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SUBJECT: MBFR WORKING GROUP - STABILISING MEASURES

- REFERENCES: A. AGV(74)17. SITCEN 2701 271730Z March
B. AGV(74)18. SITCEN 2902 291034Z March
C. AGV(74)21. SITCEN 0303 031450Z April

THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE FINAL DRAFT REPORT BY
THE MBFR WORKING GROUP ON THE STABILISING MEASURES
LISTED IN PARA 30, C-M(73)83(FINAL). THIS FINAL
DRAFT SUPERSEDES REFERENCES A, B AND C.

AT THE MBFR WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 9 APRIL,
THE AMENDMENTS TO REFERENCE A. PROPOSED BY THE BE,
TU AND UK AT REFERENCES B. AND C., WERE AGREED
WITH SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS AND ARE INCORPORATED
IN THE FINAL DRAFT. THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT AT
REFERENCE C. RELATING TO THE MEASURES AT SUB-PARA (VI)
PARA 30, C-M(73)83(FINAL) WAS DISCUSSED: THE WORKING
GROUP REACHED NO CONSENSUS ON THE IMPLICATIONS AND
DESIRABILITY OF THAT MEASURE. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE
FINAL DRAFT. (PARAGRAPHS 27-29, 30E, AND 31.)

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This document consists of
15 pages.

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THE OTHER CHANGES OF CONSEQUENCE, AS COMPARED WITH THE DRAFT AT REFERENCE A, ARE IN THE FINAL DRAFT, WHICH FOLLOWS, AT PARAGRAPHS 7 (LAST SENTENCE), 24B, AND 30B.

IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE WORKING GROUP ON THE THRSQ AND CONTENT OF THE FINAL DRAFT, IT IS CIRCULATED FOR CLEARANCE UNDER THE SILENT PROCEDURE. UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY BY 1700 HOURS (BRUSSELS TIME) ON WEDNESDAY, 17 APRIL, THE AGREEMENT OF ALL MEMBERS WILL BE ASSUMED, AND THE REPORT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
DRAFT REPORT BEGINS:

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MBFR - EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE STABILISING MEASURES
LISTED AT PARA 30 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL)

At the request(1) of the Senior Political Committee, the MBFR Working Group have examined the possible stabilising measures listed in paragraph 30 of "The Alliance Approach to Negotiations on MBFR"(2), with the aim of providing advice on the military/technical implications, including the assessment of the effects of reciprocal application, of those measures.

2. The Working Group's examination has been based primarily on relevant technical and military studies(3) and has taken full account of contributions by the German, Turkish(4), and United Kingdom representative

Scope of this Paper

3. This paper addresses the first six measures listed at para 30 of C-M(73)83(Final). For ease of reference, these are listed below:

- a. Measure 1. Possible provisions for the disbandment of Soviet withdrawn forces without replacement from the Soviet Strategic Reserve.
- b. Measure 2. Possible provisions to put into reserve the Soviet withdrawn forces.
- c. Measure 3. Provisions to prevent the Soviet withdrawn forces to be deployed to the three Western Military, the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasian, and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts, as well as to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.
- d. Measure 4. Pre-reduction stabilising measures in the Area comprising the Soviet military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia

(1) AC/119-R(74)12

(2) C-M(73)83(Final)

(3) See AC/276-WP(72)3

(4) a. Turkish Delegation Note of 19 Feb 74

b. Turkish Perm Rep letter of 11 Jan 74

as well as Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. These measures would apply only to external NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces and to Soviet ground forces which may move into the aforementioned military districts.

e. Measure 5. Stabilising Measures for certain parts of the Leningrad Military District and for Norwegian territory.

f. Measure 6. Other stabilising measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

4. These measures fall into three distinct categories:

a. The first two deal with disbandment or placing in reserve of withdrawn forces.

b. The third, fourth and fifth are concerned with measures to prevent deployment of Soviet withdrawn forces to specified areas. Such an outcome could be achieved by various means, notably by clauses within an MBFR agreement or by application of constraints on movement of forces to the territories specified. In view of the content of para c. below, it has been assumed that these three measures envisage the application of movement constraints.

c. Measure 6 postulates other stabilising measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

5. The succeeding paragraphs of this paper address the military/technical implications of these three groups of measures, in the order listed.

