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6th March, 1974

WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(71)15/20

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

DRAFT COMPENDIUM OF MBFR MATERIAL
(1.5.1967 - 1.3.1973)

Note by the Staff Group

Attached is a new Addendum to the draft Compendium of MBFR Material, covering the period 1.1.1973 - 1.3.1973(1).

2. The following pen and ink corrections have to be made:

In Chapter XVIII, the chapter-identifications are to be changed in the last column as follows:

On page XVIII-40: fourth line: II.1, II.3 must read
II.1, II.3, II.6
tenth line: II.1 must read II.6
On page XVIII-41: second line: II.1 must read II.6
third line: II.1 must read II.6
On page XVIII-43: sixth line: II.1 must read II.6

3. The following amendments are to be made:

<u>Old pages to be removed</u>	<u>New pages to be inserted</u>
1	1
-	I.10-3
II.1-24, II.1-25, II.1-26, II.1-27	II.1-24, II.1-25
II.4-15	II.4-15
-	II.5-3
-	Sub-Chapter II.6 (green paper)
-	II.6-1, II.6-2, II.6-3
-	II.6-4
-	Sub-Chapter II.7 (green paper)
-	II.7-1
III.2-11	III.2-11, III.2-12

This document consists of: 27 pages and 2 green pages

(1) In document AC/276-WP(71)15/19 this date appeared
incorrectly as 1974

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

AC/276-WP(71)15/20

-2-

Old pages to be
removed

III.5-2
VI-14
-
-
XII-7
XV-2
XVIII-45

New pages to be
inserted

III.5-2, III.5-3
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X-32, X-33
XI-13, XI-14
XII-7
XV-2, XV-3, XV-4
XVIII-45, XVIII-46,
XVIII-47

4. This cover note is automatically downgraded to NATO UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the Addendum.

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

COMPENDIUM OF MBFR MATERIAL

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II. STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968

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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND (contd)

10. The Communiqué of Brussels (1972)(contd)

- 11.1.1973 C-M(73)2(Revised) Note by the Secretary General.
CSCE: Agenda, Committee Structure and
Mandates for Committees and Sub-
Committees.
(See for contents this Compendium, Chapter III.2)
- 12.1.1973 C-M(73)4 Note by the Secretary General.
Non-Agreed Proposals on an Agenda for
a CSCE, Committee Structure and
Mandates for C's and S-C's.
- 16.1.1973 C-M(72)87(3rd revise) Note by the Secretary General.
Guidelines and Agenda Papers for
Exploratory talks on MBFR in Central
Europe.
This document provides the framework for the Allied
position at exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions in Central Europe beginning on 31 January 1973.
The contents as agreed by the Council at its meeting on
15 Jan 73 are divided into two parts: (a) the confidential
Guidelines Paper; and (b) the Agenda Paper.
(See for contents this Compendium, Chapter III.2).
- 24.1.1973 PO/72/13 Note by the Secretary General.
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues.
The present paper, intended to facilitate discussion in
Council, attempts to outline major substantive issues
which Allied countries have to resolve as they approach
and engage in MBFR negotiations.
(See for contents this Compendium, Chapter III.2).
- 26.1.1973 C-M(73)9 Note by Chairman SPC.
Organisational Arrangements after the
CSCE.
The Eastern countries will undoubtedly continue to promote
the creation of permanent bodies. These proposals have so
far been vague. This is all the more reason why the
question should not be allowed to slip out of the control
of the Western countries. We must take a cautious view of
requests which can lead us into unknown territory and
which we could only consider accepting within the framework
of negotiations in which our fundamental demands were met.
Any final decision could therefore only be taken in the
light of the Conference results.
- 2.2.1973 C-M(73)11(Revised) Note by the Chairman Council.
Follow-up to the Conference -
Amendment to Steering Brief.
This document, which was noted by the Council on 31.1.73,
sets out a number of minor amendments to paras 28 to 30
of the "Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory
Talks", C-M(72)67(Revised). (See this Compendium,
page I.9-4).

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CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1ST JANUARY, 1968 (contd)

