

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

REF ID: A66587
DOWNGRADED TO NC
SEE: DN: 200510004

EXEMPLAIRE N°
COPY 285

N A T O S E C R E T

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
24th November, 1972

DOCUMENT
AC/276-D(72)5

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE
FLANKS OF NATO

Report by the Working Group

Since mid-1971, the MBFR Working Group have been examining the implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the flanks of NATO. They have taken account of the views(1) expressed by the Military Committee - in the context of a review(1) of an assessment(2) by SHAPE of the risks involved in selected MBFR models designed for Central Europe - that certain military advantages afforded to the Warsaw Pact vis-à-vis ACE in the Central Region would be reduced, particularly in the aspects of reinforcement and initiative, if the MBFR areas could be extended to include at least the three Western Military Districts of the USSR. The Military Committee commented that "The local effect would be to slow down the Soviet build-up in the combat zone, and probably to provide more warning of imminent aggression. This would be at the cost of accepting a Soviet deployment which could pose an increased risk to NATO's flanks".

The "Risk Assessments"

2. The MBFR Working Group have concentrated, in their study, on analysis(3) carried out by SHAPE, within Terms of Reference(4) defined by the Working Group, of the effects of five possible Soviet redeployments post-MBFR for ground forces in Central Europe, i.e. in the NATO Guidelines Area (FRG, BE, LU, NL; GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia). These reductions range from 10% to 30%, and redeployments towards the flanks from 1 tank division to three divisions (2 tank: 1 motorized to S. Region: 2 motorized 1 tank to N. Region).

3. The Working Group also had the benefit of a study(5) by the Turkish Authorities which postulated a wider range of reductions, including air forces, in Central Europe (10%-50%)

This document consists of: 3 pages
Annex I of: 8 pages
Annex II of: 15 pages

- (1) MCM-43-71, 2nd July, 1971
- (2) SHAPE 23/71, 28th February, 1971 (CTS)
- (3) AC/276-WP(72)21, 19th May, 1972
- (4) AC/276-WP(71)24(Final), 4th November, 1971
- (5) AC/276-WP(71)26, 27th October, 1971

N A T O S E C R E T

AC/276-D(72)5

-2-

and redeployment of larger Soviet forces towards the South-Eastern Flank. In the lower ranges of reduction, most or all of the withdrawn divisions are so redeployed as to be available for operations against the Southern flank; in the higher ranges of postulated reductions, up to some 80% of the withdrawn Soviet forces are assumed to be redeployed against the Southern Region.

4. The two studies (at Annexes I and II for ease of reference), based on different post-MBFR redeployment assumptions(1), both conclude that MBFR in the Central Region will have serious implications for the Southern Region in particular. The disparity in force strengths on the flanks is already great: for the smaller reductions (e.g. 10%) in Central Europe and on the assumption that only one-third of the withdrawn forces are redeployed against the flanks, the SHAPE study finds that there will be a marginal increase in the military threat to Greece and Turkey. For the higher range (30%), the increase in threat would be moderate: but these "marginal" and "moderate" assessments are related to the force superiority, already substantial, possessed by the Soviets. The Turkish findings are compatible, but postulating greater Soviet redeployments towards the Southern flank, show a correspondingly greater increase in force ratios in Soviet favour.

5. Both studies stress the point that even small increases in the Soviet military superiority in the flanks could have significant implications, since any increase in these Soviet forces would be cause for concern regarding Soviet intentions.

Conclusions

6. The Working Group view, after considerable study and discussion, is that both the SHAPE and Turkish studies are valid assessments, based on their different assumptions. They cover, in conjunction, such a wide range of reductions and redeployments towards the flanks that, in the Working Group view, no further "risk assessment" of additional models is required.

7. The Working Group further conclude that:

- (a) The degree of the increase in risk to the flanks must be viewed in the perspective of the overall defence of NATO, not simply an isolated region of NATO. However, as things now stand, the Soviet superiority in conventional forces deployed to face the flanks is

(1) The Warsaw Pact figures used to compute pre-MBFR force ratios on the Southern flank in these studies included all Category I and II forces in the following locations: Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Soviet Military districts of Turkestan, Trans Caucasus, North Caucasus and Odessa. Forces in other locations and Category III forces were not included.

N A T O S E C R E T

-3-

AC/276-D(72)5

very high. Any increase in that Soviet superiority could be an indication of intention and, equally, could be an intolerable threat for the countries in the flank region.

- (b) It is conceivable that measures to deal with this potential problem could be developed as part of Alliance negotiating positions, but until further study is devoted to the matter, little else can be said. The study of possible measures should take high priority in the Movement Constraints Sub-Group, for which the Working Group will prepare terms of reference.

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

N A T O S E C R E T

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

-1-

ANNEX I to
AC/276-D(72)5

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL REGION
ON THE SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK

Note by the Turkish Delegation(1)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The mutual and balanced force reductions to be implemented in the Central Region might produce, under any agreed form or model, certain effects on the South-Eastern Flank. Unless disbanded within the framework of an MBFR agreement, the redeployment of the withdrawn Soviet Forces outside the reduction area, will create a new and additional threat on the South-Eastern Flank.

