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DOCUMENT
C-M(54)33

REPORT ON TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY

December 1953 to April 1954

Note by the Chairman of the Working Group

(1)

At its meeting on the 17th March, 1954, the Council:

"agreed that a paper should be submitted to the Ministerial Meeting on trends and implications of Soviet policy, the draft of this paper to be prepared by the Secretariat and to be reviewed by the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy."

2. The Working Group completed their work on the 14th April, 1954, and the report as agreed by them is attached, together with a chronology of events which is appended to the report.

(Signed) S. FENOALTEA

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.

(1) C-R(54)8

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY

December 1953 to April 1954

PART I

SUMMARY

A. Soviet Foreign Policy

1. It was the general conclusion of the Working Group's last report⁽¹⁾ that while "The Soviet leaders have made a number of moves designed to reduce international tensions and to give the appearance of conforming more nearly to international norms, [there is] no hint that there has been any basic change of attitude ... on matters of major interest to them ... They still aim at dividing the North Atlantic Powers, and in the long run at the overthrow of democratic governments." This conclusion has been borne out by the Berlin Conference, and by the Soviet Note of 31st March.

2. The Berlin Conference showed that:

- (a) the Soviet Government are still pursuing their constant objective of disrupting the Western Alliance;
- (b) they are not prepared to surrender the strategic positions which they at present hold in East Germany and Austria, and, a fortiori, in the Satellite States; and
- (c) at the same time, they seem interested in pursuing (a) and (b) in such a way as to prevent any increase in international tension. (It should be pointed out, however, that from the Soviet point of view all tensions arise from actions of the West to defend itself and never from Soviet actions or threatening posture. Thus, Soviet advocacy of "measures to decrease international tension" seems to be not so much a willingness on their part to eradicate the real causes of tension as an attempt to lull the West into a relaxed position.)

3. In Europe, the Soviet Government are likely to continue on this course, though they will no doubt try out different variations on the theme of (a) above. For the moment, Molotov seems particularly concerned to weaken support for the EDC by making his proposals for European security palatable to a wider circle of opinion in Western Europe. The Soviet Government's offer to enable the United States to participate in the proposed collective security treaty in Europe, and their suggestion that in certain circumstances they might themselves become members of NATO, fall into this pattern. The Soviets or their Satellites may propose

(1) C-M(53)164, dated 5th December, 1953

a further conference on the subject of European security. The Soviet leaders apparently believe that they are more likely at present to further their foreign policy aims by coming to, rather than staying away from the conference table.

4. It was no doubt partly for this reason, but more particularly because he wanted to advance the international position of China, that Molotov was prepared at Berlin to meet the Western viewpoint on the composition and agenda of the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Government may also hope to use the lure of a détente in the Far East as a means of retarding Western rearmament and EDC. At the same time, they may hope to exacerbate Western differences over China.

Soviet and peace movement propaganda has suggested that at the Geneva Conference the Soviets and the Chinese may propose a cease-fire in Indo-China and direct negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French Government, with a view to the formation of a coalition government of the whole country. Alternatively, they may suggest some form of partition.

5. The Soviet Government are likely to exploit to the utmost popular feelings in the West about developments in thermo-nuclear weapons; apart from their possible genuine fear of thermo-nuclear warfare, this line provides an invaluable fillip to the peace movement and fits in logically with Soviet superiority in conventional armaments.

B. Soviet Internal Policy

6. There does not appear to be any serious internal threat to the stability of the Soviet régime. Despite the final disposal in December of the Beria case, reshuffles of leading personnel, especially in the non-Russian republics, suggest that there is still much manoeuvring for position. The campaign on plans to achieve a "sharp rise" in the standard of living during the next two to three years, continues as before. Compulsion, as well as monetary and consumer-goods incentives, is now being used in the attempt to achieve the goals. The situation in Soviet agriculture appears to be more serious than was admitted last September. The grain problem, which seems also to include the problem of feed-grains, and which at the XIXth Party Congress in 1952 was said to be finally solved, is now the object of emergency measures. The conclusion of C-M(53)164 remains valid, that "... there has been no change in basic ideology or in the totalitarian structure of Soviet life; and Soviet preparedness for war is being maintained at a high level".

PART II

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

7. "There has been no sign that the Soviet Union's basic hostility to the Western world has been modified." This statement, which was made in C-M(53)164, is as valid now as it was last December. There has been no evidence in the interim of any Soviet "softening" on substantive matters affecting the international position of the USSR. The Berlin Conference and the Soviet Note of 31st March have shown that the Soviet Government intend to use all possible manoeuvres of diplomacy and propaganda to disrupt the organization of Western defence, in particular the inclusion in it of the German Federal Republic.

While the Soviet Government are using every opportunity to create disunity and confusion in the West and to foster their aims, they seem interested in preventing an open increase in international tension. It is probable that the Soviet leaders genuinely wish to avoid the risk of a world conflict. At the same time, they may well be influenced by the difficulties of the internal situation of the Soviet bloc and by the feeling that if international tension can be reduced without the sacrifice of any Soviet position, the Soviet Union will be the gainer since the organization of Western defence may be slowed down.

