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N A T O S E C R E T

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MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP
REPORT ON THE STUDY OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

+Corrigendum
"in TDC" 2

Note by the Chairman

The attached report was agreed at the meeting of the Working Group on 29th October, 1970.

2. The report of the Verification Sub-Group, which has not yet been discussed by the Working Group, is being issued separately.

(Signed) T.R. MILTON
Lt.General, USAF

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N A T O S E C R E T

REPORT ON THE STUDY OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

1. In May 1970, Ministers considered our first report(1) on the possibilities and implications of mutual and balanced force reductions. In that report we discussed five models designed to exemplify some possible permutations and to provide some basis for judgment of the implications of such reductions for NATO. We stressed that the data on which these models were based needed to be refined; and, while the analysis of these models proved extremely useful, they were not intended as models suitable for negotiation. However, these models and the knowledge acquired in their preparation - together with our research into other, less mathematical areas - led us to the conclusion that on the basis of the criteria adopted for the model development, it would be very difficult to find any solution which, being acceptable to the Soviets, would not work to NATO's disadvantage; or which, while maintaining NATO's security, would be negotiable. We expect to receive in November SHAPE's "Analysis in Depth" of the symmetrical model at the 10% phase and of asymmetrical model III. When this analysis has been examined by the Working Group, we expect to have learnt much about some important parameters of MBFR as they relate to Central Europe, from models in which "forces in place after reductions/withdrawals" are deduced from arbitrarily imposed percentage reductions.

2. Since May 1970, we have probed many other possibilities, amongst them the concept that it would be profitable to pursue the principle that the focus of our work should be on the scale of the forces which remain after reduction, rather than on the scale of the reductions themselves; and on exploring the possibilities of defining elements (building blocks) of future negotiating options rather than on models of reductions. We have therefore agreed that the next phase of our work will include a direct approach, to establish, first, minimum NATO requirements and then the related balancing force which could be permitted to the Warsaw Pact; we have also agreed to study the German suggestion for an approach to formulate elements of negotiable options. At this stage, we have not yet been able to form a judgement on how far this next phase of our work will be fruitful, but it will at least be informative and we intend to pursue it unless we are otherwise directed.

3. In this report, we discuss this switch in emphasis and summarise the progress made and our present attitudes and tentative conclusions on the other aspects of our study which have been subject to continuing scrutiny: the data base; the definition of areas of reduction; the stationed forces concept and its interpretation; the question of security; and the problems of verification.

(1) AC/276-D(70)4

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The Data Base

4. Although we were not satisfied that the data used in the development of models in our first report(1) was comprehensive and accurate, much of the information then available to us was sound and reliable, particularly those elements of it which gave, in round terms rather than in the detail of equipments and precise dispositions, the strengths and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces on the one hand and the NATO forces on the other. Assessments of force strengths have since been reviewed with all available authorities, and corrected as necessary. This data base (originally created for the Relative Forces Capability Study) is now being amplified, updated and automated, for use as required. In view of our previous inability to rely, with confidence, on our figures of Warsaw Pact and NATO strengths as a basis for framing and analysing various options for balanced force reductions, we feel it appropriate to recount briefly the action taken and in hand to provide reliable figures.

5. The information available to HQ NATO has been passed to concerned nations in respect of national forces and to Intelligence sources in respect of Warsaw Pact forces, with the request in both cases that it be amplified, corrected and updated as necessary. This action is complete for the Warsaw Pact forces data store, and the information has been included in the SHAPE Technical Centre computer and is now available for recall. For NATO national data, all nations have not yet provided corrected and updated information; when this information has been received, it will be reviewed at HQ NATO and incorporated in the STC computer data store. This process will take 30-60 days to complete from receipt of national contributions.

6. In July 1970, ways and means of amplifying best available intelligence were discussed with national representatives; additional and valuable material deriving from the decisions taken at this meeting will be available in the data store by early 1971. We have been advised by nations that, after this improvement, no further additional information will be forthcoming but that the information in the data store will be updated as necessary.