2. Since the Alliance has neither so far developed a certain model for MBFR negotiations nor singled out the yardsticks for the force reductions in the Central Region, some assumptions were required for this analysis. The assumptions taken as basis for this study are in conformity with the ones used in the other studies made in the Alliance. However, the possible MBFR negotiations and even the soundings and the contacts of the Explorer may turn out to be of a nature to influence these starting points.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

3. The mutual and balanced force reductions will be confined to the NATO guidelines area and South-Eastern Flank will be excluded from the reduction area.

4. Under this assumption, the minimum reduction area is dealt with among the various alternatives. In case the territories of the other Warsaw Pact countries are included in the reduction area (e.g. Hungary or three Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union) the threat on the South-Eastern Flank shall be comparably greater than the conclusions of this study.

(1) Originally issued as AC/276-WP(71)26

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

-1-

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX I to
AC/276-D(72)5

-2-

5. Regardless of the model of reductions agreed upon for the Central Region, the Soviet forces are assumed to be reduced between a minimum 10% and a maximum 50%.

6. As the threat on the South-Eastern Flank will emanate from the withdrawn Soviet forces, the present analysis shall attempt to evaluate the Soviet threat in a post-MBFR situation, rather than dealing with the models covering mutual reductions.

7. Reductions will be applied to conventional forces.

8. Reductions will cover both indigenous and stationed forces.

9. Ground and air forces will be included in the reductions. However, Naval forces, strategic missile units, internal security and border units and medium and heavy bombers not effecting land battle will be excluded.

10. The reduced indigenous forces will be disbanded or be taken to reserve status. The stationed forces will remain in active status or be taken to reserve status and they will be redeployed outside the reduction area.

11. For the Soviet stationed ground forces the redeployment areas will be one of the following:

- (a) Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian,
- (b) Odessa, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan,
- (c) Kiev and Moscow.

12. For the Soviet stationed air forces the geographic redeployment areas do not bear great importance. However, two alternatives may be considered with regard to their effects on the South-Eastern Flank:

- (a) The areas from which the aircrafts can reach South-Eastern without refuelling (Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan).
- (b) The area from which the aircrafts can reach South-Eastern Flank with a single refuelling (the Northern Russia).

13. The data used in this study is taken from MC 161/71 and DPQ(70).

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

-2-

C. ANALYSIS

I. Ground Forces

14. The withdrawn Soviet Forces will constitute a threat to various regions of NATO according to their redeployment areas:

- (a) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Baltic, Belorussia and Carpathians, these forces will threaten Central region of NATO rather than South-Eastern Flank.

This has been examined in detail by SHAPE in the Risk assessment. In order to avoid such a threat, the inclusion of the three Western Military Districts in the reduction area has been suggested.

- (b) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Kiev and Moscow districts, these forces will be assigned to the general Soviet requirements. However, if these forces remain in the I and II categories they can be in combat readiness successively in M and M + 21 days, and if they are taken in third category they might be used for the Central region and South Eastern Flank any time after D + 4.
- (c) If the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in Odessa, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan, the ratios of forces in the South-Eastern Flank and Eastern Turkey will be subject to following changes:
- (i) The pre-MBFR ratios of ground forces in Western Turkey and Greece, and Eastern Turkey are shown in Annex I.
- (ii) The pre-MBFR ratios of air forces in South-Eastern Flank are shown in Annex II.
- (iii) The post-MBFR force ratios in South-Eastern Flank and Eastern Turkey are shown in Annex III.

The tables in Annex III clearly show that there will be considerable increase in the WP forces in proportion to the NATO forces in these areas:

PRE-MBFR RATIOS

	<u>Western Turkey and Greece / WP</u>	<u>Eastern Turkey / WP</u>
Personnel	1:1.1	1:1.3
Tanks	1:2.8	1:3.5
Divisions	1:1.9	1:1.8

POST-MBFR RATIOS

	<u>Western Turkey and Greece / WP</u>	<u>Eastern Turkey / WP</u>
Personnel	1:1.3 - 1:1.9	1:1.7 - 1:3.5
Tanks	1:3.3 - 1:4.4	1:4.6 - 1:8.6
Divisions	1:2.2 - 1:2.9	1:2.3 - 1:4.1

15. As mentioned above the minimum reduction area has been taken as a basis for the present analysis. The extension of this area with the inclusion of the territories of the other Warsaw Pact countries will further increase the threat on the South-Eastern Flank. Accordingly, the inclusion of the three Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union to the NATO guidelines area may lead to the redeployment of additional forces in Odessa, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan which would thereby increase the above ratios to the disadvantage of NATO side.

II. Air Forces

16. The ratios of the air forces in the South-Eastern Flank with regard to Pre-MBFR and Post-MBFR situations are shown successively in tables II and III. The ratio between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will be as great as 1:5.6 if the withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed in the Southern Military districts of the Soviet Union.