A. The Berlin Conference

8. Germany. The Soviet position on Germany remained as uncompromising as it had appeared in the exchange of notes preceding the Conference. Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept reunification of Germany unless the present Communist control of East Germany were extended to a neutralized, united Germany, through some coalition including Communists. In other words, the Soviet Government would agree to German reunification only in conditions which would ensure that a united Germany would fall sooner or later within the Soviet system. Since the Soviet leaders must have been aware that no fruitful discussion was possible on this basis, it appears that the primary consideration in their minds was not to sacrifice their strategic position in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. They intend to bolster up the East German puppet Government; the Soviet grant on 26th March of a considerable degree of theoretical sovereignty to the East German Government was a further step in this direction. They will no doubt continue to make full use of the slogan "Germans round one table".

9. Soviet hostility towards the inclusion of the German Federal Republic in Western defence found expression in continued violent attacks by Molotov on the European Defence Community. His "European Security Plan" was presented at Berlin as a substitute for EDC and was at the same time aimed at excluding the United States from Europe.

10. Austria. The discussion of Austria provided an even clearer indication of Soviet intransigence. Molotov's introduction, at the outset, of a series of entirely new and unacceptable conditions for a settlement, excluded any possibility of agreement on the Austrian State Treaty. Not even Western acceptance of the Soviet version of the five disputed articles of the draft treaty

affected the Soviet attitude. Again, as in the case of Germany, the Soviet aim was clearly the preservation and consolidation of the status quo, including the indefinite retention of Soviet troops on Austrian soil and the maintenance of the territorial control that the Soviet Union now exercises.

11. Implications for Future Soviet Policy in Europe. In Western Europe the Soviet régime will undoubtedly continue to pursue their general objective of weakening democratic governments and impeding Western defence. They may be expected to continue their campaign against NATO in its present form and against "American bases in Europe". The most recent examples of the latter line of attack are the Notes sent on 18th March to Turkey and the Netherlands, and on 20th March to Greece. However, the Soviet Government's most pressing immediate objective is to prevent the rearmament of the German Federal Republic and its inclusion in the Western defence system. Parallel with the exploitation of their "European Security Plan", the Soviet Government may be expected to engage in other diplomatic manoeuvres calculated to create confusion and disunity in the West. The suggestion that the Soviet Union might in certain circumstances join NATO fits into this pattern.

12. The unity of the Western Foreign Ministers at Berlin had the effect of revealing Soviet unwillingness to compromise over Germany and Austria. The result of the Berlin Conference made it more difficult for the opponents of EDC to argue that a bargain could be struck on German reunification in freedom if the EDC were abandoned.

13. The Far East. The Soviet's uncompromising attitude on Germany and Austria was paralleled by Molotov's insistence on convening a Five-Power Conference, including Communist China. The original Soviet demand for such a conference envisaged a general discussion on "measures for the reduction of international tension". However, the Soviet Union ended by accepting a conference not restricted to the "Big Five", and an agenda limited to Korea and Indo-China.

Communist propaganda since Berlin has attempted to picture the Geneva Conference as a "Five-Power" meeting and it is evident that the Soviet Union will use every opportunity to place the Chinese Communists on an equal plane with the sponsoring Powers. The Soviet régime undoubtedly hopes that a conference involving the Western allies in negotiations with Communist China will result in the exacerbation of Western divergences on China, such as those revolving around her admission to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, and trade. It is improbable that the Communist bloc will agree to relinquish Communist control of North Korea; and the Indo-China situation will be exploited in an endeavour to bring about the withdrawal of French forces, to facilitate the extension of Communist control in that country, and to cause trouble among the Western allies. It appears that the Geneva Conference will test Western unity more severely than Berlin.

14. Implications for Future Soviet Policy in the Far East. Soviet aims in South-East Asia and the Far East may become clearer at the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Government are likely to continue to press by all means for the formal inclusion of the Chinese Communist Government in the councils of the great powers. In Korea, as in Germany, the aim of the Soviet Government is no doubt to bring about the withdrawal of foreign and particularly of

American troops. The optimum solution from their point of view would be to combine this with unification of the country under conditions which would enable the Communists to obtain control. Failing this, the Soviet Government will presumably acquiesce in the continued division of Korea. In Indo-China also they may propose some form of partition as a possible solution; though here too a coalition government for the whole country, with a view to eventual Communist domination after the withdrawal of French troops, would probably be the preferred solution. Peace movement propaganda suggests that the Soviets and Chinese may propose at Geneva that there should be an immediate cease-fire to be followed by direct negotiations between the French Government and Ho Chi Minh. The Soviet Government may try to give the impression that they are preparing for a limited détente in the Far East. One advantage they may seek is a weakening of popular support for EDC by suggesting that a bargain is possible. To the same end, they may well propose further conferences.

