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AG/276-WP(71)26

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL REGION
ON THE SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK

Note by the Turkish Delegation

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The mutual and balanced force reductions to be implemented in the Central Region might produce, under any agreed form or model, certain effects on the South-Eastern Flank. Unless disbanded within the framework of an MBFR agreement, the redeployment of the withdrawn Soviet Forces outside the reduction area, will create a new and additional threat on the South-Eastern Flank.

2. Since the Alliance has neither so far developed a certain model for MBFR negotiations nor singled out the yardsticks for the force reductions in the Central region, some assumptions were required for this analysis. The assumptions taken as basis for this study are in conformity with the ones used in the other studies made in the Alliance. However, the possible MBFR negotiations and even the soundings and the contacts of the Explorer may turn out to be of a nature to influence these starting points.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

3. The mutual and balanced force reductions will be confined to the NATO guidelines area and South-Eastern Flank will be excluded from the reduction area.

4. Under this assumption, the minimum reduction area is dealt with among the various alternatives. In case the territories of the other Warsaw Pact countries are included in the reduction area (e.g. Hungary or three Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union) the threat on the South-Eastern Flank shall be comparably greater than the conclusions of this study.

This document includes: 3 Annexes

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5. Regardless of the model of reductions agreed upon for the Central region, the Soviet forces are assumed to be reduced between a minimum 10% and a maximum 50%.

6. As the threat on the South-Eastern Flank will emanate from the withdrawn Soviet forces, the present analysis shall attempt to evaluate the Soviet threat in a post-MBFR situation, rather than dealing with the models covering mutual reductions.

7. Reductions will be applied to conventional forces.

8. Reductions will cover both indigenous and stationed forces.

9. Ground and air forces will be included in the reductions. However, Naval forces, strategic missile units, internal security and border units and medium and heavy bombers not effecting land battle will be excluded.

10. The reduced indigenous forces will be disbanded or be taken to reserve status. The stationed forces will remain in active status or be taken to reserve status and they will be redeployed outside the reduction area.

11. For the Soviet stationed ground forces the redeployment areas will be one of the following:

- (a) Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian,
- (b) Odessa, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan,
- (c) Kiev and Moscow.

12. For the Soviet stationed air forces the geographic redeployment areas do not bear great importance. However, two alternatives may be considered with regard to their effects on the South-Eastern Flank:

- (a) The areas from which the aircrafts can reach South-Eastern without refuelling (Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan).
- (b) The area from which the aircrafts can reach South-Eastern Flank with a single refuelling (the Northern Russia).

13. The data used in this study is taken from MC 161/71 and DPQ(70).

C. ANALYSIS

I. Ground Forces

14. The withdrawn Soviet Forces will constitute a threat to various regions of NATO according to their redeployment areas:

- (a) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Baltic, Belorussia and Carpathians, these forces will threaten Central region of NATO rather than South-Eastern Flank.

This has been examined in detail by SHAPE in the Risk assessment. In order to avoid such a threat, the inclusion of the three Western Military Districts in the reduction area has been suggested.

- (b) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Kiev and Moscow districts, these forces will be assigned to the general Soviet requirements. However, if these forces remain in the I and II categories they can be in combat readiness successively in M and M + 21 days, and if they are taken in third category they might be used for the Central region and South Eastern Flank any time after D + 4.
- (c) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Odessa, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan, the ratios of forces in the South-Eastern Flank and Eastern Turkey will be subject to following changes:
- (i) The pre-MBFR ratios of ground forces in Western Turkey and Greece, and Eastern Turkey are shown in Annex I.
- (ii) The pre-MBFR ratios of air forces in South-Eastern Flank are shown in Annex II.
- (iii) The post-MBFR force ratios in South-Eastern Flank and Eastern Turkey are shown in Annex III.

The tables in Annex III clearly show that there will be considerable increase in the WP forces in proportion to the NATO forces in these areas:

PRE-MBFR RATIOS

	<u>Western Turkey / WP</u> <u>and Greece</u>	<u>Eastern Turkey / WP</u>
Personnel	1:1.1	1:1.3
Tanks	1:2.8	1:3.5
Divisions	1:1.9	1:1.8

POST-MBFR RATIOS

	<u>Western Turkey / WP</u> <u>and Greece</u>	<u>Eastern Turkey / WP</u>
Personnel	1:1.3 - 1:1.9	1:1.7 - 1:3.5
Tanks	1:3.3 - 1:4.4	1:4.6 - 1:8.6
Divisions	1:2.2 - 1:2.9	1:2.3 - 1:4.1

15. As mentioned above the minimum reduction area has been taken as a basis for the present analysis. The extension of this area with the inclusion of the territories of the other Warsaw Pact countries will further increase the threat on the South-Eastern Flank. Accordingly, the inclusion of the three Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union to the NATO guidelines area may lead to the redeployment of additional forces in Odessa, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan which would thereby increase the above ratios to the disadvantage of NATO side.

