuation of special arrangements but indicate they will seek additional benefits and participation in decision-making under a new treaty of association to replace the present temporary arrangements which expire at the end of 1962.

44. African membership in the Commonwealth of Nations was increased by the participation of Sierra Leone and there will be a new member with the accession to independence of Tanganyika on 9th December, 1961. Only South Africa, however, left the Commonwealth.

45. Modifications were introduced in the monetary systems of Senegal, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, and Togo giving each country control in principle of its foreign exchange earnings and currency issue, but agreement was also reached among these countries and France which in practice ensures continued unrestricted convertibility with other franc zone currencies.

Neutralism and Afro-Asian solidarity at the Belgrade Conference

46. The Belgrade Conference, in which Nigeria, Togo and the Upper Volta were not willing to participate, revealed disturbing evidence of the true trend of "positive neutralism". All the African delegations were unanimous in denouncing "colonialism" once more, whereas the Soviet Union's resumption of its nuclear tests merely elicited expressions of regret or of "shock", but no formal condemnation.

47. A few days later, on breaking up after the Tananarive Conference, the twelve French-speaking Heads of State, while declaring themselves in favour of "non-alignment", did not hesitate to condemn the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear tests and to point out that Soviet colonialism was depriving a large proportion of Asia of its freedom of political expression.

48. Between these two views, there stand several African states (Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Congo (Leopoldville), Somalia) which, while preserving various links with the West, refuse any military or political commitment.

49. The Belgrade Conference also showed that the Afro-Asian states were encountering great difficulties in reaching agreement on the definition of a common political policy. In reality, Afro-Asian solidarity finds little expression except within the organizations set up to assist movements aiming at emancipation or engaged in subversive activities; the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund, whose Chairman is a Guinean, held two meetings this year and has in all likelihood been subsidised by the Soviet Union and China.

Africa and the Arab World

50. In previous reports, the Experts have pointed out the growing rôle being played by the Arab world, and in particular, the UAR, in Africa, and the anti-Western character of Arab propaganda. It has also been stated that while the UAR does not necessarily work in concert with the Sino-Soviet bloc in Africa, it frequently adopts similar conceptions and methods, and in pursuing its own aims, often serves the ends of Communism, as, for instance, through the sending of arms to Gizenga.

51. There has been no notable increase of Arab activity in Africa during the period under review. It remains to be seen what effect the break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union will have: Nasser's loss of prestige may well weaken his influence in Africa but it is equally possible that, temporarily frustrated in his Pan-Arab designs, he may seek to increase his prestige and power by a more active African policy.

African Trade Unions

52. Recent developments in trade unionism deserve careful consideration, mainly because of the political potentialities of labour movements in Africa. Although these political potentialities are very small in the states based on radical principles, they are more significant in certain states based on liberal principles in which the Trade Unions frequently play the rôle of a political opposition.

53. In May 1961 an All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) was formally established with permanent headquarters in Casablanca. This union is at present under the influence of the more radical labour leaders of the countries of the Casablanca Group and very few unions from moderate countries are among its members. In the eyes of the moderates an unacceptable provision of AATUF is the requirement for disaffiliation from other international labour confederations, including the Western-oriented ICFTU, to which many of these unions still adhere and from which they receive financial support.

54. At the moment, AATUF is a militant radical organization, not without internal strains, embracing only a minority of African unions. It has, for tactical reasons, received support from the communist WFTU which, as long as it has only very few and relatively minor African affiliates, favours the development of ostensibly neutralist African unions without international ties (See Part II, paragraphs 90 and 91).

55. The formation of a possible rival African labour confederation, whose membership would not involve cutting individual union affiliations with non-African international unions, is at present under consideration but there is also the possibility that some important moderate unions may join AATUF, especially if they can preserve Western financial support.

PROBLEMS OF PARTICULAR AREAS

The Congo

56. Although it is regarded as a State, the Congo lacks the foundations and structures of a true State. Its frontiers have been recognised at the international level, but they are disputed at the domestic level through the secession of Katanga. It has a constitution and governmental institutions, but they are still weak and precarious. It has an army and a police force which, far from keeping law and order, are frequently inducive to disorder and the threat of civil war. A completely centralised Government, which was desirable during the colonial era, may no longer be suitable for a country which is the prey of rival ethnic groups.

57. Despite the repeated efforts of the United Nations and lavish counsels of moderation and conciliation, the conferences and meetings held in the Congo and elsewhere to solve this problem, have so far achieved nothing.

58. The convening of the Parliament in Leopoldville in July 1961 resulted in the formation of a broadly representative Government in which Katanga, however, was not willing to participate. This also led to the official dissolution of the Gizenga Government at Stanleyville, hitherto recognised by the Sino-Soviet bloc, the UAR, and several states with radical leanings.

59. There were some grounds for hope that the recognition of the Adula government, both by the United Nations and by the governments belonging to the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs, would counteract the disastrous influence previously exercised by the radicals on the development of the Congo. In the event, however, the radicals, incited by Gizenga, instead of co-operating in the peaceful reconstruction of the Congo, seized the opportunity of their return to Leopoldville to accentuate the causes of discord, aggravate the confusion and do all in their power to make a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Katanga problem impossible. The Central Government, at the instigation of the Stanleyville extremists, envisaged the use of force to solve the Katanga problem. The main result of the measures taken was to show up the weakness of the national army.

60. The events of recent weeks give reason to fear that the Congo is about to revert to its old de facto division into three blocs, namely, that of the Central Government at Leopoldville, the extremist block of the Eastern Province and that of secessionist Katanga.

