

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

COPY

N° 328

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
12th March, 1974

WORKING PAPER  
AC/276-WP(71)15/21

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

DRAFT COMPENDIUM OF MBFR MATERIAL  
(1.5.1967-1.7.1973)

Note by the Staff Group

Attached is a new Addendum to the draft Compendium of MBFR Material, covering the period 1.3.1973 to 1.7.1973.

2. The following amendments are to be made:

<u>Old pages to be removed</u>	<u>New pages to be inserted</u>
-	I.10-4
-	Sub-Chapter I.11 (green paper)
-	I.11-1, I.11-2
-	II.1-26
II.4-15	II.4-15
II.5-3	II.5-3
-	II.6-5
-	II.8-2
III.2-12	III.2-12, III.2-13
-	III.4-8
VI.-14	VI.-14
VIII.-6	VIII.-6
X.-33	X.-33
XI.-14	XI.-14, XI.-15
-	XII.-8
XV.-4	XV.-4, XV.-5
XVIII.-47	XVIII.-47, XVIII.-48

3. Again the Compendium is becoming too bulky for easy handling, even when divided into two volumes. Therefore, for those who may need such, a new green hard-cover for Volume III will be issued in due course. As the legs of the clips do not seem strong enough for bulky documents, we advise the use of loose-leaf binders (ORDNERS) instead, for readers who use the Compendium frequently.

4. This cover note is automatically downgraded to NATO UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the Addendum.

NATO,  
1110 Brussels.

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND (contd.)

10. The Communiqué of Brussels (1972) (contd.)

- 30.5.1973 PO/73/77                      Review by the Secretary General.  
Annual Political Appraisal.  
The present review has been drafted in order to  
prepare the discussion by Ministers, at their June  
meeting, of the main problems facing the Alliance  
with a view to strengthening the process of  
consultation. The following subjects are dealt with  
in extract form: Trans-Atlantic relations; CSCE;  
MBFR; Link between the CSCE and MBFR; Final  
considerations; Iceland; Cyprus.
- 5.6.1973 C-M(73)50                      Note by the Chairman Council.  
(3rd revise)                      Secret MBFR Guidelines.  
The present document will be forwarded to  
Ministers. These Guidelines are intended as a  
step towards the elaboration of Allied positions  
for the Autumn MBFR negotiations.  
(See this Compendium, Chapter III.2.)

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N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

AC/276-WP(71)15/21

SUB-CHAPTER I.11

THE COMMUNIQUE OF COPENHAGEN (1973)

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND (contd)

11. The Communiqué of Copenhagen

7.6.1973

N-DPC-1(73)18      Final Communiqué of the Defence Planning Committee meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 7 June 1973.

Para 3. They noted, however, that despite these developments the Warsaw Pact continues to maintain forces of a size and character greatly in excess of those needed for purely defensive purposes. Ministers --etc.--. They noted in particular the strengthening of Soviet forces facing NATO: in the strategic nuclear forces, in the land and air forces and in the increased striking power and world-wide deployment of the Soviet Navy. In this respect, they reaffirmed that NATO must continue to provide a firm defence posture, from which a genuine and lasting détente can be negotiated.

Para 10. Ministers discussed the practical implications of negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and stressed that the NATO objective remained the maintenance of undiminished security at lower levels of forces. They reiterated their conviction that unilateral action on the part of countries of the Alliance to reduce or withdraw forces would erode the conditions of stability essential to the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement. In this connection Ministers welcomed the reaffirmation by the United States that, given a similar approach by their Allies, they would maintain and improve their forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of an East/West agreement.

15.6.1973

M.1(73)19      Final Communiqué of the MA Council meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 June, 1973.

Para 4. Ministers considered the outcome of the multilateral talks in Helsinki in preparation for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Recalling the purpose of their governments in entering into these talks, Ministers were satisfied that it had been possible at Helsinki to agree on arrangements for this Conference which would ensure that their proposals were examined fully and in depth.

Para 6. Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO's integrated defence programme noted with satisfaction that the initiative for mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe which they took at Reykjavik in 1968 has led to multilateral exploratory talks in Vienna. The agreements reached there thus far are useful steps forward. These Ministers expect negotiations on specific force reduction and associated measures in Central Europe to begin in October 1973 as previously agreed. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to the prompt fulfilment of this commitment.

CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND(contd)

11. The Communiqué of Copenhagen (contd)

Para 7. In such negotiations, it will be the aim of the Allied Governments concerned, bearing in mind the indivisibility of the security of the Alliance, to secure step by step practical arrangements which ensure undiminished security for all parties at a lower level of forces in Central Europe. The readiness of the Warsaw Pact countries to contribute to balanced results would, together with a successful outcome of the parallel negotiations in CSCE, open the way to a more fruitful and stable relationship in Europe. These Ministers reaffirmed the conviction of their governments that unilateral action on the part of countries of the Alliance to reduce or withdraw forces would undermine the negotiation of satisfactory agreements aimed at enhancing military stability.

Para 8. These Ministers noted with approval the extent of agreement already reached within the Alliance in preparation for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. They requested the Council in Permanent Session to continue this work and to develop further an Alliance programme for the forthcoming negotiations.

Para 14. Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO's integrated defence programme welcomed the reaffirmation by the United States that, given a similar approach by their Allies, they would maintain and improve their forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of an East/West agreement.---etc.

29.6.1973

FO/73/98

Communiqué issued on 28 June, 1973 at the end of the MBFR Exploratory Talks in Vienna.

Para 2. In the course of these consultations, it was decided to hold negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. The negotiations will take place in Vienna, and will begin on 30 October, 1973. It was also agreed that participation in and procedures for the negotiations will be as set forth in the record of the Plenary Meeting of 14 May, 1973.

CHAPTER II:   STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

1.   Related Studies (contd)

- |           |                 |  |
|-----------|-----------------|--|
| 26.3.1973 | AC/276-WP(73)14 | Note by the MBFR Staff Group.<br>Programme of Work for the period to<br>end September, 1973. |
| 26.4.1973 | IMSWM-80-73     | Memorandum from Director, IMS.<br>Status Report on CSCB and MBFR.                            |
| 26.5.1973 | AC/276-WP(73)15 | Note by the Chairman, MBFR WG.<br>Working Group Progress Report - May 1973.                  |
| 3.6.1973  | AC/276-D(73)1   | Progress Report MBFR Working Group -<br>June 1973.   |

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1ST JANUARY, 1968 (contd)

4. The Data Base (contd)

- 27.7.1972  
AC/276-D(72)3  
(contd)      Annex: Inventory of "Major Items of Equipment" in the context of MBFR.  
In this Annex the following equipment has been listed: Heavy and medium tanks; AIFVs, light tanks and Recce Vehicles carrying a turret or top mounted gun of 20 mm or greater calibre; ACPs (tracked or wheeled); Anti-tank weapons; Artillery; Mortars (80 mm and greater calibre); Launchers; River crossing systems; Army aviation.
- 19.9.1972      AC/276-WP(72)41      Note by Chairman S.G. Data Support, Display of Data on NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Forces in the recently approved standard formats.
- 27.9.1972      AC/276-WP(72)36  
(Revised)      Note by Chairman S.G. Data Support. Standard Formats for the Display of NATO and WP Ground Forces Data for MBFR.
- 16.2.1973      AC/276-WP(73)4      Note by Chairman, S.G. Data Support. Draft Display of Data on WP Ground Forces as at Mid 1972.  
This present document is Part 3 of the "Blue Book" on Data on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces. The Blue Book, when completed, will contain: Part 1, providing general information; Part 2, containing data on NATO ground forces; and Part 3, containing data on Warsaw Pact Ground forces.
- 16.2.1973      AC/276-WP(73)5      Progress Report by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Data Support.
- 20.3.1973      AC/276-WP(73)12      Note by Chairman, SGDS  
Data on NATO Ground and Air Forces as at End 1971.

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

II.5-3

AC/276-WP(71)15/21CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY, 1968 (Contd)5. Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact (contd)