1. Related Studies (contd)

- 10.7.1972 AC/276-WP(72)31 Note by MBFR Staff Group.
Seminar on operational analysis as applied to MBFR.
At their meeting on 20 June, 1972, the MBFR Working Group agreed that a Seminar should be held, to be attended by MBFR analysts and Policy Staffs. This present note examines the possible structure of the Seminar, venue, and some suggestions for agenda items. (NB: Actually this Seminar never took place).
- 27.7.1972 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by MBFR Staff Group.
A Discussion of the Offensive/Defensive Nature of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Postures.
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter II.6)
- 2.10.1972 US NATO(PM)/OUT/
NS/72-13 Letter from United States Mission.
MBFR Issues and Approaches to Reductions.
The document highlights the findings of US studies relating to classes of options and how reductions could be made; the role of constraints and ancillary agreements; and verification. It has been prepared as an aid to decision makers, on the basis of analytical methods discussed in earlier submissions. The following subjects are discussed in detail: I. Objectives of MBFR; II. Major classes of options; III. Assessment of basic MBFR Issues (A. Estimating strengths of ground and air forces; B. Verification; C. Base for reductions; D. Structuring reductions; E. Force improvements and compensatory post-reduction steps; F. Collateral constraints, verification and ancillary measures; G. Reintroduction and build-up models and readiness); IV. Phasing; V. Military analysis; VI. Discussion of mixed packages; VII. Comparison of option approaches.
- 4.10.1972 AC/276-WP(72)42 Note by Danish Member, MBFR WG.
Possible effects on the defence of Schleswig-Holstein/Jutland and of an MBFR agreement for the Central Region.
Schleswig-Holstein is a part of the Northern Region (except for the execution of Air Defence) as far as MNC's responsibilities are concerned. On the other hand, Schleswig-Holstein is a part of the FRG, and thus a part of the NATO Guidelines Area, in NATO terminology often referred to as the Central Region of Europe (with or without Hungary). Jutland being a geographical continuation of the Schleswig-Holstein territory, this present Working Paper evaluates the following problem:
- "What influence could an MBFR agreement have on the defence of Schleswig-Holstein/Jutland in the event of an attack, in particular if there is little (less than 24 hours) or no warning?"

After discussing such factors as warning time, availability of forces and the balance of strength, the paper concludes (among other things):

Para 20: ... On the NATO side the already marginal forces in the area could have been reduced by at least one brigade. As, therefore, the initial aggressive strength (of the WP) would be fairly much the same as it is today, while the defence forces through such a reduction would have been substantially weakened, it is very likely that the WP could achieve the aim of the operation and perhaps even more than that....etc.

Para 21: It would appear that in the particular case of Schleswig-Holstein, status quo in the level of forces on the Western side would, more than in other areas, including the Central Region, have relatively great effect on defence capabilities.

- 26.10.1972 AC/276-D(72)4 Report by the MBFR WG.
Constraints on Movements of Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces.
This document is an extract of the First Report of the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints, AC/276-WP(72)27, 29.6.72. (See for contents this Compendium, Chapter XI.)
- 15.11.1972 IMSWM-285-72 Memorandum by Director, IMS
Report on the Status of Preparations for and Studies on CSCE and MBFR.
- 16.11.1972 AC/276-D(72)6 Progress Report by the Working Group
(See C-M(72)81(Revised)).
- 21.11.1972 AC/276-R(72)18 Action Sheet of Working Group meeting
of 14 November 72.
Item VI. Compendium of MBFR Material.
The Working Group noted a suggestion by the United Kingdom member that parts of the summary contained in Chapter XVII of the Compendium (AC/276-WP(71)15/3) did not reflect the work carried out in the Working Group, and agreed to omit this Chapter (Summary) from the Compendium.
- 27.11.1972 C-M(72)81(Revised) Note by Chairman of the Council.
Progress Report on MBFR.
1. Council Progress Report on MBFR: Chapter II. Exploratory Talks; Chapter III. Further study of the problems related to the development of an Allied position for MBFR negotiations.
2. MBFR Working Group Progress Report (AC/276-D(72)6): Progress in completed and in continuing studies; Model analyses; Implications of MBFR in the Central Region for other regions of ACE; Balanced force ceiling concept; Movement Constraints; Consideration of mutual reductions in tactical aircraft; Offensive/defensive postures of WP and NATO forces; The relevance of war authorized strength and actual strength to negotiation and drafting of reduction and of post-reduction force level agreements.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1ST JANUARY, 1968 (contd)

4. The Data Base (contd)

- 27.7.1972
AC/276-D(72)3
(contd) Annex: Inventory of "Major Items of Equipment" in the context of MBFR.
In this Annex the following equipment has been listed: Heavy and medium tanks; AIFVs, light tanks and Recce Vehicles carrying a turret or top mounted gun of 20 mm or greater calibre; ACPs (tracked or wheeled); Anti-tank weapons; Artillery; Mortars (80 mm and greater calibre); Launchers; River crossing systems; Army aviation.
- 19.9.1972 AC/276-WP(72)41 Note by Chairman S.G. Data Support, Display of Data on NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Forces in the recently approved standard formats.
- 27.9.1972 AC/276-WP(72)36
(Revised) Note by Chairman S.G. Data Support. Standard Formats for the Display of NATO and WP Ground Forces Data for MBFR.
- 16.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)4 Note by Chairman, S.G. Data Support. Draft Display of Data on WP Ground Forces as at Mid 1972.
This present document is Part 3 of the "Blue Book" on Data on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces. The Blue Book, when completed, will contain: Part 1, providing general information; Part 2, containing data on NATO ground forces; and Part 3, containing data on Warsaw Pact Ground forces.
- 16.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)5 Progress Report by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Data Support.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY, 1968 (Contd)

5. Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact (contd)

14.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)2. Note by the MBFR Staff Group.
Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces.

