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WORKING PAPER  
AC/276-WP(74)3

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP  
IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO  
Preliminary Note by the Staff Group

During their discussion on 1st February, 1974(1), of stabilizing measures including non-circumvention provisions, the Senior Political Committee were advised orally by the International Military Staff representative of the basic findings of completed military studies concerning the effect of MBFR in Central Europe for the flanks of NATO, with emphasis on possible measures to mitigate any increased threat to the flanks. The Senior Political Committee, after discussion and taking account of the views expressed at that meeting by the Turkish Representative, invited the Working Group to examine:

- (1) possible provisions for the disbandment of Soviet withdrawn forces without replacement from the Soviet strategic reserve;
- (2) possible provisions to put in reserve the Soviet withdrawn forces.

2. The MBFR Staff Group, in accordance with the instruction(2) given by the MBFR Working Group at their meeting on 5th February, 1974, have undertaken the preparation of this preliminary working paper, designed to provide a synthesis of the relevant technical and military studies already conducted and the findings of these studies. This would serve to provoke discussion in the Working Group and as a basis for their consideration of any more specific and detailed studies which might follow.

3. A list of relevant documents is at Annex.

This document consists of: 4 pages  
Annex of: 3 pages

- (1) AC/119-R(74)12
- (2) AC/276-R(74)2

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NORTHERN FLANKThe post-reductions situation, first phase

4. SHAPE(1) and the MBFR Working Group in their report(2) expressed doubt whether the Soviets would find it necessary or useful to increase, with forces withdrawn from Central Europe, the already considerable forces in the Leningrad Military District. These Soviet forces are:

- 2 Category I divisions in Northern Leningrad MD, ready for early commitment;
- 3 Category II divisions in Southern Leningrad MD, in 4 to 7 days combat ready.

5. The North Atlantic Council have recognized the special circumstances on the Northern Flank and, in the context of CSCE, have agreed that confidence building measures, applicable at a lower level of forces than in other regions, should be sought.

6. In the context of MBFR, due to the present already overwhelming superiority of Soviet forces opposing Northern Norway (personnel 1:4.87 and tanks 1:44.00)(1), the increase in threat resulting from the redeployment in the first phase(3) of a part or all of a Soviet tank army (68,000 soldiers plus 1,700 tanks) to an area adjacent to this NATO country, is purely academic. From a military point of view such action could only be justified by conveniently empty barracks in this locality which could temporarily be used till better located quarters are being prepared.

Possible stabilizing measures

7. Stabilizing measures to prevent a unilateral build up of Soviet forces on the Northern Flank in peacetime could be:

- (a) An agreement which limits the force levels in the Murmansk Oblast and the County of Finnmark to their present force levels(4).
- (b) An agreement on movement constraints on forces within and into the Murmansk Oblast and the County of Finnmark as proposed in the Second Report on Movement Constraints(5).
- (c) Disbandment of all withdrawn forces.

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(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S.87/72, 10th May, 1972  
 (2) AC/276-WP(72)21, 19th May, 1972  
 (3) C-M(73)83(Final), 18th October, 1973  
 (4) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), 9th August, 1973  
 (5) AC/276-WP(73)16/1, 9th October, 1973

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SOUTHERN FLANKThe post-reduction situation, first phase

8. The military situation at present is in favour of the Soviets, the ratio of divisions being 1:1.9 in the Greek and Western Turkey areas and 1:1.8 at the Eastern Turkey border(1). Any reinforcement of the Soviet forces there would worsen this situation for NATO and ways should be found to counter any increase in threat.

9. Should the USSR decide to redeploy their forces withdrawn under a first phase agreement(2) entirely on the Southern Flank, the following situation would arise:

The Soviet tank army, consisting of 5 divisions, assumed to be divided between the areas adjacent to Greece/Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey according to the present WP proportion between these areas(3):

(a) In Odessa MD (threat to Greece and Western Turkey), three divisions:

(i) NATO strengths:

NIFP(4) - 6.86; personnel - 203,013 - tanks 1,806;

(ii) WP strengths:

NIFP - 16.82; personnel - 258,688 - tanks 5,892(5);

(iii) Force ratios NATO to WP:

Firepower potential = 1:2.45 (at present 1:2.15)

Personnel = 1:1.27 (at present 1:1.07)

Tanks = 1:3.26 (at present 1:2.70).

(b) In the North Caucasus or Transcaucasus MD (threat to Eastern Turkey), two divisions:

(i) NATO strengths:

NIFP - 3.25; personnel - 116,585 - tanks 828;

(1) AC/276-D(72)5, Annex I, 24th November, 1972

(2) C-M(73)83(Final), 18th October, 1973

(3) Extrapolation of Model III figures of SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S.87/72

(4) Normalized index of firepower potential

(5) Three-fifths of 68,000 men and of 1,700 tanks have been added

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(ii) WP strengths:

NIFP - 9.84; personnel - 158,200 - tanks 2,980;

(iii) Force ratios NATO to WP:

Firepower potential = 1:3.03 (at present 1:2.30)

Personnel = 1:1.36 (at present 1:1.12)

Tanks = 1:3.60 (at present 1:2.78).