- 14.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)2. Note by the MBFR Staff Group.  
Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces.
- The paper displays information on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces mobilisation capabilities as they pertain to military build-up for conflict in the Central Region.
- The area under examination is the NATO Guidelines Area plus the three Western Military Districts (3 WMDs) of the USSR. For NATO air forces, the area is expanded to include the whole of the French Air Force, the RAF in the UK and the USAF in the UK.
- Mobilisation time in the context of the paper includes the time taken (a) to bring units up to war authorized strength in their present locations; (b) to give refresher training to reservists as required; and (c) to move to GDP positions (for NATO forces only).
- The paper refers to DPC/D(69)32, 25 Nov 69, "Study on Mobilisation and Force Expansion Plans and Potential - Summary of Measures which might be taken in times of tension to augment the forces in the areas of AGL, ACLANT and ACCHAN", and to document DRC/D(69)2, 25 Nov 69, "A Summary of National mobilisation or call-up systems by country."
- The present paper arrives at the following conclusions:
- Para 17. NATO is a defensive Alliance and the Allied countries need to have a mobilization system to react to any aggression. The Warsaw Pact countries, much stronger in the control of their own populations, have a more efficient and rapid mobilisation system than the NATO countries involved. Apart from this, the Warsaw Pact, once having decided on offensive action, has the advantage of the initiative. This means that they can begin preparations for war at the time of their choosing, without revealing immediately their true intentions. Therefore, without ever declaring an official mobilisation, the WP could increase substantially its combat posture.
- Para 18. Even assuming that both sides began mobilizing at exactly the same time, the WP would be able to have ready for combat almost three times as many divisions as NATO within 7 days. In the case of Warsaw Pact divisions and especially those stationed in the three Soviet WMDs (8 x Cat.I, 10 x Cat.II and 3 x Cat.III) however, we have to add the movement time.
- 19.6.1973 AC/276-WP(73)2 Note by the MBFR Staff Group.  
(Revised) Mobilization of NATO and Warsaw Pact  
Ground and Air Forces.  
(See 2nd Revise on 13.2.1974.)

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

II.5-3

CHAPTER II:    STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

6.    Offensive/Defensive Natures of WP and NATO Postures.    Combat Capability (contd)

14.3.1973

AC/276-R(73)4

Action Sheet WG Meeting 6.3.73.  
Item II.    Offensive/Defensive Natures  
of WP and NATO Postures.

The Working Group agreed - for the moment - not to forward to any Authority note AC/276-WP(72)32(4th revise) and to resume consideration of the paper at an appropriate time.

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CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

8. Consideration of MBFR in Amphibious Forces

14.5.1973

AC/276-WP(73)9

Note by Danish Member, MBFR WG.  
Potential Inclusion of Amphibious  
Forces in MBFR.

The paper analyses the possibilities of reducing the threat to the Allied Command Baltic Approaches (ACBA) area - and thereby to NATO's Northern Flank - by mutual symmetrical reductions of that part of the Eastern and Western amphibious transport-capacity which has its bases in the reduction area (FRG, CDR and Poland).

This study arrives at the following conclusion:

Para 19. ----- a reduction of the overall Warsaw Pact amphibious transport capacity in the Baltic by up to 30 percent equal to a 65 percent reduction of the East German/Polish capacity in the area is likely to result in a decisive deterioration of the Warsaw Pact's ability to launch an amphibious operation with no or very short warning against Danish territory. After a reduction on that scale an operation could only be carried out by employing Soviet amphibious ships as well as reintroduction of the reduced ships. The number and the more distant geographical stations of such ships would, however, render it doubtful whether an amphibious operation could succeed as the geographical distance would give NATO's defence forces a longer warning. In these circumstances, the Danish view is that if amphibious forces were drawn into the MBFR negotiations, this would materially reduce the threat and have a stabilising effect on the Northern part of the Central Region and on the Northern Flank.

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)

- 24.1.1973 PO/73/13 Note by the Secretary General.  
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues.  
The present paper, intended to facilitate discussion in Council, attempts to outline unresolved issues. The order employed is based mainly on C-M(72)37 (3rd revise). The issues concern (1) geographical areas; (2) Phasing; (3) Constraints; (4) The flanks; (5) Forces and size and method of reductions; (6) Verification; (7) Freeze; (8) Agreement on MBFR Principles.
- 2.2.1973 C-M(73)11(Revised) Note by the Chairman Council.  
Follow-up to the Conference - Amendment to Steering Brief.  
This document, which was noted by the Council on 31.1.73, sets out a number of minor amendments to paras 28 to 30 of the "Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks", C-M(72)67(Revised). (See this Compendium, page III.2-3)
- 21.2.1973 PO/73/24 Note by the Secretary General.  
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues - Report of MBFR Working Group.  
Attached as Enclosure to this note, is a personal report from the Chairman MBFR WG, summarizing the status of efforts of the Working Group on certain of the major unresolved issues listed in PO/73/13.
- 2.5.1973 PO/73/59 Note by the Secretary General.  
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues.  
This paper is cross-referencing the subjects listed in PO/73/13 with currently relevant MBFR documents.
- 5.6.1973 C-M(73)50 Note by the Chairman, Council.  
(3rd revise) Secret MBFR Guidelines.  
The present document will be forwarded to Ministers (Meeting Copenhagen 14 June 1973). These Guidelines are intended as a step towards the elaboration of Allied positions for the Autumn MBFR negotiations.  
Principal objectives: 1. Aim at a balanced outcome that will ensure undiminished security for all members of the Alliance at a lower level for forces in Central Europe; 2. Reduce military confrontation; 3. Not diminish Allied ability for forward defence, flexible response and nuclear deterrence.  
Geographic and related concerns: 4. Reductions confined to Central Europe; 5. Take account of risks of special geographically confined arms control zone in Central Europe. MBFR programme must not be limited to the two States in Germany; 6. Not inhibit the creation of a European union or the growth of European defence co-operation; 7. Take account of the possible effects on the security of NATO's flanks of force reductions in