17. Although the threat of ground forces might materialise gradually, the air forces could be effective from the D-day on.

D. CONCLUSIONS

18. Any MBFR agreement which might lead to the redeployment of the Soviet forces outside the reduction area, will have serious implications on the South-Eastern Flank.

19. In order to maintain the security and the solidarity of the Alliance, the implications of the reductions on the peripheral areas must be taken into account with utmost care. The achievement of a certain balance of forces in Central region to the detriment of the other areas would not only damage the security of and the solidarity in the Alliance but would also influence the NATO strategy and the general defence posture.

20. In order to obtain maximum security for the Central region, the Soviet forces would have to be withdrawn to the east of a certain longitude. However, such a limitation would not provide security for the South-Eastern Flank. Keeping in view that the redeployment of the Soviet forces in the Southern Military Districts of the Soviet Union will considerably deteriorate the balance of forces in the South-Eastern Flank and consequently create disadvantages for NATO, such a limitation should also be applied to a certain latitude preventing the redeployment beyond that line.

COMPARISON OF FORCES IN THE SOUTH EASTERN FLANK BEFORE MBFR

APPENDIX 1 to
ANNEX I to
AC/276-D(72)5

M-DAY - GROUND FORCES

DOWNGRADED TO NC

SEE: DN(2005)0004

<u>N A T O</u>				<u>W A R S A W P A C T</u>				<u>R A T I O N A T O / W P</u>		
<u>TERRITORY</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANKS</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>TERRITORY</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANKS</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>
W. TURKEY	106.396	1.088	7 2/3	BULGARIA	94.674	2.421	5 tank 8 motorised			
				ROMANIA	69.270	1.612	2 tank 6 motorised			
GREECE	73.000	714	5 2/3	ODESSA	39.725	965	1 tank 3 motorised			
TOTAL	179.396	1.802	13 1/3	TOTAL	203.669	4.998	25	1:1.1	1:2.8	1:1.9
E. TURKEY	89.446	718	6	S. UNION	110.752	2.554	2 tank 9 motorised	1:1.3	1:3.5	1:1.8
GRAND TOTAL	268.842	2.520	17 1/3	GRAND TOTAL	314.421	7.552	36	1:1.2	1:3.1	1:1.9

- NOTE: (1) 2 of the 3 airborne divisions in the area are assumed to be a threat to Turkey
(2) Figures are rounded for convenience

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

APPENDIX 2 to
ANNEX I to
AC/276-D(72)5

COMPARISON OF FORCES IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK BEFORE MBFRAIR FORCES

<u>N A T O</u>		<u>WARSAW PACT</u>		<u>R A T I O</u>	
<u>Territory</u>	<u>Tactical Aircraft</u>	<u>Territory</u>	<u>Tactical Aircraft</u>	<u>Greece/WP</u>	<u>Turkey/WP</u>
TURKEY	218	S. UNION	710	1:9.8	1:7
GREECE	154	ROMANIA	351		
		BULGARIA	457		
TOTAL	372		1.518		1:4

- NOTE:
- (1) Air threat can be divided between Turkey and Greece
 - (2) The reconnaissance capabilities of the aircraft were also taken into account in addition to attack capabilities
 - (3) Above figures do not include transport aircraft and army aircraft

COMPARISON OF RATIO PRE- AND POST MBFR IN THE SOUTH EASTERN FLANK

REDEPLOYMENT AREA : ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT

<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>	<u>Pre-MBFR</u> <u>WESTERN TURKEY/</u> <u>AND GREECE</u> / <u>WP</u>	<u>Post - MBFR</u>		
		<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>10% Red.</u>	<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>30% Red.</u>	<u>W.T. and Gr./WP</u> <u>50% Red.</u>
PERSONNEL	1:1.1	1:1.3	1:1.0	1:1.9
TANKS	1:2.8	1:3.3	1:3.8	1:4.4
DIVISIONS	1:1.9	1:2.2	1:2.5	1:2.9
AIRCRAFT	1:4	1:4.4	1:5	1:5.6

COMPARISON OF RATIO PRE- AND POST MBFR IN EASTERN TURKEY

REDEPLOYMENT AREA : NORTHERN CAUCASUS, TRANSCAUCASUS AND TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICTS

<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>	<u>Pre-MBFR</u> <u>EASTERN TURKEY/WP</u>	<u>Post - MBFR</u>		
		<u>E.T. /WP</u> <u>10%</u>	<u>E.T./WP</u> <u>30%</u>	<u>E.T./WP</u> <u>50%</u>
PERSONNEL	1:1.3	1:1.7	1:2.5	1:3.5
TANKS	1:3.5	1:4.6	1:6.6	1:8.6
DIVISIONS	1:1.8	1:2.3	1:3.2	1:4.1
AIRCRAFT	1:4	1:4.4	1:5	1:5.6

IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE
FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO(1)

TO : Chairman
North Atlantic Military Committee
Autoroute Brussels-Zaventem
B-1110, Brussels, Belgium
(Attn: Chairman, MBFR WG)

REFERENCES : a. AC/276-WP(71)24(Final), 4 Nov 71
b. AC/276-WP(71)26, 27 Oct 71

1. (NR) In response to the request of the Chairman, MBFR WG (ref a), SHAPE has conducted a study on "Implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO." The purpose, scope, assumptions and methodology are covered in Sections I - III and the conclusions in Section V of the study. The study examined the possible increase in the threat to the Flanks of NATO as a consequence of an MBFR agreement in Central Europe.