Stationed Forces in Central Europe

7. In our search for possible negotiable options, we have devoted effort and research to the production and analysis of Warsaw Pact and NATO strengths in the putative areas of force reductions. In this context we have also taken

(1) AC/276-D(70)4

into account Warsaw Pact philosophies. There are two major questions: the phrase "foreign armed forces on the territory of European states" as used by the Warsaw Pact in the Budapest Communiqué of 22nd June, 1970(1) can be variously interpreted; and the areas of reduction might range from the two Germanys (if we may use that phrase) to the whole of Europe and the islands of Iceland and Malta.

8. The possible interpretations of "foreign armed forces on the territory of European states" are, in our view:

- (a) Foreign forces alien to the host country, i.e. non-indigenous forces.
- (b) Foreign forces alien to the geographic area of the force reductions.
- (c) Forces foreign to Europe.

We have discounted (c) as in our belief this would be wholly unacceptable to NATO. We have applied the definitions at (a) and (b) to the spectrum of possible "geographic areas of reduction" and show below, in tabular form, the number of forces, tanks and aircraft by nationality, which would thereby be classed as "foreign forces alien to...". The tables in Examples 1 and 2 are applicable to both the definitions at (a) and (b), whereas the tables for Examples 3(a) - 5(a) reflect the application of the definition at (a) only, and the tables for Examples 3(b) - 6(b) the application of the definition at (b) only.

<u>Area of Reduction</u>	<u>Nation(2)</u>	<u>Personnel</u>			
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
<u>Example 1</u>					
FRG/E.Germany	USSR	276,000	60,000	5,270	990
	USA	192,000	33,000	1,560	230
	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	317,000	50,500	3,560	450

(1) PO/70/411
(2) Figures extracted (as far as possible) from AC/276-D(70)4, of 16th March, 1970

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Personnel

Area of Reduction Nation(1) Army Air Force Tanks Aircraft

Example 2

FRG/E.Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia	USSR	368,400	87,000	7,550	1,440
	USA	192,000	33,000	1,560	230
	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	317,000	50,500	3,560	450

Example 3(a)

FRG, BE, NL, LU/E.Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia	USSR	368,000	87,000	7,530	1,440
	USA	193,000	35,000	1,560	250
	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	318,000	52,500	3,560	470

Example 4(a)

FRG, DA, NO, BE, NL, LU, UK, PO, IT, GR, TU/ E.Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania	USSR	428,000	97,000	8,530	1,680
	USA	199,000	70,000	1,560	600
	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	324,000	87,500	3,560	820

(1) Figures extracted (as far as possible) from
AC/276-D(70)4 of 16th March, 1970

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<u>Area of Reduction</u>	<u>Nation(1)</u>	<u>Personnel</u>			
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
<u>Example 5(a)</u>					
FRG, DA, NO, BE,	USSR	428,000	97,000	8,530	1,680
NL, LU, UK, PO,	USA	199,000	80,000	1,560	640
IT, GR, TU,	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
Iceland/plus	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
Spain and Malta/	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
Warsaw Pact: as	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
at Example 4(a)	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	324,000	97,500	3,560	860
<u>Example 6(a)</u>					
As for Example	USSR	428,000	97,000	8,530	1,680
5(a) expanded	USA	199,000	80,000	1,560	640
for Warsaw Pact	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
to include the	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
three Western	NL	4,000	4,500	50	-
Military	BE	30,000	2,000	490	-
Districts of	FR	35,000	-	820	-
USSR	Sub-total	324,000	97,500	3,560	860
<u>Example 3(b)</u>					
FRG, BE, NL, LU/	USSR	368,400	87,000	7,530	1,440
E.Germany,	USA	193,000	35,000	1,560	250
Poland,	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
Czechoslovakia	UK	50,000	7,000	580	110
	FR	35,000	-	820	-
	Sub-total	284,000	46,000	3,020	470
<u>Example 4(b)</u>					
FRG, DA, NO, BE,	USSR	428,000	97,000	8,530	1,680
NL, LU, UK, PO,	USA	199,000	70,000	1,560	600
IT, GR, TU/	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
E.Germany,	Sub-total	205,000	74,000	1,620	710
Poland,					
Czechoslovakia,					
Hungary, Bulgaria,					
Rumania					