DISBANDMENT OR PLACEMENT IN RESERVE

6. This section addresses Measures 1 and 2 of C-M(73)83(Final), paragraph 30, i.e. those concerned with disbandment or placing in reserve of withdrawn Soviet forces. In view of the fact that these two measures are capable of different interpretations, the Staff Group believe it necessary to explain the approach they have adopted, thus:

c. The measure at paragraph 2(a) (disbandment) is taken to mean that the Soviet units and formations withdrawn from the reduction area would cease to exist as formed units in peacetime, even as cadre or skeletonmanned units. The effect would be to reduce the Soviet peacetime establishment of formed military units.

d. The measure at paragraph 2(b) (possible provision to put in reserve the Soviet withdrawn force) is interpreted to mean that the Soviet units withdrawn could remain in being as cadre or skeleton formations with minimal peacetime manning and, at least, training on a periodic pattern for short periods.

7. It is recognized that these measures could/more restrictively interpreted to mean that:

a. ~~For disbandment.~~ After disbandment of withdrawn units and formations, the personnel who had manned these units and formations would be demobilized and put into civilian status.

b. ~~For placement in Reserve.~~ After placement of units and formations in reserve status (see (c) above), the personnel who had manned these units and formations would be disposed as follows:

(i) A cadre to provide the peacetime nucleus of the reserve units, say not more than the 25% manning currently estimated for Category II Soviet divisions in peacetime.

(ii) The remaining personnel (75%) would be demobilized and transferred to the Soviet manpower reserve.

These more restrictive interpretations would result in a de facto ceiling on ground force manpower in the Soviet Union or at least in the European part of it.

8. The Working Group have therefore concentrated on the interpretations at para 6 above.

The Effect of the Measures Applied Unilaterally to Soviet Forces

9. The practical effect of the two measures, in the context of the approach at para 6 would be broadly similar in military terms. The first would, however, effectively impose an upper limit, in Soviet territory, on the number of peacetime Soviet units/formations of the type withdrawn from the reduction area and is therefore more restrictive. The second measure (placing in reserve) would enable the Soviets to retain the units/formations in being as peacetime skeletons, capable of being fully equipped and manned in war and, in peacetime, of being trained. When withdrawn Soviet forces are put into reserve status, reactivation can be achieved in a few weeks because the skeletons of the original combat ready formations still exist. In the case of disbandment reactivation would take much longer and might indeed not even be considered by the Russians. In neither case would the Soviet manpower ceiling within the European part of Soviet territory necessarily be affected; personnel of the withdrawn formations/units, whether these formations/units were disbanded or placed in reserve status, could be absorbed, to the extent required by manning shortages or other factors, into other Soviet peacetime formations or units.

10. The net effect of either measure, in terms of military capability, would be to reduce the number of ready, standing Soviet formations/units in peacetime. There would be a reduction, in the early days of build-up of the number of units/formations which the Soviets could bring to bear in combat. It has been pointed out, however, that the personnel of the disbanded units/formations might be used to increase the degree of readiness of other Soviet ground formations; and that such an improvement in readiness would mitigate to some extent the effect of the disbandment. SHAPE has

estimated(1) that it would take six days, in such circumstances, for the

(1) DIRM 1000.1/20-5-4/804/73, 19 Jul 73

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Soviets to re-introduce five divisions (four tank, one INF) into Central Europe from the three Western Military Districts.

11. In the same context (the Assessment of the "UN Approach to NATO") SHARP(1) has made the point that:

"The conflict of interest between the flanks and Central Region is based on the assumption that withdrawn Soviet forces will be kept on active duty in an area from which they threaten one of the regions of Allied Command Europe. Therefore, the security interests of all regions of ACE could best be safeguarded if conditions envisaged for Pact stationed forces withdrawn under Option 3 (of "UN Approach to NATO") were extended to those withdrawn under options 1 and 2 (units to be disbanded and equipment stockpiled)." The study also points out that: "NATO security is diminished if, in an emergency, NATO withdrawn forces return to the theatre later than Pact forces withdrawn under the same agreement. Thus, reinforced security is determined by two factors: status and redeployment capability of Pact forces and status and redeployment capability of NATO forces."