2. (NR) It should be noted that the study and its conclusions are dependent upon the assumptions and Terms of Reference provided by the MBFR WG (ref a). Any change in the assumptions concerning Soviet intentions, which would be reflected in the deployment of their withdrawn forces, would most likely result in different conclusions. In this regard, the study also considered the Turkish note (ref b) which is based on different assumptions than those in ref a. In addition, the analysis of the study is done in such a way that redeployment models beyond the Terms of Reference can be perceived. In view of the impossibility of forecasting exactly where the Soviets might redeploy withdrawn forces, it does not appear worthwhile to conduct further studies on this subject at the present time.

3. (NS) The study concludes that:

a. Due to the present overwhelming superiority of Soviet forces opposing North Norway, it is questionable whether or not the Soviets would significantly increase the size of its present forces there in the event of a Central European withdrawal.

b. The redeployment of approximately one third of the withdrawn Soviet forces to the Southern Flank could, in case of a 10% withdrawal of these forces from Central Europe, increase the threat against the Greece and Western Turkey area and Eastern Turkey only marginally, while a 30% withdrawal would result in a moderate increase of the current threat to Greece and Turkey.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

1 Enclosure:
SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S87/72


KARL SCHNELL
Lt General, German Army
Deputy Chief of Staff
Plans and Operations

(1) Originally issued as AC/276-WP(72)21

IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO

	<u>Paragraph</u>
I INTRODUCTION	1 - 3
II SHAPE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS	4
Geographical Considerations	5
Quantification of the Redeployed Forces	6
Deployment of the Turkish Land Forces	7
WP Strategy	8
III STUDY APPROACH	
General	9
Comparison Methodology	10
Logistic Constraints on the Deployment of WP Forces	11
Exclusion of Air Forces	12
IV ANALYSIS	
Present (Pre-MBFR) Strength in the Relevant Areas	13
Redeployment Model I	14
Redeployment Model II	15
Redeployment Model III	16
Redeployment Model IV	17
Redeployment Model V	18
Other Models	19
V CONCLUSIONS	
Increase in Force Ratios	20
The Increase of the Threat to the Flanks of NATO as a consequence of MBFR in the Central Region	21

MAPS

IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO

- REFERENCES : a. MCM-27-70, 20 Apr 70
b. C-R(71)60, 14 Oct 71
c. AC/276-WP(71)24(Final), 4 Nov 71

I. INTRODUCTION

1. (NC) In the Memorandum on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, ref a, the Military Committee, while commenting on the illustrative models developed by the MBFR Working Group, drew attention to the fact that "MBFR in the Central Region in isolation might have adverse repercussions for the flanks in that the Warsaw Pact forces reduced from the Central Region could be moved to the flanks and thus increase the threat to NATO in these areas".

2. (NC) At the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 and 6 Oct 71, ref b, several Deputy Foreign Ministers and High Officials of member nations stated their concern about the possibility that WP forces withdrawn from the Central Region as a result of agreed reductions might be redeployed so as to add to the WP forces already available on NATO's flanks.

3. (NC) On verbal invitation of the MBFR Working Group, and confirmed in ref c, SHAPE agreed to conduct a study on this subject. In view of the fact that study results are completely dependent on the size and disposition of withdrawn Soviet forces, and since the latter involves consideration of Soviet intentions, assumptions on both points, together with the scope of the study, were provided to SHAPE in ref c, as extracted below:

"TERMS OF REFERENCE

4. (NC) The assumptions on which initial study of the implications for the NATO flanks is to be based are:

a. Soviet forces withdrawn from the reduction area are not disbanded, and are kept in a state of readiness of either Category I or Category II (as defined in MC 161/71).

b. The area of reduction from which Soviet forces are withdrawn shall be assumed to be SOZG, Poland and CSSR.

c. Soviet forces redeployed from the reduction zone shall be calculated in divisions, with normal Soviet organic air support, on the basis of 10% and 30% of the existing Soviet forces in the zone. For the initial phase of this study, the following additional TOR will apply:

d. Withdrawn Soviet forces will not be located in Hungary.

e. The bulk of Soviet withdrawn forces will be deployed in Soviet Military Districts adjacent to the reduction zone. The remainder will be located in areas adjacent to the flanks of NATO.