The paper displays information on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces mobilisation capabilities as they pertain to military build-up for conflict in the Central Region.

The area under examination is the NATO Guidelines Area plus the three Western Military Districts (3 WMDs) of the USSR. For NATO air forces, the area is expanded to include the whole of the French Air Force, the RAF in the UK and the USAF in the UK.

Mobilisation time in the context of the paper includes the time taken (a) to bring units up to war authorized strength in their present locations; (b) to give refresher training to reservists as required; and (c) to move to GDP positions (for NATO forces only).

The paper refers to DPC/D(69)32, 25 Nov 69, "Study on Mobilisation and Force Expansion Plans and Potential - Summary of Measures which might be taken in times of tension to augment the forces in the areas of ACE, ACLANT and ACCHAN", and to document DRC/D(69)2, 25 Nov 69, A Summary of National mobilisation or call-up systems by country.

The present paper arrives at the following conclusions:

Para 17. NATO is a defensive Alliance and the Allied countries need to have a mobilization system to react to any aggression. The Warsaw Pact countries, much stronger in the control of their own populations, have a more efficient and rapid mobilisation system than the NATO countries involved. Apart from this, the Warsaw Pact, once having decided on offensive action, has the advantage of the initiative. This means that they can begin preparations for war at the time of their choosing, without revealing immediately their true intentions. Therefore, without ever declaring an official mobilisation, the WP could increase substantially its combat posture.

Para 18. Even assuming that both sides began mobilizing at exactly the same time, the WP would be able to have ready for combat almost three times as many divisions as NATO within 7 days. In the case of Warsaw Pact divisions and especially those stationed in the three Soviet WMDs (8 x Cat.I, 18 x Cat.II and 3 x Cat.III) however, we have to add the movement time.

SUB--CHAPTER II.6

Offensive/Defensive Natures of Warsaw Pact and NATO Postures

Combat Capability

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (Contd)6. Offensive/Defensive Natures of WP and NATO Postures.
Combat Capability.

27.7.1972 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by MBFR Staff Group.
A discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of Warsaw Pact
and NATO Postures.

The present note considers the possibility of demonstrating the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions as being either offensive or defensive under three main headings:

- (a) Strength (to include deployment); (b) Training;
(c) Weapons and major equipments.

The paper concentrates on the Central European Region: firstly, because MBFR is intended to apply to that area initially. Secondly, because the most complete range of weapons accessible to NATO is deployed in, or available to, that region. And, thirdly, because it is: (a) the region of greatest confrontation and tension; (b) the most direct and closest route to the Soviet heart-land, and vice versa; and (c) the traditional arena for European war.

In para 10 the following newspaper quotation appears: "While Warsaw Pact forces become more formidable, NATO's ready (conventional) forces continue to decline in numbers and quality. Ironically, this decline has been most marked since the adoption of a strategy of flexible response, whose implementation requires significant increases in (conventional) land and air forces".

One of the conclusions arrived at in this paper reads: para 25. We thus see a clear advantage to NATO if we enter into a public debate on the offensive/defensive nature on the two sides military posture, training and equipment.

The Annexes to the paper are:

Annex I. Outline comparison of assessed global military strengths of NATO and Warsaw Pact.

Annex II. Outline comparison, etc... in Central Europe.

Annex III. Classification of weapons.

16.8.1973 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by MBFR Staff Group.
(Revised) A Discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of Warsaw Pact
and NATO postures.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (Contd)

6. Offensive/Defensive Natures of WP and NATO Postures.
Combat Capability.(contd)

- 17.10.1972 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by the MBFR Staff Group.
(2nd revise) A Discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of WP and NATO
Postures.
- 17.11.1972 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by the German Member, MBFR WG.
(2nd revise)/1 A Discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of Warsaw Pact
and NATO Postures:
- 22.12.1972 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by the MBFR Staff Group.
(3rd revise) A Discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of WP and NATO
Postures.
- 30.1.1973 AC/276-WP(72)32 Note by United Kingdom Member, MBFR WG.
(3rd revise)/1 A Discussion of the Offensive/
Defensive Natures of Warsaw Pact and
NATO Postures.

This paper gives extensive comments on the Staff Group's paper (2nd revise). Only the last paragraph (24) will be quoted: "The entire deployment in its present state on the western glacis of the USSR is more favourable for offensive than for defensive actions. The exact opposite to this would appear to be the present deployment of NATO land forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is not only unfavourable for defensive operations but would call for very comprehensive redeployment moves prior to any offensive action".

Commenting in detail on AC/276-WP(72)32(3rd revise), the note questions the necessity for such a paper on this subject. It suggests producing a short paper instead, on the following lines: (a) We cannot expect, whatever arguments we put forward, to persuade the WP to admit that it is any less a defensive alliance than is NATO. Indeed, the WP may well allege that there is broad global force parity. (See Table I); (b) We are confirmed in the generally held view that little is to be gained from debate as to whether a particular weapons system or weapon is primarily offensive or defensive. It is much more a question of force strength, composition, posture and intended use; (c) It is clear from Table II (and from NATO analysis) that the WP's conventional force superiority in Central Europe is such that a WP conventional attack, if pressed, would succeed very rapidly against conventional resistance by NATO. This WP capability stems primarily from the tank strength of its tank and motor rifle divisions; (d) We understand that resort to tactical nuclear weapons would enable NATO to prolong its effective resistance on land for a short time only: this is closely connected with the WP's conventional superiority as connected with its large battlefield nuclear capability..... etc.