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)

2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)

Central Europe.

Reductions: 8. Aim at reducing asymmetries in military balance favouring Warsaw Pact and mitigating the geographic advantage of Soviet Union in reinforcement; 9. Reductions in first instance confined to United States and Soviet forces, reductions of indigenous forces will be left to a later stage; 10. Reductions on Allied side should not exceed approximately 10% in total stationed or 10% in total indigenous manpower.

Phasing: 11. A controlled and calculable process with limited objectives and acceptable results.

Other MBFR Measures: 12. Any reductions must be complemented by appropriate constraints. The Allied objective should include appropriate pre-reduction constraints, but agreement on pre-reduction constraints should not be a condition to the negotiation of reductions; 13. Any MBFR agreement must contain appropriate verification provisions, including non-interference with national means; 14. Ensurance that the provisions of any MBFR agreement will not be circumvented or undermined. Hungary's inclusion in a constraints area should be kept open; 15. Legitimate security interest of the flank countries should be kept in mind.

Force Improvements: 16. Enhance Alliance defensive capabilities during the MBFR process. Success of MBFR would be jeopardised by unilateral Allied reductions or withdrawals implemented outside its framework.

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)

4. Definition of terms (contd)

17.5.1973

POLADS(73)14      Report by the Political Committee.  
Confidence Building Measures:  
Illustrative lists of military movements  
and manoeuvres, etc.

III.5. Definition. The words "manoeuvres" and "exercises" are not interchangeable since all manoeuvres are exercises but not all exercises are manoeuvres. Nor should the words "manoeuvres" and "exercises" be used as automatically including "movements". In general terms the distinctions are that movements have many aspects - movement of troops, equipment, within, into, out of, or within areas, temporary or permanent, land, sea or air, etc; manoeuvres are normally two-sided activities of real forces, trained and equipped; exercises include manoeuvres but could also refer to exercises of un-trained or paper forces. In general, a movement need not be a manoeuvre, but many manoeuvres imply movement of forces.

IV.9. Major force movements and manoeuvres: For internal guidance in the preparation of national lists, Allied countries could use as a yardstick for ground forces' involvement, those movements and manoeuvres whose combined strength equals or exceeds the level of a division.

CHAPTER VI: VERIFICATION (contd)

and reductions in a designated area are or are not being respected", the paper distinguishes between various types of potential violations, i.e. (1) minor violations; (2) substantial violations; and (3) major build-up violations.

Item III.F: Collateral Constraints, Verification, etc.

-- Reductions focussing on units or major items of equipment would be more susceptible to inspection than reductions schemes focussing on thinning out personnel. It would be as easy or difficult to verify the post-reduction force level by inspection whether the reductions were taken by the equal percentage or personnel common ceiling method: that is, the size of the reduction would not greatly affect the problem. Some form of understanding on non-interference with National Means would be essential to verification.

- 15.2.1973 AC/276(SGVE)-WP/4 Note by Chairman S.G. on Verification. Airborne Photography.  
The present note contains the draft Terms of Reference for a panel to study "Airborne Photography". As to the task of the panel, the following is stated: "The task of the panel is to examine the practicalities of adopting an airborne photographic inspection system, as an aid to verification of an MBFR or Movement Constraints Agreement with aircraft limited to flying in the height band 3,000 to 5,000 feet".
- 23.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)6 Progress Report by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Verification.
- 25.5.1973 AC/276-R(73)8 Action Sheet, MBFR WG Meeting 18.5.73. Item VI: Verification - Airborne Photography Panel.  
The Working Group agreed to hold this matter (Airborne Photography Panel) in abeyance until such time as was considered appropriate by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Verification.