(1) Figures extracted (as far as possible) from
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<u>Area of Reduction</u>	<u>Nation(1)</u>	<u>Personnel</u>			
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
<u>Example 5(b)</u>					
FRG, DA, NO, BE,	USSR	428,000	97,000	8,530	1,680
NL, LU, UK, PO,	USA	199,000	80,000	1,560	640
IT, GR, TU,	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
Iceland/plus					
Spain and Malta/					
Warsaw Pact as at	Sub-total	205,000	84,000	1,620	750
<u>Example 4(b)</u>					
<u>Example 6(b)</u>					
As for Example	USSR	No USSR forces involved			
5(b) expanded for	USA	199,000	80,000	1,560	640
Warsaw Pact to	CA	6,000	4,000	60	110
include the three					
Western Military	Sub-total	205,000	84,000	1,620	750
Districts of					

9. Although symmetrical percentage reductions in Examples 2, 3, 4 and 5 would seem to favour NATO numerically, we can come to no definitive conclusions about them at this time. We propose therefore to study further the military implications of restricting force reductions to foreign forces only.

Establishment of a Balanced Force Ceiling

10. We believe it may be profitable to pursue the concept explicit in an Italian note(2) and implicit in a United Kingdom contribution(3) that the focus should be on the scale of forces which remain after reduction rather than on a scale of the reductions themselves. Assuming willingness of the Warsaw Pact countries to bring down their forces to the minimum scale competent to contain any conceivable conventional assault by NATO with present force levels, it would be possible and sensible for NATO nations, still relying ultimately for their defence on the nuclear deterrent, to take further calculated risks and bring down their conventional strength particularly in Central Europe. This concept is discussed below as an attempt to clarify the desirable results of future MBFR negotiations. This discussion can only be carried out in tentative terms at this stage.

11. Throughout most of NATO's history, the United States and hence the Alliance has had a clear margin in strategic striking power over the Soviet Union. In recent years, this margin has been narrowing at an increasingly rapid pace and it is generally accepted that there is now, essentially, nuclear parity. The fact that the Soviets have made this intensive

(1) Figures extracted (as far as possible) from AC/276-D(70)4 of 16th March, 1970
(2) AC/276-WP(70)25
(3) AC/276-WP(70)27

effort to eliminate their strategic disadvantage is not reassuring: it is a matter of conjecture whether their action in this context was inspired by an unfounded fear of a pre-emptive attack by the United States, or by the wish to create a climate in which a strategic exchange would be unthinkable and hence free their conventional forces from this ultimate restraint. There are other possible motives. Nevertheless, approximate strategic parity appears to be a fact and, this being so, it seems to us that strategic nuclear conflict in the near future is less likely than some form of conventional attack, or political pressure reinforced by the threat of conventional attack. In the conventional field, unlike the strategic, there is great disparity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces confronting each other in Central Europe, including the three Western Military Districts of the USSR, thus:

	<u>Numbers</u>		<u>Ratio</u>	
	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>	(1) <u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>
(a) Ground forces personnel	M: 1.4	M: 0.73	1.9	: 1
(b) Tanks	22,000	6,000	3.7	: 1
(c) Aircraft	5,500	1,500	3.7	: 1

These ratios do not change to NATO's advantage if the whole of NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact territories are taken into account; the particularly important aspects would continue to favour the Warsaw Pact.

12. History shows situations in which two opposing sides had almost equal overall capability but one side attacked successfully; in these cases, the attacker concentrated his strength in one area to gain the necessary local superiority. There have been cases in which forces possessing the accepted scale of superiority have been defeated because terrain favoured the enemy, or because the principles of war were better applied by that enemy. For practical purposes such factors may be discounted here. Soviet doctrine however holds the view that the force ratio should be 3:1 in favour of the attacker.