15. The great imponderable is, however, the exact nature of the relationship between the USSR and Communist China. The extent to which their aims and intentions coincide is not yet evident. This, in turn, makes it impossible to determine in advance the degree to which the USSR may be able to commit Communist China in negotiations primarily affecting the latter's interests. In any case, it seems advisable to assume that they will maintain a common front. The respective rôles and stakes of Russia and China in the Viet-minh rebellion are difficult to assess.

B. Atomic Energy and Atomic Weapons

16. There is no evidence that the basic Soviet attitude regarding atomic controls has changed. Molotov, in his statement on 21st December 1953, agreed to discuss President Eisenhower's UN proposal, but insisted that substantive action must be preceded by an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons. Preliminary procedural discussions held in Washington were continued at the Berlin Conference, and the United States submitted on 19th March a "concrete plan to further the peaceful development and use of atomic energy".

17. Additionally, Malenkov's brief reference in his 12th March speech to the disastrous implications of atomic war for world civilization may indicate a desire to put atomic and related problems to the Soviet people more realistically and in broader terms than has been done hitherto. A few days before Malenkov's speech, Pravda published an article by A.N. Nesmeyanov, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which considerably advanced previous Soviet popular knowledge of atomic developments. It should be pointed out, however, that Malenkov's reference to implications of atomic warfare may not have been intended primarily for the Soviet audience but may have been aimed more at certain Western European countries.

18. The Soviet Note of 31st March, 1954, gave increased emphasis to this new line on the dangers of atomic warfare. After referring to the "hydrogen weapon, the power of which many times exceeds that of the atomic weapon", the Note says: "There can be no doubt that the use of the atomic and hydrogen weapons in a war would bring incalculable misfortunes upon the peoples, and would mean the mass extermination of civilian populations and the destruction of the great cities, the centres of modern industry, culture and science, including the ancient centres of civilization which are the great capitals of the world".

This part of the Note seems to suggest that the Soviet genuinely shares in the concern and fear aroused in the world at the prospects opened up by the potentialities of atomic and hydrogen warfare. At the same time this new emphasis may be a plain expression of the special Soviet interest. In the first place, a ban on the use of atomic and nuclear weapons would serve to give full effect to Soviet superiority in conventional armaments. Secondly, it is to their advantage to capitalise upon current popular feelings in the West about thermo-nuclear explosions in the hope of slowing down Western development in thermo-nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the call for a ban on weapons of mass destruction provides an invaluable slogan for rallying uncritical opinion behind communist parties.

C. Soviet "European Security Plan" and the Russian Note of 31st March

19. The trend of Communist propaganda after the Berlin Conference made it clear that the Soviet Government intend to make great efforts to impress Western opinion with the advantages of Mr. Molotov's proposals for a European Security Pact. The Satellite Governments supported these proposals and Soviet propaganda was at pains to emphasise that they had not been offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. In particular, both Malenkov and Molotov intimated in their speeches prior to the Supreme Soviet elections that the proposals could be modified to take account of the criticism that they would exclude the United States from Europe and leave Europe open to domination by the Soviet Union.

20. The Soviet Note of 31st March may be considered a logical outcome of this change in tactical approach. Two of the Note's main propositions -- that on the formation of an "All-European Collective-Security Organization", and that on Soviet readiness to consider joining NATO -- seem to have a definite purpose. On the one hand, the USSR puts forward a substitute for the EDC, which would be aimed at keeping Western Germany disarmed, and at neutralising Germany as a whole. This is the meaning of the Soviet demand for the creation of "conditions excluding the possibility of the integration of this or that part of Germany into military groupings". On the other hand, the USSR, by joining NATO, would transform it into nothing more than a duplicate of the collective-security organization, and thus render it superfluous.

The Soviet Note had also an obvious propaganda purpose. It was clearly designed to suggest to Western opinion, in particular to the opponents of German rearmament, that Mr. Molotov's European security proposals remain open to discussion and still offer a constructive alternative to the EDC. The Soviet Government, by dropping the suggestion that Communist China should be included as an observer and by allowing for full United States participation in the Pact, no doubt hope to make their original proposals more palatable to Western public opinion.

21. The suggestion about possible Soviet membership of NATO was presumably less seriously intended. The Soviet Government must have expected it to be rejected, and may have calculated that the exclusion of the "peace-loving" Soviet Union from NATO would serve to reinforce the Communist allegation that the Western Powers do not sincerely desire a decrease in international tension and that NATO is an aggressive instrument of their policy. It is in any case a reflection of NATO's effectiveness as a check on Soviet ambitions that the Soviet Government should resort to such devices in the attempt to frustrate it. It is likely that the Soviet

Government will use the refusal of their proposals to throw onto the Western Powers the responsibility for "the splitting of Europe into two hostile camps", perhaps with Eastern Germany being formally included in the Soviet-Satellite system of alliances.