SUB-CHAPTER II.7

Warning Time

CHAPTER III : GUIDANCE (contd)2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)

- 19.12.1972 C-M(72)91 Report by the Chairman, SPC.
+ Position Paper on Procedures for MBFR Talks.
Corrigendum
21.12.72
The Council is requested to examine this document, which is intended as part of a package of documents designed to guide Allied representatives at the talks. This paper on "Procedures" deals with (1) Matters of concern to the host country; (2) Facilities in host country; (3) Chairmanship; (4) Rules of procedure; Decision-making; Powers of the Chairman; (5) Seating arrangements; (6) Official languages; (7) Timing and frequency of meetings; (8) Services to be requested of the host country.
- 11.1.1973 C-M(73)2(Revised) Note by the Secretary General. CSCE : Agenda, Committee Structure and Mandates for Committees and Sub-Committees.
The contents of this paper contains the Council approved part of C-M(73)2, being a revision of C-M(72)86(2nd revise). The non-agreed part of C-M(73)2 is issued as C-M(73)4.
- 12.1.1973 C-M(73)4 Note by the Secretary General. Non-Agreed Proposals on an Agenda for a CSCE, Committee Structure and Mandates for Committees and Sub-Committees.
- 16.1.1973 C-M(72)87(3rd revise) Note by the Secretary General.
Guidelines and Agenda Papers for Exploratory talks on MBFR in Central Europe.
The Council agreed (15.1.73) the contents of this document providing the framework for the Allied position at exploratory talks on MBFR in Central Europe beginning on 31 January 1973.
Guidelines Paper : I. Objectives in MBFR exploratory talks. II. Prior arrangements. III. Duration. IV. Participation. V. Description. VI. The agenda (1) Geographical areas (2) Phasing (3) Principles (4) Constraints (5) Forces and size and method of reductions (6) Verification VII. Date and venue for substantive negotiations. VIII. Joint Communiqué.
Agenda Paper : A. Procedures. B. Participation. C. Description. D. The agenda. E. Date and venue. F. Joint Communiqué.

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)

- 24.1.1973 PO/73/13 Note by the Secretary General.
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues.
The present paper, intended to facilitate discussion in Council, attempts to outline unresolved issues. The order employed is based mainly on C-M(72)87 (3rd revise). The issues concern (1) geographical areas; (2) Phasing; (3) Constraints; (4) The flanks; (5) Forces and size and method of reductions; (6) Verification; (7) Freeze; (8) Agreement on MBFR Principles.
- 2.2.1973 C-M(73)11(Revised) Note by the Chairman Council.
Follow-up to the Conference -
Amendment to Steering Brief.
This document, which was noted by the Council on 31.1.73, sets out a number of minor amendments to paras 28 to 30 of the "Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks", C-M(72)67(Revised). (See this Compendium, page III.2-8)
- 21.2.1973 PO/73/24 Note by the Secretary General.
MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues -
Report of MBFR Working Group.
Attached as Enclosure to this note, is a personal report from the Chairman MBFR WG, summarizing the status of efforts of the Working Group on certain of the major unresolved issues listed in PO/73/13.

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)5. Machinery to support MBFR talks (contd)

Para 6. ___ the Secretary General will, throughout the consolidated consultative programme, provide assistance --- etc.

Para 7. For this reason the Secretary General would wish to have a representative in the Ad Hoc Group --etc.

Para 8. The Allied Governments may appoint a Secretary to the Ad Hoc Group --- etc. This secretary may be a member of the NATO International Staff.

19.12.1972 C-M(72)91

Report by the Chairman SPC.
Position Paper on Procedures for MBFR talks.

Item VIII. Services to be requested of the host country.

A. The host country should be asked to provide on a reimbursable basis: (1) administration of the building in which talks take place, including security (controlled entrances, etc.)

(2) translation and simultaneous interpretation at the talks from and into the official languages.

(3) administrative assistance (organisation of meetings, supervision of staff, duplicating, etc.)

B. There does not appear to be a need for host country services broader than those outlined above or for an East-West secretariat.

2.1.1973

MJ/73/1

Note by the Executive Secretariat.
Personnel Requirements for the MBFR Exploratory Talks.

The paper lists an estimate of the minimum number of staff which member countries might require the host Authorities to provide for the administrative organization of the MBFR Exploratory Talks.

3.1.1973

IMSWM-2-73

Memorandum from Director, IMS.
MC Representation on the site of MBFR Exploratory Talks.