Ruanda-Urundi

61. In implementation of the United Nations resolutions, elections were held in Ruanda and Urundi. In Ruanda, a referendum put two questions at the same time, one on the principle of the Monarchy and the other on the personal status of the Mwami, Kigeri V. The elections took place in an orderly fashion; very few disturbances were reported. The result of the elections, insofar as Ruanda is concerned, was the victory of the Parmehutu party, the eviction of the Mwami and the adoption of the republican régime. As far as Urundi is concerned, the result, on the contrary, was a victory for the pro-monarchist Uprona party, led by Mr. Rwagasore, the son of the Mwami.

62. Two Assemblies were duly formed and two legitimate governments were set up by these assemblies. It rests with these governments to lay proposals before the protecting power regarding the independence and the technical and administrative assistance which they hope to obtain from Belgium. The contrary results of the elections will make it very difficult for Ruanda-Urundi to accede to independence as a single State.

63. A few days after the elections in Urundi, Mr. Rwagasore was assassinated. The enquiry which was immediately made revealed that this assassination was attributable to conflicts between two feudal families.

Angola

64. During the past year an outbreak of violence took place in Northern Angola which received outside support in the form of arms and money both from the Sino-Soviet Bloc and from certain more radical African States. The Portuguese authorities are now able to report that order has been restored and conditions have generally returned to normal. At the same time, the Portuguese Government has introduced a number of measures of reform in Angola and Mozambique (see statement by the Portuguese Delegation attached at Annex A).

Ghana

65. The trend of events in Ghana during the past six months has caused concern to the West. Nkrumah made an extended tour of the Soviet bloc this summer issuing fulsome communiqués of friendship in each capital and concluding further trade and aid agreements. He dismissed the British Chief of Defence Staff, replacing him with a Ghanaian, announced that British officers would be removed from executive commands though he wished to retain the services of British personnel as a training mission; and decided that 400 cadets will be sent to Russia. He also dismissed two of his most senior and moderate cabinet ministers giving power to younger left-wing ministers. Fearing for his own position, following the widespread dissatisfaction in the country over the austerity budget which resulted in serious strikes, he arrested 50 political opponents and created a new court for the summary trial of political offences, without appeal.

66. At the same time, conscious that he has come to appear too closely identified with the Soviet bloc and in order to continue to receive Western aid, and in particular Western support for the Volta River project, Nkrumah has attempted to repair his relations with the West. Despite a virulent anti-British press campaign, the Nkrumah-Sandys communiqué reported agreement in many fields, including Ghanaian approval of the aims of British Colonial policy. Nkrumah has been anxious that the visit of the Queen to Ghana should proceed. While 70 cadets have already gone to Russia, Nkrumah has received a military training mission of 30 officers from Canada. It is also understood that Nkrumah intends to accept an invitation to attend the forthcoming Lagos conference of the Monrovia group, at which his aim will no doubt be to reassert his claim to leadership of African nationalism.

Mali

67. Mali is doing nothing to accelerate the process of setting-up "Pan-African" institutions: the liaison bureau of the Casablanca Group, which is to be directed by a Moroccan but is located at Bamako, has not yet been opened. This slackness in regard to the "Pan-African" movement is at variance with the zeal shown by Modibo Keita at Belgrade, for which he was rewarded by being made one of the emissaries of the uncommitted countries to President Kennedy. It is noteworthy that, with the exception of Senegal, whose leaders he abuses on every possible occasion, he treats the States of the Brazzaville Group with respect.

68. Voluntarily deprived of its only natural outlet to the sea, Mali, which has never been rich, sees its "neutrality" policy as a means of obtaining aid which is all the more essential because its Five-year Plan, initiated in October, has set ambitious targets.

69. Co-operation has been primarily developed with the East, but at the end of the summer, Mr. Keita was much cooler towards the peoples' democracies. The Chinese embassy, which had been installed for five months, was curtly requested to restrain the propaganda activities of its experts. Moreover, at the XVth Session of UNO the Mali Representative, Mr. Bocum, rejected the "troika" proposal and recommended the creation of three Assistant Secretary General posts.

Ethiopia

70. Communist activity seems to have declined during the past year. This is apparently due to two factors. As regards Ethiopia, the coup d'état of last December made the Emperor more suspicious of the Soviets, since the fomenters of the movement were known for their progressist, if not pro-communist, sympathies. As regards the Soviets, it is believed that they felt the need to dissociate themselves from the established government so as not to prejudice their chances of co-operation with any régime which might replace it.

71. It must not be forgotten that the traditional structure of Ethiopia was weakened by the coup d'état of last year, that there is a growing desire for political and social reforms, and that a change of government might very well turn out to be to the advantage of the Soviet bloc.

Somalia

72. During the Monrovia Conference, the Somali Prime Minister raised the question of the unsettled boundary problem with Ethiopia. After a lengthy discussion, the conference decided to send an appeal to the Heads of State of Ethiopia and Somalia to settle their differences through negotiations. The claims of Somalia involve territories inhabited by Somali tribes in the bordering zones of Ethiopia, Northern Kenya and French Somaliland. The Somali Government considers that the right of self-determination should be granted to these populations.

The Republic of South Africa

73. South Africa left the Commonwealth on 31st May and became the "Republic of South Africa". This decision was the result of the outspoken reaction of many members of the Commonwealth at the London Conference early this year against the continuing policy of apartheid pursued by the Verwoerd Government. The elections held in October resulted in an increased majority for the Verwoerd Government.