The Turkish Delegation's note (AC/276-WP(71)26), "A Preliminary Analysis of the Implications of Force Reductions in Central Region on the South Eastern Flank", is to be taken into account.

ANNEX II to
AC/276-D(72)5

-4-

5. (NC) Scope of the Study

a. The implications for the flanks of NATO of possible Soviet redeployments are to be examined.

b. The changes in the threat to and the risk involved in these areas are to be examined and assessed in the form of illustrative redeployment models."

II. SHAPE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

4. (NR) In addition to the aforementioned terms of reference provided by the MBFR Working Group, it was necessary for SHAPE to introduce additional assumptions and considerations as discussed in paragraphs 5-8 below.

5. (NC) Geographical Considerations

a. As can be seen from Map 1 in the Annex to this report, Soviet units withdrawn from the reduction area would be in a less favorable position (from the Soviet viewpoint) than at the present for operations against the Baltic Approaches and South Norway. Therefore, with regard to the possible increase in threat to the Northern Region, only the consequences of a redeployment towards North Norway are addressed in this study.

b. For the same reason given in a, above, the implications of the redeployment of withdrawn Soviet forces towards Italy is not considered within the framework of this study. Therefore, in the case of the Southern Flank of NATO, only the consequences of Soviet redeployments towards Greece and Western Turkey and towards Eastern Turkey are considered. Additionally, it is assumed for model formulation purposes that the present strategic intentions of the WP towards Greece and Western Turkey, on the one hand, and Eastern Turkey, on the other, remain unchanged in relation to each other. Hence, when two or more Soviet divisions are deployed to the Southern Flank, these divisions are assumed to be divided between these Western and Eastern areas in the same ratio as are the current WP forces. Additionally, Soviet forces redeployed toward Greece and Western Turkey are assumed to be located in the Odessa Military District. Although redeployment to Rumania and/or Bulgaria could have been assumed under the terms of reference, the fact that there are currently no Soviet combat forces in either of these WP countries has been considered. This latter assumption would reduce WP reaction time but would pose the same numerical threat as the assumption used in the study.

6. (NS) Quantification of the Redeployed Forces The Terms of Reference of the MBFR Working Group (para 3) assume that the Soviet forces redeployed from the reduction area be calculated in divisions and that the "bulk" of these forces will be deployed in Soviet Military Districts adjacent to the reduction zone. These Soviet Military Districts are the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian, usually referred to as the "three western military districts". For the purpose of this study it is assumed that the term "bulk" means two-thirds (2/3), and therefore, that one-third (1/3) of the withdrawn Soviet forces may be redeployed towards the flanks of NATO. The present Soviet land forces in the reduction area consist of 28 divisions; therefore the following Soviet divisions withdrawn from the reduction area are assumed to be redeployed towards the flanks of NATO. In the case of 10% reduction, 1 division ($1/3 \times 10\% \times 28$); and in the case of 30% reduction, 3 divisions ($1/3 \times 30\% \times 28$).

7. (NS) Deployment of the Turkish Land Forces. According to current plans, the I Turkish Army is completely committed to the defence of Turkish Thrace and North - Western Anatolia and the III Turkish Army to the defence of Eastern Turkey. The mission of the II Turkish Army includes defence of the

N A T O S E C R E T

-5-

ANNEX II to
AC/276-D(72)5

remainder of Turkey as well as support of the I and III Armies. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that of the II Turkish Army, one-third is used for support of the I Army in Western Turkey, one-third for support of the III Army in Eastern Turkey and one-third to secure the Southern Frontier. This distribution of the II Turkish Army is based on a further assumption that attacks from Syria and/or Iraq do not occur simultaneously with attacks in the I and III Army areas or that if such attacks do occur, their magnitude is such as to make the 1/3 - 1/3 - 1/3 distribution of the II Army logical.

8. (NS) WP Strategy. The redeployment of withdrawn divisions to the three Western Soviet Military Districts increases the flexibility for using these divisions in areas other than Central Europe. However, the assumption in the Terms of Reference of the MBFR Working Group (para 2, ref c) that the bulk of withdrawn forces are redeployed to these western military districts is interpreted by SHAPE to mean that the current WP area of strategic concentration in the Central Region has not shifted to one of the flanks of NATO as a result of MBFR negotiations, thereby indicating no major change in basic WP strategy. In fact, SHAPE considers that a WP change of emphasis from the Center to one or both flanks would be reflected by the redeployment of most of the withdrawn forces to military districts other than those specified in the Terms of Reference provided by the MBFR Working Group (ref c).

III STUDY APPROACH

9. (NC) General. This study compares NATO M-Day strength with the strength of Category I and Category II units of the WP in the flank areas, pre and post MBFR. Four illustrative models have been developed in which withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed to either the Northern - or the Southern flank. A fifth illustrative model in which withdrawn Soviet forces are redeployed towards both the Northern and the Southern flank is included.