13. The overall force ratio loses some of its importance for the side taking the initiative because of its ability to concentrate. This poses, for a defensively oriented alliance such as NATO and defensively structured forces such as NATO's, a particular dilemma. Our forces are confronted by a potentially aggressive alliance possessing larger forces, indoctrinated, trained, organized and equipped for offensive operations. These factors, and the great disparity in numbers and fire power, would nullify or greatly reduce the advantages theoretically available to the defender in such fields as prepared defences, communications and barriers.

(1) Calculated from figures in AC/276-D(70)4 of 16th March, 1970

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14. NATO's armed strength is known to the Warsaw Pact authorities at least in round figures, and almost certainly in very considerable detail covering weapons and dispositions. Whatever motives and aggressive intentions the Soviets may attribute to the NATO nations, it must be clear to them that NATO could not mount a successful assault on Warsaw Pact territory with its present forces and armaments. Neither side is remotely likely, given present attitude and strategic parity, to launch a pre-emptive strike. The Warsaw Pact could launch an attack now, with its present forces, which could not be contained by conventional means. The Soviets can be in no fear of successful conventional attack by NATO. If, as we assume, they are sincere in the desire they have expressed to reduce armed forces, then it is clear that their own and their Satellite forces could be substantially reduced now and still remain free from fear of NATO attack, even if NATO nations made no reductions in their armed strength. It would therefore be in the interest of NATO to attempt, in future MBFR negotiations, to get Soviet agreement to the principle of aiming at negotiated force ceilings which would take into consideration the actual requirements of both East and West. The first steps of MBFR could be calculated with these ultimate force ceilings in mind. The extent to which reductions would be acceptable would be a matter for detailed examination. The numerical reductions could, for example, be greater if, concurrently, there were qualitative improvements in NATO forces and equipments leading to increase of defensive fire power. As we stated earlier in this report (paragraph 10), given this Soviet attitude, it would be necessary - and practical - for NATO to take calculated risks and reduce their conventional forces in Central Europe.

15. If the concept of balanced force ceilings were to be pursued through an approach based on respective force ratios, it would be difficult to discuss, at this stage, the ratio at which we should aim. In general terms, however, parity would be the ideal - and certainly unattainable - goal; we have sustained NATO's security, under the strategic umbrella, for some twenty years with a manpower ratio of 2:1 and a tank/aircraft ratio of 3:1 or worse, to our disadvantage. If, ultimately, we could achieve, by reductions on both sides, a ratio of (say) 2:1 in our disfavour to embrace aircraft and armour as well as men, the outcome would not necessarily be to the military disadvantage of either side. A wide range of options for such reductions would be available for examination: at this stage of our study, we believe it might be sensible to concentrate on these forces confronting each other in the central part of Europe. The Warsaw Pact relative superiority, and capacity to launch an attack, would be sustained but such an attack would be markedly less likely to succeed than it is now.

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16. This concept of balanced force ceilings, of which the preceding paragraphs are but a tentative illustration and which are discussed in the Italian paper(1), will require much research and development, but we commend it in principle now, as a potentially attractive goal for negotiation. It could be attractively presented publicly, at least on the Western side.

Elements of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

17. The military-technical studies carried out so far have revealed important problems inherent in MBFR. They were not intended to be used as a basis for negotiations. The balanced force ceiling approach as outlined in paragraphs 10 to 16 aims at defining the force levels which should result from MBFR negotiations.

18. We have before us the German paper(2) which proposes that NATO should examine the possibility of defining elements of mutual and balanced force reductions which could be used in formulating options for future negotiations and which would meet the requirements of our own security as well as that of negotiability. We have not been able to discuss this proposal in detail but agreed that it should be subject to further study.