CHAPTER VIII: THE STATIONED FORCES CONCEPT (contd)

MBFR, and subsequently the remaining forces in the reduction area on a percentage reduction basis, phased at states from 10% to 50%. It has been accepted hitherto, and generally regarded as the favoured solution, that any MBFR agreement should and would apply ultimately to both foreign and indigenous forces in the Central Area of Europe - the area generally regarded as that posing the greatest threat of war. The Working Group nevertheless felt it advisable to study the implications of concentrating on reductions of stationed forces as a first step in an integral MBFR programme.

14.3.1973

AC/276-WP(73)10

Note by MBFR Staff Group.  
Implications of Reductions in  
Foreign Stationed Forces.

Para 4. The MBFR Staff Group believe that the MBFR Working Group may consider that it would be appropriate and timely to revive the examination (as in AC/276-D(71)3) in the period leading up to MBFR negotiations; and perhaps to extend their examination to include some consideration of the implications of expressing such reductions in terms of manpower.

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

- 14.2.1973 POLADS(73)5 Memorandum from Chairman SPC.  
MBFR: Article by Soviet  
Prof. Proyektor.  
The paper contains selected excerpts from an article "Problems of Military Détente in Europe" by professor Proyektor, which appeared in January 1973 in "The Soviet Union Today". The purpose of the article seems to be to provide a public rationale for the Soviet decision to enter into exploratory talks on Force Reductions in Europe and to reconcile it with the traditional Soviet position on General and Complete Disarmament on a world-wide basis.
- 5.6.1973 C-M(73)50 Note by the Chairman, Council.  
(3rd revise) Secret MBFR Guidelines.  
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter III.2.)
- 29.6.1973 PO/73/98 Communiqué issued on 28 June 1973 at the end of the MBFR Exploratory talks in Vienna.  
Para 2: In the course of these consultations, it was decided to hold negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. The negotiations will take place in Vienna, and will begin on 30 October, 1973. It was also agreed that participation in and procedures for the negotiations will be as set forth in the record of the Plenary Meeting of 14 May 1973.

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)

Movement Constraints, Stabilising Measures, etc.

drastic constraints could be envisaged which would primarily aim at confidence-building, obtaining greater transparency and a possibly longer warning time; para 7. The Turkish paper does not include Rumania and Bulgaria in the area of application of possible constraints. The question of their inclusion should also be studied.

- 14.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)3 Progress Report by the Chairman, Sub-Group on Movement Constraints. The report accounts for the work on the Second Report on Movement Constraints and reveals the promise of the Norwegian Authorities to submit a Study on Movement Constraints for the Northern Flank.
- 28.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)7 Note by the MBFR Staff Group. The Issues involved in Including Hungary in a Constraints Area. (The Working Group requested the Staff Group to re-study this subject. See therefore next paper, i.e. AC/276-WP(73)13, 22.3.73).
- 19.3.1973 AC/276-WP(73)11 Note by the MBFR Staff Group. Consideration of Movement Constraints for possible application on the South-Eastern Flank - SGMC action. The Staff Group draws the attention to a letter from the Turkish Permanent Delegation of 5.3.1973, which reads: "The recent developments in Vienna and especially Soviet attempts to draw, one way or another, the flank countries into the discussion on questions pertaining to MBFR including the problem of constraints, have reaffirmed the preoccupations of my (the Turkish) Authorities and have now led them to take a more categorical position against any possible constraints on the Turkish territory, to the extent that they are not prepared even to accept a study on the constraints over the Turkish territory on a contingency basis." The Staff Group recommend, therefore, that the Working Group reconsider the instruction to the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints as given in AC/276-WP(72)46 (Outline Work Programme for SGMC).
- 22.3.1973 AC/276-WP(73)13 Note by the MBFR Staff Group. The implications of applying Constraints to WP Forces in Hungary. (See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XV.)

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)Movement Constraints, Stabilising Measures, etc.