74. Meanwhile, relations between the Republic of South Africa and the other African and Asian states have further deteriorated. Denunciation of apartheid is one of the major weapons in the anti-colonial campaign of the Afro-Asian group and the Soviet Bloc. Since apartheid is being identified with the policy of the "white man" as such, its continuance weakens considerably the position of the entire Western world. The constant attempt of the Afro-Asian states to bring pressure to bear upon the South African Government by boycott and via the United Nations has put the West on the spot.

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PART II: COMMUNIST PENETRATION

General

75. Communist bloc operations have both deepened and widened in the past twelve months, though the main effort has been concentrated on Ghana, Mali and the Somali Republic. There are still large areas, however, notably in British East and Central Africa and in many of the countries of the Afro-Malagasy union, where no progress is to be reported.

76. The broad patterns of communist action have remained substantially unchanged. At this stage, it still appears to focus more on the destruction of Western positions than on the building up of an African branch of communism.

77. Indigenous communist parties are still very few and have at present little significance. Membership has, nevertheless, increased from some 5,000 to approximately 50,000 within the last two years. They receive little open assistance from the USSR. Overt communist ideological penetration is apparently still in a preparatory phase. It also appears likely that the African environment has proved less responsive to Marxist ideology than expected.

78. It would not be wise, however, to ignore Communist tactics which consist in acting through African Parties whose anti-Western policy is likely to meet their purposes. The principal organizations in question are the French-speaking African Independence Party in West Africa, the external organization of the Union of the Cameroun Peoples, which is behind the rebellion in West Cameroun, and the Lumumba National Party recently set up in the Congo (Leopoldville). The Communists are also able to demonstrate their totalitarian methods through the one-party systems of Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which, moreover, were present as guests at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

79. Unlike the Chinese, who seem ready to deal openly with any sympathetic faction within an African territory, Soviet bloc dealings are mainly with the established Government.

Diplomatic Relations

80. The Soviet Union has now established twelve embassies on the African continent in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Other bloc countries are well represented in the same territories and, in all, there exist some 60 missions or agreements to establish missions, varying in degree from trade offices to full embassies. In the Congo the Soviet and other bloc missions have moved from Stanleyville to Leopoldville but have been asked by the Congolese to seek fresh accreditation. There is still the same tendency to bring in staffs considerably larger than necessary for ordinary diplomatic purposes; the Soviet embassies at Mogadishu with at least 50 members, and in Ghana, with 44.

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81. State visits to Moscow and other bloc capitals have been made by the Emperor of Ethiopia (in 1959), President Sekou Touré of Guinea (1960), Abdiraschid Ali Shermarke, the Prime Minister of the Somali Republic (1961), and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1961). President Modibo Koita of Mali is expected to visit Moscow soon. Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet visited Morocco, Guinea and Ghana early in 1961 and Khrushchev himself plans to visit certain African territories, notably Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Ethiopia and Morocco and possibly Mali. However, Khrushchev has not yet paid his long-heralded visit. Exchanges of lesser delegations in the economic, cultural and trades union fields have multiplied greatly.

Deliveries of Arms

82. Although it is not possible to assess the quantities of arms delivered by the Communist bloc countries to African States, there is no doubt that the flow of supplies has continued during the last few months in proportions which exceed the requirements of these States. The main channels of entry, storage and re-distribution, are Guinea, Ghana and Egypt; Guinea is the main supply centre for the subversive movement in West Africa, and Egypt for East Africa.

Trade and Aid Relations

83. Bloc economic assistance in 1961 has been continued in such target countries as Guinea, Ghana and to a lesser extent Ethiopia. In addition, the Somali Republic, Mali, and the Sudan have been added to the list of African countries accepting Sino-Soviet Bloc aid. The Soviet Union and the satellites have by making some spectacular promises of economic and technical aid, gained considerable success on the propaganda front. Actual aid so far has, however, been very limited. Compared with a figure of total credits extended to African countries by the Sino-Soviet bloc estimated at \$330 million by April 1961 an additional \$177.8 million has been extended within the period under review. (See Annex B) This trend is all the more remarkable since the overall rate of extension of new economic assistance in the form of loans and grants by the Soviet bloc has shown some sign of decline during this period. Whereas the rate of utilisation has increased. During the period under review, it is to be noted that except in the case of Ghana and Guinea, less than 3% of the overall aid has so far been drawn. Partly as a result of credit agreements granting the Soviet bloc countries contracts to build industrial enterprises in Africa, increasing numbers of Communist technicians are now arriving in that continent. Reports from Guinea indicate growing dissatisfaction with their calibre.

84. Mali has concluded her first trade agreements with the USSR and Czechoslovakia for a total trade target of about \$56 million and lesser agreements with Bulgaria and East Germany. The Somalia Republic's agreements with the USSR and Czechoslovakia provided for an expected level of trade of \$32 million. But by far the greatest advance in both value and variety of the items involved has occurred in the agreements concluded between Ghana and the Bloc countries.

85. Recent trade figures indicate only a slight increase in the share of bloc trade within the total trade of some African countries; but it should be remembered that this is in addition to considerable increases in trade between the African countries and the Sino-Soviet Bloc during 1960. The share of trade with the Bloc which represented 28% of the total Guinean trade during the early part of 1961 has now reached 33%. Comparable percentages for other African countries are: Sudan 11%, Ghana 5%, Morocco 5%, Tunisia 3%, Nigeria 3%.