12. Furthermore, the net effect of these measures must be considered against the background verified in all the studies and analyses conducted by NATO and individual Allied Nations, that the Soviet peacetime superiority, force levels, and readiness, are such that the Soviets would not need to bring to bear all their available conventional armed forces in war, either in Central Europe or on the flanks, to be assured of success in attack as long as the Allied response were restricted to conventionally armed forces.

13. It remains true that any decrease in combat strength of Soviet striking forces would enhance NATO's military posture, vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact as peacetime. The Swedish Authorities have argued equally,

in a letter to the British Government, dated 11 Jan 75, and
(1) dated 1980.4/26-5-4/34/75, 15 Jul 75, para 26
para 37

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subsequently be discovered, that the Allies could have an excellent view of the unilateral Soviet actions. For Member States believe it is the correct case, in the context, in general.

14. Inevitably, there would be the case for the Allies to be concerned to ensure that the situation is not worsened by the content of a unilateral action. This is to be done by a signed agreement, the effects of possible unilateral actions, the implications of negotiating are discussed below.

Unilateral Reduction

15. The effect of the secret of that the Allies believe must be understood against the background of the current situation, in a matter of some importance to the security of Soviet Europe. The Allies were to be expected to respond accordingly.

16. Proposals for direct unilateral action, if made, would involve Germany, US and UK Forces (US only in the first envisaged phase of 1954). These forces must rely for their initial reaction in an emergency, very upon active (regular) units, supplemented in the case of the UK by territorial reserves at immediate readiness. Therefore the ultimate impact of unilateral actions - direct/unilateral reduction to reserve of units/combatants - would reduce the capability of those forces to react in an emergency. While it is for the nations concerned to assess the precise implications of such a measure, it is believed that the effect would be to limit the scale on which those nations could respond to an emergency within NATO, whether in Central Europe or on the flanks. The effect of such allied reductions would be increased, post reduction, partly because, the potential physical threat being undiminished, NATO will be more than ever dependent on effective mobilisation and partly because the NATO standing ready forces indigenous to continental Europe will have been reduced. The credibility and effect-

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iveness of NATO's conventional response would both be diminished.

Conclusions

17. In respect of these direct two measures, the Working Group concludes

that:

a. There would be advantage for the Allies if the Soviet withdrawal forces were unilaterally disbanded or placed in reserve.

b. The advantage would be lessened to some extent if the Soviets used the personnel of the withdrawal units to raise the morale and readiness of other Soviet personnel units/contingents.

c. Reciprocal application of these two measures to NATO (UK, US, FR) forces would be to NATO's disadvantage.

INTER-ALLIED COORDINATION AND CONTROL MEASURES

18. The preceding paragraphs address measures (iii) to (vi) included in 001(7), 03(12a), as listed at para 3 above.

Measure 3

19. The objective in measure 3 (i.e. the prevention of deployment of Soviet withdrawal forces to military districts contiguous or adjacent to NATO territory) could be achieved by:

a. Disbandment or placing in reserve the withdrawal Soviet forces.

b. Applying relevant constraints which could prohibit the permanent introduction of additional combat units into the prescribed military districts and which for temporary increases would limit the scale of such increases and would provide for prior or simultaneous notification of movement of any additional military formations below the prescribed scale.

c. By having a provision in an agreement under which the

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Soviets would undertake not to deploy withdrawn forces into the military districts listed.

g. By concluding a non-convention agreement under which the Soviets would undertake not to relocate other forces than withdrawn forces in the military districts listed. NATO in the context of the disposal of withdrawn forces have drawn attention(1) to the requirement for collateral measures with a preference for a force limitation covering the three WIDs.

20. Withdrawal movement constraints have been considered which, if applied to the Soviet Forces, would effectively meet the requirements of para 19b. Movement constraints on this pattern if applied to Soviet Forces, would effectively constrain the Soviets from increasing the current level of forces on a permanent basis within the Military Districts listed. They would involve the removal of the forces withdrawn from the operations area to Central Russia and/or the Military Districts East of the usual. They would not impose or imply a ceiling on Soviet forces on Soviet territory.