10. The situation pictured above is the worst case in the event of a redeployment of the entire Soviet army of 68,000 soldiers and 1,700 tanks on the Southern Flank of NATO. Other possibilities have not been calculated, because they have already been developed by SHAPE(1) and the Turkish Authorities(2).

Possible stabilizing measures

11. To avoid an increase in the potential threat to the Southern Flank of NATO post-reduction, the following stabilizing measures could serve:

- (a) a force limitation agreement, making provision for(3):
  - (i) no additional US NATO foreign stationed<sup>7</sup> ground forces to be located permanently in either Greece or Turkey, provided the Warsaw Pact agrees to deploy permanently no Soviet forces in either Bulgaria or Rumania;
  - (ii) no additional Soviet Warsaw Pact ground forces to be located permanently in that part of the USSR lying south of the 50th parallel;
- (b) an agreement on movement constraints on forces within and into Greece, Turkey and the USSR south of the 50th parallel as proposed in the Second Report on Movement Constraints(4);
- (c) an agreement to disband the withdrawn Soviet army.

NATO,  
1110 Brussels.

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- (1) AC/276-D(72)5, Annex II (= AC/276-WP(72)21)
  - (2) AC/276-D(72)5, Annex I (= AC/276-WP(71)26)
  - (3) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), 9th August, 1973
  - (4) AC/276-WP(73)16/1, 9th October, 1973

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ANNEX to  
AC/276-WP(74)3LIST OF DOCUMENTS ON THE FLANKS OF NATO

17.9.1971	AC/276-WP(71)21	Note by UK Member MBFR WG. MBFR - The Soviet Threat.
8.10.1971	AC/276-WP(71)24	Note by MBFR Staff Group. Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO. (T.E.R. for SHAPE study)
27.10.1971	AC/276-WP(71)26	Note by Turkish Delegation. A preliminary analysis of the implications of the force reductions in Central Region on the South Eastern Flank.
4.11.1971	AC/276-WP(71)24(Final)	Note by MBFR WG. Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO.
10.5.1972	SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S.87/72)	SHAPE's study on the implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO.
19.5.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21	
11.7.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21/1	Note by MBFR Staff Group. Comments on the SHAPE Study.
17.7.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21/2	Note by Turkish Member MBFR WG. Comments on the SHAPE Study.
20.7.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21/3	Note by Norwegian Member MBFR WG. Comments on the SHAPE Study.
20.7.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21/4	Note by Italian Member MBFR WG. Comments on the SHAPE Study.
20.7.1972	AC/276-WP(72)21/5	Note by Canadian Member MBFR WG. Comments on the SHAPE Study.

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24.11.1972	AC/276-D(72)5	Report by the MBFR Working Group. Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO.
24.11.1972	110-5375-72/PL.1A	Memorandum from Turkish MILREP. Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
11.12.1972	IMSWM-307-72	Memorandum from Director, IMS. The implications of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
15.1.1973	AC/276-WP(73)1	Note by Turkish Member MBFR WG. Suggested Movement Constraints on WP forces in order to avoid the implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
18.1.1973	Record-MC-1-73	Record MC Meeting 11.1.73. Item 3. The implications of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
30.1.1973	AC/276-WP(73)1/1	Informal note by UK Member, MBFR WG. Comments on Turkish paper.
12.2.1973	AC/276-WP(73)1/2	Note by German Member, MBFR WG. Comments on Turkish paper.
5.3.1973	AC/276-WP(73)1/3	Note by MBFR Staff Group. The question of reciprocity concerning movement constraints on the South-Eastern Flank.
19.3.1973	AC/276-WP(73)11	Note by MBFR Staff Group. Consideration of Movement Constraints for possible application on the S.E Flank.
2.8.1973	MCM-49-73	Memorandum for Secretary General. The SHAPE Assessment of the "US Approach to MBFR".
9.8.1973	AC/276-WP(73)16 (Revised)	Second Report by Sub-Group on Movement Constraints. Chapters I, II, III, IV and VII.

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28.8.1973    IMSWM-151-73(Revised)

Memorandum from Director,  
IMS. MBFR - Movement  
Constraints.

17.9.1973    MCM-60-73

Memorandum for Secretary  
General. SHAPE Assessment  
of the "US Approach to  
MBFR".

8.10.1973    AC/276-WP(73)35    )  
29.8.1973    1000.1/20-5-1/S.105/73    )

Working Paper MBFR WG.  
SHAPE Assessments of BE, US  
and UK papers on MBFR in  
Central Europe.

9.10.1973    AC/276-WP(73)16/1

Second report SG. Movement  
Constraints. Chapters V  
and VI.

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