86. Under the Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement with Guinea which was signed in September 1960, the Communist Chinese offered to send several hundred rice-growing and rural commune experts to Guinea. Nevertheless, despite conflicting reports, only a small number seem so far to have arrived. Further Bloc offers of aid to Africa should be expected as a result of prevailing receptivity on the African side. It would seem that the European satellite countries are often used as a spearhead for economic penetration since the African countries appear to consider that they are thus less involved in East-West competition. In fact, overtures have already been made to the Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Niger, Dahomey and the Senegal. Without having been definitely turned down, these offers have, however, not materialised except in the case of Togo.

Trade Union Activities

87. In this field too, the Soviet bloc has ^{not insisted on} ~~been pressed~~ for the creation of overt Communist organizations, but it has concentrated on the training of a number of anti-Western trade union leaders, while steering the trade unions of certain African countries towards a break with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) to which the majority of African federations belong. Consequently, contacts between the Communist world and the African trade unions are not made through the "World Federation of Trade Unions" (WFTU), but rather through the trade union leaders of the satellite countries and of other European countries, or, alternatively, through the pro-Soviet representatives of the "Conference for the Solidarity of the Afro-Asian Peoples", or of similar organizations.

88. In the campaign for Communist penetration of the African trade union movement, the Czechoslovakian trade unions are in the fore; they have recently sent delegations to Mali, Guinea, Ghana and Morocco and have been visited by the trade union representatives of these countries. The same is true of the trade unions of Eastern Germany. African students are admitted to the Leipzig "special schools" organized by the Single Trade Union of Pankow. A new "special school" for African trade unionists has already been operating for some time in the "Karl Marx" University at Leipzig.

89. Special agreements for assistance and co-operation exist between the trade unions of Eastern Germany and those of Guinea, whose activity in the countries of Black Africa is being intensified by their Secretary, Diallo Seydou. There is probably an information and propaganda centre in Cairo where the "representative" of the so-called German Democratic Republic in the Arab countries is believed to be directing the Communist penetration drive in the countries of Eastern Central Africa (Uganda, Zanzibar). On the occasion of a recent visit to Eastern Germany by the Italian Communist trade unionist Levrero, it was ascertained that an "Advanced Training Centre for Somali Trade Unionists" is operating in the "special school" at Leipzig.

90. Having secured these footholds, as the result of several years' hard work, the Soviet bloc recently lent its support to the proposal to set up an "All-African Trade Union Federation" (AATUF), which is at present controlled by leaders with anti-Western radical sympathies.

91. The Soviet bloc did not of course give its support to this new Federation, created in Casablanca, in order to encourage the leanings of the trade union movement towards autonomy, but because the "detachment" of the African trade unions from the ICFTU is part of the more ambitious Communist plan to sever the bonds between Africa and the Western world.

Cultural and educational action

92. Communist cultural action primarily consists in flooding Africa with a spectacular quantity of books, pamphlets, broadcasts and films, with the aim of making the Marxist classics known and of demonstrating the superiority of Russian culture and techniques. A real effort has been made, involving the use of the main vernacular languages, to win the greatest possible number of readers and listeners for this material. In certain cases (Conakry, Bamako, Lomé) the distribution is ensured by Communist-controlled bookshops.

93. With a number of African governments, the Communist countries, including Yugoslavia, have signed cultural agreements providing for exchanges in the field of art, co-operation in the making of films and the supply to the African countries of

various specialists, and particularly of teachers. For example, during the past academic year, about 150 teachers from Eastern Europe and even from North Vietnam have held teaching posts in Guinea. It must be pointed out, however, that this experiment has proved something of a failure owing to the unadaptability, and in many cases, to the poor calibre of the teachers.

94. There are two other aspects to the Communist educational effort. In Africa, the Soviet Union is completing the construction of a trade school in Conakry which can take 1,500 pupils. In the Eastern bloc countries, rapidly increasing efforts are being made to provide accommodation for African students, many of whom hold Communist scholarships. About 3,000 students, i.e. as many again as in 1960, are at present behind the Iron Curtain (including the Chinese People's Republic). These students are selected on a broader basis than that adopted by the Western powers, special attention being paid to their ideological receptivity, furthermore, a large proportion of these students is recruited without the consent of the local governments, by the Communist embassies, the youth organizations and the trade unions.

95. In 1960 the so-called "Patrice Lumumba" People's Friendship University was opened in Moscow; it has room for 3,500 students, but takes only a very few Soviet students, the Russians have thus endeavoured, apparently with some success, to overcome the difficulties of adaptation (e.g. the academic level and some expression of racial prejudice by the Russian students) which the young Africans had encountered in the traditional universities. However, despite the presence of a handful of Russian students, the new university may have given certain Africans the impression that they were in some sense the victims of segregation.

96. Books about Africa generally and studies concerning individual African states, among which the Congo (Leopoldville) is conspicuous, are appearing in greater numbers in the Soviet Union. Foremost among them was "African Looks to the Future" by Professor Ivan Potekhin, Head of the African Institute in Moscow. Extensive research into African history and current affairs is also being carried out at the Karl-Marx University, Leipzig, and at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

Friendship Societies

97. The Soviet-African Friendship Association has expanded its activities during 1961. In January its radio programme "The Soviet-African Friendship Association calling Africa" started weekly broadcasts in Moscow's Swahili service. Branches were set up in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and a special "Women's Commission" was formed. Scholarships for study in the Soviet

Union were offered by the Association which, it claimed, had later been taken up by students from eleven African states. A "German-African Society" was established in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany in March.