21. g. Movement constraints are technically feasible and if applied to Soviet Forces only would have a military advantage for NATO of broadly the same character as described in paragraph 12 of the Soviet Forces in paragraphs 9 and 12 above. In NSM-266-72 the FCJ noted that "the proposed constraints, although useful, will not affect Warsaw Pact's ICBM capability in emergency and war. There should be a clause to ensure that the effect of the constraints, in security terms, is not overvalued. Their usefulness is, and will remain restricted to the benefits claimed for them... and this is required in military terms". However, as part of a package including a ceiling and verification and other stabilizing

1. NATO, 1974, p. 10. Early para. 19(1) (b) of the 1974 NSM-266-72. 1974 NSM-266-72, para. 19(1) (b).

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draw attention to the need for observation of force levels and of preparation for war in the three WMDs.

b. Over inspection to cover the very wide area concerned, to be effective, would require a very high number of inspectors and associated reporting staff. Verification of Soviet adherence to the movement constraints under review would presumably have to rely primarily on clandestine and national technical means.

22. Soviet counter proposals for reciprocal application of movement constraints could include the following:

a. The application of similar constraints on the territory of NATO nations contiguous to the Soviet Union and/or NSWP countries.

b. Measure to apply similar constraints to the US, and possibly the Canadian and UK forces:

(i) conceivably in their own territories

(ii) in territories and waters from which their capability could be brought to bear on WP territory

(iii) to restrain them from effective reinforcement of any part of the area of Allied Command Europe.

23. The Norwegian Authorities have indicated that they would be prepared to accept certain movement constraints for their own forces in Norwegian territory provided that these were also applied to Soviet forces facing them. Because of the relatively low level of Norwegian ground forces in Northern Norway, any such movement constraints - to be effective - would have to be set at a lower level than would be applicable in other areas of ACE. With regard to the southern flank of NATO, the nations of the Southern Region will not accept reciprocal application of movement constraints within their respective territories; and the other nations of NATO have undertaken to support their decision(1). In view of the foregoing

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(1) C-1(75)39(Final)

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DECISIONS, THE QUESTION OF CONSIDERING THE RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF SUCH MEASURES IN THE TERRITORY OF INDIVIDUAL NATO NATIONS IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS NOTE. THE ISSUE DEVOLVES THEREFORE TO THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT SEEK UNDER PARA 22B. ABOVE. THE EFFECT OF SUCH EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AN EXTENSION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MBER INTO FORCES AND AREAS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN EXAMINED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

24. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE WORKING GROUP THAT SUCH RECIPROCAL APPLICATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 22B. ABOVE WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE TO NATO BECAUSE IT WOULD:

A. SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF CANADIAN, UK AND US FORCES AT SEA AND IN AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE IN NORMAL PEACETIME.

B. PREVENT OR INHIBIT RESPONSE TO ANY EMERGENCY OR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BOTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE FLANKS. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NATO SHOULD PURSUE THESE MEASURES UNILATERALLY IS A MATTER FOR POLITICAL JUDGMENT.

MEASURE 4 (PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES IN CERTAIN SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS AND IN BULGARIA, RUMANIA, GREECE ETC. TO EXTERNAL FORCES).

25. THE COMMENTS MADE IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS IN RELATION TO THE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS ON CANADIAN, UK AND US FORCES APPLY WITH EQUAL FORCE TO THIS MEASURE.

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MEASURE 5

26. STABILISING MEASURES FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF THE LENINGRAD MD ETC. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN SUBJECT TO COMMENT IN PARA 23 ABOVE.

MEASURE 6

27. THE WORKING GROUP HAS REACHED NO CONCLUSION ON MEASURE 6, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE DEFINITION OF THE SPECIFIC CONTENTS OF THE MEASURE WHICH READS: "OTHER STABILISING MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS".