II. Air Forces

16. The ratios of the air forces in the South-Eastern Flank with regard to Pre-MBFR and Post-MBFR situations are shown successively in tables II and III. The ratio between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will be as great as 1:5.6 if the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in the Southern Military districts of the Soviet Union.

17. Although the threat of ground forces might materialise gradually, the air forces could be effective from the D-day on.

D. CONCLUSIONS

18. Any MBFR agreement which might lead to the redeployment of the Soviet forces outside the reduction area, will have serious implications on the South-Eastern Flank.

19. In order to maintain the security and the solidarity of the Alliance, the implications of the reductions on the peripheral areas must be taken into account with utmost care. The achievement of a certain balance of forces in Central region to the detriment of the other areas would not only damage the security of and the solidarity in the Alliance but would also influence the NATO strategy and the general defence posture.

20. In order to obtain maximum security for the Central region, the Soviet forces would have to be withdrawn to the east of a certain longitude. However, such a limitation would not provide security for the South-Eastern Flank. Keeping in view that the redeployment of the Soviet forces in the Southern Military Districts of the Soviet Union will considerably deteriorate the balance of forces in the South-Eastern Flank and consequently create disadvantages for NATO, such a limitation should also be applied to a certain latitude preventing the redeployment beyond that line.

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COMPARISON OF FORCES IN THE SOUTH EASTERN FLANK BEFORE MBFR

ANNEX I to
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M-DAY - GROUND FORCES

<u>N A T O</u>				<u>W A R S A W P A C T</u>				<u>RATIO NATO/WP</u>		
<u>TERRITORY</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANKS</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>TERRITORY</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANKS</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>
W. TURKEY	106.396	1.088	7 2/3	BULGARIA	94.674	2.421	5 tank 8 motorised			
				ROMANIA	69.270	1.612	2 tank 6 motorised			
GREECE	73.000	714	5 2/3	ODESSA	39.725	965	1 tank 3 motorised			
TOTAL	179.396	1.802	13 1/3	TOTAL	203.669	4.998	25	1:1.1	1:2.8	1:1.9
E. TURKEY	89.446	718	6	S. UNION	110.752	2.554	2 tank 9 motorised	1:1.3	1:3.5	1:1.8
GRAND TOTAL	268.842	2.520	17 1/3	GRAND TOTAL	314.421	7.552	36	1:1.2	1:3.1	1:1.9

- NOTE: (1) 2 of the 3 airborne divisions in the area are assumed to be a threat to Turkey
 (2) Figures are rounded for convenience

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COMPARISON OF FORCES IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK BEFORE MBFR

AIR FORCES

<u>N A T O</u>		<u>WARSAW PACT</u>		<u>R A T I O</u>		
<u>Territory</u>	<u>Tactical Aircraft</u>	<u>Territory</u>	<u>Tactical Aircraft</u>	<u>Greece/WP</u>	<u>Turkey/WP</u>	<u>Tur. -Gr./WP</u>
TURKEY	218	S. UNION	710			
GREECE	154	ROMANIA	351	1:9.8	1:7	1:4
		BULGARIA	457			
TOTAL	372		1.518			

- NOTE: (1) Air threat can be divided between Turkey and Greece
- (2) The reconnaissance capabilities of the aircraft were also taken into account in addition to attack capabilities
- (3) Above figures do not include transport aircraft and army aircraft

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COMPARISON OF RATIO PRE- AND POST MBFR IN THE SOUTH EASTERN FLANK

REDEPLOYMENT AREA : ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT

<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>	<u>Pre-MBFR</u> <u>WESTERN TURKEY/</u> <u>AND GREECE / WP</u>	<u>Post - MBFR</u>		
		<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>10% Red.</u>	<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>30% Red.</u>	<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>50% Red.</u>
PERSONNEL	1:1.1	1:1.3	1:1.6	1:1.9
TANKS	1:2.8	1:3.3	1:3.8	1:4.4
DIVISIONS	1:1.9	1:2.2	1:2.5	1:2.9
AIRCRAFT	1:4	1:4.4	1:5	1:5.6

COMPARISON OF RATIO PRE- AND POST MBFR IN EASTERN TURKEY

REDEPLOYMENT AREA : NORTHERN CAUCASUS, TRANSCAUCASUS AND TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICTS

<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>	<u>Pre-MBFR</u> <u>EASTERN TURKEY/WP</u>	<u>Post - MBFR</u>		
		<u>E.T. /WP</u> <u>10%</u>	<u>E.T./WP</u> <u>30%</u>	<u>E.T./WP</u> <u>50%</u>
PERSONNEL	1:1.3	1:1.7	1:2.5	1:3.5
TANKS	1:3.5	1:4.6	1:6.6	1:8.6
DIVISIONS	1:1.8	1:2.3	1:3.2	1:4.1
AIRCRAFT	1:4	1:4.4	1:5	1:5.6