The Enclosure contains draft terms of Reference for the Military Committee Representative.

Para 1. A Colonel (or equivalent) of the IMS will be nominated as the representative of the MC.....etc.

Para 2.the MC representative will be co-located and will work closely with the representatives of SACEUR and of the International Staff; their supporting staff and facilities will be amalgamated.

Para 3. The MC and SACEUR's representatives will be full participating members of the Allied Ad Hoc Group on the site of exploratory talks. The MC representative will closely monitor the meetings and the papers issued

at the site of MBFR talks. In representing military views in the Ad Hoc Group and/or to individual members of the Ad Hoc Group, the MC representative will draw on MC views and policies already decided. Where specific issues arise which are outside the framework of existing MC views or policies, the MC representative will seek the guidance of the Military Committee.

Para 4. The MC Representative will report to the Mil. Com. and receive instructions and guidance through the Chairman MC.

Para 5. For administrative issues concerned with the operation of the joint MC Rep/SACEUR Rep office and support services, the MC Rep will be responsible to the Director, IMS. All background services (courier, communications, security, etc.) will be provided through arrangements made by the International Staff, HQ NATO.

9.1.1973

PO/73/3

Note by the Secretary General.
International Staff Role in the
Ad Hoc Group at the site of MBFR
Talks.

With reference to para 7 of PO/72/413(Revised), the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs has been requested to be the Secretary General's personal representative in the Ad Hoc Group, with the understanding that, as a rule, he will delegate this task to the Head of Disarmament and Arms Control Section of the International Secretariat.

18.1.1973

Record-MC-1-73

Summary Record MC Meeting on
11.1.1973

The Military Committee agreed in principal with IMSWM-2-73 concerning MC representation at the site of MBFR exploratory talks; in particular, the MC endorsed the draft Terms of Reference at Enclosure to the paper.

CHAPTER VI: VERIFICATION (contd)

and reductions in a designated area are or are not being respected", the paper distinguishes between various types of potential violations, i.e. (1) minor violations; (2) substantial violations; and (3) major build-up violations.

Item III.F: Collateral Constraints, Verification, etc.
- Reductions focussing on units or major items of equipment would be more susceptible to inspection than reductions schemes focussing on thinning out personnel. It would be as easy or difficult to verify the post-reduction force level by inspection whether the reductions were taken by the equal percentage or personnel common ceiling method: that is, the size of the reduction would not greatly affect the problem. Some form of understanding on non-interference with National Means would be essential to verification.

- 15.2.1973 AC/276(SGVE)-WP/4 Note by Chairman S.G. on Verification. Airborne Photography.
The present note contains the draft Terms of Reference for a panel to study "Airborne Photography". As to the task of the panel, the following is stated: "The task of the panel is to examine the practicalities of adopting an airborne photographic inspection system, as an aid to verification of an MBFR or Movement Constraints Agreement with aircraft limited to flying in the height band 3,000 to 5,000 feet".
- 23.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)6 Progress Report by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Verification.

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

11.1.1973 C-M(73)2(Revised) Note by the Secretary General.
CSCE: Agenda, Committee Structure
and Mandates for Committees and
Sub-Committees.

16.1.1973 C-M(72)87
(3rd revise) Note by the Secretary General.
Guidelines and Agenda Papers for
Exploratory Talks on MBFR in
Central Europe.
(See for contents this Compendium, Chapter III.2).

22.1.1973 PO/73/11 Note by the Secretary General.
Recent Soviet and East European
views on military aspects of
security.

This report bring up-to-date the material contained
in PO/72/407, 19.10.72.

III.8. Moskow, Oct. 72. As regards MBFR, which, in
his view, should be discussed separately from the
CSCE, Mr. Kosygin expressed the hope that negotiations
could begin by about the first half of November 1973,
(which is not the date the Russians suggested to
Mr. Kissinger).

III.10. Washington, Nov 72. Ambassador Dobrynin to
Secretary of State Rogers: (3) The Soviet side
confirms its agreement to hold talks on reduction
of armed forces and armaments in a place other than
Helsinki. (4) It was noticed in Moscow that the
Secretary of State's personal note contained certain
unilateral formulations, for example: "mutual and
balanced" force reductions. The Soviet side has
never agreed to that formula, because there is much
unclear in it, and different meanings can be applied
to it. It would be more correct to speak about
"a reciprocal (vzaimnyy) reduction of armed forces
and armaments", having in mind that a solution of
that question should not be detrimental to the
security of any of the parties.

IV.16. Helsinki, 23 Nov. 72. Mr. Skowronski (Polish
MPT Del.) to Mr. Marshall (Can.Del): (3) The Warsaw
Pact accepted that in the first instance the focus
should be on a limited geographical area, "Central
Europe", but there might be reservations about the
inclusion of Hungary.

VI.18. Washington, 11 Oct 72: Romanian Dep.Foreign
Minister Macovescu to Ass.Sec. of State Stoessel:
Romania was prepared to sign today agreements on
advance notification of military movements and
manoeuvres and exchange of observers.