- 25.3.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1/3 Note by the MBFR Staff Group. The question of Reciprocity concerning Movement Constraints on the South-Eastern Flank. Attached to the present paper are the Speaking Notes used by the Turkish WG-member at the meeting on 20 Feb 73 in answer to the British paper AC/276-WP(73)1/1 and the German one - WP(73)1/2, and to defend the official Turkish view laid down in document WP(73)1. (Because these speaking notes of 20 Feb are overtaken by AC/276-WP(73)11 of 19 March, they will not be quoted here.)
- 24.4.1973 IMSM-185-73 Memorandum from Director, IMS. CSCE - Confidence Building Measures. Herewith the Members of the Military Committee are informed that the Director, IMS has sent a letter to the Chairman, SPC, giving a preliminary staff-level view on a Yugoslav proposal that illustrative confidence-building measures to be approved by the participants in preparatory talks in Helsinki for submission to the CSCE should include "Restrains on such (military) movements and manoeuvres", indicating that the Military Committee will consider the issue formally.
- 8.5.1973 Record-MC-13-73 Summary Record Mil.Com. Meeting 26.4.73. Part I, Item 4.C: CSCE-Confidence-Building Measures. In summary, the Chairman emphasised that the Yugoslav proposal (IMSM-185-73, voluntary self-restraint) should not be accepted. --- At present, there was no idea of what these self-imposed restraints could be, and without such information, the undertaking of a study of the matter would be extremely difficult. --- etc. The Military Committee agreed that the paper IMSM-185-73 should be used by the Chairman as background for his statement to the NATO political authorities, if and as necessary.
- 15.5.1973 AC/276-WP(73)13/1 Provisional Speaking Notes UK Member W.G. The implications of applying Constraints to Warsaw Pact Forces in Hungary. (See this Compendium, Chapter XV.)
- 17.5.1973 POLADS(73)14 Report by Political Committee. Confidence Building Measures: Illustrative lists of military movements and manoeuvres to be provided by the Allied countries within the framework of the CSCE.

CHAPTER XII: IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO (contd)

- 19.3.1973      AC/276-WP(71)11      Note by the MBFR Staff Group.  
Consideration of Movement Constraints for  
possible application on the South-  
Eastern Flank.  
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XI.)
- 25.3.1973      AC/276-WP(73)1/3      Note by the MBFR Staff Group.  
The question of Reciprocity concerning  
Movement Constraints on the South-  
Eastern Flank.  
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XI.)
- 5.6.1973      C-M(73)50      Note by the Chairman Council.  
(5rd revise)      Secret MBFR Guidelines.  
Annex. Para 7. The forthcoming MBFR negotiations  
should also take account of the possible effects on the  
security of NATO's flanks of force reductions in  
Central Europe. Para 15. While dealing with the  
problems above, the Allies should keep in mind the  
legitimate security interest of the flank countries  
and the indivisibility of the security of the Alliance.  
A decision of any Allied flank country or countries not  
to be included in restrictions which would be part of  
an agreement on force reductions in Central Europe  
should be supported by the Allies.



CHAPTER XV: HUNGARY (contd)

negotiations of an agreement under (b), (c) or (d) below; (b) A Force Limitation Agreement, embracing Hungary; (c) A Non-Circumvention Agreement, either in general terms or directed specifically at Hungary; (d) A Movement Constraints Agreement in which the Soviets would undertake not to deploy additional forces beyond agreed numbers to Hungary and/or to notify movement of forces above specified levels into that area, and possibly within that area.

(Revised on 13.6.73 and 22.6.73; Final paper on 20.7.73, AC/276-D(73)2.)

- 15.5.1973    AC/276-WP(73)13/1    Provisional Speaking Notes of United Kingdom Member, MBFR WG. The Implications of applying Constraints to Warsaw Pact Forces in Hungary.

The paper contains detailed comments on AC/276-WP(73)13, the most important one in para 5, which reads (abbreviated): "It is important to differentiate between a "special constraints agreement for Hungary" and the "inclusion of Hungary in the Constraints Area". If Hungary were inside a Constraints Area, the WP forces stationed there could be moved, at will and with no advance warning from Hungary to anywhere in the remainder of the Constraints Area (for example, into the Reductions Area); whereas if Hungary were a special case outside the Constraints (or Reductions) Area, forces located there could only enter the Reduction Area up to a specified limit and after due notice had been given."

CHAPTER XVIII: INDEX (contd)

DATE	NUMBER	CLASS	ORIGINATOR	TITLE OF DOCUMENT	CHAPTER
21.2.73	PO/73/24	NS	Secretary General	MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues	III.2
22.2.73	Record-MC-4-73	NC	Mil.Com.	Summary record MC meeting 15.2.73	XV
22.2.73	IMSWM-27-73	NS	Dir. IMS	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone.	XV
23.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)6	NC	MBFR WG - SGVE	Progress Report SG on Verification	VI
26.2.73	USM-071-73	NS	US Milrep	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone	XV
26.2.73	MCM-16-73	NS	Mil.Com.	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone	XV
28.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)7	NC	MBFR WG	Issues involved in including Hungary in constraints area.	XI, XV
14.3.73	AC/276-R(73)4	NC	MBFR WG	Action sheet WG mtg. 6.3.73.	II.6
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