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TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

A Report Prepared by the Working Group Established
by the Council on 8th October, 1952

There is attached hereto the Report prepared by the Working Group which was set up by the Council at its meeting on 8th October, 1952, to prepare a paper for submission to the Ministerial Meeting of the Council, setting out the position, insofar as it could be ascertained, as to the latest trends in Soviet policy.

(Signed) HUGH S. CUMMING

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INTRODUCTION

This paper was prepared at the request of the Council to enable an appraisal to be made of the immediate and longer-term intentions underlying Soviet policy. Its purpose is not to estimate Soviet military capacity, that is to say, the ability of the USSR to start and sustain a world-wide conflict at some time in the near or distant future. It therefore deliberately disregards a significant factor for determining the danger of war. This aspect of the problem is discussed in MC.44, a document issued by the Military Committee, which will be submitted separately to the Council.

SUMMARY

2. This paper is an estimate of Soviet policy in the light of evidence that has become available since the previous report (document C9-D/1) was presented to the Ninth Session of the Council. This evidence shows that the assessment in Document C9-D/1 still remains valid in essentials. Stalin's recent article and the Soviet Party Congress mark no turning-point in Soviet policy at home or abroad. Strategy and ideology remain basically unchanged, but there is confirmation of certain changes in tactics.

3. The Congress has underlined how vastly the Soviet leaders' confidence in the strength of their position has increased since the war. Although "capitalist encirclement" remains the ideological justification for strengthening the Soviet state apparatus and provides justification for Soviet internal and external policies, it is no longer considered as a "geographical concept".

Internal

4. The Soviet Government continue to regard the development of their economic strength as the key not only to their own security, but to the outcome of the "two worlds" struggle. Their policy is still, it appears, to concentrate upon raising Soviet economic and

They are maintaining the economy's capacity for rapid conversion to war footing and are doubling strategic reserves under the current 5-year Plan. The Plan still gives first priority to capital goods and investment; consumer production will, however, rise gradually, although representing a relatively declining percentage of total production.

5. Stalin has laid down three conditions for the transition to a Communist society, apparently to warn the country that this is still a distant prospect and that Soviet internal policy must continue indefinitely on its present course. The Congress revealed a continued loss of élan in the Party and in many fields of Soviet effort owing to the growing complexity of the economy, the emergence of a privileged class, and the ideological fetters on creative minds. There is to be a thorough tightening of discipline and organization in both Party and State.

6. The replacement of the Politburo and Orgburo by an enlarged Praesidium and Secretariat may be mainly for administrative convenience and to bring in new blood. The composition of the new bodies confirms the trend towards merging State and Party responsibilities. There is no significant change among the highest leaders. Stalin remains supreme, and there is no new light on the succession.

External

7. The leaders are clearly satisfied with their post-war gains and see no reason to change the basic principles or long-term aims of their foreign policy. But the progress of Western co-operation has led them to revise their short-term aims. Whereas from 1945 to 1947 they aimed at spreading Communist control in West Europe, since 1947 they have increasingly been forced into the adoption of more negative aims, first of wrecking the European Recovery Programme and, latterly, of disrupting NATO. Similarly they have refrained from new acts of open aggression since the Berlin blockade and Korea; but they would doubtless again resort to aggression if given the chance, and they are continuing to support local warfare in the Far East where circumstances are favourable. They probably still do not want to expose the Soviet Union to the hazards of a major war in any near future.

8. Soviet leaders have failed in their manoeuvres up to date to hold up NATO or West German rearmament plans; nevertheless they have apparently concluded that they must continue to rely mainly on indirect action, fortified by the belief that the burdens of rearmament would increase "capitalist contradictions" to an intolerable degree and that Germany in particular would create an "insoluble contradiction" in the Western bloc. The Party Congress shows no present intention to make concessions on major problems. The Soviet Government seem likely to stand their ground while they develop a world-wide campaign to split and undermine the non-Communist countries. Above all their aim will be to isolate the United States. They will seek to divide the West European nations from the United States by raising the banner of national independence and sovereignty against "Dollar domination". The Soviet Government already show

such as France, Italy and perhaps Great Britain. They will also continue their efforts to develop "liberation struggles" in colonies and areas such as the Middle East, South-East Asia and Latin America.

9. The Peace Campaign, embracing all Communist-sponsored organizations, will remain one of the chief instruments of this policy. It will try to conceal its revolutionary associations, though Stalin has reassured "hard-core" Communists that their turn will come and has openly promised Soviet support to other Communist Parties for exploiting any revolutionary opportunities. Communist Parties must, therefore, at present follow "national front" tactics and work through the Peace Campaign, but this does not mean abandoning their revolutionary aims.

10. Policy in the United Nations seems unlikely to change, and the recent Soviet statements confirm that Soviet secession is improbable. The Party Congress produced no specific proposals for a Great-Power meeting, even on Germany. There was no indication of any change in relations with the satellites or China and no more light on the Sino-Soviet talks. There were no proposals on Korea.

Stalin's Theories on World Trade and War

11. The Soviet leaders are again laying much emphasis on the "deepening economic crisis of capitalism". Stalin has now said that the division of the world market into two was the most important economic result of the war. The Soviet bloc, he says, will soon no longer need imports from the West and will begin to enter foreign markets (presumably the "neutral" areas) in competition with capitalism, whose decline will be much hastened thereby. Stalin is probably thinking well ahead. The Soviet Union is unlikely to have any large exportable surplus for some years, and the Party Congress suggests no immediate change of trade policy. But Stalin's remarks make any expansion of the Soviet trade with the West unlikely, although the Soviet Union will continue to advocate increased trade in propaganda.

12. Stalin has pronounced that capitalist wars remain inevitable. Although the alleged threat of war from America is still an essential weapon of Soviet policy (as Malenkov's speech shows), Stalin says the capitalists will in practice hesitate to gamble the capitalist system in an attack on the Soviet Union, which they know will not attack them. Despite the obvious propaganda aspect of this statement, it may reflect a real trend of Soviet thought, but the Soviet leaders seem not to have finally decided whether the West means war. For the moment, like us, they seem to see the main risk in a possible miscalculation.

CONCLUSIONS

13.(a) There is no evidence that Soviet basic aims and strategy have changed. Soviet confidence appears greatly increased

- (b) The XIXth Party Congress was held mainly for internal reasons; although it was an occasion for a review of the Soviet Union's foreign as well as domestic situation, it did not mark any turning-point in Soviet foreign policy
- (c) There is no sign of any major political change within the Soviet Union, which will pursue its present course of internal development. The Soviet Government will continue to build up their economic and military potential, concentrating on heavy industry.
- (d) The Soviet Government are likely to continue their present foreign policy, and there are for the time being no indications that they intend to make genuine concessions on any outstanding international problems.
- (e) In the shorter-term the Soviet Government are seeking to disrupt NATO, and all forms of European integration, by a world-wide campaign of indirect action, psychological, economic, and political, designed to undermine and divide the free countries and above all to isolate and discredit the United States. They see special opportunities for weakening the free world by exploiting anti-European sentiments and social unrest in dependent and former dependent territories, particularly in the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia.
- (f) The Soviet Government seem unlikely to want a major war in any near future; they appear convinced that their system will be better able than those of the free world to stand the strain of a prolonged period of cold war, and that they will be able to build up their industrial potential faster than the rest of the world.
- (g) Soviet policy is, however, capable of sudden and sweeping changes. The Soviet Government will be quick to exploit any weakening or relaxation in the free world, and they will not hesitate to revert to direct aggressive policy if they deem the circumstances propitious. Constant vigilance is a prerequisite of the free world's security.

TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

A report prepared for the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in December, 1952

I. A report on Soviet policy was submitted by the Council Deputies to the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council in document C9-D/1. The present paper takes account of evidence regarding Soviet policy which has accumulated since then, in particular the proceedings of the nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This evidence shows however that the assessment in document C9-D/1 still remains valid in essentials.

II. BASIC SOVIET AIMS AND METHODS

2. The recent XIXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided the most extensive public review of Soviet outlook, achievements and aims since the previous Congress in 1939. Soviet achievements during these thirteen years have brought about great changes in the Soviet Union's material position. But the XIXth Congress has revealed no change in the basic long-term outlook and aims of the Soviet leaders since the beginning of the Stalinist era in 1924. Nor has there been any change of the general principles and methods by which Soviet policy is conducted. Only circumstances have changed, and the choice of Soviet tactics to suit them.

3. Soviet behaviour and actions are fundamentally conditioned by the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state structure, the innate hostility of regime to all non-Soviet forms of power and the total disregard of the Soviet rulers for any ethical, moral or humanitarian principles in pursuit of their policies. Stalin's fundamental aims are, in order of priority:

- (a) to preserve and strengthen the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union;
- (b) to consolidate and protect the Soviet orbit;
- (c) to expand the area of Soviet power.

4. Since the Russian revolution of 1917, Stalin has regarded the world as divided into two hostile camps: the camp of Communism and the camp of Capitalism (Note 1). Henceforward, though the camp of Capitalism might at times be divided against itself, the international situation would consist fundamentally of a life-and-death struggle between the two camps (Note 2) ending with the inevitable victory of Communism.

5. Stalin's long-term strategy for this struggle has never

forces of the revolution were, and are, the strength of the Soviet state itself and the Communist parties in other countries, making use of "reserves" (Note 5) consisting of the "exploited" classes - workers, peasants, colonials - in all countries. The strategic method was, and still is, for the Communists to gain control of working-class or nationalist movements, to deprive Governments or colonial authorities of popular confidence and support, and finally to overthrow them, opening the way to Communist dictatorship.

6. The practical conduct of this strategy takes the form of either direct or indirect action (Note 5).

- (a) Direct Action means open resort to violence by the Communists and their associates; it includes:
 - (i) Military intervention by the Soviet Union itself (Note 6) or by proxy (as in Korea);
 - (ii) Subversion by force, ranging from civil war and rebellion (Greece, Indo-China, Malaya) and coups d'état (Czechoslovakia) to civil disorder, strikes with violence, etc;
- (b) Indirect Action means using non-violent subversive methods to weaken and demoralise the enemy, primarily by playing upon the "contradictions of Capitalism" (Note 8) so as to open the way for direct action later on. The methods of indirect action are:
 - (i) Psychological and Subversive, including propaganda, Communist parties and front organizations (Peace Campaign, etc.), anti-colonial agitation;
 - (ii) Economic, including Communist leadership of the "campaign for workers' rights", strike action, trade propaganda (Moscow Economic Conference) and ultimately economic warfare;
 - (iii) Politico-Diplomatic, including attempts to secure Soviet objectives by negotiation, "non-aggressive pacts", use of the United Nations, etc.

7. Stalin has laid down four principles to govern the use of these methods:

- (a) to concentrate on the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment (Note 9);
- (b) not to strike until the time is ripe;
- (c) never to lose sight of the ultimate revolutionary goal;
- (d) to be ready to retreat temporarily when the enemy is too strong, but only in the sense of reculer pour mieux sauter (Note 10).

8. The choice of the right method to suit the conditions prevailing at a particular time or place constitutes the art of Soviet tactics. Tactics therefore often change, whilst strategy remains constant (Note 3). Soviet policy is thus within limits extremely flexible. Direct and indirect action may be employed at the same time in different places, as witness the present contrast between indirect Communist policy in Western Europe and the Middle East and the open use of violence in the Far East.

9. One fundamental principle, however, limits the choice of tactics. The Soviet Union is both the seat of Stalin's power and the base from which the revolution is to spread. If it were destroyed, the Stalinist world revolution could not take place. The Soviet Union must therefore not be exposed to any excessive risk. Though war and peace are only a matter of tactics to the Soviet leaders (Notes 6 and 7), and they will certainly defend the Soviet Union to the utmost if attacked, they cannot deliberately contemplate a total war unless they feel reasonably assured of victory.

III. BACKGROUND OF THE XIXth PARTY CONGRESS

10. From 5th to 14th October, 1952, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in Moscow its XIXth Congress, theoretically the highest authoritative body of the Party. Although the Party's Statutes provided for Congresses at least once every three years, the last Congress took place in 1939. The recent Congress again illustrated that such meetings are not genuine discussions but stage performances organized by Stalin and his small ruling elite to obtain an appearance of democratic approval for their policies; to impress the outside world with the apparent strength and homogeneity of the Soviet political system; and to rally the Party members and the Soviet peoples to continued efforts and sacrifices. Party Congresses are primarily of internal significance, but occasion is taken to review the international position of the Soviet Union and to confirm or lay down policies to be followed by Communist Parties throughout the world.

11. The chief reasons for staging the Congress at this time appear to be the following: (a) the need to explain, justify and lay down Party policies on domestic issues; (b) to obtain Congress sanction for the revision of the Party Statutes and the reorganization of the central Party organs; (c) the custom of obtaining Party ratification for a new Five-Year Plan - a plan which has actually been under way since 1st January, 1951; (d) to inspire devotion to the ruling elite among Party members and the outside masses and to instil greater discipline in the Party Membership; (e) to advertize the strength of the Soviet Union's position in a way to reinforce morale in the Soviet bloc and the foreign Communist parties; and (f) to review the international position of the Soviet Union in the light of a world situation, which in the judgment of the Soviet rulers has sufficiently crystallized to permit them publicly to review their attitudes and policies.

at this moment in order to set the tone and provide guidance for the Party Congress. The article was entirely devoted to theory, for the most part questions of internal significance for the Soviet Union.

13. Nevertheless in certain portions of his essay, Stalin necessarily touched upon questions relating directly to international affairs. Chief in importance were those which described the Soviet picture of the outside world today, those which dealt with capitalist contradictions and the likelihood of war and those which formulated the aims of the Soviet-dominated Peace Movement. Stalin's statements in Bolshevik were concerned to reinterpret rather than revise certain aspects of Communist doctrine, and they reveal no radical change of course. They are clearly, however, meant to provide guidance for Communist thought and action for a considerable time to come.

14. The Agenda of the Congress followed established tradition. First came the principal speech in the form of a report of the Central Committee delivered by Malenkov which dealt at length with the international and internal position of the Soviet Union and finally the situation in the Party. Other major speeches covered the new Five-Year Plan and the proposed changes in the Party's Statutes. Stalin also made a short speech before the end of the sessions. Immediately after the Congress, as customary in the past, the Central Committee announced the "elections" to its controlling organs, viz. the Praesidium (supplanting the Politburo) and the Secretariat (combining the Orgburo and the old Secretariat).