D. East-West Trade

22. The Soviet Government have intensified their campaign for increased East-West trade, and placed substantial orders for certain food products and other consumer goods, as well as for capital goods, in non-Communist countries. It seems that the Soviet Government desire to see an increase in East-West trade on economic grounds, especially in view of their declared policy of raising living standards in the USSR. There is thus far, however, no indication that this implies a long-term plan to draw continuously upon Western production in order to help fulfil the economic promises made to the Soviet people. The Soviet Government have also made enquiries about placing substantial orders in non-Communist countries for capital goods, important categories of which fall under existing Western strategic export regulations. By this means, they hope to mobilise public opinion in the West in order to achieve a relaxation of security controls - long a subject of major concern to them. At the same time, they use trade propaganda for general political purposes, especially in an attempt to drive a wedge between Western Europe (particularly the United Kingdom) and the United States. This effort is accompanied by a constant harping on the dangers of an economic recession in the United States, and on alleged United States dictation through the security controls.

23. In spite of the increases made in recent months, it would seem that the prospects for development of Soviet trade are fairly limited. The increase in Soviet imports was sufficient to endanger their balance of payments, for in spite of many efforts, they were unable to make up for the reduction in their bread-grain exports by export of other goods. They were therefore forced to balance their purchases by the sale of large quantities of gold in Western markets. For the same reason, the Soviet Government have tried to increase their exports of oil, and it has been estimated that this year they may double their sales of oil to Western countries in comparison with those of 1953.

E. The Middle East and India

24. Soviet concern at the possibility of increasingly close ties between Pakistan and the United States was expressed in a Note to the Government of Pakistan at the beginning of December. The projected conclusion of a pact between Pakistan and Turkey, which was announced in the latter part of February, was condemned by the USSR in a note to the Turkish Government as "an extension of NATO and the system of military bases to the East".

25. It appears that the Soviet intention is to strengthen its position in this area by cultivating close ties with India, and by playing upon Indian differences with Pakistan. Soviet propaganda has attributed great significance to the first trade agreement between the USSR and India, which was concluded on 2nd December, 1953. Malenkov, in his important speech of 12th March, dwelt at greater length on India than on China, and warmly praised Prime Minister Nehru and India's "independent rôle" in world affairs. A noticeable effort is being made by the Soviet Union to increase and strengthen cultural and economic links with India and Afghanistan.

Not the least of Soviet efforts in this area is their attempt to capitalise upon anti-colonial and anti-Western movements and sentiments in the Near and Middle East and Africa. They hope to neutralise the Arab nations, for example, by exacerbating their conflicts of interest with Western nations and by playing upon their fear and hatred of Israel.

F. Political Warfare

26. In pursuing the primary political objectives mentioned above, the Soviet Government have modified the Stalinist pattern of political warfare. They have continued to appeal direct to the peoples but this is no longer to the virtual exclusion of Governments; the traditional forms of diplomacy, including social intercourse, are receiving more attention; there is a new emphasis on commercial, cultural and sporting exchanges; and the continued activities of the Peace Movement have become less spectacular and more insidious. But the Soviet Government are careful to woo in particular those Governments whose position can be exploited to counter the influence of the United States (cf. the recent pointed flattery of the Indian Government). Meanwhile, Communist subversive activity continues throughout the world, every encouragement is given to "colonial struggles" especially through the WFTU, and official Soviet ideology continues to anticipate "the coming victory of the socialist camp over the imperialist forces". Additionally, the Soviet Union apparently hopes to foster further intergovernmental conferences, calculated simultaneously to delay West European integration and to endow Communist parties in the West with a new semblance of national respectability.

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PART III

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

27. The conclusions of C-M(53)164 ("Report on Trends of Soviet Policy - April to December, 1953") remain valid. The events of the period that has intervened since that report have confirmed its more general findings, and have only slightly modified some of its particular judgements.

A. Old Policies Continued

28. Thus, it is still true that:

- "The totalitarian structure of the Soviet State is unaltered";
- "The Marxist-Leninist ideology remains the guiding creed of the Soviet leaders, and there has been no sign of any tendency to alter its main tenets";
- "The Soviet Union remains a formidable military and industrial Power, and there is no reason to believe that the consumer drive will lead to a reduction in the size and efficiency of the Soviet armed forces". (C-M(53)164, pp. 4-5).

These judgements have in no way been affected since December, 1953.

29. The known facts about Soviet military preparations are consistent with the pattern of foreign policy outlined above. Just as no strategic positions in the West or the East are being abandoned, so the Soviet Government are maintaining their high rate of expenditure on the armed forces. Bulganin's election speech suggests strongly that the Soviet budget for 1954, like that for 1953, will contain no significant reduction in the appropriation for defence. His emphasis on the development of Soviet aviation and on Soviet ability to repulse "any enemy, whatever weapon he may command" may be taken as an indication of the high priority allotted to preparations for atomic warfare.

30. As regards economic policy, the main developments since December have been in agriculture (see paragraph 34). However, the drive for a sharp increase in the output of consumer goods continues, and in the second half of 1953, for the first time since the beginning of the plan era, the rate of growth in the output of consumer goods had started to exceed that of producer goods including armaments. This does not mean, however, that there has been a real change in the pattern of the economy which remains strongly biased on the side of heavy industry.

B. Party and Government

31. There has been no evidence since December to indicate the existence of any serious internal threat to the stability of the Soviet régime. The doctrine of collective leadership continues to be presented as a description of the régime's modus operandi, and received confirmation during the election campaign. Meanwhile, Khrushchev's position as de facto No. 2 man of the régime appears to have been confirmed. However, in protocol listings Molotov still holds second place.

32. The relatively high number of representatives of the armed forces nominated in the Supreme Soviet elections, and the fact that Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky were included in the small group of Soviet leaders instructed to accept nomination in specified districts, are possible further indications of the increased prestige which has been accorded to the military since Stalin's death. However, Soviet publicity has been careful to represent the armed forces as firmly subordinate to the Party and even if they have acquired a more prominent public status there is no evidence that this carries with it increased power vis-à-vis the Party.

33. Changes in the Party and Governmental organs of the constituent republics, particularly in the Caucasus and in Kazakhstan, continue to show that the régime's difficulties in this sphere did not end with the execution of Beria and his "accomplices" in December. The régime is treading carefully in its nationalities policy (cf. the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine), but it is clearly biased more on the side of Great Russian ascendancy than on that of concessions to the non-Russian Republics. The signs are that control by the central Party apparatus is everywhere being tightened.

C. The Agricultural Programme

34. While the régime continues its intensive propaganda campaign on the theme of a "sharp rise" in the standard of living during the next two-to-three years, there has been some indication that it will, in accordance with its Stalinite traditions, rely at least as heavily on the stick as on the carrot in the attempt to make good on its promises. For instance, the régime - carefully depicting the action as the response to a demand originating among the youth - has begun sending drafts of young people from the European Republics to the Central Asian and Siberian regions, where they are to participate in the sowing, primarily to grain, of 13 million hectares⁽¹⁾ of virgin and fallow land. It seems evident that a "back to the land" movement of this sort can only be sustained by the application of a rather large dose of compulsion. A new element was introduced into the situation in March, with the announcement of a Central Committee decision, based on a report by Khrushchev, calling for the raising of the amounts of state procurements and purchases of grain by from 35% to 40% "within the next few years", and for a considerable increase in the area planted to fodder grains. The agricultural decisions of last September had concentrated primarily on the raising of the livestock population and the production of vegetables. The new programme for grain stands in contrast to Malenkov's statement in 1952 that "the grain problem ... has been solved, solved definitely and finally". The increased intensity of attention to agricultural problems lends itself to the conclusion that the situation in this field is more serious than last year's announcements had depicted it.

(1) An area equivalent to that of Greece, or of the State of Alabama.

D. The Satellites

35. There is no sign of any weakening of Soviet control over the Satellites. With some delays and variations, which may be due either to local conditions or to difficulties in divining and applying the line desired by Moscow, the Satellites are gradually adapting their economic policies to that of the Soviet Government. It seems that Poland, where the economic plan for 1953 had been drawn up on a relatively cautious basis, has not needed, in making these adjustments, to have recourse to the sweeping changes which have been necessary in Hungary. It is likely that the Congresses of the national Communist parties which are being held this year will bring the economic policies of these countries fully into line. The tendency of recent months to replace career diplomats as Ambassadors to the Satellites with prominent party officials appears designed further to tighten party control over the orbit. In the Soviet Zone of Germany, the puppet régime has been consolidated and strengthened, and the opposition and dissent, which manifested themselves in the events of 17th June, 1953, appear to have been effectively suppressed.

SELECTED LIST OF SOVIET MOVES
DECEMBER 1st, 1953 TO MARCH 31st, 1954

A. INTERNAL

DECEMBER

- 4. Armenian Party officials removed in aftermath of BERIA case.

At Moscow meeting of newspaper editors, KHRUSHCHEV complains of slowness with which Party's September agricultural decisions are being put into practice.

- 5. Soviet Constitution day. It is no longer called the "STALIN Constitution".

- 9. Publication of decree of Central Committee of C.P.S.U., Council of Ministers, and Presidium of Supreme Soviet, calling for celebration on January 18th of 300th anniversary of "re-unification" of Ukraine with Russia.

- 16. Pravda article criticizes Minister of Agriculture BENEDIKTOV for failings in preparation of agricultural cadres.

- 17. V.G. ZHAVORONKOV is named Minister of State Control to replace V.N. MERKULOV who, it is announced, had been removed from the office on September 17th (and presumably arrested) for "criminal, anti-state activities".

- 22. SABUROV, PERVUKHIN, TEVOSYAN, MALYSHEV, and KOSYGIN named Vice-Chairmen of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

Further Governmental changes in Georgian S.S.R.

- 23. BERIA, MERKULOV, DEKANOZOV, KOBULOV, GOGLIDZE, MESHYK, and VLODZIMIRSKY shot.

- 25. Formation of Magadan Oblast in Russian S.F.S. Republic.

Opening of grandiose new department store -- GUM -- on Red Square in Moscow.

- 26/28 Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions meets, calls T.U. Congress for May 26th; Council Chairman SHVERNIK criticizes agricultural trade unions.

- 31 Régime gives unprecedented New Year's reception in Kremlin for Party, Government, Army officials, prominent Moscow workers and intellectuals.

JANUARY

- 1/10 Unprecedented New Year's parties in Kremlin for Moscow school children.

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JANUARY

- 5 Pravda article by U.S.S.R. General Procurator RU DENKO accents importance of "socialist legality" as weapon against "enemies of state and people".
- 9 BAGIROV, BERIA henchman and former Azerbaidzhanian Party and Government leader, divested of last post: that of member of Central Committee of Azerbaidzhan C.P.
- 11 Decree fixes elections to Supreme Soviet for March 14th.
- 15 Changes in Ukrainian Government make agricultural specialist KALCHENKO Premier.
- 17 I.S. ZODELAVA, pro-BERIA Georgian Party leader, relieved of post of First Vice-Premier of Georgian Government.
- 18 300th anniversary of "re-unification" of Ukraine with Russia commemorated as high-point of propaganda campaign celebrating "indivisible unity of peoples" of U.S.S.R.
- "Old Bolshevik" M.F. SHKIRYATOV, Party Control Commission Chairman, dies.
- 25/28 Conference of Machine-Tractor Station workers in Kremlin.
- 30 S. TITARENKO article in Party theoretical journal Kommunist revives demand for "vigilance" against foreign agents, in terms smacking of "vigilance campaign" which was introduced by announcement in January, 1953, of "doctor-murderers" plot.
- 31 Year-end economic report announces total 1953 industrial output up 12% over 1952, 45% over 1950, but indicates that grain harvest below that of 1952. U.S.S.R. produced 320 million tons of coal, 38 million tons of steel, 52 million tons of crude oil, 133 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, during 1953.

FEBRUARY

- 1 Pravda announces that meeting of directors of local Party agitation-propaganda sections was held "recently"; they are told to use more flexible methods in Party propaganda.
- 3/6 Conference of sovkhos workers in Kremlin.
- 5/6 Central Committee of Kazakhstan C.P. meets; P.K. PONOMARENKO, U.S.S.R. Minister of Culture, becomes Kazakhstan Party First Secretary, replacing SHAYAKHMETOV; L.I. BREZHNEV becomes Second Secretary.
- 7 Z.T. SERDYUK becomes First Secretary of Moldavian C.P.; GLADKY demoted to Second Secretary.
- 8 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry split into Ministries of Ferrous Metallurgy (A.N. KUZMIN named Minister) and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (P.F. LOMAKO -- Minister).

FEBRUARY

- 11/15 Russian Republic kolkhoz workers meet in Kremlin.
- 12 Five-year plan announced to increase Uzbek cotton production by not less than 1.8 million tons.
- Three top Azerbaidzhanian Party secretaries replaced after Party Congress finds their work unsatisfactory.
- 16 S.D. IGNATYEV, Minister of State Security until STALIN's death, and one of Secretaries of C.P.S.U. until reversal of "doctor-murderers" plot in April, 1953, is identified as First Secretary of Bashkir Oblast Party Committee.
- Georgian Party Congress (originally scheduled for February 3rd) meets; 3,000 members of Party have been expelled in last 7 months.
- Kazakhstan Party Congress (originally scheduled for February 8th) meets.
- 17 Turkmen Party Congress meets; A.A. ANDREYEV, agricultural expert and quondam Politbyuro member, elected member of Turkmen Central Committee.
- 19 Crimean Oblast transferred from Russian Republic to Ukrainian S.S.R.
- 21 In account of MALENKOV's speech at STALIN's funeral, published in Volume 22 of Great Soviet Encyclopedia, no mention is made of his promise of "further improvement in material welfare of... all Soviet people".
- 28 Pravda severely criticizes two Machine-Building Ministries for failure to produce spare parts for tractors.

MARCH

- 2 Central Committee censures Ministries of Agriculture and Sovkhozes for failure to implement September agricultural decisions, calls for 35% to 40% increase "within next few years" of Governmental procurements and purchases of grain, and announces campaign to bring under plow 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow land in eastern and south-eastern regions of U.S.S.R.
- 3 Soviet Minister of Health A.F. TRETYAKOV, who was in charge of medical treatment of STALIN during his last illness is replaced by M.D. KOVRIGINA.
- 5 On anniversary of his death, Soviet press hails STALIN as "closest pupil and comrade-in-arms of genius LENIN!"
- 7 Vice-Chairman of Council of Ministers A.N. KOSYGIN is replaced as Minister of Industrial Consumer Goods by N.S. RYZHOV.

MARCH

- 9 Pravda article by President of Academy of Sciences NESMEYANOV explains some of implications of atomic energy, but ignores its military potentialities.

 Further Governmental changes in Azerbaidzhan.
- 11 In pre-election speech in Tiflis, M.G. PERVUKHIN refers to "bourgeois nationalists" who tried to tear Georgia away from U.S.S.R., calls STALIN "leader [vozhd'] of Communist Party".

 In pre-election speech in Tashkent, KAGANOVICH quotes Constitutional provisions against national and racial discrimination.
- 12 MALENKOV pre-election speech calls for rise in labour productivity, observance of "Soviet legality", and reiterates principle of collective leadership.

 SABUROV pre-election speech stresses need to raise labour productivity.
- 14 Supreme Soviet elections held.
- 16 All-Union Ministry of Higher Education formed, V.P. YELYUTIN named Minister; G.F. ALEKSANDROV, philosopher who was attacked by ZHDANOV, named Minister of Culture to replace PONOMARENKO.
- 17 Marshal KONEV named Commander of Carpathian Military District.
- 18 Electoral commission announces that 99.79% of those eligible voted, and of these 99.84% voted for bloc of Communist and non-party candidates.
- 19 XIIth Komsomol Congress opens.
- 21 KHRUSHCHEV speech, delivered February 23rd, published. He criticized Agriculture Minister BENEDIKTOV, other agricultural officials, for the "sad state of things" in agriculture and explained that agricultural problems in Kazakhstan were too much for SHAYAKHMETOV, who had to be replaced by PONOMARENKO.

B. EXTERNAL

DECEMBER

- 2 **INDIA:** First Soviet-Indian trade agreement signed.

 PAKISTAN: U.S.S.R. warns it "cannot be indifferent" to U.S.-Pakistan negotiations allegedly envisaging establishment of American bases in Pakistan.
- 3 **CHINA:** Former Deputy Soviet High Commissioner in Germany P.F. YUDIN appointed to replace Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs V.V. KUZNETSOV as Ambassador to China.

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DECEMBER

- 4 ISRAEL: Soviet Ambassador A.N. ABRAMOV presents credentials to President ben ZVI in Jerusalem.
- 5 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Plenary session of Czechoslovak Central Committee sets Party Congress for June, 1954.
- 7 Western notes propose Berlin as site of Big-Four Foreign Ministers' Conference and January 4th as opening date.
- 8 President EISENHOWER's U.N. speech proposes formation of "atomic pool", to which all atomic producers, including U.S.S.R., would contribute.
- 9 On eve of 9th anniversary of Franco-Soviet treaty, Radio Moscow invites France to reject E.D.C, and co-operate with U.S.S.R. against German menace.
- 10 U.N.: VYSHINSKY insists on ban on atomic weapons.
Radio Moscow charges President EISENHOWER "threatened atomic war" in U.N. speech.
- 12 KOREA: U.N. Ambassador DEAN walks out of pre-conference talks following Communist charges of U.S. "perfidy".
- 16 EASTERN GERMANY: MALENKOV receives GROTEWOHL, who is in U.S.S.R. "on vacation".
AFGHANISTAN: It is learned that Moscow has protested oil explorations by "NATO country" along Soviet-Afghan frontier.
- 17 POLAND: Roman Catholic hierarchy takes "oath of loyalty" to Communist State.
YUGOSLAVIA: Danube Commission adopts Yugoslav proposals, elects head of Yugoslav delegation secretary of Commission.
INDO-CHINA: HO Chi-minh re-affirms his readiness to discuss armistice terms.
- 19 MIDDLE EAST: Communist-sponsored conference on "defence of Middle-Eastern and Arab rights" opens at Beirut.
- 21 U.S.S.R. agrees to "atom pool" procedural talks, insisting that "unconditional pledge" not to use atomic weapons be discussed.
- 22 CHINA: Deputy Premier TEVOSYAN leaves for China to participate in opening of metallurgical works.
- 26 CHINA: Pravda front-pages MAO's picture, publishes long message of C.P.S.U. Central Committee and U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, congratulating him on his 60th birthday.

DECEMBER

- 26 U.S.S.R. accepts Berlin as conference site, proposes January 25th as opening date.
- 29 GREAT BRITAIN: British port authorities reveal arrival in England during past week of "at least \$46,000,000" worth of Soviet gold, bringing British direct receipts during November and December to about \$70,000,000 worth. Another \$30,000,000 worth appeared in Continental money markets during same period.
- 30 EASTERN GERMANY: West Berlin authorities announce that 350,000 East Germans, including about 4,500 People's Police, fled West during 1953.
- 31 U.S.: U.S.S.R. agrees in principle to return 186 lend-lease vessels.

JANUARY

- 1 Soviet Government receives notes from Western Big Three, accepting Soviet proposals on Berlin Conference.
- 11 Secretary of State DULLES and Soviet Ambassador ZARUBIN hold first procedural talk on "atom-pool" proposal.
- 16 AUSTRIA: Soviet note promises that U.S.S.R. will do "everything in its power for final settlement of Austrian question".
- 20/23 EASTERN GERMANY: Socialist Unity Party Central Committee meeting expels two former Party leaders for "soft attitude" in June, 1953.
- 23 CHINA: Soviet-Chinese 1954 trade protocol signed; U.S.S.R. to provide machinery, industrial products; China to supply raw materials, agricultural products.
- HUNGARY: Premier NAGY strongly re-affirms "new course", saying "We wish to guarantee more room for private initiative and individual interests".
- 25 Berlin Conference opens.
- 26 KOREA: Communists walk out of liaison talks looking towards resumption of negotiations on Korean political conference.
- 27 AFGHANISTAN: U.S.S.R. extends \$3.5 million loan, and technical aid.
- 28 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Maria SVERMOVA, six other SLANSKY "accomplices", convicted of "anti-state activities", sentenced to from life to fifteen years.
- 29 YUGOSLAVIA: Cominform journal article invites Yugoslavia to re-join Soviet bloc.

JANUARY

- 30 DULLES-MOLOTOV procedural talks in Berlin on "atom-pool" plan.
- 31 CHINA: Moscow-Peking direct, eight-day express rail service inaugurated.

FEBRUARY

- 4 GREAT BRITAIN: Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade says U.S.S.R. could place orders in U.K. over next three years to value of £400 million.
- 6/10 CHINA: Chinese C.P. Central Committee holds plenary session; MAO Tse-tung absent, "because he is having his vacation". LIU Shao-chi, in main report, warns against "BERIAS" in Party.
- 7/15 Gunnar MYRDAL, Secretary of U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, visits Moscow.
- 13 CHINA: MAO receives Pakistan Ambassador.
- 14 GREAT BRITAIN: British businessmen in Moscow receive orders from Soviet Government to amount of £13.5 million.
- 18 Berlin Conference ends.

MARCH

- 4 China and North Korea agree to attend Geneva Conference.

BULGARIA: At end of C.P. Congress, Premier CHERVENKOV yields chief Party office - First Secretary - to Todor ZHIVKOV.
- 8 POLAND: Council of Ministers adopts decree to speed up rate of collectivization.
- 9 POLAND: KHRUSHCHEV arrives in Warsaw for C.P. Congress.
- 10 Soviet delegate to E.C.E. KUMYKIN announces that U.S.S.R. will henceforth have permanent delegation at Commission.

POLAND: BIERUT, in report to C.P. Congress, appears to foreshadow intention to speed up collectivization.
- 10/11/12 Soviet leaders, in pre-election speeches, make following foreign-affairs points:

- MALENKOV condemns cold war, "which is policy of preparing new world war, which, with contemporary means of warfare, means destruction of world civilization"; pays tribute to India and NEHRU, devoting more space to them than to praise of Communist China; supports Soviet project of "all-European treaty of collective security";

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MARCH

10/11/12

- MOLOTOV, referring to Western objections that U.S. would be excluded from Europe by Soviet "European security plan", says it is possible to amend it, and calls for further discussion of it;

- BULGANIN says U.S. is openly conducting policy of preparing new war.

11 POLAND: KHRUSHCHEV speech to C.P. Congress calls on Polish Party to "fight mercilessly against any and all enemies of people".

12 HUNGARY: Radio Budapest announces that quondam secret-police chief Gabor PETER and two associates, all Jews, have been arrested, tried and sentenced to from life to nine years for "crimes against state and people".

17 U.S.S.R., with Chinese concurrence, agrees to arrangements suggested by West for Geneva Conference.

POLAND: C.P. Congress ends. BIERUT becomes First Secretary. In subsequent Governmental reshuffle, CYRANKIEWICZ becomes Premier, Hilary MINC and Zenon NOWAK named First Vice-Premiers.

18 E.C.E. adopts joint Anglo-Soviet resolution calling for lifting of economic and administrative controls on foreign trade.

BELGIUM: C.P. Secretary-General Edgar LALMAND resigns for reasons of "health".

TURKEY: Soviet note protests Turkish-Pakistan pact, Turkish NATO membership, visits of British and American warships to Istanbul.

THE NETHERLANDS: Soviet Ambassador makes declaration to Netherlands regarding U.S. bases in peace-time.

20 GREECE: Soviet note protests U.S. military "bases" in Greece.

26 EASTERN GERMANY: Soviet Government Declaration gives "sovereignty" to "German Democratic Republic". However, Soviet troops will remain in zone to "assure security".

31 Soviet note to Britain, France and U.S. proposes further discussion of "All-European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe". U.S.S.R. sees no obstacles to U.S. adherence to Treaty. Moreover, under certain circumstances, U.S.S.R. would consider joining NATO.