Front Organizations

98. Activities have considerably broadened since the granting of independence to many African states during 1960.

99. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held in Conakry in March 1960, support was expressed for a proposed "Second Festival of African Youth". This is now planned for Conakry in February 1962 and will be organized by the Guinean Youth movement which is itself a WFDY affiliate. A "Pan-African Youth Conference", sponsored by the All African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) and due to take place in Conakry in January 1962, is doubtless also attracting WFDY's interest, since it will probably set up an extremist Pan-African Youth Federation. A Seminar to discuss the place of youth in the trade union movement, held in Casablanca (10th - 14th July) was jointly sponsored by WFDY and its Moroccan affiliate Jeunesse Ouvrière Marocaine.

100. A so-called "All-African Union of Journalists" was set up in Bamako (19th - 23rd May, 1961) as a direct result of the Second World Meeting of Journalists held in Baden in 1960 under the sponsorship of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). "Observers" from the IOJ and from the Organisation Internationale de Radio et Télévision used the inaugural conference to publicise details of aid which both organizations are prepared to supply to African information media through their own affiliates, notably in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany.

101. During the early part of the year the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) sent a high-level delegation to visit Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Nigeria. The intention was to sound out the possibilities for convening an African women's conference. No direct result was apparent; but two Guinean women active within WIDF, Mme. Camara Loffo and Mme. Jeanne Mattin, helped stage a "West African Women's Conference" in Conakry in July, during which the Secretary General of AAPC (formerly of the World Federation of Trade Unions) advanced plans for an All-African Women's Conference in Tanganyika in July 1962.

Propaganda

102. Magazines, books and newspapers are distributed both openly and clandestinely in Africa through any distribution medium available. Apart from those available in bookshops, they find their way into Africa through contacts between African and Communist Youth, Women's and Trades Union organizations. Visitors to bloc countries from African countries which ban Communist publications are encouraged to take material home with them.

103. Soviet bloc radio stations now broadcast 134 hours each week to audiences in Africa. Stations in Moscow (70 hours), Warsaw (21 hours), Prague (17 hours), East Berlin (10½ hours), Sofia (12 hours), Bucharest (3½ hours) tell Africans of the "glories" of living under a Socialist régime and of the "iniquities" of "colonialism" and "neo-colonialism" as practised by the Western powers. They also provide a Communist-orientated view of international affairs. The main languages used are English, French and Portuguese, but the latest trend is to introduce broadcasts in African languages. Moscow broadcasts 14 hours each week in Swahili and 7 hours in Amheric.

104. The Soviet, Czech, Polish and East German News Agencies have established branches in Africa which provide free news services. These are not only outlets for Communist propaganda in Africa, but also collection centres for African news transmitted back to Europe.

105. Next December a constituent conference of the Union of African National Broadcasting and Television Systems is to be held at Rabat. This Union was largely the idea of the Casablanca Group States and its creation might therefore be feared to bode no good for the West. However, the Monrovia Group States have decided to apply for admission and this would enable them to influence and keep a watch on the activities of the organization.

Special Aspects of Chinese Penetration

106. The trend of Chinese penetration presents a similar pattern to that shown by the Soviet bloc. Having started later, the Chinese have not yet penetrated as deeply in Africa, but have nevertheless made significant progress. Dissimilarities in Chinese and Soviet methods of penetration reflect the ideological differences which have become increasingly noticeable since the USSR dropped its belief in the inevitability of war. While the Chinese effort in Africa is on a smaller scale than that of the Russians, particularly in regard to technical assistance, it is nevertheless efficient and well-directed, and appears to be making particular progress among radical nationalist opinion in East Africa, Morocco and Cameroun.

107. Being themselves non-white, the Chinese do not hesitate to reinforce their revolutionary propaganda by racial attacks on the white man.

Diplomatic Relations

108. Embassies of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) were opened in Ghana and in Guinea in August 1960; in Mali in January 1961; and in the Somali Republic in May 1961. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Mali was a particular triumph since it involved the withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese Mission from Bamako. Senegal has recognised Communist China, while at the same time having diplomatic relations with Nationalist China.

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Chinese Identification with African Nationalism

109. An "Africa Freedom Day" was held in Peking on 15th April, 1961 to give wide publicity to China's support for African Nationalism. An outstanding characteristic of Chinese policy in Africa has been the support given to revolutionary movements and their political leaders and exiles. This stems from an obsession for propagating the ideological struggle, so that for the Chinese the real fight against colonialism in Africa is the fight put up by the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria or by the Armée de Libération Nationale Kamerounaise (ALNK) in Cameroun. These two movements have enjoyed the special favour of the Chinese, who have established much closer contact with them than the Russians.

110. Young Camerounians have been trained in sabotage techniques and guerilla warfare in China. Considerable financial assistance has been given to Oginga Odinga, leader of a radical splinter group of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and also to members of the Greater Somalia League.

Delegations

111. In the past twelve months well over 100 African delegations visited China and many Chinese delegations have visited Africa. Notable among African visitors were President Sekou Touré of Guinea in September, 1960, and President Kwame Nkrumah in August, 1961. Political leaders and youth and labour leaders from all parts of Africa continued to stream to Peking to receive red-carpet treatment and broadcast their favourable impressions of China's achievements.

Cultural Relations

112. A special African Affairs Committee was set up within the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. A Chinese Institute of African Affairs, modelled on the Soviet African Institute will be set up soon to train specialists for work in Africa. The outstanding event of the year has been the extensive West African tour made from February to June, 1961, by a ten-member delegation of the China-African Friendship Association. The delegation was led by Lu Chang Sheng, President of the Association and a leading member of the Chinese Presidium. The delegation visited Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Togo, Dahomey and Upper Volta. The CAFA plays an important rôle in sponsoring and entertaining African visitors to China.