VI.19. Ottawa, 17 Oct 72: Mr. Macovescu: Romania
favours a future dissolution of the two blocs: The
principal aspects of MBFR could be synthesized into
three elements: (1) Withdrawal of troops from
foreign territories, and the order of precedence for
withdrawals. (2) Reduction of existing armaments,
both nuclear and conventional. (3) Reduction of
national troops.

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)Movement Constraints, Stabilising Measures, etc.

- 15.1.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1 Note by Turkish Member, MBFR WG. Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the Implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
- In this study some very substantive and detailed movement constraints on Soviet ground forces are proposed to counter an increase in the potential threat on the South-Eastern flank of NATO post-MBFR. Those measures amount to (in brief): (a) Redeployment areas for Soviet ground forces withdrawn from Central Europe, should be north of the 50th parallel. (b) Existing Soviet forces south of the 50th parallel should not be reinforced. (c) Movements of Soviet forces entering the area south of the 50th parallel should be notified one week in advance and be restricted to two divisions at a time, for an agreed period of time, and for exercises only. (d) Mobilisation exercises should be notified at least one week in advance, their duration should not exceed 21 days, and may not coincide with exercises of additional forces in the Southern area. (e) Rotation of units from outside into the Southern area should be notified in advance and may not effect the existing balance in favour of the USSR. -
The paper lists more or less similar constraints for Soviet air forces.
- 30.1.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1/1 Informal note by United Kingdom Member, WG. Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
- This note contains several tentative comments on AC/276-WP(73)1 and some thoughts on Reciprocity and Verification.
- 12.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1/2 Note by German Member, MBFR WG. Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
- Commenting on the Turkish (WP(73)1) and British (WP(73)1/1) papers, the main points are: para 3. One of the most debatable points in the Turkish paper seems to us the fact that the suggestions and criteria developed for movement constraints at the flanks cover exclusively measures for the constraint of WP forces. In the light of the undiminished Eastern objections to the term "balanced", it must be considered extremely improbable that the WP would agree to such unilateral measures; para 5. It seems to be worth considering whether, as a first step, less

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)Movement Constraints, Stabilising Measures, etc.

drastic constraints could be envisaged which would primarily aim at confidence-building, obtaining greater transparency and a possibly longer warning time; para 7. The Turkish paper does not include Rumania and Bulgaria in the area of application of possible constraints. The question of their inclusion should also be studied.

- 14.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)3 Progress Report by the Chairman, Sub-Group on Movement Constraints. The report accounts for the work on the Second Report on Movement Constraints and reveals the promise of the Norwegian Authorities to submit a Study on Movement Constraints for the Northern Flank.
- 28.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)7 Note by the MBFR Staff Group. The Issues involved in Including Hungary in a Constraints Area. (The Working Group requested the Staff Group to re-study this subject. See therefore next paper, i.e. AC/276-WP(73)13, 22.3.73).

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AC/276-WP(71)15/20CHAPTER XII: IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO (contd)

effort should be made that the Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe were not to be redeployed south of the 50°N latitude.

d. A force reduction in Central Europe should not result in a "unilateral and unbalanced Force Augmentation" on both NATO Flanks, which would not only damage the security of and the solidarity in the Alliance but would also influence NATO strategy and general defence posture.

- 11.12.1972 IMSWM-307-72 Memorandum from Director, IMS.
The Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
The Military Committee is requested to take note of the report at Enclosure and comment the contents. The Enclosure contains Working Group Report AC/276-D(72)5; at Annex the Turkish study, AC/276-WP(71)26, and the SHAPE study AC/276-WP(72)21.
- 15.1.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1 Note by Turkish Member, MBFR WG.
Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the Implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XI).
- 16.1.1973 Record-MC-1-73 Summary Record MC Meeting.
Part I.3: The Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
The Military Committee: a. Noted the report (Enclosure to IMSWM-307-72); b. Endorsed the following conclusions: (See AC/276-D(72)5, paragraphs 6 and 7.a at page XII-6 of this Compendium); c. Noted with satisfaction that the MBFR Working Group would examine, as a matter of priority, measures which might mitigate the potential effects of MBFR in Central Europe for other Regions.
- 20.1.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1/1 Informal Note by United Kingdom Member, MBFR WG. Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the Implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
This note contains several tentative comments on AC/276-WP(73)1 and some thoughts on Reciprocity and Verification.
- 12.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)1/2 Note by the German Member, MBFR WG.
Suggested Movement Constraints on WP Forces in order to avoid the Implications of MBFR on the South-Eastern Flank.
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XI).

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CHAPTER XV: HUNGARY (contd)

Denmark) for the inclusion of Hungary in the MBFR reduction area, the military advantages cannot outweigh the disadvantages attendant to any NATO concessions. This means that any decision on the inclusion of Hungary in the reduction area would have to be taken under political aspects.