15. Summarizing the results of the Congress it may be said that the succession of statements made by Stalin and his top lieutenants set the seal of approval on the conduct, trend and overall purposes of post-war Soviet policies. They revealed no basic change of ideology or strategy, but they confirmed previous evidence of certain changes of tactics and certain small, but significant, developments of theory which the Soviet leaders have found necessary to conform to changing circumstances in the post-war period. While a certain degree of self-criticism was permitted in pointing out faults and deficiencies in regard to internal problems, Soviet policies in international affairs were adjudged correct and beyond reproach. Clearly discernible was the note of confidence in the strength and power of the Soviet State and equally clear was the Soviet intention to continue on the path of present policies.

16. The speakers displayed particular satisfaction over the post-war expansion of the Soviet bloc by the accession of the Satellite States and China (Notes 11 and 12). Malenkov still spoke of "capitalist encirclement", but only as the reason for keeping the apparatus of the State in existence even when a Communist society is achieved (in Marxist theory the State should then "wither away"). As long ago as 1930 Stalin explained that 'capitalist encirclement should not be regarded as merely a geographical concept' and since the war Soviet theorists have ceased to speak of it as such; but, as a doctrinal term it continues to be used to justify Soviet

IV. SOVIET INTERNAL POLICY

Economic and Defence

17. Despite their display of confidence, the Soviet leaders give no sign of slackening their drive to increase the strength of the Soviet Union. The XIXth Congress has again shown to what a large extent the leaders regard the development of their economic strength as the key not only to their own security, but to the final outcome of the struggle between "the two camps" (Notes 13 & 14). The new Five-Year Plan confirms Soviet intentions to continue concentrating on heavy industry (Note 15) and to allow only a gradual increase in consumers' goods. Malenkov's speech revealed that consumers' goods represent a decreasing share of the Soviet Union's expanding industrial production. On the other hand actual production figures of basic industries cited by Malenkov pointed to the probability that the 1955 goals for these industries will be met and that the objectives for basic industry laid down by Stalin for the 1960's, by which "our homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents" are likely of achievement (Note 16).

18. In the realm of military-economic policy the Soviet rulers appear content to maintain at approximately present numerical levels their large military and security forces and to concentrate rather upon raising the long-term economic and military potential of the Soviet Union. Marshal Vassilevsky, Minister of Defence, told the Congress that the new Five-Year Plan would create conditions for a better supply of first-class modern arms and munitions in considerably greater quantities than during the war. This confirms the estimate that the Soviet Union since 1945 has maintained an armaments potential capable of producing arms at a higher rate than the wartime peak and that the increased defence expenditure visible since 1950 has gone mainly into improving arms and equipment. Malenkov also noted with satisfaction the growth of industry in Siberia and the European area east of the Volga, which has lessened Soviet vulnerability to attack, and he stated that one of the objectives of the new Plan is to double State Reserves of food and materials, which will improve the Soviet Union's existing capacity for rapid conversion to a war footing.

Political

19. The description of political conditions as regards the stability of the regime and areas of discontent contained in the Annex to Document C9-D/1 of 6th February, 1952 remains valid. As always the Soviet leaders are primarily concerned with security - security against any possible threat to their position from within or without the USSR. To this end they put their main reliance on the growth of military-economic potential. Stalin in his theoretical discussion of the conditions for the transition from Socialism to Communism (Note 17) placed first the continued growth and improvement of production. However, it is clear from Stalin's article and the speeches at the Congress that the Soviet rulers have no clear idea how or when a Communist society is to be achieved in the USSR and that in the meantime they will continue to pursue the

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in the Party, whom he accused of "lightheartedly running ahead of events" in their desire to see an early transition to Communism.

The Party

20. In regard to the Party itself, two aspects brought out at the Congress should be noted, namely the reorganization of the controlling organs of the Central Committee and the emphasis upon greater Party and State discipline for all members. The old Politburo and Orgburo (Organization Bureau) have disappeared. There is now a single Praesidium of the Central Committee with 25 full and 11 candidate members (as compared to the 11 full and one candidate members of the Politburo). The new Secretariat (which absorbs the functions of the Orgburo) has also been expanded from 5 to 10 members. Two conclusions emerge from a study of the personalities selected for the Praesidium and the Secretariat. First, the composition of the Praesidium confirms the long-term trend towards the merging of State and Party responsibilities. And secondly, there has been no important change in the small group which has ruled the Soviet Union since 1939. Stalin obviously remains the leader with Molotov and Malenkov his chief lieutenants. No definite light was thrown on the question of a possible successor to Stalin.

Internal Difficulties

21. Although the picture which the Soviet rulers sought to impress upon the world was one of limitless confidence in the present conditions and future development of Soviet society (Note 18), in the stability and growth of Soviet power and in the attainment of Soviet objectives, the contents of the speeches at the Congress divulged many problems and deficiencies present in the Soviet scene.

22. Malenkov's speech, for instance, contained considerably more detailed criticism of shortcomings and malpractices in all walks of Soviet life than did Stalin's reports in 1934 and 1939. Much of this criticism echoed frequent complaints in the past but a few points are worthy of note.

- (1) Great emphasis was placed upon increasing productivity, reducing production costs and observing the strictest economy in both industrial and agricultural fields. The Soviet Union has reached a point where further economic advance will be a matter of technique rather than manpower, and correspondingly more difficult (Note 15).
- (2) Criticism of Party shortcomings revealed that the loss of revolutionary fervour already noticeable since the '30s is now widespread enough to cause the Soviet rulers some real concern. The Party no longer corresponds to Lenin's conception of a dedicated elite. One of the main objects of the Congress was a thorough tightening of discipline (Note 19).
- (3) Apart from the Congress, the constant denunciations in the

None of these criticisms should be over-estimated. There is no serious internal threat to the régime in the foreseeable future. But the Party Congress underlines the fact that, human nature - "remnants of capitalism" - is the Soviet leaders' worst enemy and that they have not solved the problem posed by the emergence of a relatively privileged class who may before long discover their own standard of life is more important than world revolution. It also indicates that, although there is no question of political disloyalty, large sections of the Soviet population are not so wholeheartedly responsive to the practical demands of Party and State as Soviet propaganda claims.

V. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

23. In his report to the XIXth Congress, Malenkov's general approach to the international situation followed the conventional line of similar Soviet speeches since the war. His four "tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy" closely resembled the definitions given at the Cominform meeting of 1947 (Note 21). Going further back, we find that Stalin gave similar definitions of foreign policy, though in very different circumstances, to the Congresses of 1934 and 1939 (Note 20). The fact is that these discourses deal in great part with strategy, and their fundamental likeness over so many years is a graphic illustration that the basic aims and methods of strategy described in Section II above have never changed. Tactics, equally, are still governed by the general principle "all mischief short of war". From their speeches to the Congress, it is plain that the Soviet leaders regard the growth of Soviet strength since 1939 as a triumphant vindication of the main principles of Stalinist foreign policy, and they see no reason to abandon them (Note 22).

The Course of Post-War Policy

24. Beneath this general uniformity, however, a comparison of the post-war speeches, as well as of Soviet actions, does reveal important changes of current tactics.

25. In Europe immediately after the war the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe ensured the extension of Soviet political control over the whole area. In Western Europe the Soviet Government operating through local Communist parties, aimed at prolonging and exploiting the post-war political and economic instability so as to bring into power Governments favourable to, and perhaps ultimately controlled by the Soviet Union. But their rapid and inevitable success in Eastern Europe, combined with their intransigence elsewhere awakened the West to the true nature of Soviet post-war policy and caused the West to begin organising its defence, first economically through the European Recovery Programme, and then militarily and politically through NATO. The immediate Soviet aim became, according to wreck these organizations. At the same time Germany became the central problem in Europe. After their failure to obtain Allied acquiescence to a Soviet solution to the German problem, and after their failure to drive the Western powers out of Berlin by the blockade of 1948-49, the Soviet Government contented themselves with a policy

26. In the East, the effects of Japanese occupation and the rise of nationalism presented the Soviet Union with a ready-made framework of direct action, which proceeded with little Soviet support, even in China. Local circumstances have enabled direct action to continue in Indo-China, Malaya, and Burma. But the only operation directly controlled by the Soviet Union, in Korea, failed to attain its objective, and the unexpected degree of Western resistance has also contributed to the modification of Soviet tactics.

27. Thus, although "all mischief short of war" remains the basic principle of Soviet tactics, post-war experience has shown that the amount of mischief varies inversely with Western strength and determination. The containment policy increasingly caused a certain loss of initiative on the Soviet side and concentration on negative aims at countering Western moves.

All Mischief Short of War

28. Deliberate aggression by the Soviet armed forces is not excluded from the range of Soviet methods (Note 6), but the Soviet leaders, as already mentioned (paragraph 10) are not willing to run any serious risk of defeat in war. Stalin, as we have seen (paragraph 18) will not regard the Soviet Union as economically secure until the 1960's. It seems probable, indeed, that the Soviet Government have never yet been willing to take any serious risk of involving the Soviet Union in a major war with the West; they may well remain disinclined to do so until at least Stalin's targets are reached, and probably longer. They have, however, been willing to gamble on their own estimate of the opposition's weakness or irresolution, and their two most dangerous post-war adventures - the Berlin blockade and Korea - may reasonably be regarded as falling within the Soviet conception of "all mischief short of war" (i.e. war involving the Soviet Union). They met firm Western resistance both times, and they have refrained from any such provocative acts in Europe or the Far East since. But this is the result of Western reaction. There is no evidence to show that they will not again resort to local aggression if ever the non-Communist Governments were to give them reason to think they had a safe opportunity. This could be compatible, as in the case of Korea, with a "peace" policy elsewhere. But the risks are probably now too great, save possibly in South-East Asia and Persia, and local aggression seems unlikely for so long as present Western policy is effectively maintained.

29. Hence the emphasis at the XIXth Congress upon the Soviet desire for "peace". Since the earliest days of the Revolution it has been a recurrent device of Soviet tactics to claim that the Soviet Government are willing and anxious to maintain relations of "peaceful co-existence" and co-operation with non-Communist powers (Note 31). This is simply the application of the strategic principle described in paragraph 7(d) above: when the Soviet Government find the opposition strong enough to make direct action too difficult or dangerous they bide their time and advocate "peaceful co-existence" in the hopes of undermining the enemy by indirect action so that they may ultimately be able to resume the offensive (Note 10). "Peaceful co-existence" is in fact no more than the Soviet name for the Soviet

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refraining from the riskier forms of direct action. The Soviet concept of "peace" demands that the Soviet Union shall be free to augment its own strength and undermine the strength of the non-Communist world; all efforts or combinations by the non-Communist powers to protect themselves are denounced as "hostile acts" against the Soviet Union. The speeches at the Party Congress support this view and, according to one report, Stalin told Signor Nenni last July that he is prepared for at least ten or fifteen years of "peaceful co-existence" in this sense.

Soviet Cold-War Policy

30. In the opening phase of their campaign against NATO the Soviet Government resorted to politico-diplomatic action: the threatening notes to Norway and Denmark and the Palais Rose negotiations of 1951. Their objectives were to delay the NATO programme and prevent a German defence contribution. But since they themselves would make no major concession, they secured none from the West. They therefore fell back on using Western and German rearmament as the foundation for a propaganda campaign, and they continued to rely on indirect action against NATO. They regarded this course, it appears, as being not only necessary owing to the growth of Western strength, but also correct, because they believed that NATO rearmament would bring about a sharp worsening of the "general crisis of capitalism". Stalin and Malenkov take this as their point of departure in reviewing the international situation. They seem convinced that the burdens of rearmament will subject the non-Communist world to intolerable strains and divergences, which they hope to exploit by indirect methods so as not only to render NATO ineffective, but to open the way to more positive gains later on. The following paragraphs deal with the possible forms that Soviet action may take.

(a) Military

31. Direct Soviet aggression, as already stated, seems unlikely, and so also does any new war by proxy in the immediate future. But the threat created by the mere existence of large Soviet armed forces remains an important psychological weapon of Soviet policy, as is shown by Point (iv) of Malenkov's "tasks of foreign policy" (Note 21b). Beria's speech to the Congress shows also that the Soviet Government will remain very sensitive to any actual or potential infringement of Soviet and by implication, Satellite, territory, as was already evident from the incidents with Swedish and American aircraft. We may also expect the Soviet Government to push forward the development of the European satellites' armed forces.

(b) Political and Diplomatic

32. There is no sign from the XIXth Congress that the Soviet Government will adopt any more reasonable attitude towards problems such as Germany, Austria, Trieste, disarmament or the control of atomic energy. Soviet notes and statements during the past few months have clearly indicated that the Soviet Government feel no necessity for compromise with the concept of Western powers as such. They may yet

being able or willing to offer acceptable conditions for such a meeting. If they allow the ratification of the EDC and the German contracts without again proposing any Great-Power Meeting, it will indicate that they take Western rearmament as a political fait accompli, though they will continue to use all possible action to frustrate it and to discourage Governments from effective participation in NATO programmes (e.g. the recent note to Denmark, the latest of a long series of diplomatic protests, which seems likely to continue). Their object is clearly not to conciliate but to divide the capitalist powers, especially the members of NATO; and above all to isolate the United States. For this purpose the Kremlin may on occasion adopt superficially less hostile tactics towards the other Western powers. Malenkov indeed offers "complete understanding" to any power that will break with the United States.

(c) Psychological and Subversive

33. It is, however, mainly to peoples rather than Governments that Soviet disruptive tactics will be addressed. The Soviet Union is mounting a world-wide offensive of propaganda and subversion designed to weaken the free world by playing upon the "contradictions of Capitalism" (Note 8). They are seeking to undermine confidence in democratic methods and destroy belief in peaceful evolution. They are trying to create and exploit class dissensions and differences between the Colonies and their mother countries. Above all, they seek to foster the belief that co-operation with the United States is the main road to economic catastrophe and war. Malenkov holds out a welcoming hand to politicians who for whatever reasons oppose the NATO programme (Note 23).

34. The main vehicle for this offensive will continue to be the Peace Campaign, for which not only the Peace Movement itself but all the other Communist-led international front organizations are now primarily working. The principal methods of this Campaign are:

- (1) to develop anti-American feeling in every way;
- (2) to stimulate and play upon nationalistic sentiments, particularly so as to undermine all forms of European organization;
- (3) to exploit national aspirations in colonial and former colonial countries so as to develop the "liberation struggle" along Communist lines.

The campaign is organized as a "peoples' front", and its subservience to Soviet control and revolutionary aims is as far as possible concealed. Indeed Stalin's article defined the Peace Campaign as a popular front directed primarily against Western rearmament, and not a revolutionary movement, though it might have an ultimate revolutionary effect in certain cases. Malenkov, however, made no mention of this revolutionary aspect, nor would one expect any at a time when every effort is being made to render the Peace Movement more widely acceptable. The Marty-Tillon affair in France has shown

further ahead: he doubtless wished to reassure the "hard core" Communists that their efforts for the Peace Campaign have an ultimate revolutionary purpose and that their time will come.

35. It is clearly often difficult, indeed, for true Communists to adapt themselves to a phase of indirect action. The role of most foreign Communist Parties is now to refrain from violence, to work for the Peace Campaign, to form national fronts, and to collaborate with those of whatever political complexion who oppose rearmament. In order to assist the Soviet leaders in their endeavours to lull the Western countries into a false sense of security by emphasizing the possibility of the "peaceful co-existence" foreign Communist Parties will probably use more parliamentary and seemingly less revolutionary tactics for these purposes. Perhaps to give further consolation to those who, like Marty and Tillon, might chafe under such disagreeable restraints and associations, Stalin devoted his closing speech to the XIXth Congress to reassuring the foreign Communist Parties that he had not lost sight of their ultimate revolutionary purpose. He reminded them that their task had become much easier owing to the growth of the Soviet camp and gave them a remarkably frank undertaking that the Soviet Union would help them to exploit any revolutionary opportunities that might occur (Note 24)

36. The XIXth Congress once again showed that in the Soviet subversive campaign a special importance attaches to the "liberation struggle in the colonial and dependent territories" (Note 25). It is important to remember that in Communist parlance this phrase includes not only the colonies proper, but the countries in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, which the West regards as independent, but which Soviet theory considers to be subjected to the Western powers by economic or political ties. Such countries are considered as the main economic base of capitalism, owing to their raw materials, strategic facilities, etc., and the Soviet Government believe that any steps to disturb or detach them will directly serve the main cause of disrupting NATO. Hence there is now a growing effort to develop the Peace Campaign in these areas.

37. A prominent feature of Beria's speech was the comparison of workers' standards of living in Western Europe, the Middle East, India, etc., with the now allegedly much higher standards in comparable Soviet Republics such as the Ukraine, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. This illustrates an important aspect of the Soviet propaganda campaign, which is to persuade foreign workers that life in the Soviet bloc is now more secure and better worth living, socially and economically, than under capitalist "exploitation". There is no doubt of the Soviet leaders' confidence that they can make Communism a more attractive proposition than Capitalism, especially to peoples in under-developed areas (Notes 26 and 27).

(d) Economic Policy

38. Given the key role of economics in Soviet thinking, economic subversion is naturally an important part of Soviet cold-war policy, and has been employed continuously in one form or another since the war. At present, however, Western Communists in general lack the capabilities for effective use of the more open forms of

strikes - and these methods seem likely to be avoided. The object will as a rule be to promote labour unrest under cover of supporting economic aims: demands for higher wages, better standards of living, etc. The real aim will be to increase the difficulties laid upon the West by the rearmament programme and so to aggravate the "general crisis of capitalism".

39. It appears from Stalin's article that Soviet foreign-trade policy will in time be used for the same object. To the Soviet leaders, foreign trade is not a desirable end in itself, but partly a regrettable necessity of the moment, and partly an instrument of political policy. Their ultimate aim is economic self-sufficiency (autarky) for the Soviet bloc, and they have gone a considerable way to achieving it. But as long as the Soviet economy needs essential materials from the free world, they will try to secure these by foreign trade. This is the primary reason for such East-West trade as they at present conduct, (though political or propoganda motives do occasionally enter); they will probably consider it economically advantageous to continue East-West trade at about present levels for some time to come. Owing to the development of Soviet and satellite industry, however, to Western supply shortages, and to Western security export controls, (despite certain Communist efforts to circumvent them), the field for East-West trade in essentials is increasingly restricted. Any increase of trade would have to be mainly in Soviet imports of inessential goods. Despite much propoganda (e.g. at the Moscow Economic Conference), the Soviet Government have shown no practical disposition to increase East-West trade on such a basis. They appear not to have fulfilled any of the promises of new trade made at the Moscow Economic Conference.

40. Stalin's article in Bolshevik has now thrown some new light on this subject. We have mentioned above that one important reason why the Soviet leaders think the present time favourable to indirect action is that they appear to expect the burdens of rearmament to cause a sharp aggravation of the "general crisis of capitalism". It is an old and fundamental article of Soviet doctrine that since about 1914, the capitalist economy has been in a state of gradually mounting crisis. This chronic "general crisis" takes the outward form of a series of acute temporary crises. Capitalism supposedly never fully recovers from each acute crisis before the next occurs; these are the slumps and booms of Western parlance. But the Soviet leaders formerly admitted that between each acute crisis, capitalism could achieve periods of relative economic stability.

41. Stalin now says that such "periodic stabilizations" of capitalisms are no longer possible. The reason is that since the war the single world market has been split in two, owing to the emergence of the Soviet bloc; including China, as a separate and nearly self-contained market. The loss of markets has had a disastrous effect on capitalist economy (Note 28), which the capitalists are trying to avert by American aid, rearmament, and

of maximum profits, the capitalists are incapable of taking the proper economic measures to avert a crisis (Note 29).

42. Stalin looks forward to a time when the Soviet bloc will be able actively to exploit these supposed difficulties. Owing to the rapid economic development of the Soviet bloc countries, Stalin says, "we shall soon reach the stage when these countries will not only have no need to import goods from the capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the need to dispose of their surplus production".

43. This should mean that the Soviet Union will, at a chosen moment, make an attempt to enter capitalist markets presumably in the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America, on a larger scale than before; and it would be logical at the same time to exploit the natural temptation for Western Germany to trade with Eastern Europe and for Japan to trade with China. But the present Five-Year Plan does not suggest that the Soviet Union will have an effective surplus of goods for these purposes for a few years to come. Malenkov's and Mikoyan's speeches, also, indicate that the Soviet Government intend to maintain their present East-West trade policy in the immediate future and continue their propaganda for "expanding business relations with all countries" - i.e. to maintain the propaganda line of the Moscow Economic Conference as a complement to the Peace Campaign, whether or not the Conference itself is revived (Note 30). But Stalin's remarks make it hardly likely that the West will be offered any big increase of trade of an acceptable kind. The Soviet Government are already, on occasion, using foreign trade deals for political or propaganda purposes, and we must be prepared to see the beginnings of economic warfare, possibly in South-East Asia, where relatively small Soviet exports could have a considerable effect. At the same time we may see a diversion of Soviet commodity exports away from NATO countries. It must be repeated that Soviet capabilities in this field are uncertain. Meanwhile, on the political side, this is added evidence that Soviet tactics may pursue their present course for some considerable time.

(e) United Nations

44. The Soviet Union regards the United Nations merely as an instrument in its foreign policy adapted to serve three basic and overlapping objectives: the protection of fundamental Soviet State interests, aggravation of differences in the non-Soviet world, and world-wide dissemination of Soviet propaganda.

45. At the recent Moscow Party Congress Malenkov substantially retreated from the hostile attitude which Stalin adopted towards the UN in his interview in Pravda in February 1951. In contrast to Stalin's prediction that the "UN is burying its moral authority and dooms itself to disintegration", Malenkov asserted that "the Soviet Government attaches great importance to the UN, considering that this organization could be an important means of maintaining peace". A possible explanation

be beginning to break up the "Anglo-American voting machine". This latest Soviet pronouncement confirms previous estimates that the Soviet Union is unlikely to secede from the UN.

Notes on Individual Areas

(a) Soviet Bloc:

46. Soviet power remains entrenched in all the European satellite nations, and their military and economic integration into the Soviet pattern proceeds gradually but surely. In none of them is there any practical prospect of a successful "national deviation". Recent purges reflect failures and dissensions within the Satellite Governments or Communist parties, but it is not possible to fit them into any general pattern. The formal absorption of any of these countries by the Soviet Union is not indicated in the near future.