Verification

19. In mid-September 1970, in furtherance of the decision(3) of the Senior Political Committee to initiate further studies on verification, drawing on reports already available(4)(5)(6), and involving members of Delegations, the International Staff, and NATO Military Authorities, we set up an MBFR Verification Sub-Group and gave it, as a first task, the preparation of a coherent report incorporating such individual contributions as became available by 1st October, 1970. This report by the MBFR Verification Sub-Group, based on four national contributions(7)(8)(9)(10), will be published separately and is summarised in paragraphs 20-29 below.

20. The aims of MBFR Verification remain as set out in C-M(69)52(Final).

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- (1) AC/276-WP(70)25
 - (2) AC/276-WP(70)33
 - (3) PO/70/334(Revised)
 - (4) POLADS(69)60, Annex III
 - (5) PO/70/313 (paragraphs 8 and 9)
 - (6) AC/276-WP(70)7
 - (7) AC/276-WP(70)28
 - (8) AC/276-WP(70)29
 - (9) AC/276-WP(70)30
 - (10) AC/276-WP(70)34

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21. Subject to the views of the NATO Military Authorities, little further general study of the technical and military aspects of MBFR Verification is now required so far as ground forces are concerned; we believe this to be true in respect of air forces also. One aspect which does, however, still require study is the degree and type of adversary inspection which NATO could accept for its own troops and facilities. Subject to this, a basis now exists for designing at short notice a verification system to meet the technical requirements of any specific MBFR agreement, the terms of which must themselves take considerable account of the verification problem and of the political situation at the time.

22. In principle, the agreed overt elements of a verification system should be as simple as is consistent with effectiveness.

23. Covert intelligence can play the major information producing rôle in verification, operating as it does in conjunction with the overt rôle already played by Service Attachés and MLMs. Any MBFR agreement should however provide for such additional overt means of verification, supported by clauses in the agreement specifically designed to enhance their effectiveness, as are necessary and/or desirable to resolve ambiguities in covert intelligence, to provide a basis for confronting a violator with evidence of his violation and to maintain public confidence.

24. The actual withdrawal of foreign forces can be expected to be comparatively easy to verify, and in this phase of action on an agreement a fair degree of Warsaw Pact co-operation may be assumed. The latter should also be so in respect of the disbandment of indigenous forces, but this presents a more difficult technical problem.

25. The Warsaw Pact may be considerably less co-operative over the verification of the pre- and post-reduction force limitation phases of an agreement. But negotiation of the required level of inspection may not present an insoluble problem, particularly in the improved atmosphere of international confidence which would appear to be the prerequisite of a significant MBFR agreement consistent with the guidelines promulgated by Ministers.

26. Priority of verification effort should be directed towards Soviet forces, rather than to those of NSWP countries.

27. Provision for verification in the agreement together with collateral constraints should concentrate on the deterrence and identification of violations important enough to threaten NATO's security. Concern with minor detail could well cause friction which would do more harm than good to NATO's interests; but persistent minor violations would be of cumulative political and military importance.

28. Our report describes in detail current covert intelligence capabilities, as they relate to MBFR Verification, and some possible overt verification systems; and it suggests a method of establishing the military criteria for judging the effectiveness of verification required.

29. Such overt verification arrangements as can be negotiated can be expected, as a bonus, to enhance the effectiveness of NATO intelligence in the "warning of attack" rôle. Should however the terms of an agreement leave NATO more dependent on warning for its security than it is at present, this bonus might become a necessity.

Some Other Future Tasks

30. We believe we have acquired, in our study of the complex concept of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, a much deeper understanding of the problems involved. We are conscious that much work remains to be done.

31. We are continuing with improvement of the data base in conjunction with the RFC study; with our examination of various options, notably those which assume reduction areas likely to be least adverse to NATO's interests; and with study of the Sub-Group report on verification. We have so far not made any deep study of possible MBFR options involving reductions or withdrawals on Soviet territory, as we believe that they are highly unlikely to be satisfactorily negotiable. We request direction as to whether we should continue in this attitude.