10. (NR) Comparison Methodology

a. The comparison of military capabilities of two opposing forces is recognized as a very complex process because of the numerous factors involved, some of which cannot be quantified. In addition, in this study, the number of Soviet forces available for redeployment is relatively small compared to the Soviet forces already in the geographical areas of interest. Consequently, the local force changes are relatively small and the effect is difficult to measure with known dynamic analytical techniques.

b. Recognizing the inherent limitations of static analysis, it was felt, nonetheless, that within the framework of this study, a static force ratio approach provided a balance between a manageable technique on the one hand and acceptability on the other. The selection of this technique is also supported by the fact that this study addresses the relationship, in relative terms, of the pre and post MBFR threats, rather than the absolute magnitude of these threats.

c. A technique was selected for a gross measurement of combat effectiveness of NATO and WP forces using an Index of Firepower Potential (IFP). This IFP is similar to that used in SHAPE's "Analysis of ACE Forces Capabilities" (1). A numerical rating is assigned to each type of weapon based on

(1) SHAPE 48/69

N A T O S E C R E T

-5-

lethality, rate of fire and other factors. This rating is multiplied by the number of weapons of that type in the unit and then the contribution of each weapon type is summed to give an overall rating for the unit. The IFP of each unit is then expressed as a percentage of the IFP of the unit having the largest score. This is referred to as the Normalized Index of Firepower Potential (NIFP). In the various redeployment models, the relative threat is presented as a force ratio of firepower potential. In addition to this firepower ratio, the ratio of personnel (war authorized strength) and tanks (light tanks excluded) have been presented. All calculations are based on MC 161/71 for WP forces and on DPQ 71 for NATO forces in the relevant areas.

11. (NS) Logistic Constraints on the Deployment of WP Forces

a. Logistic constraints are considered relevant only if they cause a limitation on the employment of Soviet forces adjacent to or on NATO territory. Based on geographical and infrastructural factors, the following WP capabilities have been determined (1):

(1) Using existing sealift and Finnish territory; up to 14 Soviet divisions are supportable in North Norway.

(2) Up to 30 WP divisions are supportable in the Greece and Western Turkey area.

(3) Up to 25 Soviet divisions are supportable in Eastern Turkey, sealift over the Black Sea included.

b. Under the Terms of Reference provided, WP forces levels for all models examined are supportable.

12. (NS) Exclusion of Air Forces Since no decision has been made by NATO on including air forces in MBFR (2), the effect of air forces is not considered in this study.

IV ANALYSIS

13. (NS) Present (Pre-MBFR) Strength in the Relevant Areas The present strengths are as follows:

a. Greece and Western Turkey

(1) NATO : NIFP - 6.86; Personnel - 203,013; Tanks - 1,806

(2) WP : NIFP -14.78; Personnel - 217,888; Tanks - 4,872

(3) Force Ratios NATO to WP:

Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.15

Personnel : 1 : 1.07

Tanks : 1 : 2.70

(1) MC 161/71
(2) C-M(71)49(Final)

b. Eastern Turkey

- (1) NATO : NIFP - 3.25; Personnel - 116,585; Tanks - 828
- (2) WP : NIFP - 7.48; Personnel - 131,000; Tanks - 2,300
- (3) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.30
 - Personnel : 1 : 1.12
 - Tanks : 1 : 2.78

c. North Norway

- (1) NATO : NIFP - 0.25; Personnel - 12,326; Tanks - 25
- (2) WP : NIFP - 3.42; Personnel - 60,000; Tanks - 1,100
- (3) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 13.68
 - Personnel : 1 : 4.87
 - Tanks : 1 : 44.00

14. (NS) Redeployment Model I (10% Reduction; redeployment towards the Southern Flank; see Map 2 in Annex). This model involves the redeployment of one third of the Soviet Divisions withdrawn from the Reduction Zone towards the Southern Flank after a 10% reduction in Central Europe.

a. Kind and number of forces to be redeployed:

One Tank Division, upgraded to full strength.

b. Assumed redeployment location:

(1) In Odessa Military District (Threat to Greece and Western Turkey). Strengths:

- (a) NATO : NIFP - 6.86; Personnel - 203,013; Tanks - 1,806
- (b) WP : NIFP - 15.46; Personnel - 226,888; Tanks - 5,191
- (c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.25 (1 : 2.15)*
 - Personnel : 1 : 1.12 (1 : 1.07)
 - Tanks : 1 : 2.87 (1 : 2.70)

* Pre-MBFR Ratios are shown in brackets throughout the remainder of this section.

(2) In the North Caucasus or Transcaucasus Military District Threat to Eastern Turkey. Same situation as Pre-MBFR since there is no additional deployment to this area.