(b) Germany

47. Control of all Germany, as being the key to control of all Europe, is still a basic Soviet objective. But owing to Western policy, the Soviet Government have for some time had to concentrate on the more immediate negative aim of preventing Western Germany from aligning herself effectively with the Western powers, especially for defence. Since the failure of the Berlin blockade they have sought to do this directly by negotiation with the Western Powers and indirectly by working on West German opinion, now with threats and now with ostensible concessions. But the negotiations have failed because the Kremlin has never been willing to make sufficient concessions, even temporarily, or in particular to relax its grip on Eastern Germany. In the last few months the Soviet Government seem to have abandoned hope of progress through negotiations. Malenkov's speech made no specific suggestion for a Four-Power meeting; since July Eastern Germany has begun a programme of open and accelerated Sovietization and is speeding up rearmament; Malenkov spoke of Eastern Germany as an accepted member of the Soviet bloc, and Shvernik's presence at the recent anniversary celebrations in Berlin underlines this. The Soviet Government may always return to the tactics of negotiation, but they shew little sign of making the necessary adjustments of policy to render it effective.

48. If this assessment is correct, it would appear that the Soviet Government still consider West Germany's rearmament and alignment with the West in the light of Zhdanov's dictum of 1947, now taken up by Stalin, that in the long run the "re-birth of German imperialism" will create an insoluble contradiction in the Anglo-Franco-American bloc. Stalin may feel that as long as he grasps Eastern Germany, West Germany

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well increasingly resort to measures for harassing and strangling West Berlin in the hopes of rendering the Western position there untenable.

(c) Yugoslavia

49. The Soviet aim to replace Marshall Tito's regime with a government subservient to Moscow remains no nearer fulfilment. In the present phase of tactics, any Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia appears less likely than a year ago.

(d) Middle East and North Africa

50. During the past year the Middle East has assumed a place of increased importance in Soviet tactics owing to Turkey's accession to NATO and the extension of Western defence projects. In accord with their general policy, the Soviet Government aim at maintaining pressure on Turkey to hamper her contribution to NATO, at discouraging the Arab States and Israel from collaborating in projects for Middle Eastern defence, and at causing the maximum unrest throughout this strategic area. They have used, and will clearly go on using, all forms of indirect action: notably political, in the threatening notes to Turkey and the Arab States, and psychological, in an increased effort to spread the Peace Campaign and exploit anti-Western nationalist sentiments.

51. The situation in Iran has developed in a way highly satisfactory to the Soviet Government, who have not thought fit, or doubtless felt it necessary, to make any more direct intervention than a routine protest against American advisers. But they are clearly working through the illegal Tudeh (Communist) Party, which demonstrated considerable organized strength in the recent Government crisis. There is a danger that the Tudeh may come to power either by penetration of, and alliance with, certain national-front factions or in a collapse of internal security due to failure to pay the security forces.

(e) Far East and South East Asia

52. Nothing is known about the August-September Sino-Soviet talks beyond what was contained in the final published communiqué. Close harmonious relations between Moscow and Communist China are of fundamental and vital importance in the pursuit of common objectives. Although potential sources of friction are readily discernible -- for example, the extent to which Soviet influence can make itself felt in the border regions -- it is believed that the USSR and Communist China will continue for an indefinite period to present a united front to the rest of the world.

53. The Party Congress furnished no new indication of Soviet or Chinese intentions regarding Korea. It would take too long to review the evidence on this complicated subject here, and no firm conclusions could either be reached. The Communists

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apparently see enough advantages in the present situation (particularly the diversion of Western military effort) to cause them to be in no hurry to end the deadlock at the armistice talks.

54. The Chinese are assisting the Viet Minh in Indo-China with supplies and could intervene with troops at short notice, but there is no sign that they intend to do so. The position of the non-Communist Government in Burma has been strengthened over the past eight months; however, increased Chinese aid to the Burmese Communists (or actual Chinese intervention (of which there is at present no sign) would jeopardize the existence of that government.

55. With regard to Japan, present tactics are to attack the Japanese Peace Treaty as "illegal", to exploit "US domination" of Japan as represented by the US-Japanese Defence Pact and to appeal to the Japanese people over the heads of their present Government in an effort to encourage them to throw off the "American oppressor". It is difficult to forecast Soviet and Chinese reaction, if Japanese rearmament is actually brought about, except in the light of the world situation then existing.

VI. THE RISK OF WAR

56. Stalin has revived the emphasis on the doctrine of the inevitable conflict within the Capitalist world. He says that although in theory the contradictions between the capitalists and the Soviet camps are greater than those between the Capitalist States themselves, the latter may now be stronger in practice. All may seem well on the surface, but fundamentally Britain, France, Germany, and Japan are bound to rise and try to throw off American domination: inter-capitalist wars are thus inevitable and will remain so until "imperialism" is destroyed. Malenkov, on the other hand, dwelt almost entirely on the danger of war from the United States, saying that the American leaders are preparing to launch a war on the Soviet Union. In the looking-glass world of the Kremlin tactics these two lines are not incompatible. Malenkov was concerned with more immediate things: the threat from America is necessary to the Peace Campaign and a spur to Soviet effort at home. Stalin has not disowned the theory that the Capitalist States will sink their differences and turn upon the Soviet Union. He is saying that, much as they might wish to, they will hesitate to try this in practice.

57. Stalin's reasons for doubting the practical likelihood of capitalist attack are: first, that war with the Soviet Union would mean the end of capitalism (this has been a constant feature of Soviet post-war speeches); secondly, that the capitalists know in their hearts that the Soviet Union will never attack them; and thirdly Malenkov adds that "it is not so easy today to drive the peoples . . . into a war against peace-loving peoples. There is an obvious propaganda motive in these arguments: they are calculated to

reflect the trend of Soviet thought at the moment. On the other hand, Malenkov's references to American aggression, foreign bases, etc. probably also reflect Soviet thinking in the sense that the Soviet Government is not fully convinced that in fact NATO is not aggressive. Malenkov's statement that "we must . . . follow our course without yielding either to provocations or intimidations" carries an echo of our own belief that we may avoid war if we combine firmness with restraint; it suggests that the Soviet Government likewise view the risk of war as arising at present mainly from the possibility of miscalculation. But this can only hold good as long as the Soviet Government feel unjustified in making deliberate tactical use of war.

Future Prospects

58. The foregoing study consists only of deductions which it seems logical to make from Soviet theory, propaganda, and actions. They can give only an approximate clue to Soviet intentions and they cannot be verified except by events. Soviet policy is capable of sudden and sweeping changes. We can be certain only that the Soviet Government will be quick to exploit any weakening or relaxation in the free world and will not hesitate to revert to direct aggressive policy if they judge the circumstances propitious. But as far as we can see, provided the Western world adheres to the course it has chosen, it is unlikely that the Soviet Government would deliberately start general hostilities. We can look forward to a period of cold war, lasting perhaps many years, during which the Kremlin will maintain unremitting pressure upon the free world. The foundation of their policy is the conviction that they can win the psychological and economic battle now in progress for the minds of men.

NOTES

(N.B. Page reference to Stalin's Problems of Leninism refer to the 11th English Edition, 1947, unless otherwise stated).

1. "At the one pole we find capitalism stabilising itself, consolidating the position it has reached and continuing its development. At the other pole we find the Soviet system stabilising itself, consolidating the position it has won and marching forward on the road to victory.