- 17.11.1972 Record-MC-42-72 Summary Record Mil.Com.Meeting
9.11.72
I.2. The MBFR Reduction Zone:
Hungary.
- In discussing IMSWM-263-72, the Italian Member stated, that a reciprocal inclusion of Italy in a reduction area would be unacceptable to Italy. The Greek Member said that his Military Authorities considered that the expansion of the reduction zone to Hungary would be disadvantageous to NATO. The Turkish Member endorsed the Greek Member's remarks. In further discussion, there was general support for the concept that the IMS study should address the military implications for other regions than Central Europe. The study should include air as well as ground forces.
- 24.11.1972 110-5375-72/PL.1A. Memorandum from Turkish Milrep.
The Implications of MBFR in
Central Europe for other Regions.
(See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XII).
- 6.12.1972 MILSTAM(MBFR)-181-72 Memorandum from MBFR Staff Group.
MBFR and Hungary.
- Members of the Military Committee are requested to comment on this draft study on the military implications of adding Hungary to a reduction zone in MBFR.
- In the first part of this study the situation is analysed in which Hungary is added to the NATO Guidelines Area. In the second part of the study the situation is analysed in which Hungary is added to the NGA and some other Alliance member is added as a quid pro quo for Hungary's inclusion.
- 9.2.1973 IMSWM-20-73 Memorandum from Director, IMS.
MBFR - The Implications of
including Hungary in a Reduction
Zone.
- Para 2. It is recommended that the Military Committee:
(a) note the study at Enclosure (similar to MILSTAM(MBFR)-181-72); (b) endorse the conclusions of the study, that is, paragraph 19.
(See for contents, this compendium, page XV-3 in COM-14-73).

CHAPTER XV: HUNGARY (contd)

16.2.1973 MCM-14-73 Mil.Com. Memorandum for Sec.General.
MBFR: The Implications of Including
Hungary in a Reduction Zone.

At their meeting (Record MC-4-73) on 15.2.73, the Military Committee approved report (similar to IMSWM-20-73) annexed to this memorandum on the implications of including Hungary in a reduction zone. The Mil.Com. instructed that the report be forwarded with the request that its findings be taken into consideration in Council deliberations on MBFR.

The Report has been divided into two parts: Part I The implications of adding Hungary alone to the NATO Guidelines Area; and Part II The implications of adding additional NATO member States. The conclusions reached at, are:

Para 19. The inclusion of Hungary in a reduction area would be militarily advantageous to NATO, provided that the area is limited on the NATO side to the FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; and provided, also, that reductions are negotiated on a percentage basis. Concurrently, however, it is noted that:

a. There would be no military advantage in including Hungary in the area mentioned above if either (1) force reductions were negotiated in absolute terms; or (2) the Warsaw Pact could attenuate reductions of their forces opposing the FRG by applying correspondingly greater reductions to the forces based in Hungary.

b. If the Soviet forces withdrawn from Hungary could be so deployed as to increase the direct military threat in the Soviet military districts confronting Greece and/or Turkey, the advantages of including Hungary in a reduction zone would be outweighed by the disadvantage thus incurred.

c. If the inclusion of Hungary in a reduction area were to involve the addition of Denmark, Italy or the UK to the reduction area, the military advantages of including Hungary would be outweighed by the disadvantages which NATO would incur.

22.2.1973 Record-MC-4-73 Summary Record Mil.Com. Meeting
15.2.73. Part I. Item 3. MBFR.
The Implications of Including
Hungary in a Reduction Zone.
(See MCM-14-73), above).

CHAPTER XV: HUNGARY (contd)

- 22.2.1973 IMSWM-27-73 Memorandum, from the Director, IMS.
 MBFR - The Implications of Including
 Hungary in a Reduction Zone.
 The Council at a meeting on 21.2.73 requested the
 Military Committee to provide a response to the question:
 "Would the exclusion of Hungary from a reduction zone be
 disadvantageous to NATO from a military point of view?".
 Enclosed with the present memorandum is a proposed
 Addendum to MCM-14-73, in response to this requirement.
 The conclusion arrived at in the Enclosure reads:
 Para 8. "The exclusion of Hungary from a reduction area
 would be militarily disadvantageous for NATO. This
 conclusion is made without prejudice to the conclusions
 stated in MCM-14-73, of which this paper is an Addendum".
- 26.2.1973 USM-071-73 Memorandum from United States
 Representative MC.
 MBFR - The Implications of Including
 Hungary in a Reduction Zone.
 Because certain aspects of IMSWM-27-73 are unacceptable
 to the US MilRep, the present Memorandum contains a
 proposed new version of that paper.
- 26.2.1973 MCM-16-73 Mil.Com. Memorandum for Secretary General.
 MBFR - The Implications of Including
 Hungary in a Reduction Zone.
 The MC have approved the Addendum to MCM-14-73, annexed
 to this memorandum, in response to the question posed to
 the MC in the Council meeting of 21.2.73. The MC
 instructed that this Addendum be forwarded to the Council.
 The conclusion reads: Para 6. "Without prejudice to the
 conclusions stated in MCM-14-73, the exclusion of
 Hungary, like any other Warsaw Pact country posing a
 possible threat to the Central Region, would, of course,
 be militarily disadvantageous to NATO".
- 28.2.1973 AC/276-WP(73)7 Note by the MBFR Staff Group.
 The Issues involved in Including Hungary
 in a Constraints Area.
 (See for contents, this Compendium, Chapter XI).