15. (NS) Redeployment Model II (10% Reduction; redeployment towards North Norway; see Map 2 in Annex). This model involves the redeployment of one third of the Soviet Divisions withdrawn from the Reduction Zone towards North Norway after a 10% reduction in Central Europe.

a. Kind and number of forces to be redeployed:

One Tank Division, upgraded to full strength and adapted to specific regional climatic-conditions.

b. Assumed redeployment location: In the Kola Peninsula area of the Leningrad Military District, (Threat to North Norway). Strengths:

(1) NATO : NIFP - 0.25; Personnel - 12,326; Tanks - 25

(2) WP : NIFP - 4.10; Personnel - 69,000; Tanks - 1,419

(3) Force Ratios NATO to WP:

Firepower Potential : 1 : 16.40 (1 : 13.68)

Personnel : 1 : 5.60 (1 : 4.87)

Tanks : 1 : 56.76 (1 : 44.00)

16. (NS) Redeployment Model III (30% Reduction; redeployment towards the Southern Flank; see Map 3 in Annex). This model involves the redeployment of one third of the Soviet Divisions withdrawn from the Reduction Zone towards the Southern Flank after a 30% reduction in Central Europe.

a. Kind and number of forces to be redeployed:

Two Tank Divisions, One Motorized Rifle Division, all upgraded to full strength.

b. Assumed redeployment location: Divided between Greece/Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey, according to the present WP proportion between these areas:

(1) In Odessa Military District (Threat to Greece and Western Turkey), one Tank Division and one Motorised Rifle Division. Strengths:

(a) NATO :NIFP - 6.86; Personnel - 203,013; Tanks - 1,806

(b) WP :NIFP - 16.10; Personnel - 237,888; Tanks - 5,377

(c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:

Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.35 (1 : 2.15)

Personnel : 1 : 1.17 (1 : 1.07)

Tanks : 1 : 2.98 (1 : 2.70)

(2) In the North Caucasus or Transcaucasus Military District (Threat to Eastern Turkey), one Tank Division. Strengths:

- (a) NATO : NIFP - 3.25; Personnel - 116,585; Tanks - 828
- (b) WP : NIFP - 8.16; Personnel - 140,000; Tanks - 2,619
- (c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.51 (1 : 2.30)
Personnel : 1 : 1.20 (1 : 1.12)
Tanks : 1 : 3.16 (1 : 2.78)

17. (NS) Redeployment Model IV (30% Reduction; redeployment towards North Norway; see Map 3 in Annex). This model involves the redeployment of one third of the Soviet Divisions withdrawn from the Reduction Zone towards North Norway after a 30% reduction in Central Europe. Although Model III (30% reduction with redeployment towards the Southern Flank) assumed Two Tank Divisions and One Motorized Rifle Division were redeployed, this combination is considered highly improbable for the Northern Flank because of the pre-MBFR tank ratio of 1:44 in favor of the Warsaw Pact in the North, in addition to the considerable costs involved in adapting two tank divisions to the climatic conditions. In view of the already overwhelming WP tank superiority in this area, the mix of divisions in this model was changed from that assumed for the Southern Flank.

a. Kind and number of forces to be redeployed:

One Tank Division and two Motorized Rifle Divisions, all upgraded to full strength and adapted to specific regional climatic conditions.

b. Assumed redeployment location: In the Kola Peninsula area of the Leningrad Military District (Threat to North Norway). Strengths:

- (1) NATO : NIFP - 0.25; Personnel - 12,326; Tanks - 25
- (2) WP : NIFP - 5.38; Personnel - 91,000; Tanks - 1,791
- (3) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
Firepower Potential : 1 : 21.52 (1 : 13.68)
Personnel : 1 : 7.38 (1 : 4.87)
Tanks : 1 : 71.64 (1 : 44.00)

18. (NS) Redeployment Model V (30% Reduction; redeployment towards both North Norway and the Southern Flank; see Map 3 in Annex). The present force-ratio in the North Norway - Kola Peninsula area is so overwhelmingly in favor of the WP that the deployment of three additional Soviet Divisions in this area as postulated in Model IV appears illogical. Therefore, Model V, described below, is felt to be more suitable than Model IV. This model involves a 30% reduction in Central Europe, the redeployment of one Soviet Division towards North Norway, and two Soviet Divisions towards the Southern Flank.

DOWNGRADED TO NC
 ANNEX II to
 REF: 2005/0094
 AC/276-D(72)5

a. Kind and number of forces to be redeployed:

Two Tank Divisions, one Motorized Rifle Division, all upgraded to full strength; one Tank Division is adapted to specific regional climatic conditions.

b. Assumed redeployment location: Toward North Norway, Greece/Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey as follows:

(1) In the Kola Peninsula area of the Leningrad Military District (Threat to North Norway), one Tank Division. Strengths:

- (a) NATO : NIFP - 0.25; Personnel - 12,326, Tanks - 25
- (b) WP : NIFP - 4.10; Personnel - 69,000, Tanks - 1,419
- (c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 16.40 (1 : 13.68)
 - Personnel : 1 : 5.60 (1 : 4.87)
 - Tanks : 1 : 56.76 (1 : 44.00)

(2) In Odessa Military District (Threat to Greece and Western Turkey), one Tank Division. Strengths:

- (a) NATO : NIFP - 6.86; Personnel - 203,013; Tanks - 1,806
- (b) WP : NIFP - 15.46; Personnel - 226,888; Tanks - 5,191
- (c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.25 (1 : 2.15)
 - Personnel : 1 : 1.12 (1 : 1.07)
 - Tanks : 1 : 2.87 (1 : 2.70)

(3) In North Caucasus or Transcaucasus Military District, (Threat to Eastern Turkey), one Motorized Rifle Division. Strengths:

- (a) NATO : NIFP - 3.25; Personnel - 116,585; Tanks - 828
- (b) WP : NIFP - 8.12; Personnel - 142,000; Tanks - 2,486
- (c) Force Ratios NATO to WP:
 - Firepower Potential : 1 : 2.50 (1 : 2.30)
 - Personnel : 1 : 1.22 (1 : 1.12)
 - Tanks : 1 : 3.00 (1 : 2.78)

19. (NS) Other Models. It is recognized that additional redeployment models can be conceived, both within and beyond the Terms of Reference provided in ref c. In order to be consistent, for comparison purposes, with the models contained in this report, the following parameters apply:

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

	<u>NIFP</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Tanks</u>
Soviet Tank Division	.68	9,000	319
Soviet Motorized Rifle Division	.64	11,000	186

V CONCLUSIONS

20. (NS) The Increase in Force Ratios Several cases of possible post-MBFR redeployment of Soviet Forces have been depicted in the postulated redeployment models. As previously mentioned, Model IV is considered illogical and, therefore, is not a sound basis for conclusions. The Warsaw Pact increases in ratios of firepower potential in the case of Models I, II, III and V are as follows:

Redeployment Model	Greece and Western Turkey Area	Eastern Turkey Area	North Norway Area
I. MBFR 10%, Southern Flank	4.6%	-	-
II. MBFR 10%, North Norway	-	-	19.9%
III. MBFR 30%, Southern Flank	8.9%	9.1%	-
V MBFR 30%, North Norway, Southern Flank	4.6%	8.6%	19.9%

21. (NS) The Increase of the Threat to the Flanks of NATO as a Consequence of MBFR in the Central Region

a. The present Soviet forces opposing North Norway possess a strong invasion capability and considerably outnumber the NATO forces in the area. It is therefore questionable whether the Soviet Union would redeploy additional forces from the Central Region towards North Norway. However, if, in spite of the fact that the present forces are already far in excess for any possible defensive role, such redeployment of additional forces should occur, this could be taken as a significant indicator of WP aggressive intentions.

b. In event of a reduction of 10% of the Soviet forces in Central Europe and redeployment of 1/3 of these forces towards the Southern Flank, the threat against Greece/Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey will be increased only marginally. A reduction of 30% of the Soviet Forces in Central Europe and redeployment of 1/3 of these forces towards the Southern Flank, would result in a moderate increase in the threat to Greece and Turkey.

c. On the other hand, it is concluded that even a relatively small increase in the threat to any NATO area could have significant political implications since any change in the status quo is cause for concern regarding Soviet intentions.

d. The foregoing conclusions are based on the Terms of Reference provided to SHAPE for this study, in which the dominant factor is the assumption that the bulk of the withdrawn Soviet Forces will be retained in the military districts adjacent to the Central Region of ACE. This

DOWNGRADED TO NC
ANNEX II to
AC/276-D(72)5


assumption is a consequence of the hypothesis that no change in Soviet strategic intentions will occur directly as a result of MBFR negotiations. It also highlights the fact that the implications to the flanks of NATO could be more severe than judged here if the WP should agree to the inclusion of the three western military districts in the MBFR reduction area.

e. Finally, the Note of the Turkish Delegation (1) is indicative of the more dramatic increase in the threat to the Southern Flank that could result if the USSR were to take maximum advantage of MBFR in the Central Region in order to improve its posture adjacent to the Southern Region. It must be recognized, however, that the validity of the military situation depicted in the Turkish analysis -- as is also true for the foregoing SHAPE analysis -- can be no greater than the validity of the assumption regarding Soviet intentions.

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DOWNGRADED TO NC
SEE: DN(2005)0008

-13-



Map # 1
No redeployment to
Flanks

1000.1/20-5-4/ST9/72
Implantations of HERR in Central
Europe for the Flanks of NATO
Annex A
Withdrawal Soviet Forces:
10th Reduction: 3 Divisions
30th Reduction: 9 Divisions

-13-


ANNEX II to
AC/276-D(72)5

NATO SECRET
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE
SECRET

W A T O S E C R E T

ANNEX II to
AC/276-D(72)5

DOWNGRADED TO NC
SEP 15 2005 DN(2005)0004




NATO SECRET

~~NATO SECRET~~

1000.1/20-5-4/S78/72
 Implications of MFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO
 Annex A
 Redeployment Models III, IV & V

MAP # 3
 Redeployment to Flanks
 30% Reduction
 1/3 of withdrawn forces are redeployed



~~NATO SECRET~~

NATO SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE