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WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(70)32

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

FIRST DRAFT OF THE WORKING GROUP REPORT

Note by the Chairman

In May 1970, Ministers considered our first report(1) on the possibilities and implications of mutual and balanced force reductions. We encountered considerable difficulty in conducting the study leading to this report, some on points of principle in that, for example, the political guidelines required reductions to be in identical units and we found that units within NATO were not identical although similarly described, while Warsaw Pact formations/units are substantially different from Western National units. We encountered difficulty, too, in interpretation of the stationed forces concept and, at the mechanical level, in obtaining the information we required on both Warsaw Pact and NATO forces with an inadequate data base and no automated recall facility for such data. We did, however, develop five models designed to exemplify the many possible permutations and to provide some basis for judgment of the implications of such reductions for NATO; at the time, we stressed that the data on which these models were based had to be refined. While the analysis of these models proved extremely useful, it remains our opinion that - in their present form - they could not be offered as models to be negotiated.

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2. In the period since May 1970, we have probed many other possibilities and have concentrated on rapid expansion and up-dating of the automated data base. We discuss these below, and the progress made in improvement of our data since May 1970.

The Data Base

3. However, even at that time, much of the data available to us was comprehensive and accurate, particularly those elements of it which gave, in round terms rather than in the detail of equipments and precise dispositions, the strengths and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces on the one hand and the

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NATO forces on the other. Since May 1970, we have reviewed and confirmed or corrected our assessments of force strengths with all available reliable authorities; and are now in process of amplifying, up-dating and automating our store of data in this context. In view of our previous inability to rely, with confidence, on our figures of Warsaw Pact and NATO strengths as a basis for framing and analysing various options for balanced force reductions, we feel it appropriate to recount briefly the action taken and in hand to provide reliable figures.

4. The information available to HQ NATO has been passed to concerned Nations in respect of National forces and to Intelligence sources in respect of Warsaw Pact forces, with the request in both cases that it be amplified, corrected and up-dated as necessary. This action is complete for the Warsaw Pact forces data store and the information is expected to be included in, and available for recall from, the SHAPE Technical Centre computer by the end of October 1970. For NATO National data, only five Nations have thus far provided corrected and up-dated information; when this information has been received and reviewed at HQ NATO, it will be incorporated in the STC computer data store. This process will take 30-60 days to complete from receipt of National contributions.

5. In July 1970, ways and means of amplifying available intelligence were discussed with National representatives; additional and valuable material deriving from the decisions taken at this meeting will be available in the data store by early 1971. We have been advised by Nations that, after this improvement, no further additional informations will be forthcoming but that the information in the data store will be up-dated as necessary.

Numerical Relationship with the Warsaw Pact

6. The Warsaw Pact is substantially superior in terms of military manpower and equipment to NATO: we summarise below our comparisons, based on the latest and most accurate data available to us, of NATO and WARSAW PACT strengths in certain crucial aspects of military power. We have used, in these examples, the headings Stationed Forces in Europe, Non-indigenous Forces in Europe, and Non-indigenous Forces in Central Region.

(a) Totals of Western Forces in Europe (including French forces) and Warsaw Pact Forces ready for early commitment(1)

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO plus French</u>
(1)	Divisions	46 $\frac{30}{3}$	158 $\frac{2}{3}$	51 $\frac{30}{3}$
(2)	Personnel	M: 0.88	M: 1.7	M: 0.98

(1) Extracted from AC/281-WP(70)53(Revised)

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<u>Serial</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO plus French</u>
(3)	Combat a/c	3,105	5,700	3,470
(4)	Tanks	9,900	36,000	11,000
(5)	Arm'd Vehs.	19,120	37,000	20,000
(6)	AT Wpns.	9,855	10,000	10,000
(7)	Mortars	4,910	6,000	5,000
(8)	Artillery	4,725	14,000	5,000
(9)	SAM	1,652	4,600	1,700
(10)	Long range a/c.	-	600	-
(11)	Air Def. a/c.	-	2,600	-
(12)	Logistics vehs	M: 0.134	M: 0.275	M: 0.16.

(b) Non-indigenous Forces (incl. US in Spain, Turkey, Italy and UK: FR, BE, NL, UK & US in Germany: Soviet in Hungary)

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO plus French</u>
(1)	Personnel	371,500	513,000	406,000
(2)	Aircraft	-	1,560	670
(3)	Tanks	3,020	8,500	3,840

(c)(1) Non-indigenous Forces in Central Region

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO plus French</u>
(1)	Personnel	339,500	455,000	374,000
(2)	Aircraft	-	1,400	470
(3)	Tanks	3,020	7,500	3,840

(c)(2) Non-indigenous Forces in Central Region as Percentage of Forces in Central Region

		<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
(1)	Personnel	44	36
(2)	Aircraft	36	32
(3)	Tanks	51	49

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7. Although it may be too early to draw any final and firm conclusions, it is apparent that the disparity of the opposing strengths so favours the Warsaw Pact, under any and all of the headings listed above, that it will be extremely difficult to evolve any reductions which, being balanced - whether numerically, proportionately to starting strength, or in relative effect - will not work to NATO's disadvantage. No direct and valid comparisons can be made in formation strengths (eg divisions) because of differences in structure; however, the Warsaw Pact superiority in fire power - and particularly in offensive fire power - can be illustrated graphically by their preponderance in aircraft, artillery and tanks, thus:

(a) <u>Forces in Europe</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Arty</u>	<u>Tanks</u>
(1) NATO (M - Day) plus French:	3,470	5,000	11,000
(2) French	-	275	1,100
(3) WP (Ready for early commitment)	8,300	14,000	36,000
(b) <u>Non-indigenous - Central Region</u>			
(1) NATO	470		3,840
(2) French	-		820
(3) WP	1,400		7,500
(c) <u>Non-indigenous - Europe</u>			
(1) NATO	670		3,840
(2) French	-		820
(3) WP	1,560		8,500

8. In producing and analysing these figures, and various models, we have borne constantly in mind that while these present on the one hand virtually the total capability of the NATO nations, the figures represent only part of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact capability - that part currently located in or directed toward Europe. The Soviet reserves are known to be very large and the Warsaw Pact enjoys the very significant advantages of internal lines of communication, standardisation of equipments, standardisation of training, the initiative, and choice of target. On the other hand, we are sensible that there are certain intangible and unquantifiable but important elements within the Warsaw Pact which could work to our advantage. The Soviets must, for example, so dispose their resources and forces as to take account of the chronic border disturbances and the threat posed by Red China in the East; they devote a substantial element of their forces to internal security; the commitment of certain of the satellite Nations to Soviet aims is neither absolute nor wholly reliable.

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It might be that withdrawal of Soviet forces, wholly or partly, from (say) Poland and Czechoslovakia under a negotiated "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction" agreement would create opportunity in those countries for defection from the Soviet system or reduce their reliability as defensive bastions or bases for offensive action against the West.

Stationed Forces in the Central Region

9. The phrase "foreign armed forces on the territory of European states" can be variously interpreted; viz:

- (a) Forces of one or more nations stationed on the territory in Europe of another nation; or on the territories in Europe of other nations.
- (b) Forces of one or more nations, whose territory lies outside an area of force reductions, which, however, are stationed on the territory of European nations wholly or partially included in an area of force reductions.
- (c) Forces of one or more nations, whose territory lies wholly or partly inside an area of force reductions, which are stationed on the territory in Europe of one or more other nations which may partially or totally - or might not be - included in an area of force reductions.

10. We have taken, as a means of illustrating some of the possibilities, five assumed areas for possible reductions and we show below the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces which would be involved if the definition in paragraph 9(b) above were applied to these assumed areas; thus:

(a) Area of Reduction: FRG/East Germany

	<u>Army Personnel</u>	<u>Air Force Personnel</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Soviet in E. Germany	276,039	60,000	5,272	990	
NATO in FRG	316,375	46,045	3,573	455	

(b) Area of Reduction: FRG, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg / East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia

Soviet	368,411	87,000	7,532	1,443	
NATO	283,734	46,026	3,010	472	

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(c) Area of Reduction: FRG, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey / East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania

	<u>Army Personnel</u>	<u>Air Force Personnel</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Soviet	428,411	97,000	8,532	1,680	
NATO	204,998	73,946	1,614	708	

(d) Area of Reduction: As for (c) above, plus Iceland, Malta, Spain

Soviet	428,411	97,000	8,532	1,680	
NATO	204,998	83,946	1,614	753	

11. Applying the definition in paragraph 9(b) above for "non-indigenous forces" to these areas of reductions and the forces shown therein, only the forces of the following nations, stationed in the areas of reduction quoted, would be affected:

<u>Area of Reduction</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Tanks</u>	<u>A/C</u>
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>		
(a) FRG/E. Germany	Soviet	276,039	60,000	5,272	990
NATO plus French	US	192,340	33,255	1,558	233
	CAN	6,000	4,011	56	113
	UK	49,837	6,628	575	109
	NL	3,550	-	-	-
	BE	30,110	2,149	491	-
	FR	34,538	-	821	-
	Total		316,375	46,045	3,573
(b) <u>FRG; BE:NL: LU: / E. Germany:Poland; Czechoslovakia</u>	Soviet	368,411	87,000	7,532	1,443
	US	193,222	35,387	1,558	250
	CA	6,137	4,011	56	113
	UK	49,837	6,628	575	109
	FR	34,538	-	821	-
	Total		283,734	46,026	3,010

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(c) FRG:DA.NO: BE:	Soviet	428,411	97,000	8,532	1,680
NL.LU: FRANCE:					
UK: PO: IT: GR:	US	198,861	69,935	1,558	595
TU: / E. GERMANY:	CA	6,137	4,011	56	113
POLAND. CZECHOS-					
LOVAKIA: HUNGARY:	Total	204,998	73,946	1,614	708
BULGARIA: RUMANIA.					
(d) FRG.DA.NO:BE:NL.	Soviet	428,411	97,000	8,532	1,680
LU: FRANCE:UK:PO:					
IT:GR:TU:ICELAND/					
E.GERMANY.POLAND:	US	198,861	79,935	1,558	640
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:	CA	6,137	4,011	56	113
HUNGARY.BULGARIA.					
RUMANIA.	Total	204,998	83,946	1,614	753
PLUS FOR NATO					
SPAIN AND MALTA.					
(e) FRG:DA.NO.BE:NL:	Soviet	-	-	-	-
LU:FR:UK:PO:IT:					
GR:TU: ICELAND/					
E.GERMANY:POLAND:	US	198,861	79,935	1,558	640
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:	CA	6,137	4,011	56	113
HUNGARY:BULGARIA					
PLUS SPAIN AND	Total	204,998	83,946	1,614	853
MALTA / THREE					
WESTERN MDs/USSR					

12. It will be deduced from cases (a)-(e) above that:

- (a) No German forces would be subject to reduction in case (a).
- (b) No GE. NL. BE: LU: POLISH or CZECHOSLOVAKIAN forces would be involved in case (b).
- (c) Case (e) would affect US and CA forces only.

13. Although a symmetrical cut in the ceilings of "foreign armed forces" in cases (b), (c) and (d) would seem to favour NATO, such solutions would not be acceptable militarily to NATO. Indeed, at this stage of our study, we cannot envisage any solution which, being acceptable to the Soviets, would not work to NATO's disadvantage by a weakening in absolute terms of forces which we believe to be minimal, or below strength to meet a major threat of conventional war. We believe it might be profitable, however, to pursue the concept implicit in an Italian note (1) and explicit in the United Kingdom contribution(2) that the focus

(1) AC/276-WP(70)25

(2) AC/276-WP(70)27

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should be on the scale of forces which remain after reduction rather than on the scale of the reduction themselves. If, for example, the Soviets could be persuaded to reduce to a scale competent to contain any conceivable conventional assault by NATO with present NATO force ceilings, the consequent reduction on the Warsaw Pact side would be much greater than on the NATO side; and it would then be possible and sensible for NATO Nations, still relying ultimately for their defence on the nuclear deterrent, to take further calculated risks and reduce their conventional strength in the Central Region particularly.

14. There are various means of approaching such a concept and we discuss below a philosophy, rather than a proposal, which might provide the base for a negotiable position.

Establishment of a Force Limitation

15. Military experience shows that a force ratio of 2:1 in favour of the attacker is generally considered appropriate for a successful attack. History also shows situations in which two opposing sides had almost equal overall capability but one side attacked successfully; in these cases, the attacker concentrated his strength in one area to gain local superiority and seize the initiative. Equally, there have been cases in which stronger forces have been defeated because terrain favoured their enemy, or because the principles of war were better applied by that enemy. For practical purposes, however, such factors as terrain and manoeuvrability may be discounted here, as they might be used properly by both sides.