113. A large-scale Chinese exhibition was held in Conakry in January, 1961, concentrated mainly on displaying industrial and technical exhibits, including the first Chinese car, "Le Drapeau Rouge". A Chinese Economic Reconstruction Exhibition was held in Accra in August and September, 1961.

114. An agreement for cultural co-operation between China and Ghana was signed in Peking in August, 1961.

115. The Chinese have as yet no system of training for Africans on the scale of the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University in Moscow, but the number of African students is increasing. 250 scholarships were offered to Somalis, irrespective of the recipients' qualifications, and scholarships have also been offered to Zanzibar. It was announced in April 1961 that a Union of African students in China had been formed, with members from the Somali Republic, Kenya, Zanzibar and Cameroun.

Propaganda

116. The New China News Agency (NCNA) has established offices in Cairo, Rabat, Accra, and Conakry and has decided to open an office in Tunis. There is a NCNA representative in Bamako. Radio Peking broadcasts to Africa for 35 hours a week in English, 14 in French and 7 each in Portuguese, Cantonese, Swahili and Italian. Chinese publications in English, French and Arabic circulate extensively in Africa and make considerable impact due to their high-quality production and low cost. Chinese films have been shown in Guinea.

Yugoslavia's action in Africa

117. The interest shown by Yugoslavia in Central Africa since 1960 took the spectacular form of Marshall Tito's official visit early in 1961 to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea and Mali, and of the participation of African States in the Belgrade Conference. Cultural, commercial or technical aid agreements were signed; they have started to produce some results but on a modest scale, except in the case of a special cultural effort in Guinea where 60 Yugoslav teachers have held posts during the past academic year.

118. By accepting this assistance, the leaders of the African States concerned have siezed an opportunity of showing that their "positive neutralism" could be put into practice. President Sékou Touré, for his part, was also glad to avoid being involved in a dialogue with the Communist Bloc alone.

PART III: WESTERN ACTION

Harmonisation of Western Action

119. The experts wish once more to draw attention to the continued validity and increasing importance of what was said in earlier reports about the necessity of harmonisation of Western action in the face of the Soviet challenge in Africa.

120. "Individual Western countries have much to gain and little to lose by such harmonisation, which can be furthered by consultation among representatives of NATO countries on the spot, bilaterally on governmental level, or multilaterally under the auspices of NATO or other Western organizations. In some cases, such co-ordination would, for psychological reasons, have to be carried out discreetly. A NATO label attached to economic, technical or cultural assistance would, undoubtedly, do more harm than good in Africa. However, demonstrations of Western unity and strength in the face of the Soviet threat might go a long way toward countering the Soviet propaganda thesis that the West is finished and that the future is theirs, provided this Western posture of strength and unity does not appear to Africans as a united front against African interests."

121. Efforts made within NATO at such harmonisation have undoubtedly borne some fruit and the recent creation of an ad hoc Committee on Africa would seem to be a further step in the right direction. However, within the United Nations and in other world forums, NATO nations still often speak with a variety of voices on African subjects. This cannot be said to strengthen the Western position in Africa or to impede Communist penetration. As long as a common Western policy on Africa remains unattainable because differences of interests and conceptions continue, our countries might contribute to strengthening the Western positions by not associating themselves with destructive attacks by the Soviet Bloc on NATO countries or by proclaiming policies in open contradiction with general world currents.

122. The process of de-colonisation sometimes gives rise to temporary strains between the new state and that on which it was formerly dependent politically. In such circumstances, there should be frequent consultation among NATO nations with a view to ensuring that gaps in assistance and trade do not arise which might be filled by the East. At the same time, NATO countries ought to avoid harmful competition for influence in the new states of Africa.

123. Aspects of this subject deserve further attention by NATO African experts at their next meeting.

Diplomatic and other political relations

124. It is desirable that Western countries should be represented diplomatically in full strength in all the independent African states; it is equally desirable that their network of consular representation, trade missions, etc., should also be as extensive as possible. This will help to convey to Africans that the West is serious in regarding them as free and equal partners. In addition, every possible contact by democratic political parties and other groupings in the West with similar organizations in independent African countries would seem to deserve encouragement. Visits of prominent individuals and delegations from NATO countries in Africa also strengthen the bonds between Africa and the West, as do invitations to leading Africans for visits in countries of the Alliance.

United Nations and Specialised Agencies

125. The newly independent African states look to the United Nations both for support for their independence and for assistance in obtaining the independence of the remaining dependent territories in Africa. It seems in the Western interest that they should not lose faith in the United Nations, for otherwise they might turn to the Soviets to further their aspirations.

126. The West should, therefore, be forthcoming and understanding in considering questions which are particularly important to Africans. This does not mean that the West could or should support all proposals which the Africans might put forward, but it is important that it should demonstrate sympathy for reasonable African aspirations within the limits of the Charter.

127. Increased African participation in United Nations organs should be encouraged by supporting proposals for a reasonable enlargement of the membership of United Nations bodies.

128. United Nations actions will not always be satisfactory to all NATO countries, nor will all United Nations actions always satisfy African aspirations. It is therefore important that Western policies should be carefully and unequivocally explained to Africans to prevent them from believing that the Soviet bloc is more sympathetic and more ready to defend their interests.

The Congo

129. The experts are of the opinion that the United Nations Organization has a leading rôle to play in the solution of the Congo crisis and that it should therefore be able to rely on the wholehearted co-operation of the Western nations. The West should therefore endeavour to harmonise its attitude towards the action of UNO, including, insofar as possible, the methods it is employing.

130. In this connection, the question has been raised whether the use of force by the United Nations authorities in the Congo is legitimate for purposes other than the keeping of the peace without prior authorisation from the competent organs of the United Nations.

131. The experts believe that the most urgent African problem confronting Africa and the West at this juncture is a solution of the Congo crisis. The importance of this issue warrants the special attention of the NATO Council.

Deliveries of arms

132. It would be desirable in future to assess the quantities of arms delivered to Africa, either directly or indirectly, by the Communist bloc countries and to ascertain the precise channels of penetration and zones of distribution.

133. It is suggested that the member countries should regularly exchange the information gathered in this regard in order to facilitate an enquiry. Full and accurate knowledge of the facts would enable the member countries to take action where appropriate.

134. Special attention must be paid to Soviet military assistance to the Casablanca Group States, whose joint military High Command might be used as a further means of penetration in Africa. The stock-piling of weapons in Guinea, on the frontier of the Portuguese province of Guinea, also deserves attention.

Economic Aid and Commercial Policies

135. Recommendations in previous reports of continuing validity include:

- (a) the great importance of technical assistance, and the desirability of using to the full the scope for co-ordination of Western policies in this field;
- (b) the need to co-ordinate measures to promote investment;

- (c) the need to encourage measures to promote inter-African trade and the diversification of production;
- (d) the need for further efforts to stabilise commodity prices.

136. The primary purpose of aid is to contribute to the building of more stable and prosperous economies as a foundation for genuine independence. If in the process it secures a direct return in terms of political goodwill, this is a bonus to be welcomed. The West should therefore do the maximum its resources permit to provide aid in the most productive and acceptable forms, endeavouring to ensure that the efforts of individual NATO members, and friendly non-NATO States, complement and do not impede each other.

137. It should also, as previous reports have suggested, expose the shortcomings of Communist aid and the dangers attaching thereto, but not in any hope of putting the Communists out of business. African needs exceed the physical investment available from all sources; and some African Governments feel a psychological need to "balance" Eastern against Western aid. To the extent that the East meets a real need well, the eventual African gain may be more beneficial to our cause than the accruing Communist advantage is detrimental. We should be content if Africans can be brought to recognise that the West compares favourably with the East as a provider of aid (we may first have to wait until some of the novelty of Eastern aid wears off), and if African Governments can be helped to learn the need for circumspection in negotiating commitments with bloc countries.

138. Given that Western resources are not unlimited (although aid to Africa deserves a considerable priority) the question arises whether the best cuts should go to Governments whose policies are most to the liking of the West, to those wobbling most dangerously towards the East, to those intrinsically most important in terms of e.g., size or geographical location, or to those capable of using aid to the greatest economic advantage, etc. It seems advisable to adopt an empirical approach to these and other criteria, bearing in mind (to the extent that public opinion in donor countries will permit)

- (a) the risk of leaving our friends with the feeling that we are unsatisfactory associates;
- (b) the desirability of maintaining contact at the largest number of points;
- (c) the danger of highly favoured Governments being represented as subservient to the West, and overthrown;
- (d) the risk that curtailing aid for disciplinary reasons may drive an East-inclined government all the way.

139. Certain forms of aid - e.g. long-term educational assistance - may be better suited than others in the case of countries whose current political attitudes are unsympathetic to the West. On the other hand, institutions which may become focal points in their regions should be situated where the political atmosphere is healthiest.

Trade Union activities

140. It is considered important to maintain and foster the closest possible contacts between Western and African democratic trade unionists. The formation of a rival Confederation to the AATUF should only be encouraged in the last resort, in order to avert the dangers involved in completely isolating the AATUF, over which Communism might then gain an increasingly firm hold.

141. In addition, encouragement might be given to the training of African Trade Union leaders by organising courses either in the Western countries or in trade union schools in the African countries themselves.

Education and Scholarships

142. Education is given the highest priority by new African states and there is a growing belief that the most effective way to assist African education is by developing facilities within these countries. There is a great shortage of teachers and university professors and this gap will need to be filled during the next five years while Africans are being trained. The Western countries should therefore encourage teachers and university instructors to go to Africa by assisting African countries in recruitment, by supplementing salaries, by paying of travel expenses and by protecting seniority rights, as well as by directly providing personnel. Links between African universities and Western academic institutions should be encouraged.

143. Since there are limitations on the means which can be devoted by the Western countries to supplying the African States with all the European teaching staff they need, consideration might be given to the possibility of speeding up the training of indigenous teachers, either in European universities, or in exclusively African universities.

144. The programme of providing scholarships for African students should be continued and extended, but great care should be exercised in their selection, in co-operation with legitimate African educational authorities, to keep the academic failure rate as low as possible. More care should be taken in ensuring that students in Western countries are able to enter into and understand the life of the community in which they are studying.

145. Aid to education must be seen as one aspect of an overall "country development plan". Only thus will African states be able to minimise the danger of either creating an "academic proletariat" or of retarding development due to a lack of relevant skills.

Public Relations

146. It is inevitable that African countries recently freed from colonial rule should continue to harbour for some time certain resentments against their former colonial masters and thus an easy prey to anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist slogans. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, Communist China and the other Communist states, are far away and are not linked with the colonial past in Africa. Thus the African easily acquires a distorted picture of the world which is potentially very dangerous.

147. The West must, therefore, make a much greater effort than hitherto in the field of public relations. Its aim should be to convince Africans that as far as the West is concerned, colonial rule is a thing of the past and that the West is sincere in its desire to establish relationships of friendship and equality with the new African countries. It might also be pointed out to Africans that the West has in the past made very positive contributions to African development and that it is willing and able to continue and even increase such contributions in the era of independence. It must be consistently pointed out to Africans that this action of the West has nothing to do with "neo-colonialism" nor with the cold war, but that the West regards stability and prosperity in Africa as one of the principal aims of its own policy.

148. Simultaneously, the West should try to demolish the idealised image which the Communist countries are trying to build up of themselves. The imperialist and colonialist character of the Soviet Union must be frankly exposed and the halo of the Soviet Union as the champion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism must be destroyed. This can probably best be done by a clear and dispassionate exposure of Soviet colonial policy in Central Asia and elsewhere. For this purpose, Western countries should make a more thorough study of the colonial aspects of the Soviet Empire, assemble all the facts available and disseminate them as widely as possible.

149. It is also important that the West should impress upon Africans that whereas in the world as conceived by the Western powers, there is room for independent nations and for genuine neutrals, in the world which the Soviets are trying to build, there can be neither neutrality nor national independence. African leaders should be made to see that in view of the positions of strength which the Communists have already acquired in certain countries, the danger is now at their very doorstep.

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150. In carrying out a public relations programme of this kind, the West would be well advised to bear in mind that -

- Africans will not always be ready to accept advice from their former rulers and that in many cases, experience will be the best teacher;
- African leaders are strongly inclined to suspect cold war manoeuvres behind all Western actions and that the West must therefore make every effort not to lend substance to this suspicion;
- Africans will carefully compare our statements with our actions and that it is therefore important that our words should never belie facts.

151. Attention should also be paid to ways and means of making our information more easily available to Africans. The Communist countries put the services of their news agencies at the disposal of the African press and broadcasting systems free of charge. Moreover, Communist radio stations are powerful and their hours and frequencies are advertised. In a continent where the modern means of mass communication are still in the infant stage, but where there is also a great hunger for information, these practices give the Communist a considerable advantage.

Teaching of African languages and civilisation in NATO countries

152. Western contacts with African countries could be greatly intensified and would be likely to bring better results if greater efforts were made to spread knowledge about Africa and of native African languages among citizens of NATO countries. The experts appreciate the considerable efforts made by universities in many Western countries to expand the teaching of African languages; they would point out, however, that such efforts should not be confined to the field of pure scholarship but should, wherever possible, be extended to include language courses for technical, economic and political advisers as well as for teachers and other personnel from the West likely to become active in African territories.

Action by Free World Non-NATO Countries

153. We reiterate the views expressed in previous reports concerning the important role free world countries not belonging to NATO might play in Africa.

154. At present, most of the new African states remain acutely dependent on outside help for trained civil service, higher education, development capital and military training and support. In many cases, the greater part of this assistance

comes, quite naturally, from the former metropolitan power, or is limited to a very few external powers. For psychological and political reasons, there are pressures within some of the new states to diversify their dependent relationships as much as possible.

155. It is in the interest of the West that this diversification, where and when it is demanded by the new state, takes place largely within the free world. For if it does not, the pressure will grow to balance the over-weighted dependence on a restricted number of Western powers by accepting dependence on aid and trade with the Communist Bloc. Increased involvement of non-NATO Western countries in Africa will therefore expand the options available to interested African states wishing to diversify their reliance on the external world. The involvement of free world non-Western powers is of special psychological importance in this respect.

156. We recognise that the very active interest taken by Israel in some of the new African states contributes in some respect to the development and consolidation of these countries on non-Communist lines. However, by carrying the Arab-Israeli conflict and the deep emotions which it provokes into Africa south of the Sahara, an artificially expanded role by Israel may also harm Western interests.

(Signed) A. BOKER
Chairman

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

ANGOLA

Statement by the Portuguese Delegation

The Portuguese Government has taken a number of legislative measures which initiate far-reaching administrative reforms: (a) the indigenato system, originally established for the Portuguese provinces of Africa and Timor and, since 1953, restricted to Angola and Mozambique, has just been abolished. All Portuguese nationals will now have the same legal rights, without distinction of any kind, and will have the same political status, thus enabling them to vote for or seek election to national bodies, provincial legislative councils and local administrative agencies; (b) local rural communities (regedorias) have been organized in which the head of the community (the regedor) will be elected by the members of the community and be assisted by a council nominated by himself; (c) municipalities have been organized and a camara municipal will be set up in concelhos with more than 500 electors, its administration being in the hands of a commission elected by the inhabitants of the concelho; (d) the system of land ownership has been reorganized, each community receiving henceforth an area five times larger than the one previously available to it, and each member of the community being also enabled to dispose of all the land he requires; (e) agencies have been set up (juntas de provoação) to promote the peopling of the most fertile areas through the settlement there of families from Continental Portugal and of indigenous families from less fertile areas and even from other overseas provinces.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Credits and Grants
extended to African Countries from
1st January 1961 to September 1961

<u>Recipient country</u>	<u>Total</u> \$/Million	<u>Breakdown</u>	<u>Donor country</u>
Mali	6.0	6.0	USSR
Guinea			
Mali	56.9	44.4 12.5	USSR Czechoslovakia
Somali	57.9	52.3 4.3 1.4	USSR Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia (grant)
Ghana	54.6	14.0 7.0 14.0 19.6	Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland China
Sudan	22.0	22.0	USSR
Tunisia	28.0	28.0	USSR
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Total Jan.-Sept. 1961	225.4		
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Total Credits and grants extended since the beginning of the extension of aid by bloc countries up to 31st December, 1961	284.0		
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Total extended up to September 1961	509.0		
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