28. TO DATE, THE WORKING GROUP HAS ADDRESSED ONLY ONE SPECIFIC MEASURE FALLING WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF MEASURE 6, THAT SPECIFIC MEASURE BEING A PROVISION IN AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY WITHDRAWN FORCES INTO THE MILITARY DISTRICTS LISTED. THIS MEASURE, TAKEN ENTIRELY ALONE WOULD NOT LEGALLY NOR MORALLY PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM DEPLOYING FORCES, OTHER THAN THOSE WITHDRAWN, TO THE AREAS FACING THE FLANKS NOR TO THE THREE WMDS. THIS SPECIFIC MEASURE COULD, HOWEVER, BE COMBINED WITH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SOVIETS NOT TO DEPLOY PERMANENTLY ANY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE AREAS FACING THE FLANKS OR TO THE THREE WMDS. TAKEN TOGETHER THESE TWO MEASURES, IF HONOURED, WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS THE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS DISCUSSED ABOVE, IN PREVENTING ANY PERMANENT SOVIET ~~XX~~ REINFORCEMENT OF FORCES FACING THOSE FLANKS. THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WOULD BE OF BROADLY THE SAME CHARACTER AS THAT DISCUSSED FOR MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS.

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29. MOST DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE BALANCE OF MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FAVOUR SUCH A MEASURE (AS DESCRIBED AT PARA 28), WHILE A FEW DELEGATIONS HAD RESERVATIONS, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH A MEASURE WERE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO STUDY FURTHER SUB-PARAGRAPH (VI), PARA 30, C-M(73)83(FINAL).

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS30. A. MEASURES (1) AND (2) (PARA 17)

(1) THERE WOULD BE AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE ALLIES IF EITHER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES WERE DISBANDED OR PLACED IN RESERVE.

(2) THE ADVANTAGE WOULD BE LESSENERED TO SOME EXTENT IF THE SOVIETS USED THE PERSONNEL OF THE WITHDRAWN UNITS TO RAISE THE MANNING AND READINESS OF OTHER SOVIET PEACETIME UNITS/FORMATIONS.

(3). RECIPROCAL APPLICATIONS OF THESE TWO MEASURES TO NATO (CA, UK, US) FORCES WOULD BE TO NATO'S DISADVANTAGE.

B. MEASURE (3)

IN EXAMINING MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS THE WORKING GROUP CONCLUDE THAT:

(1) IT WOULD BE MILITARILY ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ALLIES IF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE APPLIED UNILATERALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION (PARA 21).

(2) EFFECTS OF RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AS PRESCRIBED ABOVE IN PARA 24 WOULD BE MILITARILY INTOLERABLE TO NATO.

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(3) NORWAY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT CERTAIN MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS FOR HER OWN FORCES (PARA23).

C. MEASURE 4. RECIPROCIITY AFFECTING CANADIAN, UK AND US FORCES WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE (PARA 25).

D. MEASURE 5. RECIPROCIITY AFFECTING CERTAIN PARTS OF THE ~~KXNX~~ LENINGRAD MD WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE (PARAS 23 AND 26).

E. MEASURE 6. THE WORKING GROUP HAS REACHED NO CONCLUSION ON MEASURE 6; AND BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO STUDY FURTHER SUB-PARAGRAPH (VI), OF PARA 30, OF C-M(73)83(FINAL). (SEE PARAS 27-29 ABOVE.)

OVERALL CONCLUSION

31. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE BEEN CONCERNED IN THIS PAPER TO DETERMINE, FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, WHETHER THE STABILISING MEASURES LISTED IN PARA 30 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL) COULD MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE FLANKS AND COULD BE SO DEvised THAT THEY WOULD SATISFY THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FLANKS. THE WORKING GROUP'S VIEW IS THAT THE MEASURES EXAMINED IF APPLIED UNILATERALLY, WOULD HAVE VALUE; IF APPLIED RECIPROCALLY HOWEVER, ^{THEY} ~~IT~~ WOULD HAVE ADVERSE MILITARY EFFECTS FOR NATO. THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT THIS FINDING WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO OTHER FORMS OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WHICH MIGHT BE EXAMINED. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS GENERAL STATEMENT COULD BE A MEASURE AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 28 ABOVE, ON WHICH THE WORKING GROUP HAVE REACHED NO CONSENSUS. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NATO SHOULD PURSUE THESE MEASURES UNILATERALLY IS A MATTER FOR POLITICAL JUDGMENT.