16. The overall force ratio loses some of its importance for the side taking the initiative. This poses, for a defensively oriented alliance like NATO, a particular dilemma since, not only is it relatively lightly armed, it is also confronted with an aggressive alliance possessing larger forces, indoctrinated, trained, organized and equipped for offensive operations. It is true, however, that the side taking the initiative in aggression is confronted with decreasing advantages and increasing problems as its forces decrease in relation to the opposing forces. The prospect of launching a successful attack grows less as forces become more nearly balanced.

17. The leading powers in both alliances, NATO and Warsaw Pact, are believed to have, or to be near to achieving, nuclear balance in the strategic sense. This makes future nuclear conflict less likely. The main problem facing NATO is that of conventional attack, or the threat of such attack; and in this field, there is great disparity, particularly in the Central Region, as shown by the following force ratios:

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	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>		<u>NATO</u>
(a) Personnel	1.9	:	1
(b) Tanks	3.7	:	1
(c) Aircraft	3.7	:	1

These ratios do not change to NATO's advantage if the whole of NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact territories are taken into account; the particularly important aspects would further favour the Warsaw Pact.

18. In our view, it would be logical - and might well provide a basis for negotiation - to attempt to bring the force ratios cited above closer. It is felt that NATO could live with an overall force ratio in the Central Region of 2:1 in favour of the Warsaw Pact. With that as a target, force limitations should be established for Warsaw Pact and NATO as follows and in the order of priority as listed:

(a) Tanks	10,000 : 5,000 = 2:1
(b) Aircraft	2,500 : 1,200 = 2:1
(c) Personnel	1 M. : 0.5 M = 2:1

The number of divisions remaining should not exceed 20 for NATO and 60 (at the normal two-thirds NATO divisional strength) for the Warsaw Pact, in the reduction area which, in our concept, should include the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux countries, the SOZG, CSSR, Poland and the three most westerly Military Districts of the USSR. With a balance such as we envisage, neither side need fear immediate attack and each would have forces adequate to contain an attack on the scale practicable to the other side. We envisage a programme on the following broad lines:

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- (d) A limitation on any increase of present forces; coupled with agreement to refrain from replacement of worn or obsolete major armament (ie tanks and aircraft): this should result eventually in actual reductions.
 - (e) Each side to decide its own reductions to arrive at the figures and ratios at (a)-(c) above. NATO could so distribute the reductions as to retain eg divisions on the scale US - 4: UK - 2: NL - 1 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds: BE - 1 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds: CA - $\frac{1}{3}$ rd: GE - 10 $\frac{1}{3}$ rd, each at 100% strength.
 - (f) The reductions to be implemented in three equal annual slices.
 - (g) Movement within the reduction to be restricted: up to say 3 divisions might be concentrated for manoeuvres or exercises, and supplemented by a fourth division from outside the reduction area for a specified period (say 60 days).

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- (h) In the area of immediate confrontation, the verification system would require the capability to detect even minor breaches of the agreement; elsewhere in the reduction area, verification could concentrate on identification of major breaches.

19. Since our last report(1), we have pursued various lines of thought and action directed towards finding an acceptable basis for negotiation of "mutual and balanced force reductions" which would not work too seriously to NATO's disadvantage. We cannot claim to have discovered such a basis, but do not despair of finding one after further study; and we believe that consideration should be given towards pursuing the concept of reductions to balanced force ceilings(2) either overall or in specified areas.

20. We have had some valuable inputs from Nations which provided solid and provocative material for thought. We await other contributions, notably from the United States, which will help to carry the study further. We are impressed by the flexibility and imaginativeness of the approach to the problem apparent in many of the papers we have received; and we share the view expressed by the German Military Representative that our future studies if they are to be productive, will have to be more flexible than was possible in the rather restrictive boundaries of the illustrative model studies we conducted in earlier phases of our examination; and perhaps broader in scope than is envisaged in the present political guidelines.

21. We have found means, and are now implementing them, to produce more, and more reliable, information on the strengths, composition and equipments of both our own and the Warsaw Pact forces. These figures, when available towards the end of this year and early in 1971, will provide a solid base for comparisons of relative strengths and the implications of proposed reductions.

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(1) AC/276-D(70)4
(2) AC/276-WP(70)27