CHAPTER XVIII: INDEX (contd)

DATE	NUMBER	CLASS	ORIGINATOR	TITLE OF DOCUMENT	CHAPTER
13.12.72	MILSTAM(MBFR)- 182-72 (Revised 17.1.73)	NS	MBFR Staff Group	Consideration of Mutual Reductions in tac.air.	XIII
15.12.72	PO/72/430	NC	Secretary General	Follow-up to the Ministerial Meeting	I.10, III.2
19.12.72	C-M(72)91	NC	SPC	Position papers on procedures for MBFR talks	III.2, III.5
21.12.72	AC/276(SGTA)-N/13 (2nd revise)	NS	MBFR WG - SGTA	Consideration of mutual reductions in tac.air.	XIII
2.1.73	MJ/73/1	NU	Exec.Sec.	Personnel require- ments for MBFR Exploratory Talks.	III.5
3.1.73	IMSWM-2-73	NC	Dir.IMS	MC Representation on the site of MBFR Expl. talks.	III.5
9.1.73	PO/73/3	NC	Secretary General	I.S. role in the Ad Hoc Group at MBFR Expl. talks.	III.5
11.1.73	C-M(73)2(rev.)	NC	Council	CSCE: Agenda, Mandates.	I.10, III-2 X
12.1.73	C-M(73)4	NC	Council	Non-agreed proposals on Agenda CSCE, etc.	I.10, III-2
15.1.73	AC/276-WP(73)1	NC	MBFR WG.	Suggested Movement Constraints S.B. Flank.(Turkish Member)	XI, XII
16.1.73	C-M(72)87 (3rd revise)	NC	Council	Guidelines and Agenda papers for MBFR Expl.talks.	I.10, III-2 X
18.1.73	Record-MC-1-73	NC	Mil.Comm.	Summary record MC meeting 11.1.73	III.5, XII
22.1.73	PO/73/11	NC	Secretary General	Recent Soviet and East European views on mil.aspects of security	X
24.1.73	PO/73/13	NC	Secretary General	MBFR: Major unresolved issues.	I.10, III.2

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DATE	NUMBER	CLASS	ORIGINATOR	TITLE OF DOCUMENT	CHAPTER
26.1.73	C-M(73)9	NC	SPC	Organizational arrangements after the CSCE.	I.10
30.1.73	AC/276-WP(73)1/1	NC	MBFR WG	Movement Constraints on SE Flank (UK Member)	XI, XII
31.1.73	AC/276-WP(72)32 (3rd revise)/1	NC	MBFR WG	Offensive/Defensive natures of WP and NATO (UK Member).	II.6
2.2.73	C-M(73)11(Revised)	NC	Council	Follow-up to the Conference - Amendment to Steering Brief.	I.10 III.2
9.2.73	IMSWM-20-73	NS	Dir. IMS	Implications of including Hungary in Reduction Zone	XV
12.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)1/2	NC	MBFR WG	Movement constraints on SE Flank (German Member).	XI, XII
13.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)32 (4th revise)	NS	MBFR WG	Offensive/Defensive Natures of WP and NATO.	II.6
14.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)2	NS	MBFR WG	Mobilization of NATO and WP forces	II.5
14.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)3	NC	MBFR WG -- SGMC	Progress Report SG Movement Constraints	XI
14.2.73	POLADS(73)5	NR	SPC	MBFR: Article by Prof. Projektor	X
15.2.73	AC/276(SGVE)-WP/4	NC	MBFR WG -- SGVE	Airborne Photography	VI
16.2.73	MCM-14-73	NS	Mil. Com.	Implications including Hungary in Reduction Zone.	XV
16.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)4	NS	MBFR WG -- SGDS	Data on NATO and WP Ground Forces.	II.4
16.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)5	NC	MBFR WG -- SGDS	Progress Report SG Data Support	II.4

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DATE	NUMBER	CLASS	ORIGINATOR	TITLE OF DOCUMENT	CHAPTER
21.2.73	PO/73/24	NS	Secretary General	MBFR: Major Unresolved Issues	III.2
22.2.73	Record-MC-4-73	NC	Mil.Com.	Summary record MC meeting 15.2.73	XV
22.2.73	IMSWM-27-73	NS	Dir. IMS	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone.	XV
23.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)6	NC	MBFR WG - SGVE	Progress Report SG on Verification	VI
26.2.73	USM-071-73	NS	US Milrep	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone	XV
26.2.73	MCM-16-73	NS	Mil.Com.	Implications of including Hungary in reduction zone	XV
28.2.73	AC/276-WP(73)7	NC	MBFR WG	Issues involved in including Hungary in constraints area.	XI, XV

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