Who will defeat whom? This is the essence of the question."

(Stalin, Report to the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party, May 1925).

2. "When a life and death struggle is being waged, and is spreading between proletarian Russia and the imperialist entente, only two alternatives confront the border regions: either they join forces with Russia, and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be emancipated from imperialist oppression; or they join forces with the entente, and then the yoke of imperialism is inevitable. There is no third solution. The so-called independence of a so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion, and conceals the utter dependence of those apologies for States on one group of imperialists or another."

(Extract from Pravda, 10th October, 1920).

3. "Strategy deals with main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, remains essentially unchanged throughout a given stage

Our revolution has already passed through two stages, and after the October revolution it has entered a third stage. Our ~~strategy~~ changed accordingly

Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organisation of the proletariat, with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline of the revolution

During the second and third stages of the revolution, tactics changed dozens of times, whereas the strategical plans remained unchanged."

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Pages 69-71.)

4. Soviet Strategy since 1917

Third Stage

Commenced after the October Revolution.

Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. The revolution is spreading beyond the confines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has commenced. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, isolation of the parties of the second international, which constitute the main support of the policy of compromise with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries.

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Page 69.)

5. "The reserves of the revolution can be:

Direct: (a) the peasantry and in general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; (b) the proletariat of the neighbouring countries; (c) the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries; (d) the gains and achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat - part of which the proletariat may give up temporarily, while retaining superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite, and

Indirect: (a) the contradictions and conflicts among the non-proletarian classes within the country, which can be utilised by the proletariat to weaken the economy and to strengthen its own reserves; or (b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletariat state, which can be utilised by the proletariat in its offensive or in manœuvring in the event of a forced retreat.

There is no need to speak at length about the reserves of the first category, as their significance is understood by everyone. As for the reserves of the second category, whose significance is not always clear, it must be said that sometimes they are of prime importance for the progress of the revolution."

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Page 71.)

6. "Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several, or even in one capitalist country, taken singly. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolt in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states."

(Lenin, selected works, Vol. V, Page 141, quoted in Problems of Leninism, Page 103.)

7(a). "The character of a war, as Lenin has shown, depends not on the aggressor, nor on the country where the 'enemy' is, but on the class which is conducting the war and on the political aim of the war in question."

(b). "The Bolsheviks never were, and are not, supporters of peace at all costs. They understood, and still understand, that one cannot do without wars in the struggle for a real peace, as long as imperialism, capitalists and landowners remain in existence. The Bolsheviks were and are irreconcilable enemies only of unjust wars: they are supporters of just wars

(Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on Question of War, Peace and Revolution, by Prof. F.D. Kretov, 25th March, 1952.)

(c). "Unjust, aggressive wars of the reactionary exploiting classes hinder the development of society. Wars fought among the Imperialist States themselves in their struggle for a division of the world, for markets and capital investment spheres, are reactionary and unjust wars, as are, especially, the wars which the imperialist bourgeoisie has waged against the Soviet Union, and has waged and is waging against the revolutionary, liberation, democratic movement of the working masses, against the peoples of colonies and dependent countries fighting for their national liberation, for their state independence

..... Just wars of liberation against imperialist aggressors are progressive, since they always, in some way, lead to the weakening, the undermining or the complete destruction of the reactionary classes and their institutions, which hinder the development of the peoples, bringing liberation from capitalist slavery, liberation to the peoples of the colonies from the scourge of imperialism, and creating conditions for the national development of all the peoples of the world. Just wars serve the interests of the progressive development of society."

(Imperialism - The Source of Aggression and Wars of Conquest - by F. Khrustov, January 1952.)

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(d) "We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying the war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us." (Report to the 15th Party Congress, 1927). (Bolshevik No. 20, October, 1939, Editorial.)

8. The "contradictions of capitalism"

"Of these contradictions there are three which must be regarded as the most important.

The first contradiction is the contradiction between labour and capital

The second contradiction is the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory

The third contradiction is the contradiction between the handful of ruling, 'civilised' nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world

Such, in general, are the principal contradictions of imperialism which have converted the old 'flourishing' capitalism into moribund capitalism."

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Pages 15 and 16.)

9. "Where will the revolution begin? Where, in what country, can the front of capital be pierced first?

The front of capital will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletariat revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialistic front at its weakest link"

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Page 31.)

10. Fourth: Manoeuvring the reserves with a view to effect a proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given alignment of forces, retreat becomes the only way to ward off a blow against the vanguard and to keep the reserves intact.

The object of this strategy is to gain time, to demoralise the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive."

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Page 74.)

11. "Comrades, the Soviet state is no longer a lone oasis surrounded by capitalist countries. We are moving forward together with the great Chinese people (prolonged applause), together with the many millions of the People's Democracies and the German Democratic Republic." (Prolonged applause).

Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

12. "Nothing, however, can conceal the considerable weakening of the world capitalist system which has occurred in recent years, particularly as in the post-war period a whole number of states, with a total population of about 600 millions, have abandoned it."

(Molotov, speech to XIXth Party Congress, 1952.)

"Today, a third of mankind has already been delivered from the yoke of imperialism, freed from the chains of imperialist exploitation."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

13. "Thus in the course of the further development of the international revolution two world centres will develop: the socialist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards socialism, and the capitalist centre, attracting to itself the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The struggle of these two centres for mastery of the economy of the world will decide the fate of capitalism and communism throughout the world. For the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of socialism in the arena of world economy".

(Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Tenth Russian edition, Page 194.)

14. "Comrade Stalin teaches that 'socialism can be victorious only on the basis of high labour productivity, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and consumer goods of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultural life of all members of the community'."

(Mikoyan, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952.)

15. "The fulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan demands the carrying through of a gigantic programme of capital construction. Capital construction has always been and remains the chief

The successful solution of this task depends on the fulfilment of the tasks for increased labour productivity, on the lowering of production costs, capable management, and the ability to ensure a true régime of economy on each sector of economic construction."

(Saburov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952.)

16. "We must achieve a situation where our industry can produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron, up to 60 million tons of steel, up to 500 million tons of coal, and up to 60 million tons of oil. Only under such conditions can we consider that our homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents. That will take three more Five-Year Plans, I should think, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it."

(Stalin: Election speech, 1946.)

17. "The Transition to Communism"

The following points summarise the main differences between socialism (i.e. the present state of Soviet society) and communism, the state of society ultimately aimed at:

- (1) "Under socialism there are two forms of socialist ownership (state and cooperative-kolkhoz); under communism there will be a single communist form of ownership.
- (2) Under socialism there still exist classes, survivals of the contradiction between physical and mental labour, between town and country; under communism there will be no classes, and the contradiction between town and country and between physical and mental labour will have been completely liquidated.
- (3) Under socialism the level of the productive forces is as yet insufficient to enable all the requirements of the workers to be satisfied; but under communism the productive forces will have been developed to such a level as to provide an abundance of all consumer goods.
- (4) Under socialism the principle prevails of distribution according to the quantity and quality of work; under communism - according to requirements.

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- (5) Under socialism labour requires material and moral incentives; under communism labour becomes a necessity of life, a habit.
- (6) Under socialism use is made of such instruments of the bourgeois economic system as commerce, money, credit, etc.; under communism goods - money relations wither away.
- (7) Under socialism the state, which plays the determining role in the development of the economy, is still necessary; under communism it is only necessary in conditions of capitalist encirclement, for defence against military aggression and the machinations of external enemies.
- (8) Under socialism various survivals of capitalism are still alive in people's minds; under communism they will have died out, the communist mentality and communist morality will prevail."

18. "There is no force in the world that can halt the advance of Soviet society. Our cause is invincible. We must keep our hand firmly on the helm and steer our course undeterred by provocation or intimidation."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

19. "But it would be wrong not to see that the level of Party political work is still not abreast of the demands of actual life and of the tasks set by the Party

There are facts that show that achievement has bred in the ranks of the Party a tendency to self-satisfaction, to make a pretence of all being well, a spirit of smug complacency, a desire on the part of people to rest on their laurels and to live on the capital of their past services

A spirit of negligence has penetrated our Party organizations. There are cases of Party, economic, Soviet and other executives relaxing their vigilance and failing to see what is going on around them; there are cases of divulgence of Party and state secrets. Some responsible workers get absorbed in economic affairs; they allow their heads to be turned by successes, and begin to forget that we are still in a capitalist encirclement, that the enemies of the Soviet state are working persistently to smuggle their agents into our country and to utilize unstable elements in Soviet society for their own malignant ends."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

20. Soviet Foreign Policy: (i) Pre-war

(a) 1934

Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. The USSR does not think of threatening anybody - let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow. Those who want peace and seek business relations with us will always have our support. But those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing repulse to teach them not to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden.

Such is our foreign policy.

The task is to continue this policy persistently and consistently.

(Stalin: Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B)).

(b) 1939

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

- (1) To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;
- (2) To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;
- (3) To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;
- (4) To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

(Stalin: Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B)).

21. Soviet Foreign Policy: Post-war

(a) 1947

The purpose of [the democratic] camp is to combat the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and uproot the remnants of fascism

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Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the existence for a long period of two systems - capitalism and socialism.

(Zhdanov: Report to the Founding Meeting of the Cominform.)

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries is aimed at undermining imperialism, securing the firm democratic peace of the nations, and strengthening in every possible way the friendly cooperation of the peace-loving nations. This foreign policy is based on the enhanced international significance of the Soviet State and the new democracies.

(Malenkov: Report to the Founding Meeting of the Cominform.)

(b) 1952

"The Party's tasks in the sphere of foreign policy:

- (i) To continue the struggle against the preparation and unleashing of another war; to rally the mighty antiwar democratic front for the purpose of strengthening peace; strengthen the ties of friendship and solidarity with peace supporters the world over; persistently to expose all preparations for a new war and all the designs and intrigues of the warmongers;
- (ii) To continue the policy of international cooperation and development of business relations with all countries;
- (iii) To strengthen and develop inviolable friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic, with the European People's Democracies - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, with the German Democratic Republic, with the Korean People's Democratic Republic and with the Mongolian People's Republic;
- (iv) Tirelessly to strengthen the defence power of the Soviet state and enhance our preparedness devastatingly to repel any aggressor."

(Malenkov: Report to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

22. "Comrades, the main achievement that our Party has to report to the XIXth Congress is that the Soviet Union has attained unparalleled might and international prestige. We have achieved this through the policy of industrialisation, which has changed

our country from an agrarian land into an advanced industrial Power; through the policy of collectivisation, which has changed our agriculture into large-scale, mechanised agriculture, the most advanced in the world; through consistent implementation of the national policy of Lenin and Stalin, a policy which ensures indissoluble unity and friendship among the peoples of the USSR; through unswerving implementation of the Stalin foreign policy aimed at maintaining peace among the nations."

(Beria, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

23. "But already the more sober-minded and progressive politicians in the European and other capitalist countries, those who are not blinded by anti-Soviet enmity, distinctly see the abyss into which the reckless American adventurers are dragging them; and they are beginning to come out against war. It is to be supposed that in the countries which are being condemned to the role of obedient pawns of the American dictators genuine democratic and peace forces will be found who will pursue an independent peace policy and find a way out of the impasse into which the American dictators have driven them. If they take this new path, European and other countries will meet with the complete understanding on the part of all the peace-loving countries."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

24. "As for the Soviet Union, its interests are entirely inseparable from the cause of world peace.

Naturally, our Party cannot remain in debt to the fraternal parties, and it must, in its turn, render support to them and also to their peoples in their struggle for liberation, in their struggle for the preservation of peace. As is known, that is precisely what it does."

(Stalin; speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

25. "The position of the world capitalist system is now becoming increasingly difficult owing to the fact that, as a result of the war and of the new upsurge of the struggle for national liberation in the colonial and dependent countries, the colonial system of imperialism is actually disintegrating."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

26. "We are confident that, in peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist system of economy will, year after year,

more and more strikingly demonstrate its superiority over the capitalist system of economy."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

27. "The dominating imperialist countries are strangling the economies of backward countries, transforming them into their agrarian and raw-material appendages and markets for their stale goods. This emphasizes even more the repulsive nature of the international division of labour between the capitalist countries.

28. "The two world markets are developing in opposite directions. The new democratic world market knows no sales difficulties, because its capacity is growing year after year in conformity with the crisis-free growth of production in the countries of the democratic camp, because the continuous growth of production in all the countries of the democratic camp is continuously expanding the capacity of the democratic market. On the other hand, there is the other world market, the imperialist market, which is not connected with the USSR and the other democratic countries; it is therefore restricted and encounters sales difficulties due to interruptions and crises of production, unemployment and the impoverishment of the masses and its isolation from the democratic countries. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that as a result of the breakup of the single world market the sphere for the application of the forces of the principal capitalist countries (USA, Britain and France) to the world resources has shrunk considerably, and this leads to the progressive contraction of the capitalist market. Selling conditions in that market have deteriorated, and are deteriorating still further."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

29. "Nothing can conceal, either, the inability of the capitalist countries to overcome the growing danger of another economic crisis and a new increase of mass unemployment, which also leads to an increase of contradictions and friction between these States and to an inevitable sharpening of class struggle in those countries".

(Malenkov, speech to XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

30. "The Soviet Union has always stood for, and now advocates, the development of trade and cooperation with other countries, irrespective of the difference in social systems. The Party will continue to pursue this policy on the basis of mutual advantage."

(Malenkov, speech to the XIXth Party Congress, 1952).

31.(a) It's not possible that I said that the two economic systems could not cooperate. Cooperation ideas were expressed by Lenin. I might have said that one system was reluctant to cooperate, but that concerned only one side. But as to the possibility of cooperation I adhere to Lenin, who expressed both the possibility and desire of cooperation. As to the desire of the people to cooperate on the part of the USSR and the Party, it is possible - and the two countries will benefit only by this cooperation.

(Stalin - "Interview with Stassen," April 9, 1947. New York Times, May 4, 1947; Pravda, May 8, 1947. (answer to question regarding earlier statements of Party officials to the effect that cooperation between socialism and capitalism was impossible.)

(b) Therefore there are definite limits to the cooperation of the two systems. They "are set by the opposite characters of the two systems between which there is rivalry and conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreement is quite possible". (Stalin, 1927)

(E.A. Korovin, "On the General Norms of International Law" in Soviet State and Law No. 9, September 1951).

(c) Are these agreements (with capitalist countries) merely experiments? Or can they be of a more or less prolonged character? That does not altogether depend on us alone. It depends also upon the other parties. It depends upon the general situation. A war may upset any and every agreement ..."

(Stalin: Interview with the first American Labour Delegation in Russia, 1927; this is from the same passage as Korovin is quoting in 31(b) above.)